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Abstract
In the literature of International Relations the notion of coexistence is not 
understood as a question for world politics, despite the frequent irruption of 
issues of coexistence that constantly preoccupy international praxis. Rather, in 
theoretic terms coexistence is considered self-evidently as the composition of 
units, identified with co-presence in some spatial sense. This is evident, not 
from the explicit theorisation of coexistence as such, but from the ontological 
commitments of the discipline. The enquiry points toward the ontological 
centrality of the modem subject, whose key attributes are reason, self-mastery 
and control over others and itself, and which determines coexistence through ‘a 
logic of composition.’ The logic of composition reduces the multifarious 
relations of self and other to mere co-presence of already constituted subjects, 
that is, it occludes the constitutive role of the other in coexistence and for the 
‘subject’ itself. Illustrating the interplay of subjectivity, composition and 
heteronomy in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and the work of David Campbell, 
the thesis turns to the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger in order to gain 
access to the heteronomy of entities. In his account of Being-in-the-world, it is 
argued, can be found an ‘optics of coexistence’ which enables a factically 
adequate understanding of coexistence. Such an optics reveals the self, not as 
autonomous and masterful, but as other-determined in its everydayness, and as 
uniquely appropriating this heteronomy in its process of becoming-proper. 
Existential heteronomy ‘unworks modem subjectivity’. In this way, it forms 
the basis for the self s ethical comportment, a self which is an opening to 
otherness, and enables the articulation of a ‘politics of non-self-sufficiency,’ as 
a point of departure away from the subjective politics of self-sufficiency. 
Moreover, the diclosure of heteronomy disturbs the determination of 
coexistence as composition and points to community constitution through 
critique. Through what is called ‘critical mimesis’ community comes into 
being through the deconstructive retrieve of past possibilities inherited from 
past generations in process which is inclusive and critical. This is an account of 
communal constitution which is productive also in an era of global 
transformations, concerned with the destabilising effects o f ‘globalisation.’
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Subjectivity, Coexistence, and the 
Question of Heteronomy
L The issue of coexistence and International Relations
Coexistence could be said to be paramount for international politics in the 
post-Cold War world. Exploring what coexistence might mean and what it 
might entail, however, has not been directly addressed by the discipline of 
International Relations (IR). That is not to say that IR scholars have not turned 
their attention to specific and diverse issues of cohabitation or living-in- 
common but, rather, to suggest that what is considered to be ‘coexistence’ has 
yet to receive proper questioning. Coexistence, in other words, is not presently 
regarded as a question for world politics; it is, instead, a term whose meaning 
is considered to be self-evident. Endowed with the literal meaning of co­
presence, its study is bounded within a set of assumptions and parameters that 
serve to revoke its status as a question, restricting reflection on coexistence as 
an aporia of international politics.
The seeming self-evidence of ‘coexistence,’ however, is rendered unstable by 
world events, which often unsettle and disrupt the everyday activities of world- 
political actors, what one might call, in its collective form, ‘international 
praxis.’ States, governments, international organisations and other non­
governmental bodies alike are, in awareness of it or not, continuously 
preoccupied by specific concerns that arise from the question of coexistence. 
International praxis, thus, is constantly required to address itself to coexistence 
as a questionSuch preoccupation centres on issues within state borders, such 
as civil war, secession disputes, resource conflicts, civic debate within 
multiethnic or other diverse communities about issues of cultural diversity, etc. 
Additionally, it is an issue at the level of international interaction for
6
intergovernmental bodies that become increasingly concerned with the 
regional or global repercussions of states’ internal disputes. Since 1989, such 
interaction has often resulted in military interventions, in the form of assisting 
in the cessation of hostilities and violence. These are, usually, undertaken in 
the name of certain values often considered ‘humanitarian,’ whose protection 
is regarded as imperative to the current human rights regime. Interventionist 
measures, moreover, are intended to promulgate these values in the aftermath 
of conflict in the wider cause of international peace and order, although their 
critics often consider these a disguise for power politics.
It can be claimed, therefore, that while coexistence has not been question- 
worthy for international thought, it is constantly surfacing as a problem for 
international praxis. In this regard, international thought could be said to have 
failed to keep up apace with international praxis in its consideration of the 
general meaning of ‘coexistence.’2 In the context of this project ‘coexistence’ 
is taken to be a concept whose aporetic nature is obscured in international 
thought, and yet one that constantly preoccupies international praxis, but is 
usually dealt with under other, more specific, guises. This thesis illustrates 
how, in the absence of direct questioning about coexistence, its more general 
meaning can only be discerned from an examination of the ontological 
premises of international relations. Amongst these premises the modem subject 
stands out in its ontological centrality,3 IR theory being embedded in the larger 
context of modem philosophical and social inquiry.4
1 Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International 
Security 22, no. 2 (1997), 55.
2 This neglect can be noted, even if, were we to look at them specifically, the nature and 
intentions of political praxis at the international level would come under severe critique.
3 Robert C. Solomon has suggested that the rise of the subject to prominence has been the 
single most defining trend in continental thinking. See his Continental Philosophy since 1750: 
The Rise and Fall o f  the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
4 Fred Halliday notes that IR academic work is embedded within the social science context, 
itself ensconced within the political and social context of developments in the world. See Fred 
Halliday, “Gender and IR: Progress, Backlash, and Prospect,” Millennium 27, no. 4 (1998), 
833-839. See also, M. Hakan Seckinelgin, “The Possibility of Existence Under the Cosmology 
of the Enlightenment,” in M. Hakan Seckinelgin, The Law o f  The Sea and the South Pacific: 
An Ecological Critique o f the Philosophical Basis o f  International Relations (Ph.D. Thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science), 140-176.
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Within this larger theoretical context, the modem subject is generally 
understood as a completed self, already fully constituted when it ‘enters’ into 
relations with others, relations that are considered ontologically secondary to 
the subject itself. Its main attributes are, in sum, self-consciousness, non- 
relationality and autonomy; these become instrumental in determining 
coexistence as the presence of multiple units, as a composition of otherwise 
non-relational subjects, in other words. The thesis contends that based on the 
ground of modem subjectivity coexistence can only be articulated through 
what might be called the ‘logic of composition.’ When being-with-others is 
understood solely as a composition of entities, the constitutive role of 
otherness in coexistence, but also for selfhood itself, is obscured. In particular, 
the other’s participation in the constitution of the self, what might be called the 
‘heteronomous constitution of selfhood,* remains concealed. The other is 
grasped, instead, as a similar non-relational subject; its otherness reduced to 
what is knowable about the self.5
Unless this heteronomous constitution of selfhood is allowed to show itself,6 
then coexistence appears only as the mere composition of units, as is often 
assumed in IR, instead of being the prior and constitutive condition of their 
being. Before providing a fuller articulation of the juncture of subjectivity, 
coexistence and heteronomy, however, it is important to review the historical 
trajectory of IR discourses about ‘coexistence,’ in order to bring to the fore the 
reduction of coexistence to the co-presence of entities in both the Cold War 
and post-Cold War conceptual constellations. This brief survey highlights that, 
despite the assumption that these are radically different historical 
configurations, there is an inherent unanimity in their prevalent determinations 
of coexistence as co-presence or composition. It suggests, therefore, that any 
reconsideration of coexistence requires, in the first instance, that closer 
attention be paid to the pervasive centrality of modem subjectivity.
5 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1979).
In the sense of being phenomenologically brought forward. See Martin Heidegger, Being and 
Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), §7.
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2. The Cold War, ideological conflict and coexistence
In the post-1945 world, various forces practically and conceptually affected the 
meaning and study of coexistence. In the years following the end of World 
War II, societal and political concerns revolved primarily around the imminent 
nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers. The very presence of 
nuclear arms meant that conflict resounded with the possibility of worldwide 
destruction. Thus, the conflictual workings of the state system, without any 
higher authority to guarantee peace, called for concerned academics, 
politicians, and international activists alike to bring about ‘a conception of 
coexistence which matches the needs of the nuclear age.’7 During the Cold 
War, then, the presence of nuclear weapons ensured that thinking about 
coexistence revolved exclusively around the nexus of survival. Amongst 
politicians in the so-called ‘first’ and ‘second’ worlds, the co-presence of 
divergent political systems was the centrepiece of a strategy aimed towards the 
accommodation of the ideological differences of the superpowers. It was 
widely regarded that such ‘coexistence’ of contradictory, yet totalising, 
ideological positions was required for the very survival both of their 
incompatible political systems, but also of the human species as a whole, 
considering the nuclear context within which the struggle among their 
competing ideologies took place. Related to the potentially holocaustal 
repercussions of nuclear conflict, ‘coexistence’ also became the sole means of 
survival when one reflected on the various paths to development and 
modernity available to post-colonial, developing countries that were inevitably 
caught up in the international politics of the Cold War. Moreover, 
‘coexistence’ became a central concern for peace movements that attempted to 
diffuse the nuclear tension by calling for an end to the superpowers’s 
ideological struggle.
Amongst the anti-nuclear activist movement, it was felt that the entanglement 
brought about by the nuclear age rested with the politicians’ inability to extract
7 Christopher Paget Mayhew, Coexistence Plus: A Positive Approach to World Peace 
(London: Bodley Head, 1962), 4.
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themselves from an old age of strife. ‘Pride, arrogance, fear of loss of face, and 
ideological intolerance have obscured their power of judgement,’8 insisted one 
of its most vocal members, British philosopher Bertrand Russell. In his 
extensive writings against nuclear armament, Russell clarified further the 
association between survival and coexistence. ‘Coexistence,’ he wrote in the 
early 1960s, ‘must be accepted genuinely and not superficially as a necessary 
condition of human survival.’9 That coexistence was the hoped-for antidote to 
the possibility of nuclear annihilation served to affirm and highlight the 
assumed opposition of coexistence and conflict. It has remained, to this day, a 
certainty that ‘coexistence’ is the condition or state that surpasses conflict, but 
not the primary condition in which entities find themselves. Rather, it is 
considered to be a state that must be actively, and secondarily, brought about.
Despite the calls for a notion of coexistence to accommodate the particularities 
of the nuclear age, it was a primarily conflictual configuration of the concept 
that prevailed in the international political world. In the 1950s Nikita 
Khrushchev revived the Leninist term ‘peaceful coexistence* to signal that 
nuclear confrontation was not only undesirable but also unnecessary. V.I. 
Lenin had indicated that in the international climate of the 1920s coexistence 
was possible, and also preferable for the Soviet Union, in order to provide the 
peace which the newly founded USSR needed to survive in its first years of 
existence.10 While for many political commentators in the West military and 
political coexistence was considered inconceivable, coexistence of the 
diverging systems was a fact of international political life. As Y. Frantsev 
noted once, ‘[socialism and capitalism exist on the same planet and their 
coexistence is historically inevitable.*n Ironically, Lenin had argued that it is 
the ‘general economic world relations, which compel them [capitalists] to 
establish intercourse with us.’12 Situated as Lenin was in the ‘revolutionary
8 Bertrand Russell, Has Man a Future? (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961), 120.
9 Russell, Has Man a Future?, 90.
10 With the Bolshevik Revolution under threat after its initial success, Lenin had reminded the 
revolutionaries of the fact of the majority of capitalist states surrounding the newly created 
socialist Soviet Union in a seminal speech at Brest Litovsk in 1918.
11 Y. P. Frantsev, Peace, Peaceful Coexistence and Prospects Ahead fo r  Socialism (Moscow: 
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1965), 9.
12 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 129 cited in Frantsev, Peace, 12, brackets added.
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struggle,’ he was aware of the requirement for peace to allow for the 
progression of socialism.
Khrushchev’s revival of the term ‘peaceful coexistence’ reasserted the political 
necessity of promoting the co-presence of conflicting ideologies and political 
systems in order to avoid war with capitalist states. He agreed in this regard 
with Lenin’s earlier argument that, at the inter-state level, coexistence between 
capitalist states and communist countries was possible and the struggle against 
capitalism could be carried out at the level of ideas. ‘Peaceful coexistence’ in 
the post-1945 world entailed, therefore, the desire to avoid interstate warfare in 
the name of ideological opposition, but revived the pledge to maintain and 
encourage confrontation in the realm of ideology to bring about the collapse of 
the capitalist system.13 As Khrushchev himself proposed in an article in 
Foreign Affairs, peaceful coexistence intended ‘to keep the positions of the 
ideological struggle, without resorting to arms in order to prove that one is 
right.*14 It could be argued, then, that in the 1960s ‘peaceful coexistence 
between countries regardless of their social system* came to form ‘the bedrock 
of international affairs.’15
Despite some political opposition, the West prudently embraced the chance to 
challenge the Soviet articulation of the concept of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in 
order to reshape it for its own ends. The Commission to Study the 
Organization of Peace, a member of the American Association for the United 
Nations, defined ‘peaceful coexistence’ as ‘primarily a state of affairs in which 
the so-called sovereign states seek to protect and promote their conflicting 
national interests by means other than war, or organized and systematic 
intimidation based upon the threat of war.’16 In its report on this issue the 
Commission reiterated that peaceful coexistence should be considered as a
13 This summary obscures, of course, the extensive role played by proxy wars, where military 
confrontation was afforded between the superpowers through conventional warfare. See Tarak 
Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization,” 
European Journal o f  International Relations 5, no. 4 (1999): 403-434.
14 Nikita S. Khrushchev, “On Peaceful Coexistence,” Foreign Affairs, October 1959, 5.
15 Frantsev, Peace, 15.
16 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Peaceful Coexistence: A New Challenge to 
the United Nations, Twelfth Report (New York: Commission to Study the Organization of 
Peace, 1960), 4.
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compromise because this concept lay ‘between war in the literal sense and 
peace in the ideal sense.’17 As a compromise necessitated by the nuclear 
context, ‘peaceful coexistence’ accepted that ideological struggle was the 
means of confrontation and a mechanism of ‘diffusion’ of the nuclear situation. 
With its re-articulation of peaceful coexistence the Association sought to 
counter the Soviet hegemony over the term and to reiterate it in ways that 
accorded a much greater role to international law in the workings of 
international politics, in recognition of the fact that, in a time of nuclear 
proliferation, ‘national security is unobtainable by military force alone.’18
‘Peaceful coexistence,’ therefore, mitigated nuclear war by allowing 
ideological competition amongst the superpowers, a contention which resulted 
in many a proxy war fought with conventional weapons in the periphery, as 
well as in the often violent intervention into the political systems of developing 
and post-colonial countries.19 Opponents of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in other 
countries and social movements resisted this initial acceptance of the notion of 
‘peaceful coexistence’ by emphasising that Krushchev’s proposal for ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ contained within it the notion of ideological struggle as the site of 
contestation of the capitalist world system and that, as a result, ‘coexistence’ 
became a paradoxical term: ‘[b]itter ideological struggle is central to their idea 
of coexistence’ denounced Christopher Paget Mayhew, a British politician in 
the 1960s.20 Where ‘peaceful coexistence’ is the condition where state 
interaction allows for a sustained ideological struggle, then one can be said to 
be ‘waging peaceful coexistence,’ no matter how counter-intuitive or 
oxymoronic this may seem.21 This resistance to the ideologically contentious 
configuration of ‘coexistence’ once again highlights the assumption that
17 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Peaceful Coexistence, 9.
18 Commission to Study the Organization o f Peace, Peaceful Coexistence, 5. Towards further 
condification of this notion, Marshal Tito o f Yugoslavia succeeded in convincing the Non- 
aligned movement to accept 18 principles of peaceful coexistence law as the Cairo Declaration 
of 1964, see John Newbold Hazard, Coexistence Law Reconsidered (Copenhagen: 
Juristforbundets Forlag, 1969), 196 and n.13. Yet, events such as the Prague Spring and its 
quashing by Soviet troops in 1968, led to a reconsideration of the nominal acceptance and 
hopes for ‘peaceful coexistence’ among the super-powers. At the very least such events, led to 
the speculation whether a new Soviet position with respect to coexistence with capitalism was 
in the making, see also, 191.
19 Again see Barkawi and LafFey, “The Imperial Peace”, 403-434.
20 Mayhew, Coexistence Plus, 5.
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‘coexistence’ was regarded as that state which transcends conflict and enables 
survival.
Furthermore, many in the West noted the danger that such an ideological 
competition still entailed despite the widely held admission that ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ would be the ideational tool through which interstate violence, so 
potentially precipitous in the era of nuclear weapons, could be avoided, or at 
the very least, mitigated. The acceptance, and even encouragement, of 
ideological propaganda on both sides of the world-political spectrum, argued 
opponents of ‘peaceful coexistence,’ could lead to the reduction of ideological 
variety and complexity arising from the multifarious social systems in the 
international political world. Intense ideological struggle as the means of 
engagement between the two superpowers discouraged world-wide multi- 
vocality and reduced the possibility of multiple interpretations of the world 
system. More importantly, it captured the terms of international discourse and 
limited the alternatives available to political thought, at a time when they were 
most needed. Such a reduction of variety to two monolithic ideologies was 
tantamount to the creation of ideological myths, which were ‘a prime cause of 
international tension and a major barrier to disarmament and peace.’22
Amongst those who attempted to think outside the parameters of ‘peaceful 
coexistence,’ a different type of concern as to the future of peace arose 
precisely from the presence of too many voices. In the late 1950s, Sir Kenneth 
Grubb equated ‘coexistence’ with the existing international system of 
sovereign states and their political interactions. Understood in this way 
coexistence meant taking ‘for granted an unlimited compatibility of national 
aspirations,’23 whose acknowledgement did not, however, provide the requisite 
conditions or guidelines for the prevention of nuclear conflict. The fact of 
coexistence alone, in other words, did not suggest how one may ‘coexist.’ 
Taken literally coexistence is nothing more than co-presence. As Grubb noted 
in 1957, ‘[presumably coexistence simply means side by side: it does not
21 Mayhew, Coexistence Plus, 22.
22 Mayhew, Coexistence Plus, 2.
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require that we live together in any meaningful way; it merely records that we 
live in the same limited space, the inhabited world,’24 astutely observing the 
spatial determination of coexistence, where it is understood as co-presence or 
the composition of units. In this way, international thought and praxis about 
‘coexistence’ in the post-1945 era reduced the term to a primary concern with 
the organisation of a multitude of units, and the sustenance of the international 
state system and its principle of state-centricity, whose survival was far from 
assured in the nuclear context. Grubb called for a more meaningful and 
instructive definition of what kinds of interaction coexistence might entail, and 
highlighted the need to move beyond ‘mere coexistence’ ‘into a closer 
partnership or community,’ among states and peoples.25 Coexistence, 
understood as the cohabitation of sovereign states, harboured ‘a terrible lie,’ 
containing within it a principle that belied what ‘coexistence’ ought to mean, 
suggested Grubb. This was, of course, the norm of state sovereignty, which 
accorded the state absolute control within its territorial boundaries. Such 
sovereign cohabitation ‘almost seems to sanctify evil and condone the effects 
of tyranny,’26 he noted, advancing an opposition to the kinds of actions that 
were subsumed under the heading of ‘coexistence,’ such as war, violent 
incitement to struggle, proxy wars in the periphery and, finally, sustained 
ideological propaganda.
During the Cold War era an understanding of coexistence evolved to 
accommodate the nuclear threat by proposing that ‘coexistence’ be thought as 
the co-presence of opposed entities, in which ideological competition ought to 
be tolerated. This led to the equation of coexistence with survival and the 
absence or transcendence of conflict, despite the fact that the mitigation of 
nuclear war in this way entailed the toleration of intense ideological struggle. 
The commitment to the avoidance of war in the centre, transposed 
confrontation to the periphery, where proxy wars were fought throughout the 
post-World War II years. This brief exposition suggests that international
23 Kenneth George Grubb, Coexistence and the Conditions o f Peace (London: S.C.M. Press, 
1957), 5.
24 Grubb, Coexistence, 5.
25 Grubb, Coexistence, 3.
26 Grubb, Coexistence, 9.
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relations literature and institutional or political practice were largely 
preoccupied and sought to address the continued danger brought about by the 
production and deployment of nuclear arms on the one hand, and the perceived 
ideological incompatibility of capitalism and really existing communism.
While there was a general acceptance of the progress that the concept of 
‘peaceful coexistence* brought to Cold War political life, largely seen as the 
immediate avoidance of nuclear warfare, concerns remained about the dangers 
of the ideological struggle entailed within ‘peaceful coexistence.’ Therefore, 
despite this general acceptance of the usefulness of the term, many opponents 
saw it as a restrictive concept and attempted to think beyond ‘mere 
coexistence.’ Given the disconcerting nuclear context, scholarly focus reflected 
the connection between coexistence and survival, which concerned world 
politics and the general public of the West.27 This served to highlight and, 
moreover, sustain the conceptual opposition between coexistence and conflict, 
despite the conflictual element inherent within the term ‘peaceful coexistence.’ 
The ideological struggle, in which such reflection took place, led to the 
ossification of the meaning of coexistence as the tentative and dangerous co­
presence of ideologically incompatible units. Coexistence also came to connote 
an ephemeral state, as it contained within it the acceptance that conflict was 
inevitable, albeit momentarily restricting it to the realm of ideology.
3. Coexistence in thepost-Cold War era
Since the collapse of communism, the parameters of thought that had guided 
international coexistence between opposing ideological camps during the post-
27 Several movies which noted the anxiety caused by the nuclear threat and depicted the horror 
of nuclear holocaust were released in the 1950s and 1960s, such as On the Beach, Dr. 
Strangelove and The War Game, as discussed in Geoffrey Stem, The Structure o f  International 
Society: An Introduction to the Study o f  International Relations (London: Pinter, 1995), 265. 
As Gunter Figal suggests literary works and films are ‘represented experience, and a literary 
work is the representation of its experiential context’ in Gunter Figal, “Stereoscopic 
Experience: Emst Jiinger’s Poetics of The Adventurous Heart,” trans. Wayne Klein, in Gunter 
Figal, For a Philosophy o f  Freedom and Strife (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1998), 91.
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1945 era have undergone major changes. Contrary to the political 
preoccupation with the possibility of nuclear annihilation during the Cold War, 
since 1989 concerns with potentially precipitous ideological competition have 
dissipated, leaving concerns about issues of ‘coexistence’ to evolve along three 
main trajectories.
In the context of the first path, a certain uncertainty and source of concern was
visible, arising from the perception that,
the West [was left] without markers to identify potential threats to its way of 
life or reasons to be prepared. With the collapse of communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, the 
global ideological confrontation that had served so well to identify friend and 
foe vanished.28
Cold War thinking about ideological struggle has transformed its content by 
discursively shifting away from superpower conflict towards ‘civilizational 
tension or struggle.’ The most widely known example of this strand of thinking 
is Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations,’29 although his theorisation of 
the post-1989 international political scene has come under severe criticism, not 
only from mainstream authors but also from critical theorists.30 Embedded 
within an alarmist ontology of decline, IR thinking about civilisations sought 
to replace the formulaic role of Cold War ideological and military oppositions 
with mapped cultural differences.31 As Marc Lynch argues in this vein, 
‘Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” initially defined the terms of debate 
within a realist conceptual universe which simply replaced “states” with
28 Susan L. Woodward, “Violence-Prone Area or International Transition? The Role of 
Outsiders in Balkan Violence,” in Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Ramphele and 
Pamela Reynolds (eds.), Violence and Subjectivity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000), 19, brackets added.
29 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
30 See for example, Stephen Chan, “Too Neat and Under-thought a World Order: Huntington 
and Civilisations,” Millennium 26, no. 1 (1997): 137-140 and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 
“‘Civilization’ on Trial,” Millennium 28, no. 1 (1999): 141-153. Unfortunately, IR has yet to 
benefit from sociological thinking on civilisation such as that of Johann Araason which aims to 
understand ‘civilizational structures as configurations o f culture and power’ as the editors of a 
special issue on his work note. For the contributions to this see Thesis Eleven no. 61 (2000): 1- 
113. However, efforts to rescue civilisational thinking from its realist premises appear to be 
increasing, see Marc Lynch, “The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres,” 
Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 307-330.
31 See Gianni Vattimo, “Toward an Ontology of Decline,” trans. Barbara Spackman, in 
Giovanna Borradori (ed.), Recoding Metaphysics: The New Italian Philosophy (Evanston:
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“civilisations”.’32 As such, it remains wedded to an understanding of 
civilisation, not as diverse and polymorphic, but as unitary.33
The second trajectory reveals that the discipline of International Relations has 
been increasingly called upon to theorise coexistence, not amongst sovereign 
states where its traditional expertise lies but, rather, of sub-state groups and 
individuals. The emerging coneem with the coexistence of people as an issue 
which requires attention in IR is evident when one considers the rise in civil 
wars, ethnic conflicts and other such ‘internal’ matters that have preoccupied 
the international community in the post-1989 world.34 Similarly, there is an 
increased scholarly focus towards individual or group conflict at a more 
localised level, usually in the form of specific case studies. The concerns of 
conflict resolution scholarship evolve around ‘peace-making’ and, additionally, 
in terms of peace maintenance and post-conflict reconstruction, include ‘peace­
keeping’ and ‘peace-building.’ This strand of thinking about ‘coexistence’ 
inevitably responds to the considerations of the international community about 
localised conflicts, either couched in humanitarian language or considered with 
regards to their international repercussions, or both.
As Eva Bertram argues, a certain extension of the scope of multilateral (usually 
United Nations) peace operations can be noted since 1990, when there 
occurred a move from the prevention of hostilities to the active building of ‘the 
political conditions for a sustainable peace,’35 a task which amounts to 
‘remak[ing] a state’s political institutions, security forces, and economic 
arrangements,’ in short, ‘nation-building.’36 Such ‘on the ground’ widening in 
the scope of operations within international praxis, as has occurred since 1989,
Northwestern University Press, 1988), 63-75, although admittedly this would assume a 
different sense in post-Cold War realist ontology.
32 Lynch, “The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres,” 311.
33 Robert W. Cox, “Thinking about Civilizations,” Review o f  International Studies 26, Special 
Issue (2000): 217-234.
34 See, as examples in an ever increasing literature, Stephen John Stedman, “UN Intervention 
in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and Strategy,” in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. 
Hayes (eds.), Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 40-63, Eva 
Bertram, “Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils o f United Nations Peace 
Building,” Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995): 387-418 and Michael E. Brown 
(ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
35 Bertram, “Reinventing Governments,” 388.
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has thus far not been accompanied by a deepening of scholarly focus, 
punctuated with the return to reflection about the more general, yet 
foundational, terms which bound that scope. Deepening of that sense would 
serve to better clarify what it is that these operations are trying to achieve, 
namely, ‘coexistence’ and would, moreover, enable the consideration of this 
concept beyond specific issues of technical management of transitions and 
cessation of hostilities.
It must be noted that the confrontational politics of the Cold War, compounded 
as it was by its location in a nuclear context, afforded the tragic opportunity of 
reflecting on the meaning of coexistence as such, despite the fixing of 
dichotomies between coexistence and conflict which that location had imposed 
on thinking. The post-1989 focus on peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace­
building, has thus far restricted itself largely to the technical issues of conflict 
prevention or management within the generalised context of the ‘up-keeping’ 
of the world system. Despite its difference from the civilisational path of post- 
Cold War thinking it, too, has the tendency to consider coexistence in the post- 
Cold War context as co-presence in a new political geography. It can be 
argued, therefore, that ‘a new political geography of the world’ has began to 
dominate political understanding, where new kinds of wars are associated with 
‘violence-prone areas,’ which necessarily require the mobilisation of world- 
political resources for the management of international peace and security.37
This reflective restriction and self-imposed limitation of scholarly scope and 
debate, however, are not understood by the discipline of International 
Relations as limitations, but, on the contrary, as prudent responses to what is 
now perceived the mere maintenance of the international system.38 This level
36 Bertram, “Reinventing Governments,” 389.
37 Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman, “Introduction” in Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, 
Mamphela Ramphele and Pamela Reynolds (eds.), Violence and Subjectivity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), 1.
38 Saskia Sassen has argued that the world economic system is not, as often claimed, a 
spontaneous order, but, rather, is designed and maintained in Saskia Sassen, Globalization and 
its Discontents (New York: New Press, 1998) and Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty 
in an Age o f  Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Similarly, the 
increased engagement o f the UN ‘as an agent of democratic transitions’ as noted by Bertram,
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of comfort only makes sense if located within the ‘end of history’ so 
optimistically heralded by Francis Fukuyama,39 which leaves but one historical 
alternative: liberalism. In this regard, Roland Paris has argued that the guiding 
paradigm of post-1989 peace operations is liberal internationalism with its 
premises of ffee-market oriented economy and liberal democratic polity, which 
he collectively unites in the phrase ‘market democracy.’40 Fukuyama’s 
proposition about the ‘end of history,’ and the prevalence of liberalism more 
generally, illustrate the acceptance of the modem subject at the centre of the 
political ontology of IR, despite widely held pessimism in philosophical and 
social scientific circles about the assumptions of modem subjectivity.41 
Furthermore, the widespread orientation towards technicity and minute 
specialisation occludes the status of coexistence as a question. Specifically, it 
presents research as multiple and varied, whereas, upon closer examination the 
apparent multiplicity in the study of coexistence takes place within the bounds 
of a greater unanimity about the subject of coexistence. Moreover, there are no 
attempts to think about the meaning of ‘coexistence* and its conditions of 
possibility. Finally, and most definitely, there are no discernible attempts to 
explore the possibility of grasping coexistence as anything other than 
composition or co-presence of already constituted units.
The third and final post-Cold War strand of thinking about ‘coexistence’ 
comprises international attempts to encourage the ‘extension of moral 
inclusion in world politics.’42 Just as within the structures of national societies, 
it is suggested that in international society, too, inclusion ‘depends crucially on
“Reinventing Governments,” should illustrate, I argue, how the international system, in some 
respects, is likewise designed and maintained.
39 Francis Fukuyama, The End o f History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992).
40 Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 58.
41 In this sense, one might disagree with Slavoj Zizek who finds the centre of political ontology 
to be vacant, since the modem (Cartesian) subject has been ‘chased away,’ so to speak, by 
concerted critique mounted on multiple fronts. See Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The 
Absent Centre o f  Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999). Naturally, Zizek is referring 
primarily to philosophical circles; upon closer attention to the concerns of the international 
community, with its newly found focus on human rights, the modem subject is definitely 
securely holding court.
42 Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: a Pragmatic Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14. See also, Andrew Linklater, The 
Transformation o f  Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f  the Post-Westphalian Era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 14-45 and 60, as well as Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a 
Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 136.
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finding ways of bringing disadvantaged groups, women or men into the 
political process.’43 This mandate of greater inclusivity has arisen more 
recenlty from the destabilising effects brought about by the globalisation of 
world politics and the intensification of social relations across a number of 
spheres of interaction. The more influential of these discourses tend to suggest 
that something akin to a post-Westphalian era is now approaching, which, in 
turn, might signal a more inclusive approach to ‘community.’44 Their analysis 
of the impact of processes of globalisation upon territorially sovereign nation­
states, as well as their evaluation of the possibilities arising from novel 
political arrangements for the future of ‘community,’ as in the context of the 
European Union for example, offer the most promising outlook of the three 
trajectories.
The great majority of those working within this third path are ‘proponents of a 
liberalism hospitable to particularities* and exhibit a concern with otherness 
that aims to bestow upon it ‘equality in the sense of legal egalitarianism.’45 
Most influential amongst these, are the writings of David Campbell and 
Andrew Linklater. The latter’s recent monograph The Transformation o f 
Political Community sets out to sociologically appraise recent attempts to 
move beyond the statist Westphalian ‘blind alley’,46 for the express purpose of 
making the notion of ‘community’ less exclusionary.47 The larger project, in 
Linklater’s words, is twofold: the first aspect of this drive for more inclusion is 
to reconstruct ‘the modem state and the international state system to permit the 
development of higher levels of universality.’ The second aspect concerns the 
cultivation of a sensitivity and respect towards otherness. This entails 
‘transforming exclusionary political communities so that higher levels of
43 Swasti Mitter, “Universalism’s Struggle,” Radical Philosophy no. 108 (July/August 2001), 
42.
44 See also David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in 
Bosnia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
45 Wemer Hamacher, “Heterautonomies: Multiculturalism and the Politics of Respect,” trans. 
Dana Hollander, Centre fo r Theoretical Studies Working Papers, no. 15 (1997), 5.
46 The phrase belongs to Darel E. Paul, “Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian Blind 
Alley in International Relations,” Review o f  International Studies 25, no. 2 (1999): 217-231.
47 For a discussion of the notion of a world community see Chris Brown, “Political Theory and 
the Idea of a World Community,” in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International 
Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
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respect for cultural difference can evolve.’48 The transition towards a post- 
Westphalian international environment, whether this is due to the impact that 
globalisation is said to have on the state-form as such, or whether it is 
attributable to the successes of political innovations such as the European 
political project, is seen as productive for bringing about a universality 
sensitive to difference, where ‘universalistic loyalties have to be reconciled 
with strong emotional ties to specific communities.’49
This trajectory, therefore, questions current modes of exclusion of the other, a 
task that appears to cohere with this thesis’s interest in why and how 
coexistence understood as co-presence occludes the role of otherness. Their 
inquiry into otherness, however, is limited to how community might be 
expanded, as if greater inclusivity in terms of numbers alone might be the 
decisive issue. Rather, the issue is how does one allow existence to show itself 
as other-determined, as ‘heteronomous’ and coexistential from the start, so that 
issues of addition become of no consequence. As Wemer Hamacher writes in 
response to the debate on multiculturalism and the question of inclusion, 
thinking must seek to go beyond addition, beyond mere counting.50 Diana 
Coole concurs, noting that ‘where the prevailing liberalism is grounded in a 
philosophy of the subject,’ as the majority of these perspectives are, ‘the 
radical challenge is to rethink the political’ and coexistence in a more 
fundamental way.
This must entail something more fundamental than placing rational 
individuals within a communicative situation: what is needed is an ontology 
of this interworld, in order to grasp the way rational forms are engendered 
within the thick, adverse space between subjects. The analysis of politics no 
longer begins with the juridico-theoretical model (as Foucault will call it),
48 Both in Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political Community, 16.
49 Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political Community, 2. It would appear that Linkalter’s 
work is expressive of a desire to transcend the sharp divide between cosmopolitans and 
communitarian thinkers, which was seen to lead to an ‘impasse.’ See Cochran, Normative 
Theory in International Relations. As Gerard Delanty has recently suggested, however, the 
greater majority of ‘communitarians can be seen as liberals disenchanted by liberal 
individualism’ but who anchor their positions on ‘the liberal principle o f equality.’ Gerard 
Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Philadelphia: Open University 
Press, 2000), 25 and 27 respectively. As to the credence given to particularist ties and 
sentiment see also Alan Finlayson, “Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Theories of 
Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 4, no. 2 (1998): 145-162 who argues that there is a 
reductive psychological account on which most theories of nationalism and nationalists 
sentiment rest.
50 Hamacher, “Heterautonomies,” 8.
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with the state at its zenith and juridical subjects beneath, but with struggles for 
coexistence.51
The reliance of the majority of these literatures on predominant variants of the 
modern subject, therefore, suggests that such attempts for greater inclusion are 
limited in their ability to rethink coexistence, unwittingly reducing its 
consideration to composition. This reduction is what the thesis calls ‘the logic 
of composition.’ Prior to its fuller articulation, however, it is advisable to 
outline in brief the prevalent assumptions of the modem subject operating 
within this logic in order to highlight its inadequacy for thinking about 
coexistence. This can be seen as an extension of Paris’s initial insights 
regarding the prevalence of liberal internationalism, ‘that cynicism called 
liberalism’ as the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy has called it,52 by way of 
providing a curtailed analysis of the subjectivism which is the condition of 
possibility of the ‘liberal paradigm.’
4. International ontological commitments
A paradoxical situation comes into view, as was already noted above, when 
one reflects upon the status of coexistence in International Relations in the 
post-Cold War world. While the issue of coexistence ought to be paramount 
for world-political understanding, its meaning is taken as self-evident; in other 
words, coexistence is not addressed as a question. Since coexistence is not 
regarded as an aporia, there is no scholarly debate about what it is, how 
difficult it is to define and grasp, or, moreover, what other theoretical issues it 
might both reveal and conceal. Therefore, this thesis argues that statements 
about coexistence in the theoretical literature of International Relations (IR) 
are to be found solely within the discipline’s ontological statements, where 
ontology is understood as ‘what is the world of international relations and what 
are its units of analysis.’
51 Both quotes in Diana Coole, “Thinking Politically with Merleau-Ponty,” Radical 
Philosophy, no. 108 (July/August 2001), 25.
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According to the prominent stories that IR tells about an anarchical society or 
system of sovereign nation-states, and more recently, stories about individuals 
or sub-state groups, the term coexistence is implicitly understood as a 
condition of entities coming together to cohabit a particular geographical, 
social, and political space. It does not necessarily require a physical joining, 
but it does appear to require the explicit act of ‘staying together.’ The 
definition of coexistence as a state of staying together presumes coexistence to 
be a secondary condition requiring a predating event of coming together. As 
such, the term connotes an a posteriori state; the event of coming together, in 
other words, renders coexistence a state that must be yielded from purposive 
action. The thesis argues that, for IR, coexistence is post-ontological; if such a 
term may be useful, it denotes a condition not investigated at the level of the 
existential structures of these entities, but rather one that rests on other 
ontological assumptions.
What are those assumptions, and can they be traced to a single basis or guiding 
principle? Despite the substantially differentiated contexts within which 
attempts to think about ‘coexistence’ have arisen, it can be claimed that, in 
modernity, their grounding has been centred on the individual subject, the 
historical development of which is examined in greater detail in chapter two. 
IR theory presents the state as subject in much the same way as social theory 
takes the self or individual as subject, in the sense of a unitary observable and 
purposive agent.53 Where IR turns to issues of individuals, such as recent 
preoccupations with human rights or post-conflict transitions, it joins more 
explicitly related social sciences in its grounding on the modem subject.54
52 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Being-With,” trans. Iain Macdonald, Centre fo r  Theoretical Studies 
Working Papers, no. 11 (1996), 1.
53 See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Reading: Addison- 
Wesley, 1979), and amongst constructivists the more recent work o f Wendt reinstates the state 
as subject. See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). Of course, sub-fields such as Foreign Policy Analysis 
have sought to problematise both the agency of the state and its unitary outlook.
54 See the introduction to C. Fred Alford, The Self in Social Theory: A Psychoanalytic Account 
o f  its Construction in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991).
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What does one refer to when one speaks of the modem subject? Following
Christoph Menke’s recent articulation, it could be argued that
[i]n “modem” use, the term “subject” is no longer taken just in its 
grammatical meaning where a subject is that of which something can be 
predicated,55 but refers to anything that (and, thus, anyone who) can say ‘I’.56
David Carr, similarly, elaborates this definition of the modem subject as being 
‘centered in such notions as the cogito, the “I think”, consciousness, self- 
consciousness, self-transparency, self-determination.’57 But does this actually 
suggest that the ability to say T  is the condition of subjectivity? In and of 
itself, I-saying does not elucidate the characteristics of subjectivity, unless it is 
considered that I-saying has been traditionally seen as the evocation of self- 
consciousness and self-control. Stephen K. White notes in this respect that the 
modem subject can be identified as the
assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background 
(tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the 
name of accelerating mastery of them. This teflon [non-stick] subject has the 
leading role in the modem stage.58
In chapter two the characteristics of modem subjectivity are outlined in some 
detail, but suffice it to say presently that its main features are non-relationality 
and self-control, features which are often discussed as the values of autonomy 
and sovereignty. Non-relationality, does not suggest that modem subjects do 
not engage in relations, but that these relations are not considered constitutive 
of the subject; rather, they tend to be viewed as non-constitutive for selfhood.
As White rightly observes, however, discussions of the modem subject are not 
customarily conducted in such critical terms, but more neutrally and without 
explicit exploration as to how its main features affect the subject’s relationality 
towards others. Upon closer examination, moreover, it appears that the modem 
subject is under-thematised, a historical outcome which ought to be taken as ‘at
55 ‘Subject translates hypokeimenon and refers to anything which can have predicates’ in 
Christoph Menke, “Modernity and Subjectivity: From an Aesthetic Point of View,” Graduate 
Faculty Philosophy Journal 21, no. 2 (1999), 221.
56 Menke, “Modernity and Subjectivity: From an Aesthetic Point of View,” 217.
57 David Carr, “The Question of the Subject: Heidegger and the Transcendental Tradition,” 
Human Studies 17, no. 4 (1995), 403.
58 Stephen K. White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection,” Political Theory 25, no. 4 
(1997), 503, brackets added.
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least a measure of modernity’s self-confidence.’59 It is perhaps a rising
insecurity about the modem subject, a dissipation of the once prevalent
modernist confidence about its foundational capacities, which has recently led
to ontological investigation in search of different thinking about ‘ourselves,
and being in general’ among multifarious lines of inquiry.60 Slavoj Zizek, for
example, notes that philosophy, along with social and political theory, have
expended considerable energy criticising the hold which modem subjectivity
has over inquiry in the modem era, often seeking alternatives or reformulations
to it. He notes that,
[a] spectre is haunting Western academia, the spectre of the Cartesian subject.
All academic powers have entered into a holy alliance to exorcize this spectre: 
the New Age Obscurantist.. .the postmodern deconstructionist... the 
Habermasian theorist of communication...the Heideggerian proponent of the 
thought of Being...the cognitive scientist...the Deep Ecologist...the critical 
(post-) Marxist.. .and the feminist.. .61
This recent attempt to evaluate stories about human existence, to gain access to 
the kind of entity ‘which we ourselves are’62 is what is normally suggested by 
the type of inquiry called ‘ontology.’ As Tracy Strong has argued, narratives 
about political order (and coexistence) are grounded in the stories people tell 
about themselves.63 As regards International Relations, ontology has been 
neglected in IR, as Alexander Wendt has argued, because the so-called ‘third 
debate’ between the advocates of positivist methodology, on the one hand, and 
post- or anti-positivists, on the other, has focused on methodological and 
epistemological issues. Wendt encourages a shift to a more ontological 
emphasis in order to reevaluate what ‘the international world is made of,’64 in
59 White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection,” 503.
60 White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection,” 503.
61 Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, 1.
62 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), 67.
63 Tracy B. Strong, “Introduction: The Self and the Political Order,” in Tracy B. Strong (ed.), 
The Self and the Political Order (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 1-21.
64 Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, 90. While such a call is in itself laudable, it 
is, unfortunately handicapped by Wendt’s own location and theoretical commitments. Wendt 
regards that epistemology should give way to ontology in IR because of ‘both sides [of the 
third debate] are tacit realists’ (p. 90) revealing with this statement his embeddedness in the 
United States academic context where alternatives to the realist paradigm display strong 
similarities in their premises with the realists. More importantly, however, Wendt’s 
ontological investigations are taken entirely within this location, serving to legitimate and 
broaden it, but by no means challenge it. In a way, his project wishes to correct the answers to 
the right questions of international politics asked in 1979 by Kenneth Waltz. See Michael
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other words, ‘what actors there are, how they relate to one another, and what 
methods are appropriate for the type of research we want to do.’65 While 
Wendt hopes that this sort of ontological exercise should enable debate to 
recommence after a substantial period of ceased communication between the 
two sides of the epistemological spectrum, he does not appear to advocate a 
serious reconsideration of the ontological premises of international politics as 
a modern social science, as the one described by White for political thought 
more generally.66 On the contrary, Wendt is eager to complete an investigation 
of IR’s ontology, because, as a modem social science, it lacks knowledge of its 
ground.
While this thesis endorses Wendt’s call for ontological thinking, it also wishes 
to distinguish itself from the agreement with IR’s existing ontological 
premises, which is implicit in his constructivist writings.67 This is because such 
a tacit agreement encloses international thought within a subjectivist ground 
(see chapter two), on the basis of which coexistence can only be articulated 
through a ‘logic of composition.’ Below, this logic is outlined along with the 
implications of the mutual reinforcement of ‘composition’ and ‘subject,’ 
which, it is argued, obscures the constitutive role of otherness, what one might 
call at this stage ‘the question of heteronomy.’ This concealed heteronomy of 
selfhood itself is taken here as a ‘mandate of otherness’ and points to the need 
to elucidate an account of heteronomous coexistence by engaging with the 
concept of heteronomy itself, and suggest the way forward and structure of the 
project as a whole.
Cox, Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne, “Editors’ Introduction to the Forum on Social Theory o f  
International Politics," Review o f International Studies 26, no. 1 (2000), 123. See also Waltz, 
Theory o f  International Politics.
65 Cox, Booth, and Dunne, “Editors’ Introduction to the Forum on Social Theory o f  
International Politics,” 123.
66 White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection.”
67 It is quite interesting that in addition to the restricted nature o f Wendt’s inquiry, some of the 
commentators on his project have sought to curtail even further the ontological explorations of 
IR, seeking to limit the discipline’s output to ‘analysis o f international relations’ and to 
discourage the onset o f ‘ontological debates,’ achieving in this way a closure o f questions 
about what is it that IR examines, that is states, their interactions and affiliated issues, Robert 
O. Keohane, “Ideas Part-way Down,” Review o f  International Studies 26, no. 1 (2000): 125- 
130, 126.
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5. The logic of composition: subjectivity and coexistence
It has been claimed above that the ground of modem subjectivity restricts the
possibility of understanding coexistence as anything but a collection of
composite subjects of already constituted individuals. Grounding inquiry on
the modem subject limits theoretical articulations of coexistence through what
the thesis calls ‘the logic of composition.’68 What being-together or coexistence
might mean post-1989, is largely determined by one of ‘Europe’s’ greatest
achievements. Nancy, for example, considers that the construction of the
modem subject, the individual, is widely heralded as ‘Europe’s
incontrovertible merit of having shown the world the sole path to emancipation
from tyranny, and the norm by which to measure all our collective or
communitarian undertakings.’69 How can this construct, he asks, be considered
a triumph, an achievement of European thought, when it is at the centre of the
dissolution of coexistence more generally and of community more specifically.
By its nature — as the name indicates, it is the atom, the indivisible -  the 
individual reveals that it is the abstract result of a decomposition. It is another, 
and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for-itself, 
taken as origin and as certainty.70
Within the metaphysics of the detached subject, the ‘with’ may only be
grasped as composition.71 Prescribing to what can be called the ‘logic of
composition’ means that the predicate ‘together’
is in fact only a qualification extrinsic to subjects, not belonging to the 
appearing of each as such, designating a pure and indifferent juxta-position; 
or, on the other hand, it adds a particular quality, endowed with a literal sense, 
which must realise itself for all subjects “together” and as an “ensemble”.72
The understanding of coexistence as extrinsic to the subject that coexists 
illustrates the power of the ontological commitment to determine coexistence 
as little more than a situation of subjects being simultaneously present, the 
reduction of coexistence to co-presence.
68 Inspired by the analysis provided by French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. See Nancy, 
“Being-With,” 5.
69 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael 
Holland and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 3.
70 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 3.
71 For what this as might itself reveal, see Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. 
Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesotta Press, 1993), 98-99.
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Such a ‘logic of composition’ might be thought as a mode of articulation, 
because it iterates ‘a relation among elements such that their identity is 
modified as a result of the articulatory practice.’73 Based on modem 
subjectivity, with its key features of self-sufficiency and mastery prescribing a 
relation of mere co-presence, the logic of composition suggests that units or 
entities are non-relational in their constitution until ‘composed.’ The 
articularoty practice itself does not arise from the phenomena, the facticity of 
entities, but as an interpretation it is ‘grounded in something we already have 
in advance -  a fore-having,’ or interpretative pre-conception.74 The ‘fore­
having,’ which is part of the structure of understanding, and which is brought 
into the thinking of coexistence affecting its articulation, is the non-relational 
subject. The interpretation of coexistence that this articulatory practice 
establishes renders it as a secondary and fragile condition; an act of composing 
previously unrelated subjects. The decisive effect of such an articulatory 
practice is the restriction of relationality to mere co-presence, among the 
elements modified, determined and inscribed by the practice.
One might object, asking whether the logic of composition can be reduced to 
its reliance on the human subject. What about the system of states which 
provides the parameters for the discipline of world politics? Surely, one might 
argue, the system of states defies this logic by concentrating on state as the 
type of unit involved in coexistence. However, this logic not only assumes that 
collectivities are made up of multiple ‘I’s but also that as collectivities they 
behave as a larger ‘I,’ which works by a reduction of the ‘we’ to an ‘I’. The 
‘logic of composition’ involves the understanding of collectivity according to 
the principle of subject. The logic of composition is not problematic because of 
composition as such, but because it fails to recognise the priority of 
coexistence and the constitutive role that otherness has in the construction of 
selfhood, a role which one might call ‘heteronomy.’ It is blind to the fact of the
72 Nancy, “Being-With,” 17, emphasis added.
73 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, (London: Verso, 1985), 105.
74 Heidegger, Being and Time, 191.
28
other’s primacy or ‘equi-primordiality’ with the self. It cannot recognise, 
furthermore, that the self is already thrown into a world of otherness.
The logic of composition is not some aberration of the philosophy of some
thinkers, of liberalism, etc, easily exorcised or denounced. Rather, it becomes
the sole means of grasping togetherness once the metaphysics of the subject
has become prominent. Coexistence becomes a technical problem, instead of
an irreducible aporia, when sovereign subjectivity is the underlying
assumption. The tension between ‘self and ‘society,’ the ‘I’ and the ‘we,’
arises only with the arrival of the modem subject as the ground of inquiry:
[o]nly because insofar as man actually and essentially has becom e subject is it 
necessary for him, as a consequence, to confront the explicit question: Is it as 
an “I” confined to its own preferences and freed into its own arbitrary 
choosing or as the “w e” o f society; is it as an individual or as a community; is 
it as a personality within the community or as a m ere group m em ber in the 
corporate body; is it as a state and nation and as a people or as the common 
hum anity o f  m odem  man, that man will and ought to  be the subject that in his 
m odem  essence he already is ? 75
In other words, the question of self and collectivity cannot be asked from any 
other position; it is only a comprehensible concern from the perspective of 
subjectivism.
Since the question of being-in-common becomes settled through the logic of
composition, the question of the status of coexistence is never properly raised:
‘[a]n inconsequential atomism, individualism tends to forget that the atom is
also a world.’76 The atom, the indivisible unit that the modem human subject
is assumed to be, is a world, that is, it is enclosed within itself in its certainty
and mastery. It relations are relations of grasping, of presenting that which is
(beings) to itself as its object. Thus, thinking about coexistence falls within a
larger ‘metaphysics of the subject,’ understood as part of, or equal to,
the m etaphysics o f  the absolute for-itself -  be it in the form o f  the individual 
or the total state -  which means also the m etaphysics o f  the absolute in
75 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” trans. William Lovitt, in Martin 
Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1977), 132-133.
Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 4.
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general, o f  being-ab-solute, as perfectly detached, distinct, and closed: being 
w ithout relation.77
‘Being without relation’ does not mean that there are no actual relations of the 
subject to that which is (world and other beings). Rather, it suggests that the 
subject, having established itself as complete and absolute, can only strive to 
preside over its relations: it is unencumbered, it is solitary, it is unaffected in 
its self-constitution by the ‘objects’ of its representation and reflection.
Within this metaphysics of subjectivity the question of coexistence can only be 
asked as that of composition, of a technical arrangement of units, its success 
always fragile, its descent to conflict never surprising, always expected. 
Expectation of incompatibility and surprise at any achievement of coexistence 
betrays that the logic of composition determines it as an afterthought, as a 
secondary condition. This also helps to clarify why in IR coexistence is 
primarily considered as the tentative state which might always ‘slip-back’ into 
conflict: it is because the ‘with’ is seen as that which must be constructed from 
the starting point of subjectivism that is becomes a precarious achievement. 
There is, in other words, a subterranean theoretical linkage between 
‘coexistence’ and ‘conflict’ which is sustained even by the people who wish to 
imbue coexistence with a different meaning, and those who wish to emphasise 
that coexistence is a matter crucial to human survival. Coexistence, especially 
in the absence of ideological contestation, appears as a technical issue of how 
to arrange units in a certain manner to bring about this condition of 
togetherness crucial to ‘survival.’
This thesis argues, therefore, that if coexistence is to be theorised otherwise in 
IR, the reliance on the premises of modem subjectivity must itself be 
questioned. A certain awareness of the ‘late modem’ times, in which IR takes
77 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 4. Agnes Heller has claimed that, contra to the 
‘postmodern’ and often Heidegger-inspired critique of the completed subject of modernity, this 
subject is nothing short of fractured. See a series of arguments initially in Agnes Heller, 
“Death o f the Subject?,” in George Levine (ed.), Constructions o f  the S e lf (New  Bruncwick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1992), 269-284, and subsequently in Agnes Heller, “The Three 
Logics of Modernity and the Double-Bind of Imagination,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal 21, no. 2 (1999): 177-194, and Agnes Heller, A Theory o f  Modernity (Malden: 
Blackwell, 1999). While Heller opposes Heidegger’s account of modem subjectivity,
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place as a social science, is presently evident in the abundance and unabated 
increase in studies of globalisation, the retreat of the state, as well the 
appearance of phenomena not easily viewed through IR’s conceptual lenses. 
For example, as was noted above, IR has increasingly become involved in the 
study and policy advocacy of concerns previously not considered within its 
parameters of study, such as civil wars, ethnic conflicts, internal disruption of 
communities, internal political transitions, etc. This juncture, as a result, might 
present an opportunity to ‘unwork modem subjectivity,’78 to problematise 
subjectivity and suggest a recovery of selfhood that is able to coexist in its 
heteronomy. But why should such resistance and problematisation be 
considered so crucial? The remaining pages examine, finally, the effacement of 
heteronomy, which comes about when coexistence is determined through the 
logic of composition.
The effacement of heteronomy
It is the contention of this enquiry that understanding human existence under
the sign of modem subjectivity produces a set of assumptions about the entity
‘we all are, in each case,’ and about the other, based on
a m indset o f  valuation, disposal, management, and objectification in our care 
for our lives, a m indset whose overpowering force hem s us in throughout our 
everyday world, confuses freedom with the condition o f  possibility for certain 
types o f  subjectivity, and gives priority to correctness and m easurem ent in 
m atters o f  truth.79
It is by the production of certain assumptions about ourselves, Charles Scott 
argues in this regard, that ‘we make ourselves present to each other by 
reference to values that commonly identify us and have proven trustworthy for 
our survival and well-being.’80 Yet, the values which are customarily 
considered as ‘trustworthy’ guides for life, are located within ‘a history of
essentially they are in agreement. The self is fractured and this is even more powerfully stated 
by Heidegger, for whom the self is the basis o f nothingness, see chapter four below.
78 In the sense of Abbau. See Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic 
Phenomenology in Being and Time" in John Sallis (ed.), Radical Phenomenology: Essays in 
Honor o f  Martin Heidegger (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978).
79 Charles E. Scott, The Question o f Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), 138.
80 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 138.
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thought and practice in which engagement in the disclosure of beings is 
thoroughly overlooked and excluded from thought/81 Human existence, and 
coexistence, are understood in ways which distort the disclosiveness of beings 
and which lead, moreover, to their reduction to ‘their identifiability, their use, 
or, in the case of other people, their ability to be answerable to standards, to 
themselves, or to God.’82 Within the ground of modem subjectivity, disclosure 
becomes detached from facticity, from the fact that an entity is and how it is in 
the ‘world.’ In this way, ‘[t]he disclosiveness of beings is thus distorted into 
their presence and their quality of will regarding other beings.’83 To be is to be 
present and the question of coexistence becomes one of management of 
tentative co-presence, of bringing together units through composition and 
creating a discourse of primary solipsism. When self-sufficient subjectivity is 
the ground on which the ‘with’ is thought, ‘coexistence’ cannot be revealed in 
its heteronomy.
To attempt to shed light on heteronomy is to refuse the effacement by modem
subjectivity of its own constitution by otherness, and to allow otherness and
‘selfhood’ to be disclosed outside of a subjectivist grasping. Rethinking the
relationship between selfhood and alterity does not merely seek to ‘reverse an
oppositional dissymmetry while leaving the opposition and its terms intact’;
rather, the consideration of heteronomy
seeks to articulate a relation other than that of opposition itself, a relation of 
differential intrication in which die involvement of terms with each other 
constitutes their only identity or quidity.84
The first step towards the grasping of heteronomy and the enabling of 
coexistence beyond composition must begin with a challenge to the 
assumptions of non-relationality and self-sufficiency, usually bound up in the 
notion of ‘autonomy.’ Autonomy has to do with freedom and ‘absolute 
autoactivity, a spontaneity and a power of man to determine himself on his
81 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 138-139.
82 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 139.
83 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 139.
84 Both in Thomas Trezise, ‘Foreword,’ in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject o f  
Philosophy, trans. Thomas Trezise, Hugh J. Silverman, Gary M. Cole. Timothy D. Bent, Karen 
McPherson, and Claudette Sartiliot, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xv.
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own.’85 But why, asks Paul Standish ‘should we have anything to say against 
autonomy, why feel any reservations about this sort of ideal’86 intricately 
related as this is ‘in a fundamental way with many aspects of our freedom and 
with the related notion of our individuality.’87 Yet, what the thesis seeks to 
challenge is the fallout from this kind of autonomy as an attribute. As Ute 
Guzzoni suggests autonomy has, in many a configuration of the modem 
subject, been related to mastery over otherness: ‘[t]he subject is posited as 
autonomously determining in relation to an object which is determined by it; 
its autonomy is revealed in a relation of domination over everything which is 
not itself.’88
Asking the question of heteronomy, however, does not only understand the 
mandate of otherness to refer only to really-existing others; rather, it is equally 
interested in the suppression of the otherness, the strangeness, of human 
existence, which autonomy similarly effaces. There are, then, two concerns 
about ‘otherness* in the thesis. The first is how the logic of composition 
reduces the phenomena of sociality to co-presence of already constituted 
subjects. The second relates to how the subject’s otherness, its heteronomy, 
how it is other to itself is grasped as subject. It will be argued in the course of 
the thesis that it is only when selfhood is grasped beyond the subject, that 
coexistence itself will be thought beyond addition or composition.
Prior to further exploration of the ontological basis of coexistence 
‘heteronomy’ as a term should defy a fixed definition, because any definition, 
which might be given presently, has to come from within a subjectivist ground. 
Yet, awareness of the futility of accessing heteronomy within the language of 
the subject does not obviate the need for something like a ‘working definition’ 
of the term. The term heteronomy ought to be taken at this stage as nothing but 
a formal indication, in the sense that it indicates a potential meaning without
85 Julia Kristeva, Crisis o f  the European Subject, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other 
Press, 2000), 119.
86 Paul Standish, Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Limits o f  Language, 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 170.
87 Standish, Beyond the Self, 210.
88 Ute Guzzoni, “Do We Still Want to Be Subjects?,” in Simon Critchley and Peter Dews 
(eds.), Deconstructive Subjectivities (Albany: State University o f New York, 1996), 201-216, 
203.
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strict determination, leaving open the definition of heteronomy to be 
illuminated through the discussion. Thus, the term heteronomy should be 
considered as a ‘formal indicator’ for a phenomenon still obscured by 
subjectivist thinking. As such, it only serves as a placeholder for unfixed 
meanings, which indicate something as yet to be properly discussed.
The usage of ‘heteronomy,’ therefore, warns of a phenomenal awareness of 
something like ‘heteronomy’ but its determination (which may very well 
require a reformulation in the assumptions of formally indicated ‘heteronomy’) 
will be momentary and gradual. In some sense, heteronomy means 
‘constitutive otherness,’ but also entails within it another meaning, that of
being-other-directed.89 Furthermore, and this is the meaning that challenges the
/
predominant feature of non-relational subjectivity, heteronomy could be seen 
to indicate being-radically-in-relation. Yet another possible sense of the term 
arise when one asks what it is that compels thinking towards the questioning of 
modem subjectivity. How is an aporia created in something as complete and 
self-actualising as the constellation of modem subjectivity? As Foucault noted, 
the achievement of subjectivity is a continuous process, a ‘ceaseless task’ 
within which is contained the possibility of the failure of totalisation and 
closure.90 To think of this failure, is to think of the space in which subjectivity 
(putting this term under erasure awaiting its rearticulation) can be rethought. 
‘The subject is thus indeed already, between the lines (and thanks to a 
retrospective reading), what threatens.. .But why is the subject threatening? 
And what is it, in the subject, that threatens?’91 What is it ‘which, in the 
subject, deserts (has always already deserted) the subject itself and leads to 
‘the dissolution, the defeat of the subject or as the subject: the (de)construction 
of the subject or the “loss” of the subject—if indeed one can think the loss of 
what one has never had, a kind of “originary” and “constitutive” loss (of 
“self’).’92 It will be argued that, not only something in the subject ‘threatens’ 
its own construction but that, in its making itself secure it fails to adequately
89 See Heller, A Theory o f  Modernity, 227.
90 Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things: Archaeology o f  the Human Sciences, (London: 
Tavistock Publications, 1974), 324.
91 Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject o f Philosophy, 79-80.
92 Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject o f  Philosophy, 82.
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efface its own heteronomous constitution. Heteronomy, then, is the remainder 
that subjectivity could not erase.
Finally, heteronomy denies the premise of individuality understood as self­
constitution, but considers the fact of singularity, because ‘behind the theme of 
the individual, but beyond it, lurks the question of singularity.’93 As Nancy 
argues, ‘singularity never has the nature of individuality. Singularity never 
takes place at the level of atoms, those identifiable, if not identical identities’; 
rather singularity has to do with the inclination or disposition to otherness.94 In 
addition to the violent erasure of otherness with subjectivity, the self- 
understanding of self as subject is phenomenologically inadequate.
6. The structure o f the project
The project is divided into two substantive parts. Chapter two is illustrative of 
manifestations of composition in both traditional and critical international 
political thought. It provides a brief historical trajectory of the modem subject 
and examines the interplay of subjectivity, otherness, and coexistence in 
Thomas Hobbes’s account of the social contract arising in the state of nature, 
which is one of the most lasting and powerful manifestations of the logic of 
composition, especially for International Relations. The logic of composition, 
however, surfaces in accounts that seek to provide an account of subjectivity 
that go beyond the subject, or, stated otherwise, that problematise the relaince 
of modem subjectivity. The investigation of David Campbell’s influential 
critical perspective shows that the logic of composition is inadvertently 
operating despite his concerted efforts to ground his work on Levinas’ account 
of subjective constitution through the face-to-face encounter, efforts which 
have received great attention amongst scholars interested in rearticulating 
world-political interaction. Campbell’s theory still harbours and is impeded in 
an unstated, residual ‘contractarianism.’ The discussions of Hobbes and 
Campbell remain brief illustrations of the logic of composition, however,
93 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 6.
94 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 6-7.
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because the thesis seeks to investigate the possibility of an ontological account 
which can arrest the articulation of coexistence as co-presence or composition.
The second part of the thesis then, falls loosely within what Stephen K. White 
has called ‘the recent ontological drift.’ In order to think of coexistence as a 
question and to gesture towards a possibility of theorising it otherwise than 
composition, an ontological examination of the entity normally conceived as 
subject is called for. The conditions of possibility for an alternative framing of 
coexistence lie in the initiation of a process of ‘unworking subjectivity.’ This 
process has as its starting point the search for a method through which to 
access and express the ‘facticity’ of entities. This is found in the early thought 
of German philosopher Martin Heidegger and his rearticulation of 
interpretative phenomenology, which is examined in chapter three.
Chapter four, then, undertakes the phenomenological examination o f Dasein95 
(Being-there) in the project of fundamental ontology, largely contained within 
his seminal work Being and Time. Within the phenomenology of everyday 
existence can be found ‘an optics of coexistence,’ a host of elements that 
‘unwork’ the presuppositions of the subjectivist ontology of IR. Through these 
elements, coexistence is shown phenomenally to be the primary fact of 
Dasein’s existence. Theoretically, such an account of primary sociality renders 
unstable the terms of subjectivist discourse through which ethical and political 
issues of coexistence are conceptualised. The disclosure of Dasein as 
coexistential and heteronomously embedded in the world. Such an optics is 
what can be called a heterology or a discourse where the other is primary, but 
also an other discourse, one which attempts to defy the dominance of 
subjectivity and which shows that selfhood is coexistentially heteronomous.96
95 See both Martin Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics o f  Facticity, trans. John van Buren 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 5 and Heidegger, Being and Time, 67.
96 Robert Bemasconi rightly points out two phases in the attempt to go beyond the domination 
o f modem subjectivity in Heidegger’s thought. Summarily stated, Heidegger in his earlier 
period was concerned with ‘destroying’ or ‘de-constructing’ the history of ontology and 
providing a phenomenological account of the structures of Dasein. In the 1930s, however, this 
project became reconfigured into a history of Being (Seynsgeschichte), which attempts not to 
provide ontologically informed alternatives to modem subjectivity. Rather, Heidegger realised 
that what he initially had assumed was a decline associated with the subjectivism of the 
modem age marked ‘the sending of that which brings the completion of Western metaphysics:
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Heidegger’s ‘optics of coexistence’ and his ‘calls for the overcoming of 
subjectivity as the constitutive feature of man,’97 engages in a process of 
‘unworking of subjectivity,’ which lets heteronomy show itself. Chapter five, 
moreover, continues this task by discussing how Dasein becomes aware of its 
own heteronomy through a process of becoming-proper.
The task of thesis does not stop here, however. It essential to emphasise that 
the account given by Heidegger in Being and Time amounts to an existential 
heteronomy, which forces us to relinquish the determination of coexistence as 
composition. The unworking that chapter four undertakes does not seek to 
replace the ‘subject’ with another account of ontological certainty. It is, on the 
contrary, the problematising of assumptions that aims at creating the possibility 
for thinking of coexistence beyond composition. Thus, chapters six and seven 
ask how might a new understanding of coexistence be articulated, if it can no 
longer be conceived as mere co-presence. To think of coexistence on the basis 
of the heteronomous facticity of selfhood involves two steps, both of which 
involve the interrogation of ethical and political terms towards which 
coexistence might turn after the disruption of its determination as co-presence. 
As chapter six shows, calling ethics into question recovers ‘an ethical’ self that 
sees itself as an openness to alterity. Chapter seven, brings this recovery of the 
‘ethical’ self to bear on political self-sufficiency. Chapter seven, moreover, 
examines the possibility of conceptualising the constitution of coexistence 
beyond composition, through what it calls ‘critical mimesis’ and considers how
representation, subjectivity, certainty, and Historie itself.’ Robert Bemasconi, Heidegger in 
Question: The Art o f  Existing (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1993), 167. See also pp. 
150-169 and also Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. Krell, David Farrell,, Vol. IV: Nihilism 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1991), 86-120. This became known as ‘Die Kehre’ or the ‘turn’ 
in Heidegger’s thinking Martin Heidegger, “The Turning,” trans. William Lovitt, in Martin 
Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1977), 36-49. The question to this project becomes, then, why pursue the 
phenomenological-ontological project at such length, since Heidegger himself turned away 
from it towards the history of Being. I think that it is best to cite David Wood, who cautions 
that engagements with the early work are still productive, arguing that the turn to the history of 
Being ‘is surely too much of a reaction to a predominantly subjectcentered tradition, and as a 
reaction, flawed.’ David Wood, “Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger 
on Time,” in John Sallis (ed.), Reading Heidegger: Commemorations (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), 153.
97 Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure o f Difference: Philosophy after Nietzche and Heidegger, 
trans. Cyprian Blamires and Thomas Harrison (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 47.
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this account might become the basis of future research for thinking about 
‘community’ in an era of globalisation.
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Chapter 2
Manifestations of Composition: Discourses 
Traditional and Critical
We think restlessly within familiar frameworks to avoid 
thought about how our thinking is framed.
William E. Connolly1
How does coexistence come to be articulated through the ‘logic of 
composition,’ as a condition of joining distinct, previously unrelated ‘units’? 
The equating of coexistence to composition, it is argued here, becomes 
possible in a political thinking based on modem subjectivity. Presently, it is 
necessary to examine in greater detail the historical development of ‘the 
subject,’ so that the ontological commitment of International Relations (IR) to 
modem subjectivity can be illustrated. Such a discussion enables, it is hoped, 
the illustration of how coexistence is manifested as composition once the 
grounding in the modem subject has occurred. On the ground of modem 
subjectivity, as described briefly in the introduction, a number of accounts of 
political coexistence (and more specifically, of ‘communal constitution’) have 
arisen in the modem age,2 which take different perspectives on government 
and the creation of political order. Martin Wight’s reflections on the traditions 
of international political thought suggest, in this regard, a number of political 
philosophic accounts which have grounded the theoretical perspectives of 
International Relations (IR). Wight has, in this regard, distinguished between 
Realist, Rationalist, and Revolutionist legacies, loosely associated with 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Immanuel Kant, respectively.3 Despite their 
diversity, they do determine coexistence on the basis of composition to a 
greater or lesser extent.
1 William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 4.
2 I delineate ‘the modem age’ not necessarily as a historical spectrum, but an era where certain 
philosophic concerns become prevalent, see section 1 below, Jurgen Habermas, Theory and 
Practice, trans. John Viertel, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), and Connolly, Political Theory 
and Modernity.
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Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to exemplify in detail how the 
logic of composition operates in all the traditions and the breadth of thinkers 
included in Wight’s typology, this chapter seeks to illustrate how the 
assumptions of subjectivity affect the understanding of coexistence in both 
‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ discourses prominent in IR. As an example, then, of 
this effect the present chapter focuses on certain aspects of the political 
philosophy of seventeenth century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes for the 
following three reasons. First, Hobbes reconfigures the emerging attributes of 
early modem subjectivity for the purposes of his political theory, by 
specifically reformulating reason and mastery into a self-interested subject 
concerned with survival and self-preservation. The Hobbesian infusion of 
danger into the ontological basis of the modem subject inserts the notion of 
self-preservation as part of the mastery of the subject. Hobbes’ reconfiguration 
is an example of how different distinct modem philosophies re-articulate the 
main features of modem subjectivity. Although re-articulations of modem 
subjectivity can vary widely, there exists a basic question, revolving around the 
very concern about subjectivity, which is distinctive of modem philosophy. As 
Dieter Sturma and Karl Ameriks argue, modem philosophy ‘has combined 
perspectives that construct and criticize the standpoint of subjectivity.. .but 
without thereby giving up the notion of the self.’4
Second, his account of the creation of a civil and orderly commonwealth out of 
a ‘state of nature,’ through the establishment of a social contract, has been one 
of the more lasting and powerful manifestations of the ‘logic of composition,’ 
a composition that is, in his case, permeated by danger. Third, Hobbes’s 
political philosophy clearly illustrates the interconnectedness of subjectivity, 
composition, and otherness. Hobbes’s Leviathan contains an extensive 
heterology, a logos ofiabout the other, which sustains his political theoretic 
construction. Specifically, his reconfiguration of modem subjectivity leads to 
the specific understanding of the other-as-enemy, where the other is
3 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, (London: Leicester University 
Press for RIIA, 1991).
4 Dieter Sturma and Karl Ameriks, “Introduction,” in Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma (eds.), 
The Modem Subject: Conceptions o f  the Self in Classical German Philosophy (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995), 1-2.
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encountered through an ‘ethos of survival’ as an enemy which must be 
survived.5 The effect of the interplay between subjectivity and composition is a 
political theory of coexistence, which exhibits all the characteristics of the 
‘logic of composition’ as outlined in chapter one, namely, tentativeness, 
tendency to failure and non-constitutive, controlled, relationality.
In addition to this ‘traditional’ discourse, the chapter examines how 
coexistence as composition is an implicit assumption in discourses that aim 
towards a greater ‘moral inclusivity’ and that seek to offer ethical alternatives 
to modem subjectivity. Specifically, David Campbell’s reflections on 
responsibility and just governance are exemplary of a critical perspective of IR 
that results in the logic of composition, despite trying to remain faithful to its 
grounding in the philosophy of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas.6 
Campbell rightly attempts to surpass the ethical parameters of the modem 
subject, and his work merits acknowledgement for highlighting the need to 
move beyond territorial notions of ethical responsibility in IR. It might still be 
argued, however, that even within such a critical account anchored on the 
phenomenology of subjective constitution found in Levinas, there is a residual 
contractarianism at play at the level of inter-state action, at the specific point of 
transference of responsibility to international action. This contractual 
mechanism required for the dissemination of this notion of responsibility 
allows the implicit assumption of composition to make itself evident and 
detracts from the otherwise innovative effort to consider alternatives to modem 
subjectivity. It becomes, therefore, increasingly difficult to adopt or use this 
perspective for a reconsideration of coexistence.
5 A certain ethos of survival has been acutely influential for the perspective of political realism 
in International Relations and more generally for discourses which invoke the notion of 
anarchy. See Louiza Odysseos, “Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical 
Theorising in International Relations,” Review o f  International Studies forthcoming (2002).
6 See David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
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1. The modem subject in historical context
The modern subject has been at the centre o f social 
and political inquiry even i f  by negation.
Simon Critchley and Peter Dews7
As Simon Critchley and Peter Dews note in the preceding epigraph, the 
modem subject has been holding court over the philosophic endeavours of the 
modem era. In this century it has become the focus of numerous divergent 
philosophies, with often contradictory aims and ends. To talk about ‘the 
modem subject’ is not to claim that a unifying conception of it holds for all 
modem philosophy. Rather, its importance suggests that modem philosophy 
might be seen as ‘a set of variations on a theme* of the subject,8 which 
originated in Continental philosophy, and where it received extensive attention, 
but also substantive critique.9
Jane Flax notes that after the seventeenth century two related but distinct views 
about the subject dominated philosophic debate:
[o]ne is the Cartesian idea of the self as an ahistoric, solid indwelling entity 
that grounds the possibility of rational thought. In turn the self is accessible 
and transparent to such thought. The defining characteristic of this self is to 
engage in abstract rational thought, including thought about its own 
thought.. .The second idea is the Humean-empirical one. This self and its 
knowledge are derived from sense experience.10
Paul Standish notes, however, that what is known as ‘analytical’ philosophy 
has been similarly preoccupied with modem subjectivity. He suggests that
7 Simon Critchley and Peter Dews, “Introduction,” in Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (eds.), 
Deconstructive Subjectivities (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 1.
8 David Carr, The Paradox o f Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 30.
9 Simon Critchley, “What is Continental Philosophy?,” International Journal o f  Philosophical 
Studies 5, no. 3 (1997): 347-365; Andrew Bowie, “Rethinking the History o f the Subject: 
Jacobi, Shelling, and Heidegger,” in Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (eds.), Deconstructive 
Subjectivities (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 105-126; Etienne Balibar, 
“Citizen Subject,” in Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds.), Who Comes 
After the Subject? (New York: Routledge, 1991), 33-57; Etienne Balibar, “Subjection and 
Subjectivation,” in Joan Copjec (ed.), Supposing the Subject (London: Verso, 1994), 1-15; and 
finally, Agnes Heller, “Death of the Subject?” in George Levine (ed.), Constructions o f  the Self 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 269-284 all contest a narrow reading o f the 
term.
10 Jane Flax, Disputed Subjects: Essays on Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 95-96.
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while ‘[a]mongst European philosophers the tendency has been to take [the 
cogito] as an immediate datum of conscious experience; in the Anglo- 
American tradition it is the self-generating character of the utterance which is 
regarded as key.’11 From its philosophic origins, the modem subject has 
become the cornerstone, the underlying premise, of much theoretic inquiry and 
has provided the unit of analysis for the majority of the ‘social’ sciences. In 
order to elucidate the problematic of coexistence as one which obeys a certain 
‘logic of composition,’ it is necessary to provide an account of that which is 
operative in this logic and, moreover, of that which makes this logic possible. 
This is to ask the question: ‘what is meant by subjectV The answer that this 
chapter offers can only sketch, in summary form, a historical trajectory of the 
institution of the subject, while bearing in mind that any ‘narration of its story’ 
in such a setting can never be fully inclusive of the resistances and critiques 
rendered against ‘the subject,’ nor of the forms of its many reassertions.12
Subject as hypokeimenon
‘Subject,’ at first glance, appears to translate the term hypokeimenon, which in 
Greek philosophy meant that which lies under, that which predicates 
something else. This apparent relation or identity between ‘subject’ and 
hypokeimenon, however, requires careful consideration because the concept of 
the subject has undergone a reformulation in the modem era which prohibits 
such an immediate equivalence. In Greek philosophy hypokeimenon was 
generally understood together with the term ‘substance’ (ousia) because 
‘[sjubstance is the underlying, persisting foundation which supports everything 
else.’13 For something to be, therefore, it had to be ‘a substance or to be a
11 Paul Standish, Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Limits o f  Language 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 132.
12 Hassan Melehy, Writing Cogito: Montaigne, Descartes and Institution o f  the Modem 
Subject (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 3 denies the possibility o f writing 
about ‘one beginning of the subject in modernity.’ But Meleny also suggests that the story of 
the reassertions of the Cartesian subject, recounted through the debate between Jacques 
Derrida and Michel Foucault about the ‘Cartesian moment for the twentieth century’ in The 
Order o f  Things, illustrate that there are threads of subjectivity which point to a certain 
institutionalisation of the subject through the modem academy which is indicative, if not of a 
‘beginning’ but of a diverse continuity, 27-35.
13 David Carr, “The Question of the Subject: Heidegger and the Transcendental Tradition,” 
Human Studies 17, no. 4 (1995), 404.
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property or predicate of a substance. Substance exists in the primary sense, 
everything else exists “in” substance and thus has a merely secondary and 
dependent way of existing.’14 In Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, 
hypokeimenon refers to ‘that of which all other entities are predicated but 
which is itself not predicated of anything else,’ that which does not require 
further foundation.15 For the Greeks, then, subject indicated a predicate which 
acted as a foundation ‘which persists through change, the sub-stratum, and 
which has a function analogous to matter (hule). It is matter which persists 
through the changes that form (morphe) imposes on it.’16 These brief 
references to a pre-modem meaning of ‘subject’ as hypokeimenon, make clear 
that the term ‘names that-which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers 
everything onto itself.’17
What is missing from this description of what ‘subject’ meant in a pre-modem 
context for the ancient Greek philosophy is any relation or equation of 
hypokeimenon to ‘man’ or human being. As the 20th century German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger argued, ‘ [tjhis metaphysical meaning of the 
concept of subject has first of all no special relationship to man and none at all 
to the I.’18 In his own work on modem metaphysics he opposed a subjectivist 
re-reading of Greek philosophy.19 He also emphasised the sea-change which 
came about in modernity, and particularly with the principle ego cogito, ergo 
sum put forward as the essential feature of selfhood by French philosopher 
Rene Descartes in the 17th century.20 Heidegger understood ‘all metaphysics’ to
14 Carr, “The Question of the Subject,” 404.
15 Simon Critchley, “Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity,” in Simon 
Critchley and Peter Dews (eds.), Deconstructive Subjectivities (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1996), 13.
16 Critchley, “Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity,” 13.
17 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” trans. William Lovitt, in Martin 
Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1977), 128.
18 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 128.
19 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell Krell, Vol. IV: Nihilism (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1991), 91-95.
20 See Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins o f  Modernity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Walter Soffer, From Science to Subjectivity: 
An Interpretation o f  Descartes' Meditations (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987); Richard 
A. Watson, The Breakdown o f  Cartesian Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); Bernard 
Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” Man and World 16 (1983), 3-23; and
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be ‘characterized by “subjectity”, but in modem philosophy this is transformed 
into “subjectivity.”’21 Whereas subjectum or hypokeimenon had meant the 
underlying, unchanging predicate which itself required no further foundation 
but denoted no relation to man or the ‘I,’ with the advent of modem 
metaphysics ‘man’ asserts himself as this final ground.
Man as subjectum
The inception of subjectivity is closely related to the increasing concern with
the individual in the 17th century. As Paul Barry Clarke notes, ‘[tjhis is no
mere accident’; such an interest in the individual as subject is ‘a clear
consequence of the breakdown of the medieval order’22 and is evident in
several thinkers of that time. The creation of a relationship between man, seen
as the ultimate predicate (hypokeimenon), and constancy, in the sense of
continuous presence and certainty, must be grasped within the context of 17th
century metaphysics and the space created by the loss of certainty associated
with pre-modem cosmology. The collapse of divine ultimate foundations,
however, required the formulation of a new ground. Man as final foundation
had not only to be itself one that was certain, but since every standard o f  
m easure from any other sphere was forbidden, it had at the same time to be o f 
such a kind that through it the essence o f  the freedom  claim ed would be 
posited as self certainty.23
Thus, the disavowal of medieval metaphysics seeks a modernist kind of
grounding which, in effect, works as ‘man’s making himself secure as
subiectum.'24 As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have argued,
the seventeenth century [brought about] the collapse o f  the view  o f  the 
cosmos as a meaningful order within which man occupied a precise and 
determ ined place -  and the replacement o f  this view by a self-defining 
conception o f the subject, as an entity maintaining relations o f  exteriority w ith 
the rest o f  the universe.25
Joseph Claude Evans, The Metaphysics o f  Transcendental Subjectivity: Descartes, Kant and 
W. Sellars (Amsterdam: Verlag B.R. Griiner, 1984).
21 Martin Heidegger, “Metaphysics as History of Being,” trans. Joan Stambaugh, in Martin 
Heidegger, The End o f  Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 46-47 cited in Carr, 
“The Question o f the Subject,” 404.
22 Paul Barry Clarke, Autonomy Unbound (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 15.
23 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 148.
24 Heidegger, “The Age o f the World Picture,” 142.
25 Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), 94, brackets added.
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According to Heidegger, the philosophy of Rene Descartes, specifically, 
played a grounding role in the establishment of man as subject.26 Cartesian 
thought enabled the philosophical development of modem subjectivity as the 
primary ground by emphatically placing the subject as the final foundation of 
rigorous science. As Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins note in their 
overview of the history of philosophy ‘Descartes was the philosopher who 
most dramatically insisted on the simultaneous turn to subjectivity and the use 
of logic...to argue his way to objectivity.’27 David Carr goes as far to suggest, 
that in fact,
[bjeneath the surface o f a language that m etaphysically valorizes the 
“objective” over the “subjective” ...lies an ontology that precisely the reverse.
For in spite o f  all orientation towards the objective, in m odem  philosophy and 
especially science, it is the subject.. .which exists in the prim ary sense, while 
the objective is reduced to something secondary.28
The modem articulation of reflection as constitutive for subjectivity, in the
form of the Cartesian cogito, played a grounding role for subsequent
philosophising and theorising. Heidegger regarded that,
[a]t the beginning o f  m odem  philosophy stands Descartes’ statement Ego  
cogito, ergo sum , “I think, therefore I am ”. All consciousness o f  things and o f 
beings as a whole is referred back to the self-consciousness o f  the hum an 
subject as the unshakable ground o f all certainty.29
The liberation of man from the medieval schematic of salvation required the 
creation of its replacement in the form of a different, human-based, self- 
sufficient kind of certainty30 and Descartes’s position is this transition ‘was to 
ground the metaphysical ground o f man’s liberation in the new freedom of
26 Melehy suggests that Montaigne’s thought had unsettled ‘much of the old philosophy’ that 
had served to ‘clear the way for Descartes.’ Whereas Montaigne’s skepticism had assailed the 
systems of thought of the collapsing medieval period Descartes ‘was the one who assumes his 
skepticism in order to subordinate it, in order to find the ground of certainty required by the 
notion of modernity.’ See Melehy, Writing Cogito, 94.
27 Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, A Short History o f  Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 179.
28 Carr, The Paradox o f  Subjectivity, 18.
29 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 86.
30 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 99.
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self-assured self-legislation’31 to fashion, in other words, a ‘foundation for the 
freeing of man to freedom as the self-determination that is certain of itself532
The distinguishing feature of metaphysics in the modem age, therefore, ‘is that 
the metaphysical foundation is no longer claimed to reside in a form, 
substance, or deity outside of the human intellect but is rather found in the 
human being understood as subject.’33 The assignment of man as subject came 
about, Heidegger argued, because Cartesian inquiry relied on the existing idea 
of substance with which to grasp the ‘essence’ of man. He disregarded an 
analysis of man that would adequately account for his embeddedness within 
the world, relying instead on the idea of substance to describe the world and 
innerworldly entities. Human being became, then, the entity who is defined by 
distinction to substance, as the entity defined by its reflective capacity, the ‘I 
think.’ According to Heidegger, Descartes ‘prescribes for the world its “real” 
Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been 
unveiled and which has not been demonstrated of its own right’34 but is, rather, 
equated with substantiality.35 The res corporea, from which the ego cogito is 
distinguished, is understood as res extensa, as ‘extended substance.’36
What about the human subject, however? Heidegger argues that Descartes 
neglected serious investigation of the latter part of his now famous maxim, of 
the ‘I am,’ the sum, examining solely the ego cogito. In this way, the ‘I am’ in 
the cogito ergo sum is rendered equivalent to presence and to ‘remaining 
constant.’37 In other words, in focusing on the ‘I think’ Descartes created an 
opposition between what makes me certain that I am this entity, the reflective 
‘I think,’ and the fact that I am this entity, the ‘I am.’ In this respect, the 
embodiment of the ‘I think’ is neglected, and this oversight results in its 
equivalence with that against which the ‘I think’ is distinguished, namely,
31 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 100.
32 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 148.
33 Critchley, “Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity,” 15.
34 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), 129.
35 Heidegger, Being and Time, 123.
36 John McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 219.
37 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 219.
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‘extended substance.’ Descartes, therefore, understood human being ‘in the 
very same way as he takes the Being of the res extensa -  namely, as 
substance.’38 Heidegger questioned whether it was phenomenally adequate to 
equate the ‘I am’ with the res extensa and substantiality in general.39
In sum, what distinguished the modem age from the prior medieval era, but 
also from Greek philosophy, is that in modernity ‘man, independently and by 
his own effort, contrives to become certain and sure of his human being the 
midst of beings as a whole.’40 Michel Foucault concurs years later, not only 
that certainty is self-instituted but that ‘the modem cogito. . .is not so much the 
discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless task constantly to be undertaken 
afresh...’41 This echoes Friedrich Nietzsche’s insight that ‘[t]he subject is 
multiplicity that built an imaginary unity for itself.’42 The process of securing 
man as the ground of certainty is, in other words, continuous and reiterative 
and has to be asserted through the subject’s relations with others within its 
world.
The emplacement of man as foundation, moreover, had to ‘make secure as 
certain that being [man] for which such certain knowing must be certain and 
through which everything knowable must be made secure.’43 This transition 
was far from effortless and involved two related steps. The first is the pivotal 
role of thinking-as-representing and the second is the representing-as-securing, 
which, taken together, render ‘man’ as ground. ‘The freeing of the subject to 
freedom,’ liberated man from the medieval schema in which he had been thus 
far incorporated. Man as subject, however, inversely ‘assume[d] a definitive 
relationship of domination with regard to the world in which it represented]
38 Heidegger, Being and Time, 131.
39 Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 85.
40 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 89.
41 Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things: Archaeology o f  the Human Sciences (London: 
Tavistock Publications, 1974), 324.
42 Friedrich Nietzsche, La Volonte de Puissance, trans. G. Bianquis (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), 
1:255, cited in Michel Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, trans. Michael Gendre (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996), 89.
43 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 149, brackets added.
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itself as living.’44 The relation of man-as-subject to existing entities was a 
relation of mastery: the subject relates to the world, and entities within the 
world, as object. As Dalia Judovitz suggests, ‘the subject signifies a new way 
of being human, one that has to do with the rationalization of human 
capabilities through their delimitation and economization in order to master the 
world through representation.’45
The representing subject
The ‘ceaseless task’ of subjectivity is intricately connected to representation 
not only of entities as objects but also of the subject to itself as the subject of 
re-presentation, the subject which presents itself to itself as subject. Lacoue- 
Labarthe contends that the modem subject is ‘the subject that writes itself 
[s’ecrit]: that writes about the subject, that is written about, that is written—in 
short, the subject that is “one,” only insofar as it is in some way or other 
inscribed.'*6 Having already noted that to exist for a subject is ‘to be an object 
or representation of it,’ it has been argued that the relationship of human being 
to the world, to other entities and other human beings within the world, 
becomes one of subject and object.47 As Richard Polt suggests, ‘[sjubjectivism 
pictures the human situation in terms of the subject, object, and a 
representational connection between the two.’48
There results a limitation in relationality, a reduction to representation. As 
Bernard Flynn notes, ‘[w]hat can appear is determined in advance as what can 
be represented to a subject, a subject whose self-representation is the ground of 
all that it represents to itself.’49 But what does that mean for alterity? In the 
first instance, it reduces the spectmm of relationality to self and other, leaving 
no space for an understanding of the self as permeated by alterity, constituted
44 Melehy, Writing Cogito, 3.
45 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 181. This mastery over the world is 
also ‘its major failure’ she argues further.
46 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Echo of the Subject,” trans. Christopher Fynsk, in Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 141.
47 Carr, “The Question of the Subject,” 404-405.
48 Richard Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrage zur Philosophies Political 
Theory 25, no. 5 (1997), 657.
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through and through by otherness. ‘Instead of a medieval hierarchy of relations 
between the Creator and his creatures, Descartes elaborates a new set of 
relations, those of subjectivity and representation.’50 Far from further 
elucidating the self s constitution, the subject of representation ‘is supposed to 
be in complete command of its own consciousness, perfectly self-present or at 
least potentially so.’51 The very character of this subject is representation, 
understood as ‘a gesture of proposal and of proposition by the subject to itself. 
In so doing, Descartes gives representation its character as a command or 
will.’52 Otherness, as the object, ‘is supposed to be a thing that occurs as 
present within a neutral space.’53 It becomes something knowable and 
intelligible because ‘by representing it, that is, by following some procedure 
that will yield the correct picture or account of the object’ it is determined as 
an object distinct and non-related to the subject that presents it to itself.54 
Representation, thus, ‘make[s] the object available for manipulation,’55 
whereas ‘[t]he human subject—as self, ego, or conscious, thinking thing— 
becomes the ultimate foundation upon which entities are rendered intelligible, 
that in virtue of which entities are understandable in their Being.’56 The 
representing subject reduces relationships with otherness and with the world to 
a process of representation and knowledge, although this knowledge is not of 
entities as they are, but rather, a conflation of otherness to sameness. 
Subjectivity ‘takes over all being by objectifying it and reducing it to 
calculable representations, framing it within a world-picture which is a product 
of subjective (human) activity.’57 Through this will and activity ‘in the 
philosophical era extending from Descartes to Hegel, subjectivity ultimately 
negates its own negation, sublates the other as or into itself.’58
49 Flynn, “Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity,” 14.
50 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 126.
51 Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrdge zur Philosophies 657.
52 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 126.
53 Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrdge zur Philosophies 657.
54 Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrdge zur Philosophies 657.
55 Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrdge zur Philosophies 657.
56 Critchley, “Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity,” 15.
57 Carr, ‘The Question of the Subject,” 405.
58 Thomas Trezise, ‘Foreword: Persistence,’ in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject o f  
Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xiv.
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As well as revealing the relations of domination woven by the concept of the 
subject, the relationship between subjectivity, intelligibility, and representation 
is of great ontological significance for the very institution of subjectivity itself. 
Through the grasping and determination of otherness as object the subject 
secures itself: in representing the ‘object* ‘the subject is supposed to be 
capable of representing itself with the object.’59 Thinking-as-representing, 
therefore, does not affect only otherness. The invocation of the dichotomy of 
subject and object recalls ‘the very interval constitutive of the modem 
metaphysics of subjectivity, in which a subject entirely present to itself 
confronts an object present or op-posed to that subject.’60 The emphasis placed 
on representation and intelligibility, in other words, puts into focus the ego 
cogito: man as subject becomes himself reduced to his reflective capacity and 
his mind. Richard Williams and Edwin Gantt suggest that ‘[t]he intellectual 
spirit of modernism is captured and preserved in its finest creation, the 
individual mind as subject, standing over against the world conceived as 
object.*61 As Carr further argues ‘primary being or subjectivity...is conceived 
as the activity, striving or will’62 reified as a mind distinct from its embodiment 
and in control over it. With mind in the ascent the material world and otherness 
becomes purveyed and thought of as non-constitutive, the result of which is the 
consideration of world and people as ‘resources.’63 The opposition of 
subject/object, most prevalently taken as the pursuit of knowledge of inner- 
worldly entities in the name of manipulating them or putting them to use, is 
best exemplified in the domain of scientific inquiry where science is 
transformed into ‘human science.’
59 Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrdge zur Philosophies 657.
60 Trezise, ‘Foreword: Persistence,’ xiii-xiv.
61 Richard N. Williams and Edwin E. Gantt, “Intimacy and Heteronomy: On Grounding 
Psychology in the Ethical,” Theory and Psychology 8, no. 2 (1998), 253, emphasis added.
62 Carr, “The Question of the Subject,” 405.
63 The German word is Bestand. See Martin Heidegger, “The Turning,” trans. William Lovitt, 
in Martin Heidegger (ed.), The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1977), 36-49 and Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture”.
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Science as human science
The human sciences, argued Foucault, cannot be traced to the problem,
obstacle or requirement of a theoretical or practical order to which their
genesis and subsequent institutionalisation is normally attributed. Rather,
their intrinsic possibility, the simple fact that man, w hether in isolation or as a 
group, and for the first time since human beings have existed and have lived 
together in societies, should have become the object o f  science -  that cannot 
be considered or treated as a phenomenon o f  opinion: it is an event in the 
order o f  knowledge.64
Political knowledge is, naturally, of special interest to us and its epistemic 
transformation from the classical age to modernity illustrates three evident 
changes. First, ‘the claim of scientifically grounded social philosophy aims at 
establishing once and for all the conditions for the correct order of the state and 
society as such. Its assertions are to be valid independently of place, time, and 
circumstances, and are to permit an enduring foundation for communal life, 
regardless of the historical situation.’65 Second, the transition from knowledge 
into praxis is now considered a merely technical problem. General conditions 
for order are considered knowable and narrowing the task of politics to ‘the 
correctly calculated generation of rules, relationships, and institutions.’66 The 
third change, most importantly, involves the subject of politics, whose 
behaviour now becomes ‘the material for science,’ itself transformed into the 
deduction and ‘construction of conditions under which human beings, just like 
objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner.’67
The assertion of man as subject and its characteristic self-certainty ‘leads to a 
conception of knowledge as information gathering and processing, which can 
then be exploited to serve the interests of the subject.’68 Thus, all science 
becomes, in some sense, ‘anthropology’: in other words, science is now 
understood from man’s perspective. ‘Anthropology,’ in this instance, 
‘designates that philosophical interpretation of man which explains and
64 Foucault, The Order o f  Things, 345.
65 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 43.
66 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 43.
67 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 43.
68 Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrdge zur P h ilo so p h ie 667.
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evaluates what is, in its entirety, from the standpoint of man and in relation to
man.’69 As Foucault argued, ‘the anthropological configuration of modem
philosophy’ suggests that ‘the pre-critical analysis of what man is in his
essence becomes the analytic of everything that can, in general, be presented to
man’s experience.’70 It is not, however, just that this scientific configuration
evinces technicity and calculability and that these two modes of relating to the
social and physical world have become predominant. The transformation of
science into ‘human’ science or ‘anthropology’ is not without its overtly
political determinations because ‘the modem enterprise is thus also
inextricably tied to a kind of “metaphysical politics”... striving] for a complete
universal self-authorization.’71 In other words, the subject’s positing of itself as
the object of science and the reduction of science to what is representable to
the subject as part of its experience involves the desire towards self-knowledge
and the ability to make total claims about the world. In this way, ‘we come to
know the world “outside” by looking “inside”.’72 This paradoxical ‘arrogance
of knowledge coupled with the seeming humility of critical self-examination,’
however, means that a largely situated perspective can make global claims
about the objectivity of its knowledge amassed subjectively.73 Thus, the rise of
the subject is not merely synonymous with the ‘apotheosis of reason, and the
successful pursuit of knowledge.’74 Rather, the story of science as the
institutionalisation of thinking-as-representing and representing-as-securing is
‘also a story of power and politics.’75 Heidegger admits that
man assumes a special role in metaphysics inasmuch as he seeks, develops, 
grounds, defends, and passes on metaphysical knowledge -  and distorts it. But 
that still does not give us the right to consider him the measure of all things as 
well, to characterize him as the center of all beings, and establish him as 
master of all things.76
69 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 133.
70 Foucault, The Order o f  Things, 340. In this way, ‘the end of man, for its part, is the return of 
the beginning of philosophy,’ p. 342.
71 Robert B. Pippin, “Heideggerean Postmodernism and Metaphysical Politics,” European 
Journal o f  Philosophy 4, no. 1 (1996), 23.
72 Solomon and Higgins, A Short History o f Philosophy, 178.
73 Solomon and Higgins, A Short History o f Philosophy, 178.
74 Solomon and Higgins, A Short History o f  Philosophy, 178.
75 Solomon and Higgins, A Short History o f  Philosophy, 178.
76 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 86.
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The subject of international politics
While philosophy has been preoccupied with notions of subjectivity for the 
better part of this century and has involved a process of self-critique since the 
very advent of the enlightenment,77 it appears that in the more applied fields of 
the human sciences, the modem subject has taken hold and is still generally 
accepted as the basis of inquiry. C. Fred Alford has observed that, in political 
theory and political science, as well as social science in general, theorisations 
of the ‘self always involve trade-offs. Often authors will ‘weaken, split, and 
shatter the integrity of the self, in order to render it more tractable, or more 
ideal/78 The purpose of these manipulations of the self is, of course, to write 
social or political theory which fulfils certain functions and allows certain 
normative concerns to be realised theoretically. The self, thus, is considered to 
be little more than ‘a dependent variable in this or that social theory.’79 If 
Alford is correct in his opinion, this might also explain why ontology is not a 
major concern in social and political theory, although in some respects this 
may be changing.80 Alford contends, not without irony, that for most social 
scientists ‘more subtle and complex models [of the self] may be interesting, but 
they are not necessary to do real social science.’81 It is interesting to ask as to 
the extent to which his comment, ironic as it may be, could not also be 
appropriate for IR as a social science, and significantly as a social science not 
really concerned with ‘people’ at all, although again exceptions can be found.82 
Furthermore, ‘subtle and complex models’ of the self might be what is required
77 For objections to this account of the modem subject see Bowie, “Rethinking the History of 
the Subject,” and Etienne Balibar, “Subjection and Subjectivation.” On the notion of critique 
as embodied in the ethos of the enlightenment see Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 
trans. Catherine Porter, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (London: Penguin, 1984), 
32-50.
78 C. Fred Alford, The Self in Social Theory: A Psychoanalytic Account o f  its Construction in 
Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), vii.
79 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, vii.
80 Stephen K. White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection,” Political Theory 25, no. 4 
(1997): 502-523 documents a recent rise in interest in ontology, and in IR Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory o f  International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) has 
attempted to conduct an ontological examination of the state-system.
81 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, 3, brackets added.
82 IR scholars interested in ethics have questioned subjectivity, see Vivienne Jabri, “Restyling 
the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations,” Millennium 27, no. 3 (1998): 591 - 
611. Also critical international relations names subjectivity as a neglected area in IR, see R. B. 
J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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for a reconsideration of coexistence as an issue of primary importance for 
international politics.
It might be contentious to suggest that the ontological assumptions on which 
IR grounds coexistence are centred on the individual subject. However, the 
disciplinary position of IR can be ascertained to lie within the modernist 
tradition and to share its fundamental metaphysical positions about human 
beings as sovereign and self-sufficient. Martin Wight classified IR theories into 
three schools made up of realists, rationalists, and revolutionists, because these 
perspectives take their assumptions from philosophical movements or schools 
which bear those names, although, as he rightly notes not without 
‘debasement.’83 Can one really claim that these rest on a common 
understanding of subjectivity? Yet, is this really the claim put forward here, 
namely, that post-Cartesian philosophy is identical to the Cartesian 
articulation? Not at all. The claim put forward here, rather, suggests not 
identity among philosophies of the modem era about their consideration of 
subjectivity, but an inherent centrality within them of the notion of the subject. 
The suggestion is that with modernity philosophy becomes grounded in the 
human being as subject, although there are a number of differentiated features 
of that subject proposed by various thinkers. Cartesian philosophy has effected 
a change in the terms of discourse, so that post-Cartesian philosophy takes its 
problematique from the cogito. Whereas in Descartes, one finds no explicit 
mention of ‘subject,’ the discursive parameters change after his contribution.
Let us consider briefly the first two ‘schools of thought’ noted explicitly by 
Wight, which trace their lineage to Hobbes and Locke, as examples of the 
ontological centrality of the subject with its modem features but also as 
illustrations of the different political theories which can arise from the basis of 
such centrality.84 It is crucial to discuss Hobbes within this enquiry because his
83 Wight, International Theory, 15 and also 7-24.
84 For Immanuel Kant, see Evans, The Metaphysics o f  Transcendental Subjectivity, David Carr, 
“Kant: Subjectivity and Apperception,” in Carr, The Paradox o f  Subjectivity, and the essays in 
Ameriks and Sturma (eds.), The Modem Subject. Kant has also received treatment in 
International Relations scholarship, see Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique, and Politics 
(New York: Routledge, 1996), Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in 
International Relations,” Review o f International Studies 16, no. 3 (1990), M. Hakan
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work can illustrate how, although, harshly differing from some generalised 
modem understanding of the subject, the features of modem subjectivity 
become reformulated in a unique and politically useful way to ground his 
political philosophy of the creation of a civil commonwealth. Hobbes, is a 
contemporary of Descartes and displays a parallel move which one might call 
‘modernist’ with his reliance on certain features of subjectivity.85 Hobbesian 
subjectivity is amongst the earliest modem reconfigurations of human being 
out of a medieval schema, although his articulation retains some archaic 
characteristics.86 The Hobbesian subject utilises its natural right towards 
modernist concerns. The self is endowed with autonomous will and mastery 
over material nature. His equality with other such subjects amounts to a self- 
induced vulnerability, compounded by ‘the state of nature’ where the lack of a 
sovereign authority provides the structural parameters of anarchy. Hobbes re- 
articulates the features of the modem subject, reason and mastery, in a 
differentiated way, to achieve the self-interested subject of survival. The 
modernist infusion comes with the elucidation of the ‘flash of reason,* which 
refers to man’s capacity to use this endowment in order to calculate his self- 
interest and to mitigate against his vulnerability. It is this capacity for self- 
interest and rationality which succeeds in extracting man out of the ‘warre of 
all against all’ in the state of nature and which enables man to give up his free 
will and to acquiesce willingly to the civil commonwealth. Reason, then, is 
instrumental in activating and facilitating the realisation of desires; it assists, in 
other words, intentionality in the pursuit of purposive action. Hobbes is 
amongst the first thinkers to endow the state with selfhood, to consider it an
Seckinelgin, The Law o f the Sea and the South Pacific: An Ecological Critique o f  the 
Philosophical Basis o f  International Relations (Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 2000), and Andrew Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political 
Community: Ethical Foundations o f  the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998).
85 There are, of course, a number of differences between the Cartesian and Hobbesian 
formulations of subjectivity. Descartes was a dualist and an advocate o f ‘free will’ while 
Hobbes is a monist, a materialist and a determinist. However, ‘[wjhatever the differences 
between Hobbes and his successors and Descartes and his successors might be, what they tend 
to share is an initial concern with the individual...What they and their successors held in 
common was the phenomenon of individualism and consciously or unconsciously (probably 
the latter) a need to explain what Maine was later to call the shift from “status to contract”.’ 
Clarke, Autonomy Unbound, 15.
86 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, chapter 5. Which is why, of course, Hobbes is not 
included in Michel Foucault’s understanding of the modem episteme. See Foucault, The Order 
o f  Things, xxii.
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‘Artificiall Man,’ which has been as constitutive of IR discourse as the sum of 
his construction of the state of nature has formed the basis for political realism.
The Lockean account is even more embedded within, and serves to extend, the 
subjectivist project. For Locke, consciousness helps to form a distinct personal 
identity of individual units through the act of ‘holding ambivalent and 
contradictory passions together’ and the ability to ‘claim and exert ownership’ 
over man’s actions,87 which are concerned with labour and property. The reign 
of consciousness is paramount in the Second Treatise which intended ‘not to 
quell the desire for unlimited mastery, domination and acquisition but to 
rechannel it (sublimation) into the acquisition of property’ because this was 
regarded by Locke as the weakest and gentlest form of mastery.88 In this vein, 
Locke reified the notion of acquisition, through which, he contended, we 
produce and increase value for others but, furthermore, by increasing our 
accumulations ‘we make ourselves vulnerable to the social.’89 His theory of 
governance reflects this primacy of proprietary consciousness because ‘the 
authority of government derives from the consent of the governed’ whose 
foremost identity is linked to onwership.90 Not only does the existence of 
government arise from the consent of the governed, ‘but its structures and 
limits’ are also determined in this way.91 Locke considers that ‘any 
Community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being 
necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary that the 
Body should move that way whither that greater force carries it, which is the 
consent of the majority...’92 As John McCumber argues, community and 
society are conceived as ‘a body composed.. .of independently moving 
individuals’ which voluntarily consent to constitute themselves as a ‘body.’93
87 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, 114 and 115.
88 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, 117.
89 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, 120.
90 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 152.
91 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 152.
92 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 
96.
93 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 155.
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This brief illustration suggests that despite their renowned and sharp difference 
regarding the characteristics they attribute to subjectivity, and the political 
theoretic result of these differences, modem subjectivity is what allows both 
Hobbes and Locke to articulate their political thought in the way in which they 
do. Far from agreeing on the particulars they put the attributes of modem 
subjectivity to work in radically differentiated political theories. These 
theories, however, are united by their grounding on modem subjectivity even if 
their reformulations of it are varied. But it is not only traditional accounts of 
international politics which avail a view of the ontological centrality of the 
modem subject. The discipline of IR takes its subject to be the modem subject 
and this can be seen in at least three ways. First, IR as the study of the 
interactions of states seen through their statesmen and diplomats, engages with 
the modem subject in its utmost interpretation, namely, the secular, self- 
interested subject of modem politics.94 Second, the entities of IR undergo a 
process of anthropomorphisation, so that non-human or pluralistic actors, the 
most prevalent being the state, assume a number of the characteristics 
attributed to human being as subject, such as purposive behaviour, self- 
sufficiency, and rationality. This is not only an occurrence in IR but is the case 
with social theory in general, which takes its object of inquiry, society or 
community, as the ‘absolutization of subjectivity.’95
Third, the resurgence of critically-disposed theorising in IR has returned 
disciplinary attention to, and effected an acceptance of, the study of 
‘individuals.’96 This had been customarily neglected by political realists, who 
took their unit to be the sovereign state (as subject), especially following the 
pervasive turn to structuralism in the late 1970s.97 Of course, liberal political 
theory assumes ‘individual human beings as the primary international actors’ 
and states as pluralistic actors whose interests and functions are determined by
94 See, Robert H. Jackson, “The Political Theory o f International Society,” in Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
95 Heidegger cited in Karsten Harries, “Heidegger as a Political Thinker,” in Michael Murray 
(ed.), Heidegger and Modem Philosophy: Critical Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1978), 304.
96 John W. Burton, most notably, had been at the forefront of emphasising the need to focus on 
individuals. See, John W. Burton, Conflict: Human Needs Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1990).
97 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
58
bargaining, elections and contestations amongst groups of individuals.98 Until 
the early 1990s realism was harshly distinct from its opposing paradigm, 
liberal internationalism but a most interesting development of the 1990s is 
what Ole Weaver and others have called the ‘neo-neo synthesis,’ between neo­
realist and neo-liberalist approaches to IR after the discipline’s ‘third debate.’ 
In this synthetic move, methodology and key assumptions of the two 
perspectives appear to have converged particularly regarding ‘anarchy’ and 
‘rationality.’99 The ‘neo-neo synthesis’ offers a unique opportunity for 
ontological examination because it reveals for the first time the unanimity 
between these two alternative worldviews on international politics, whose 
assumptions about the subject can hardly be prohibitive to such a convergence.
As an epiphenomenon of this neo-neo synthesis, Alexander Wendt’s 
constructivist international theory, whose latest statement is Social Theory o f 
International Politics, takes as its premise the state as a ‘purposive actor’ and 
regards that in its social interactions, the state is equivalent to a Self. Despite 
his commitment to a ‘synthetic view’ on structure/agency questions, Wendt 
suggests that ‘states really are agents,’100 that is they are endowed with reason 
and a form of rationality conducive to purposive action. He invests the units of 
analysis in customary IR with subjectivity, directly related to the action- 
directed and masterful subject of modernity. Relations with other such subjects 
are at least partly determined, he argues, from the type of self these units are 
(and partly structurally). Wendtian social theory, then, seeks to reinforce the 
view that, ‘states are also purposive actors with a sense of Self -  “states are 
people too” -  and that this affects the nature of the international system.’101 
This is not to reject the value of the effort to provide a synthetic view of unit 
between holism and individualism, as Wendt purports to do.102 But it must be
98 Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, “Liberal International Theory: Common Trends, 
Divergent Strands,” in Charles W. Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International Relations 
Theory: Realism and the Neo-Liberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 118.
99 Ole Waever, “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, 
and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 149-185, 163. On this synthesis see also Chris Brown, 
Understanding International Relations (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 49.
100 Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, 10.
101 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, 194.
102 Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, 165-184.
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bome in mind that strategically Wendt’s account depends on the revival of 
subjectivism, of the state as the subject of intentionality and agency understood 
in ways which resound with the echo of modem subjectivity. This is because 
his explicit concern is to counter the hegemony of a neo-realist structuralist 
account, which reduces the workings of the international system to the effects 
of structure. Thus, despite his awareness of the pitfalls of pure individualism, 
his much sought ‘balance* weighs heavily on the side of subjectivism for the 
strategic purpose of returning to the proper consideration of state ‘agency.’ 
Thus, Wendtian constructivism harbours an implicit, if not explicit, call for 
selfhood or subjectivity as the bedrock of international politics.103 It is not 
unusual, Williams and Gantt argue, for critical work to display such ‘perverse’ 
faith to sovereign subjectivity. The denunciation of Cartesian subjectivity on 
the basis of empirical or psychological evidence does not usually amount to a 
fundamental questioning of the ‘self.’ Rather, even empirically minded 
sceptics ‘retain the individual self as locus, or bearer, of all a person is or 
knows. This privatizes knowledge and makes the individual the principal focus 
of the (perhaps misnamed) “social” sciences.’104 The remainder of this chapter 
turns more closely to the interplay of subjectivity, composition and otherness 
and examines two particular manifestations of coexistence as composition, in 
‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ discourse respectively.
2. Thomas Hobbes and the social contract
As Jurgen Habermas has argued, modem social philosophy largely arose out of 
the pragmatic political concern with the maintenance of human life. The 
primary concern of modem philosophers ‘is how human beings could 
technically master the threatening evils of nature.’105 While it cannot be denied 
that early modem philosophy was ‘also concerned with the betterment, the 
easing, and the raising of life to a higher level’ this was a preoccupation wholly 
distinct ‘from the moral perfection of life* through the cultivation of virtue
103 Wendt distinguishes between individuality and what he calls ‘the social terms of 
individuality.’ See, Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics, 181.
104 Williams and Gantt, “Intimacy and Heteronomy,” 253.
105 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 51.
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which had concerned the ancients.106 Rather, for modem philosophers, like 
Hobbes, ‘[t]he pragmatic forms of heightening the agreeableness and strength 
of life retain their reference to the positive, to the mere maintenance of life.’107
This section examines Hobbes’s formulation of subjectivity and attempts to 
bring to the fore some of the implications this has for coexistence. 
Coexistence, in this context, is regarded as co-presence prior to the social 
contractarian solution to the problem of dangerous anarchy and, subsequent to 
it, it is reduced to a fragile composition of units sustainable solely by the 
mechanism of its institution and by the exercise of absolute power of the 
sovereign. Coexistence is not the primary state of being for the Hobbesian 
subject but must be politically effected. The contract, therefore, is constitutive 
of the sociality (coexistence) of the already constituted, completed selves of 
the Hobbesian schema. The contract, moreover, serves to reinforce the 
particular type of non-relational subjectivity required for it to work as a 
political mechanism, maintaining the ontological assumption of the tendency 
to failure and general fragility of a composition of non-relational subjects. It 
frames and articulates ‘civil and orderly’ coexistence through the ‘logic of 
composition.’
Configuring subjectivity: danger and reason
The Hobbesian enframing of the subject must be contextualised as the locus of 
a social philosophy responding to the revolutionary climate and chaotic 
political and social situation of England in the 1650s, wherein Hobbes’s 
seminal philosophical text, Leviathan, was conceived. Heavily influenced by 
this context, Hobbes provided an imaginary description of social existence 
prior to the creation of, or in the absence of, the ‘state’ as an anarchical ‘state 
of nature,* wherein people are enmeshed in a ‘war of all against all’ and in 
which all persons were enemies to others. The Hobbesian account of what is
106 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 51.
107 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 51.
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widely known as ‘anarchy’108 elucidates ‘self/other’ constructs as ‘self/enemy,’ 
whence the other is always already encountered through what might be called 
‘an ethos of survival.’109 ‘Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of 
Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the 
time, wherein men live without other security than what their own strength, 
and their own invention shall furnish them withall.*110 The pre-social world, in 
other words, is understood as ‘dangerous,’ where danger is inevitable out of 
two related principles, the first of which is a materialist understanding of man’s 
nature and the second is the lack of a natural harmony of interests, which 
necessitate the presence and efficacy of a sovereign authority to maintain peace 
and order. However, the locus of danger is Hobbes’s conception of the other- 
as-enemy: pervasive enmity makes the notion of an-archy ‘dangerous’ and 
establishes survival as the predominant preoccupation of the subject in the state 
of nature.
The causes of war, strife and lawlessness are to be found in every man’s
nature. Hobbes writes in this respect, ‘that in the nature of man, we find three
principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly,
Glory.’ It is important to elaborate that Hobbes does not identify the state of
nature in actual fighting and enmity. Rather, he explains that, ‘...the nature of
War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto,
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.’111 The universal
disposition to quarrel arises from the equality among men:
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that 
though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or 
quicker of mind then [sic] another; yet when all is reckoned together, the 
difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can 
claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as 
he.112
108 For an exposition of the political theoretic significance o f this concept, see Robert Nozick, 
Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), although Nozick’s account 
suggests that the ‘minimal state’ is a necessity. For a different opinion see, Noel O’Sullivan, 
“Postmodernism, Difference and the Concept of the Political,” unpublished paper, 27.
109 Odysseos, “Dangerous Ontologies.” See also, Vilho Harle, The Enemy With a Thousand 
Faces: The Tradition o f the Other in Western Political Thought and History (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2000).
110 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 89.
111 Hobbes, Leviathan, 88-89.
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Equality, in this regard, leads to a universal desire for material possessions or 
glory ‘which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy.’ For this being impossible, 
men who desire the same thing ‘become enemies; and in the way to their 
End....endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.’113 Yet, in addition to the 
drive for material goods, the Hobbesian subject comes to desire power in itself. 
John McCumber argues that the materialist desire for specific objects, which 
distinguishes the Hobbesian subject, is supplemented ‘with the general desire 
for power.’114 When Hobbes suggests that there is in mankind ‘a generall 
inclination...a perpetuall, and restlesse desire for Power after power, that 
ceaseth onely in Death,’115 he thereby transforms power from being ‘the 
universal means to satisfying desires into a universal object of desire on its 
own account.’116 It is this transformation which delivers us to the state of nature 
and to an understanding of the enemy as the other person in competition for 
power, as well as material goods.
Moreover, man’s ability to transcend his ‘inclination to quarrel’ becomes 
possible by another feature of Hobbesian subjectivity, namely, Hobbes’s 
distinction between ‘danger’ and ‘sin.’ When man is described as evil, this 
refers to ‘dangerous’ and should be understood not as theological evil, but as 
‘the innocent evil of the beasts.’117 Man’s troublesome nature is, furthermore, 
compounded by the structure of the state of nature, namely, the absence of a 
sovereign authority. Prior to the laying down his rights by agreeing to the 
covenant, man is at liberty to do as he pleases. There are no limits to his rights 
and liberties. He is dangerous because of his quest for power, yet this endless 
quest for power is largely the result of lacking security to ensure his own 
survival. The evil of man is not theological but, rather, is grounded in 
materialist competition, itself pursued due to the lack of other means to 
security. Hobbes does not have a notion of sin, other than one tied to the
112 Hobbes, Leviathan, 86-87.
113 Hobbes, Leviathan, 87.
114 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 138.
115 Hobbes, Leviathan, 70.
116 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 138.
117 Leo Strauss, “Notes to The Concept of the Political',’’ trans. George Schwab, The Concept 
o f  the Political (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), 99.
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disobedience to the covenant, and the laws stated by the covenant.118 He denies 
a theological conception of evil while, at the same time, attributes danger to 
man’s dispositions. Similarly, the other-as-enemy is not evil, but, rather, 
dangerous. This distinction between danger and evil is crucial as it explains, 
William E. Connolly argues, that the Hobbesian self has the reason to 
recognise the need for society but does not have the nature for it. The subject 
of the state of nature is in need of education and control, but cannot be said to 
b e ‘evil.’119
The conditions in the state of nature leads man to seek self-preservation 
through survival, and in order to ensure it he may lay down all his rights but 
the right to his own life. The only ‘inalienable* right, which may not be given 
up to the Leviathan, is the right to life: ‘man cannot lay down the right of 
resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he 
cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himself.’120 Survival is, 
in this way, connected to man’s natural right, which exists in the state of nature 
and becomes the aetiology for the creation of the Leviathan. Since man has an 
inalienable right to life, it is his responsibility to himself to ensure that he does 
survive: to transcend the state of nature fulfils one’s responsibility to oneself, 
that is, the responsibility to survive. Thus, transcendence of the state of nature 
becomes the foremost responsibility of the self and, as such, should not be seen 
merely as a pragmatic response to danger. Leo Strauss explains that Hobbes’s 
‘contention that the State originates only in mutual fear and can only so 
originate had thus moral, not merely technical, significance.’121 ‘Survival’ 
serves as the constellation of the attributes of mastery and control, and the 
modernist concern with the maintenance of human life over against the world 
and entities within the world.
That survival of the other and self-mastery is intimately connected to 
Hobbesian subjectivity becomes apparent when, as Connolly argues, the state
118 Hobbes, Leviathan, 201.
1,9 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 27.
120 Hobbes, Leviathan, 93.
121 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy o f  Hobbes: its Basis and its Genesis, trans. Elsa M. 
Sinclair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 23.
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of nature is seen as a construct aiming to express Hobbes’s political
preoccupations at the time and place of writing.
When Hobbes discusses the state of nature he is talking to people already in 
civil society. He is not trying to convince them to move from a stateless 
condition to a state, from a condition in which the passions are wild to one in 
which they are domesticated. Rather he is persuading imperfectly 
domesticated subjects that they, in their present state, should consent to 
remain there and should commit themselves more frilly to the habits and 
principles that ensure the stability of their condition, even though that 
condition does and must carry many “inconveniences.”122
Thus, Connolly argues, the purpose of the state of nature is to simulate ‘what it 
would be like to live amongst others in a condition where civil power has been 
removed.’123 In this respect, he explains, it is advisable to realise that, for 
Hobbes, the description of the state of nature has an instrumental and 
disciplinary intent: ‘the state of nature is shock therapy. It helps subjects to get 
their priorities straight by teaching them what life would be like without 
sovereignty. It domesticates by eliciting the vicarious fear of violent death in 
those who have not had to confront it directly.’124 Hobbesian subjectivity is 
thus shaped by the confrontation with the possibility of violent death. Fear of 
death becomes the means by which the subject, although having no limits to 
his natural right, cultivates a disposition towards survival. In this manner, with 
the possibility of death, the right to self-determination is relinquished, giving 
way to sovereign government: ‘when one confronts the fear of early and 
violent death, one becomes willing to regulate oneself and to accept external 
regulations that will secure life against its dangers. The fear of death pulls the 
self together.’125 As John Dunn suggests, for Hobbes, ‘human political 
authority is a rational response to the overwhelming motivation of human 
fearfulness. It rests practically upon a systematization of the passion of fear.’126
122 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 28. The ‘dismal facts’ about human nature 
allowed for ‘an uncontested’ civil government. See Christine Di Stefano, Configurations o f  
Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective on Modem Political Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), 69.
123 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 29.
124 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 29.
125 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 29.
126 John Dunn, The History o f Political Theory and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 52.
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Hobbes’s configuration of subjectivity is, therefore, well served by the
accentuation of man’s immature and quarrelsome sociability and his
disposition to strife. According to Connolly’s analysis, this ‘is a useful passion,
useful to an ordering of the self and to peace and quiet in the social order.’127
The quarrelsome disposition of man is at once a cause for concern for man’s
own life and, at the same time, the means that leads man to choose an orderly
society, that is, to ensure that his survival is safeguarded by a state apparatus.
Transcendence of the danger that man posed to one’s self and to others was
possible because, as was noted above, the Hobbesian self is a curious entity.
The Hobbesian individual is, first, not a given but a formation out of material 
that is only partly susceptible to this form [social life] and, second, not merely 
an end in itself but more significantly a means to the end of a stable society.
The Hobbesian individual is thus in part a product of the civil society which is 
to regulate it, and the Hobbesian problem is how to form it so that it will be 
able and willing to abide by the natural laws and contracts appropriate to civil 
society.128
To shape such a subject is to bring to bear another feature of modem 
subjectivity to the artifice that is the Hobbesian self: reason. Transcendence of 
the state of nature is only possible due to man’s ‘flash of reason,’ by which 
Hobbes meant man’s ability to ‘recognize as the real enemy not the rival, but 
“that terrible enemy of nature, death”.’129 Eager to advocate against the 
collapse of civil order, Hobbes theorised the transcendence of the state of 
nature towards orderly coexistence through man’s calculation of his interest to 
avoid violent death and his ability to agree to a Covenant. Hence, man self- 
interestedly chooses to transcend the dangerous state of nature by abandoning 
the multiplicity of wills present among the people at large and relegating 
responsibility for survival to the Leviathan as the only means of temporally 
and spatially transcending anarchy. The Hobbesian solution to the dangerous 
ontology of ‘the state of nature’ created a fragile peace within a 
‘commonwealth.’ Maintenance of this peace required the vigilance of a state 
apparatus, the Leviathan. This man-made covenant, by which order is brought 
about, is a product of man’s rationality and self-knowledge and, as such, 
resisted any continuity with the medieval age where covenants were contracted
127 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 29
128 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 27, brackets added.
129 Strauss, The Political Philosophy o f  Hobbes, 22.
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between the people and a godly or princely sovereign. In Hobbes, the social 
contract is brought into being solely through man’s action and, therefore, is 
radically individualist in its conception. It can be seen, therefore, that this 
configuration of subjectivity, through the attributes of danger but not sin, 
reason but non-relationality, and omnipresent enmity, conceptually enables 
transcendence of the state of nature through the subject’s decision to agree to 
the radical reformation of the structural conditions. As Connolly writes, ‘[t]he 
self-interested self is an artifice, an artifice celebrated by Hobbes as the one 
most conducive to a well-ordered society.’130 At the same time, the implication 
of retaining the non-relational subject after transcendence is that there occurs a 
framing of coexistence as fragile co-presence, directly implicated in the need 
for sovereign civil authority.
Heterology in the state of nature
The Hobbesian account, it was noted above, frames the relation to the other as 
one of ‘self/enemy’ and regards enmity as omnipresent (‘all against all’) by 
definition. Such a framing of ‘the other’ as ‘an enemy’ occurs largely because 
coexistence in the state of nature is potentially a war of all against all because 
it is grounded on a subjectivity whose modernist aspects are configured 
through a systematisation of innate mastery, fear, and danger. It is important to 
note that, the dangerous ontology of the state of nature, where proximity to 
others is theorised as a “warre of all against all,” determines sociality through 
an overriding imperative: survival. The essence of man, according to Hobbes, 
is utilised to connect danger and subjectivity and reduces, in this way, 
proximity to a relation of enmity. When the mode of relating to those residing 
in proximity to the self is examined at length, survival is revealed to be the 
predominant relational schema of the Hobbesian account. ‘Survival,’ then, can 
be seen as a particular kind of relationality, whose focus is the protection of 
the self and the surviving of the other. The relation to the other becomes a 
relation of danger, one to be transcended in concordance with the subjective 
and ethical imperative of self-preservation. As Strauss noted in this regard,
130 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 29.
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“[s]elf-preservation and the striving after peace for the sake of self- 
preservation are ‘necessary,’ because man fears death with inescapable 
necessity.”131
The extensive and pessimistic heterology of Leviathan reduces otherness to the 
same (self) since it is grasped and represented to the subject according to the 
attributes of the very same Hobbesian selfhood. In this way, by encountering 
the other as a competitor for material goods and power against the background 
of structural insecurity, as well as an enemy against whom one must preserve 
oneself, his terrifying otherness is assimilated to the self s knowable nature. 
The other is tamed and his enmity transformed to an enmity of otherness in the 
subject, that is, of those attributes which are at once accentuated and lamented, 
so that they can build the edifice of the Leviathan. The other’s very alterity is 
expunged and subordinated to the well-structured construct designed to effect a 
workable political philosophy. Through the ‘ethos of survival’ the other is 
‘othered,’ as well as enclosed within a certain schema indicative of the mastery 
and control exerted over otherness, yet made possible through the manipulation 
of subjectivity. The self-interested and rational subject holds mastery over the 
other as well as itself by politically determining the fate of otherness in a 
solution whose very rationality leaves no choice of dissent.
Composing social life through the contract
The social contract has undoubtedly provided political thought with a powerful 
and lasting imaginary that inseparably links state, coexistence with others and 
subjectivity. The imaginary of the ‘state of nature’ or more generally, the 
notion of ‘anarchy’ has become a staple of political theorising and analysis. 
Stuart Umphrey argues, in this regard, that ‘[Hobbes’s] teaching...remains to 
be overcome in fact. Our way of regarding things political is still 
predominantly Hobbesian.’132 Mary Dietz, a prominent Hobbes scholar, 
concurs when she writes that, ‘[Hobbes’s] political theory...is at least partly
131 Strauss, The Political Philosophy o f  Hobbes, 25.
132 Stuart Umphrey, “Why Politike Philosophia?,” in J. N. Mohanty (ed.), Phenomenology and 
the Human Sciences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 193.
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constitutive of the ways in which we continue to understand and describe our 
own political practices.’133 The Hobbesian description of the world as pre- 
socially dangerous has assumed immense significance in International 
Relations by providing the ground for the perspective of political realism, and 
this importance has long been recognised within the discipline.134
Brian C. Schmidt writes in his study The Political Discourse o f Anarchy that
[fjrom an early point in the history of academic international relations, 
scholars embraced the view that the topics of central concern to the field -  
topics that included the study of the factors leading to war and peace, 
international law, international organization, colonial administration, and the 
means of achieving world order reform -  were grounded in an ontology of 
anarchy. The idea that international relations was characterized both by the 
presence and absence of sovereignty has provided the intellectual paradigm 
within which the academic discourse of international relations has taken 
place.135
Once order is brought about by the covenant and safeguarded by the Leviathan, 
danger is relegated to the outside of state boundaries in the form of others-as- 
enemies. As Leo Strauss once noted in this regard, ‘the state of nature 
continues at least in the relationship between the nations.’136 James Der Derian 
concurs, noting that ‘Hobbes’s solution for civil war displaces the disposition 
for a “warre of every man against every man” to the international arena.’137 A 
parallel can be discerned where the state behaves in the international (the 
outside) in the same fashion as man behaved in the state of nature. The state 
acts to promote its own survival and mastery over the system, creating what 
Der Derian calls ‘an ethico-political imperative embedded in the nature of 
things.’138
133 Mary G. Dietz, “Introduction,” in Mary G. Dietz (ed.), Thomas Hobbes and Political 
Theory (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 4.
134 Wight, International Theory and R. John Vincent, “The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth 
Century International Thought,” Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981): 91-101. Habermas argues that 
‘[t]he rationale for Hobbes absolutist state, constructed according to Natural Law, is a liberal 
one.’ Habermas, Theory and Practice, 67. But, he continues, ‘the liberal contents of Natural 
Law are sacrificed to the absolutist form of its sanctions,’ 69.
135 Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse o f  Anarchy: A Disciplinary History o f  
International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 231.
136 Leo Strauss, “Notes to ‘The Concept of the Political’,” trans. George Schwab,The Concept 
o f  the Political (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), 90.
1 7 James Der Derian, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, Baudrillard,” in 
David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), The Political Subject o f  Violence (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993), 99.
138 Der Derian, “The Value of Security,” 99.
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The link between anarchy and danger in the international sphere relates to the 
absence of principles which have brought about order inside the Leviathan. 
Arche, meaning both principle and order, enables us to look at an-archy as that 
condition which lacks the principled order brought about by a sovereign 
power. Thus, danger imposes on us an an-archic, or unprincipled, environment 
reminiscent of the pre-commonwealth state of nature, where the other-as- 
enemy is defined as a like-entity, that is, as another Leviathan among many. 
The outside of the Leviathan remains in the state of nature and offers no 
security. Beate Jahn has claimed, moreover, that understanding of ‘the 
international’ as a state of nature ‘is the defining claim of IR, its very raison 
d ’etre.'™
With regards to the coexistence of individuals, the linkage of subjectivity and 
danger is resolved though the creation of a commonwealth through an agreed- 
upon contract whereby men give up the multiplicity of their wills because they 
have a responsibility to survive. The covenant, however, does little to dispel or 
deconstruct the Hobbesian subject. On the contrary, the need for contract 
establishes the subject as unsociable, that is, having no capacity to be with 
others without the regulation of rules and principles. Hobbes’s institution of an 
ontology of danger through the elaboration of the notion of an anarchical state 
of nature, in which the other is encountered as an enemy serves to emphasise 
the features of the logic of composition, that is, the notion that coexistence is 
but fragile co-presence.
Highlighting the non-relational aspect of the subject even after the occurrence 
of transcendence sustains the anarchical assumption that coexistence is fragile, 
if not dangerous, and will still require watchful authority and general vigilance 
against its proneness to collapse, since the condition of ‘staying-together’ 
following the act of ‘joining-together’ is in some ways ‘unnatural’ to the 
subject determined in large by the assumption of non-relationality. The already 
constituted subjects which compose coexistence must have autonomy and
70
rationality in order to choose the contract but also to retain that right which 
underlies the whole edifice: the right to self-preservation. Furthermore, the 
mechanical construction of coexistence or sociability amounts to ‘a physics of 
sociation.,14° The contract, in other words, composes non-relationality into the 
controlled sociability of the Leviathan. It, additionally, imbues sociability with 
the need for domination and control by merely modifying the structural 
conditions of the state of nature, but leaving unchanged and unchangeable the 
ground on which the political solution is based.
To conclude this section, Hobbesian political philosophy has enabled an 
illustration of how the reconfiguration of subjectivity determines coexistence 
through a ‘logic of composition’ and highlights the interconnection between 
subjectivity, otherness and coexistence is quite clearly evidenced. The social 
contract, taken here as an example of compositional logic, becomes a necessity 
for a thought which is grounded in the subject because of the non-relational 
nature of this subjectivity. Georges Van den Abbeele argues that ‘the notion of 
social contract assumes the prior constitution of self-determining subjects who 
“freely” aggregate to form a community.’ Not only does the notion of contract 
occlude the whence of its subjects’ constitution (usually through the delegation 
of it to human nature), but it ‘forgets the differences between subjects that may 
obtain in such a way as to obviate, or at least complicate, the presumption of 
their absolute equality. ’141
3. Residual contractarianism: David CampbelVs critical thought
The discussion of Hobbes’s Leviathan has demonstrated the manifestation of 
the interplay between subjectivity and composition in ‘traditional discourses’ 
of international politics. It is imperative to show, moreover, that residual 
elements of composition are present implicitly in work which claims to forego
139 Beate Jahn, “IR and the State of Nature: The Cultural Origins of a Ruling Ideology,” 
Review o f  International Studies 25, no. 3 (1999), 411.
140 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 72.
141 Both in Georges Van Den Abbeele, “Introduction,” in Miami Theory Collective (ed.), 
Community at Loose Ends (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), xi.
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a grounding in modem subjectivity and which forms part of discourses of IR 
which intend to offer an alternative account of subjectivity. For this purpose, 
the remainder of this chapter concentrates on the critical writings of David 
Campbell on the refashioning of international responsibility. Campbell’s work 
might be classified as ‘constitutive theory,’142 it shares, in other words, its 
concern about issues of self-reflection, alterity and the general transformation 
of international relations theory with other critical discourses of IR. 
Campbell’s work is distinct, however, in that it has turned to the 
phenomenological writings of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas on the 
constitution of the ethical subject, which fundamentally transforms the 
concepts of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘responsibility.’ His writings have mostly 
viewed Levinasian ‘ethics’ as a means of reformulating more traditional 
understandings of ‘responsibility’, and expanding ethical regard to people 
beyond the borders of the state; arriving, in other words at a different nexus in 
debates on self and other.
From the basis of Levinasian phenomenology Campbell has articulated an 
ethos of political criticism aimed at the articulation of just governance.143 It can 
be argued, however, that as regards its theoretic application to the inter-state 
and international level, Campbell’s extraction of Levinas’s subjectivity from 
its phenomenological framework requires, and makes use of, elements of 
composition, in the form of contractarianism, for its coherence. This reliance 
on residual elements of contractarianism as the necessary mechanism of 
diffusion of his interpersonal model for responsibility, renders Campbell’s 
work unsuitable for theorising coexistence. After a brief description of the
142 Constitutive theory refers to theory which is aware of the impact of reflection on what is 
being theorised, see Scott Burchill, “Introduction,” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater 
(eds.), Theories o f International Relations (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 13-15. Campbell 
differs in his inspiration compared, for example, to the critical discourses which have been 
influence by Frankfurt School critical theory, such as Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and 
Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, (London: Macmillan Press, 1990); 
Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” Millennium 16, no. 2 (1987): 
231-247 and Jurgen Haacke, “Theory and Praxis in International Relations: Habermas, Self- 
Reflection, Rational Argumentation,” Millennium 25, no. 2 (1996): 255-289, or by feminist 
theory, such as V. Spike Peterson, “Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, 
Gender and International Relations,” Millennium 21, no. 2 (1992): 183-206.
143 Campbell, National Deconstruction.
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model suggested by Levinas and Campbell, the residual elements of the logic 
of composition are highlighted.
Grounding Campbell: subjectivity and responsibility in Levinas
It is not surprising that Campbell has turned to Levinas for an alternative to 
modem subjectivity, since his philosophy of ‘the face’ has attracted great 
attention amongst critical discourses in IR. He is regarded as one of the 
philosophers of otherness,144 whose wider concerns were aimed both at a 
contestation of the Western philosophical tradition, which he calls Hellenic, in 
its drive towards systematic totalisation and also at a supplementation of this 
tradition with a Hebraic openness to ‘the infinite.’145 For Levinas, and for 
Campbell, Hellenic philosophy frames engagements with alterity through 
‘ontological totalitarianism,’146 where a tendency to equate truth to presence is 
seen to reduce the other to the same. The other becomes an object of 
comprehension engulfed within the framework of the ‘knowing self as 
described in section one above. Levinas considered his own philosophy to be 
informed by a ‘phenomenology of nearness,’147 and he was concerned to 
articulate a framework of subjectivity and responsibility that avoids the 
ontological totalitarianism of the Western philosophical tradition and describes 
a relationality to the other beyond knowledge and instrumentality.
Consciousness as posited by the continued trajectory of Hellenic philosophy, 
Levinas contented, was a process where being ‘los[es] and rediscovers] itself, 
so as to possess itself by showing itself, proposing itself as a theme, exposing 
itself in truth,’ so that consciousness amounts to ‘the rediscovery of being on
144 Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal o f  
International Relations 2, no. 2 (1996), 150.
145 See Adriaan T. Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy o f  Emmanuel Levinas, (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1997).
146 Emmanuel Levinas, “Peace and Proximity (1984),” in Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon 
Critchley, and Robert Bemasconi (eds.), Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 162-165.
147 See Krzysztof Ziarek, Inflected Language: Toward a Hermeneutics o f  Nearness (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1994).
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the basis of an ideal principle or arche in its thematic exposition.’148 
Consciousness, according to Hellenic philosophy, is a process of loss and 
rediscovery based on thematisation, on ordering according to a principle or 
theme. The ideal principle is Being itself, and it is through this ego-centric 
theme that being comes to consciousness, when ‘consciousness is therefore 
always the grasping (Fassen) of a being through an ideality,’ an ideal 
principle.149 For Levinas, the Western philosophical tradition is tantamount to 
an egology, compounded by a self-folding of being into being. In Levinas’s 
words the drive to consciousness can be thought as ‘the gathering of the being 
[Being/essence] of a being [existent] into being [as a subject]’150
Levinas used phenomenology to describe relations differently and to extract a 
model of subjectivity arising out of a ‘face to face relationship’ to the other. 
The face to face encounter with the other differs from the dominant Hellenic 
conception of approaching otherness as an object to be known by an I, where 
the other is appropriated by knowledge. In his own reformulation, ‘subjectivity 
is structured as the other in the same, but in a way different from that of 
consciousness. Consciousness is always correlative with a theme,’ whereas 
‘the other in the same determinative of subjectivity is the restlessness of the 
same disturbed by the other.’151 Levinas argues that the face to face encounter 
with the other is constitutive of the self, that it is where subjectivity is exposed 
and uncovered to itself, not as a possession of the autonomous I, but as 
heteronomy. This understanding of subjectivity does not assume an already 
constituted I  who is in relationship with the other. Rather, the other’s face 
summons the self into consciousness and constitutes it as subject.
The face to face relationship, therefore, is not one of knowledge, of 
encountering the other as an object to be known based on a theme {arche) of an
148 Emmanuel Levinas, “Substitution (1968),” trans. Simon Critchley and Robert Bemasconi, 
in Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bemasconi (eds.), Emmanuel Levinas: 
Basic Philosophical Writings (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 80
149 Levinas, “Substitution (1968),” 80.
150 Emmanuel Levinas, “Diachrony and Representation (1982),” trans. Richard A. Cohen, in 
Emmanuel Levinas (ed.), Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1987), 
101.
151 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or, Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 25.
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already-constituted self. The face to face relation disrupts the commonplace 
‘understanding’ of alterity derived from the thematisation of otherness on the 
basis of the theme of an independently constituted self When an I  discovers 
the other and approaches the other as an object of knowledge, an object of 
comprehension, the other is not ethically implicated in the Fs constitution. 
‘[BJeing in direct relation with the Other is not to thematize the Other and 
consider him in the manner one considers a known object, nor to communicate 
a knowledge to him.’152 Knowledge (of the other) is not social, nor ethical, 
because ‘knowledge is re-presentation, a return to presence, and nothing may 
remain other to it...’; the other has been freed, through the Fs knowing it, of 
its otherness.153 Contrary to the Western philosophical tradition, Levinas does 
not consider ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge of others’ as equivalent or constitutive 
of the social. ‘The most audacious and remote knowledge does not put us in 
communion with the truly other; it does not take the place of sociality; it is 
always a solitude.’154 Levinas attempted to go against the grain of ontological 
inquiry and particularly Heideggerian fundamental ontology, which he clained 
relayed subjectivity as the locus engendered by the inner movement of Being 
for its own exhibition. On the contrary, for him, subjectivity is the focal point 
where ‘alterity makes contact,’ a locus which is generated by the very 
movement o f the other. Showing how Being moves to constitute itself as an 
entity does not ontologically elucidate subjectivity. Nor is subjectivity 
constituted by ek-statically flying from Being.155 The other’s alterity is 
irreducible to a theme of my consciousness, it is, in other words, an-archical, it 
is ordered according to a theme, an arche; rather, an-archy disrupts 
thematisation according to a principle or arche. The other does not confirm the 
identity of the self; rather, it places it and its ‘limitless’ freedom into question.
Moreover, the face to face relationship is not one of presence, but one of 
proximity. For Levinas, proximity is irreducible to consciousness and 
thematisation, it cannot be reduced to images, it is incommensurable with a
152 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard 
A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 57.
153 Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy,” in Sean Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 76-77.
154 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 60.
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theme, it frustrates any schematism. It is a relationship with a singularity, a 
‘summoning of myself by the other,’ yet it is not a summoning related, or 
determined, by distance or geometrical contiguity. ‘The subject, “me,” is 
affected without the source of the affection becoming a theme of re­
presentation.’156 Proximity, according to Levinas is radically different from 
other kinds of relationships and must be understood as responsibility for the 
other, ‘it might be called humanity, or subjectivity, or self.’157 Levinas calls this 
kind of relation obsession and persecution to illustrate its non-voluntarist 
nature. The relationship with the other is an ethically constitutive one but it is 
not by definition reciprocal or symmetrical. It is a relationship inasmuch as it is 
a responsibility invoked in me by the other’s face. The other’s face demands a 
response, and therein arises my responsibility for the other. The face invokes 
me to respond to it. ‘Responsibility is the response to the imperative addressed 
in the concrete act of facing.’158 The act of facing is the way in which the face 
enters the sphere of the phenomena. The encounter with alterity entails 
making-contact prior to, and supportive of, making signs.
In his later writings Levinas sought to rethink the face to face encounter as a 
linguistic one. He distinguished between the saying (the act) and the said (what 
is said). Levinas became more concerned with the act of saying than with the 
informational content of it (the said). The face compels me to speak, this is the 
signification of the saying. ‘The Other becomes my neighbour precisely 
through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so 
doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question.’159 Therefore, the 
other is not first an object of comprehension that, once comprehended, 
becomes an interlocutor; my understanding of the other is ‘inseparable’ from 
his invocation of me. To respond to the invocation is to ‘have neglected the 
universal being that he incarnates in order to remain with the particular being
155 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, part I.
156 Levinas, “Substitution (1968),” 81.
157 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 46.
158 Alphonso Lingis, “Translator’s Introduction” in Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 
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he is.’160 The saying is a way of greeting the other, ‘but to greet the other is to 
already answer for him.’161 In this way, Levinas seeks to link response and 
responsibility and make it part of the encounter which constitutes the subject.
Bernhard Waldenfels noted that there are three instances of responsibility in 
traditional ethical thought. First, something is said or done for which one is 
responsible; in other words, one is responsible for the result of one’s actions. 
Second, one is responsible to somebody, which is more or less anonymous. 
This is the ‘neutral third’; the transsubjective standpoint of the neutral third 
that transforms what is said and done into an objective state of affairs that is 
subject to objective standards. Finally, somebody has to justify himself, has to 
assume responsibility and responsibility becomes the criterion of becoming a 
subject of carrying duties and rights.162 In Levinas however, the response to the 
other does not refer to ‘something which has been said or done but rather to 
something which has to be said and done.’163 The other’s demand cannot fall 
under the usual distinctions of ‘is’ or ‘ought’ because the demand cannot be 
reduced to an empirical fact, or to a general law. Levinas objects to notions of 
reciprocity because ‘it implies that humans are interchangeable, that one may 
substitute one person for another...’164 The face to face encounter is an 
articulation of another kind of relationship, which he terms ‘substitution,’ 
where taking an ethical stance vis-a-vis the other is ‘to put oneself in another’s 
place...taking responsibility for the other as if one were the other.’165 This is 
not responsibility to the other but for  the other. This account of responsibility 
‘grounds both the Other and oneself without reducing or absorbing either to the 
other.’166
160 Emmanuel Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental? (1951),” trans. Simon Critchley, Peter 
Atterton, and Graham Norton, in Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert 
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The Levinasian approach de-centres subjectivity by giving an account of how 
it arises through the face to face relation, which is constitutive of the very 
‘subjectivity’ of the self This inter-face relationship however, is based on a 
phenomenology of subjective constitution, situated within the larger project 
concerned with the constitution of the transcendental Ego in the heritage of 
Edmund Husserl. It cannot be understood as political theory and, although it is 
a rich and powerful account of selfhood, it frames selfhood within the face to 
face relationship. The ‘phenomenological reduction* is disrupted and cannot 
account for what Levinas has called ‘the third party,’ which refers to the others 
beyond the face to face relationship. More accurately, it accounts for the 
multiplicity of others in a secondary, derivative way, by claiming that the third 
party is reflected in the face of the other. In so doing, Levinas’s framework has 
trouble moving from the particularism of the other’s face to the wider social 
sphere made up of multiple others. Therefore, the theorisation of the social, 
which can be thought of as a transition from the face-to-face relation to a 
relation encompassing the third party (or multiplicity of third parties) is 
problematic in Levinasian thought.167 The third party is precisely the locus 
where coexistence could have been articulated, and yet it is the moment when 
the phenomenon of multiplicity becomes disruptive of the very framework of 
the face to face, on the basis of which coexistence would have to be based.
Campbell’s concerns are both theoretical and practical: he is interested in 
examining how notions of responsibility are brought to bear on the 
‘reterritorialisation of states’ which cannot be conceptualised without an 
exploration of new forms of deterritorialised responsibility.168 He begins from 
the premise that the requirements of the contemporary political world cannot 
be fulfilled with the current notions of state-based responsibility. Campbell’s 
initial interest in Levinasian phenomenology, therefore, sprung from his 
concern of how to foster responsibility beyond state boundaries. Concerned 
with the apparent inability to respond internationally to crises, he rightly traced 
this to ‘the normal foundations for ethical considerations in International
166 Werhane, “Levinas’s Ethics,” 65.
167 See for example Levinas, “Peace and Proximity (1984).”
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Relations -  sovereign states in an anarchic realm.’169 Campbell claims that 
Levinasian ethics provides a philosophic ground from which to theorise 
responsibility beyond the frontiers of the territorial state.170 After Levinas, 
responsibility is no longer the responsibility of ‘autonomous agents’ and it 
cannot be seen as contained within territorial states.171 By invoking the ethical 
constitution of the self by the other in the Levinasian ethics of heteronomy, 
Campbell sees potential for responding to others that would not be included in 
conventional, territorially bounded, space. The face to face encounter, which is 
the event of responsibility, knows no boundaries. There is responsibility in the 
moment of encounter with no regard to the spatial/territorial constrains that 
political theories of responsibility posit. Campbell sees the heteronomic 
‘ethics’ as an antidote to the ethical and moral blueprints or codes that typify, 
for him, traditional notions of responsibility where ‘ethics is most often 
understood in terms of the moral codes and commands pertaining to 
autonomous agents (whether be they individuals or states).’172
Campbell’s attempt to utilise Levinas’s model of subjective constitution in the 
task of reformulating notions of responsibility at the inter-state and 
international level is laudable. This effort, however, is largely restricted by the 
parameters of the Levinasian framework itself because the phenomenological 
description of the face to face encounter is not intended, in the first instance, to 
be applicable to non-human, or pluralistic/collective entities. Its description is 
concerned with reformulating the transcendental ego beyond the 
phenomenological project of Edmund Husserl; furthermore, the phenomena it 
addresses, for example, the mother-child relationship or the erotic relationship 
in Totality and Infinity, are restricted to that reformulation. Levinas’s 
problematic handling of the phenomena of multiplicity and coexistence 
illustrates that beyond the inter-face relationship the framework becomes
168 David Campbell, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics 
after the End of Philosophy,” Alternatives 19 (1994), 457.
169 Campbell, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility,” 456.
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171 Campbell, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility,” and David Campbell, “The Politics 
of Radical Interdependence: A Rejoinder to Daniel Warner,” Millennium 25, no. 1 (1996): 
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difficult to attain but rather must be posited as an ideal goal, always deferred, 
and towards which ethical thought must strive.
The de-territorialised responsibility which Campbell hopes to advance requires 
the capacity to describe a ‘world,’ a totality of relations in which selfhood is 
constituted in multiple ways and within multifarious relations of otherness. 
This would make possible not only interpersonal responsibility but could 
advance novel deliberations of politics as well as societal or ‘public’ 
responsibility. It appears that Campbell fails to see the need for precisely what 
Levinas rejects as the ‘side by side,’ namely a framework of being-in-the- 
world-with-others which places self and other in a referential totality of 
relations amongst co-constituted and heteronomous entities.173
In the absence of a workable framework of multiplicity within the limited 
Levinasian framework, Campbell’s concern’s with just international 
governance must seek a process or mechanism which can infuse the 
interpersonal into the international-political. Since Levinas’s phenomenology 
of the face offers an account of responsibility contained within the framewrok 
of subjective constitution, something that Zygmunt Bauman has called the 
‘moral party of two,’174 the mode of dissemination of the face to face must be 
deliberated explicitly. This has not yet occurred in the extant writings of 
Campbell, who turns to Jacques Derrida’s reflections on justice and the radical 
undecidability of politics to address another aspect of the problematic entry of 
the third party into the face to face relationship.175 To overcome the restriction 
presented to it by this ‘moral party of two,’ Campbell’s attempt implicitly falls
173 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962).
174 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 82.
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When asked whether for the Israeli, the other is no one but the Palestinian, Levinas responded: 
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you’re for the other, you’re for the neighbour. But if your neighbour attacks another neighbour 
or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we 
can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is wrong, 
who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong.’ Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics 
and Politics,” in Sean Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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back on some mechanism of the social contract in order to be able to move 
from interpersonal to international responsibility. The notion of the contract 
offers the means by which the responsibility that the self ‘develops’ for the 
other can be reflected to the subject’s state and be made its responsibility. 
Thus, Campbell’s extraction of Levinas’s subjectivity from its 
phenomenological framework requires, and makes use of, elements of 
contractarianism for its coherence, and thus is caught up in workings of the 
logic of composition, despite his desire to move beyond the subject.
In the absence of a contractarian mechanism through which to disseminate 
responsibility, Campbell’s claim that heteronomic responsibility enables us to 
acknowledge our responsibility to the other beyond our borders confounds two 
sets of ‘we.’ One is the group of concerned citizens who may very well feel 
that the events beyond the boundaries of the state, which grant them 
citizenship, ought to invoke a response. The second set of ‘we’ is the state and 
its attendant institutions (domestic and affiliated international). To move 
unreflectively from one set to the other is to ignore the very framework of 
heteronomic ethics. To claim, in other words, that the state is responsible for 
the other outside of its territory is to claim that the face to face is a metaphor 
for the relations of politics in the international domain, reading thus Levinas 
violently and against the grain.176 How can the moral motivation of states come 
about when the underlying philosophical framework is one which resides in the 
interpersonal relation, the original encounter of the face to face? This problem 
is exacerbated when one considers that this particular philosophical framework 
is regarded by Campbell himself as problematic when there exists, as it 
inevitably does, a multiplicity of others. This is not, however, what Campbell’s 
informed discussion intends to do, leaving unanswered questions about the 
need for a mechanism of disseminating the interpersonal model of 
responsibility to the level of inter-state interaction. By unwittingly deploying 
the mechanism of the social contract, in order to fill the gap between the
1989), 294. See Campbell, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility,” and Campbell, “The 
Politics of Radical Interdependence.”
176 To suggest that states are responsible and encounter others in the way in which Levinas 
describes is to suggest a Wendtian type of ‘state subjectivity’ for the state that Campbell 
cannot but shy away from.
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subject constituted by the other and the actions of the state of which the subject 
is a citizen, Campbell’s theory cannot but detract from its purported challenge 
to the ‘autonomous agents’ entailed within the parameters of modem 
subjectivity.
More importantly, however, this reliance on residual elements of 
contractarianism as the necessary mechanism of diffusion of his interpersonal 
model for responsibility, renders Campbell’s work problematic for theorising 
coexistence. It conceptualises coexistence as requiring a mode of articulation, a 
mechanism of keeping it into place, such as the social contract. By collapsing 
at the point of the disruptive introduction of the phenomenon of multiple 
entities into the face to face relationship it conforms to one of the 
characteristics of the ‘logic of composition’ which we outlined in chapter one, 
namely, that coexistence is a secondary, post-ontological condition, a state 
which must be effected from non-relational subjects and which will remain 
tentative.
4. Conclusion
As the discussion above has illustrated, the ontological centrality of the 
modem subject is evident in traditional discourses of international politics. The 
examination of Thomas Hobbes’s manifestation of social contractarianism, 
conveys the specific schema formed by the interplay of his own ‘dangerous’ 
configuration of subjectivity and a heterology of enmity. This relational 
schema, or ‘ethos of survival,’ has been extremely influential and is still at play 
in political realism and generally discourses which invoke the notion of 
anarchy. The chapter also provided an example of the slippery slope into the 
mechanisms of modem subjectivity in, what has perhaps been one of the most 
successful critical theories in IR, namely Campbell’s writings about the need 
for international responsiveness and responsibility beyond territorial 
boundaries. Despite his laudable efforts to work with an alternative to the 
modem subject, the particular choice of ground in the Levinasian 
phenomenology of the face to face relationship arguably restricts the
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possibilities for a successful articulation of politics. In order for the theory to 
disseminate its interpersonal foundation to the pluralistic level, be this the 
interstate or the ‘interhuman’ level, it requires a theory of diffusion, such as a 
form of contractarianism.
In order to be able to articulate an understanding of coexistence beyond 
composition and to mitigate against the effacement of the constitutive function 
of otherness in the articulation of selfhood, two conditions must be addressed. 
First, an account of the self is required which does not start from the 
presuppositions and assumptions of the modem subject, since it is those non­
relational attributes of modem subjectivity, such as autonomy, non- 
relationality and mastery, which reduce coexistence to mere co-presence or 
composition of already constituted units. Second, and in order to avoid the 
ossification of theoretic assumptions about the self, there is a need for a 
different mode of access to the facticity of entities, that is an access to the way 
they are manifested in their location in the world with others. The remainder of 
this enquiry, therefore, sets out to fulfil this task through the philosophy of 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger and, particularly, his phenomenology 
of average everydayness. Specifically, the next chapter turns to his search for a 
method with which to access and express the facticity of the entity too easily 
designated as subject in a modem configuration. His path towards a radicalised 
phenomenology is instructive of the methodological issues at hand in 
challenging modem subjectivity, and forms the first step in a process that 
might be called ‘unworking subjectivity.’
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Chapter 3
Towards a ‘Hermeneutics of Facticity’1: 
Martin Heidegger’s Philosophical Project
The subject of modem politics, it was argued in the previous chapter, is the
subject of certainty and mastery. This subject voluntarily curtails its natural
right and chooses to enter into arrangements of regulated sociability, usually
via the mechanism of the contract, of which residual elements can still be
found in recent contributions to critical thought in LR. Since, however,
coexistence can only be rethought beyond the logic of composition if the
subjectivist understanding of existence is challenged, it is advisable to turn to
the phenomenological insights of German philosopher Martin Heidegger,
where an ‘optics of coexistence’ can be discerned. Heidegger’s existential
analytic in Being and Time does not presuppose the I-saying subject for its
enquiry; it seeks, instead, to analyse this entity with respect to how it is, in the
fact that it is in its world. Indeed, Heidegger wanted to know
[h]ow does man come to play the role of the one and only subject proper? 
Why is the human subject transposed into the “I”, so that subjectivity here 
becomes coterminous with I-ness? Is subjectivity defined through I-ness, or 
the reverse, I-ness through subjectivity?2
His analysis, in turn, offers an account of existence where coexistence is not 
reduced to the mere addition of co-present subjects. Rather, the ‘optics of 
coexistence’ discernible in Being and Time reveals that the being ‘each of us is 
in each case’ is constituted as a heteronomous and coexistential entity.
It is not only the substantive content of the ‘optics of coexistence’ which is of 
interest to this thesis as a whole, however. Equally important to the attempt to 
articulate an understanding of coexistence beyond co-presence is the method 
through which existence is accessed, and it is with this task that the present 
chapter is concerned. This method is phenomenology, which Heidegger
1 Martin Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics o f  Facticity, trans. John van Buren 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 1.
2 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell Krell, Vol. IV: Nihilism (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1991), 96.
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radicalised to pursue his project regarding the question of Being. The historical 
development of this method arose, furthermore, through Heidegger’s own 
attempts to avoid presuppositions about subjectivity when assessing lived 
experience. In this methodological search Heidegger challenged the implicit 
assumption that the modem subject, which had grounded philosophy since 
Descartes, could be used in philosophy and the sciences on the basis of prior 
presuppositions and without an attempt to gain access to its existence as it is. 
He, therefore, sought to gain access to the facticity of existence. His critical 
engagement with phenomenology resulted in an account of coexistential 
heteronomy through the analysis of Da-sein (Being-there), or the facticity of 
this entity which each of us is. This search for a method further highlights the 
fact that coexistence cannot be analysed through the uncritical acceptance of 
theoretical assumptions regarding the modem subject but must, rather, be 
sought in its facticity.3 It is necessary, therefore, to explicate this method 
through the historical trajectory of Heidegger’s search for a method 
appropriate for thinking about existence.
Prior to any consideration of the substantive content of his analysis, a 
discussion of the philosophical context in which Heidegger’s project developed 
is also necessary in order to understand the status of its coexistential 
heteronomy as an optics. The exposition of the philosophical context presented 
here is by necessity brief; it aims, however, to advance the reader’s general 
understanding of Heidegger’s project in order to situate the discussion 
undertaken in chapter four. It also highlights that the ‘optics of coexistence’ 
arises within a project that seeks to restate the question of Being as the 
question of philosophy, and is not, in and of itself, Heidegger’s focus.
3 This focus on facticity is not to be equated with the primacy on ‘sense data’. It does not wish 
to ‘privilege ontology and assume that the world discloses itself by affecting our senses, and 
that, therefore, we have come to some primitive or basic observational statements which “tell it
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1. Heidegger*sproject
Heidegger’s project revolved around restating the question of Being as the 
question of philosophy. In order to channel philosophical inquiry towards the 
question of Being, Heidegger began with the question asked by traditional 
ontology, namely, ‘what is the being of entities?’4 Heidegger thought that this 
question had to be preceded by a question into the meaning of Being, in other 
words, into the ‘conditions for the possibility of having any understanding 
whatsoever.’5 Contrary to the assumptions of mainstream Heidegger 
scholarship, Heidegger’s own concern was with ‘what gives or produces being 
as an effect,’6 what ‘lets things be what they are, what “determines entities as 
entities” in their various ways of being.’7 As early as 1922, when Heidegger 
wrote the essay ‘Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle,’8 
his program was two-fold: first, to inquire into the meaning of Being, what he 
called fundamental ontology, inseparably accompanied by the second part, 
namely, the ‘destruction’ of the history of ontology, where destruction does not 
imply the rejection of the ontological tradition but rather a critical stance 
towards it and a re-appropriation of its positive aspects (BT, §6).9 It is helpful, 
however, to first outline Heidegger’s philosophical concerns and how these led 
him to his early engagement with the ontological tradition, prior to turning to 
the radicalisation of phenomenology beyond subjectivity and towards human 
facticity.
like it is”,’ Friedrich Kratochwil, “Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt’s “Social Theory of 
International Politics” and the Constructivist Challenge,” Millennium 29, no. 1 (2000), 73.
4 The term ‘entities’ is interchangeable with ‘beings’ but is used to avoid confusion.
5 Charles Guignon, “Introduction,” in Charles Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5.
6 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor o f  the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 38.
7 Guignon, “Introduction,” 7, citing Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie 
and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 25, subsequently cited in text as BT, 
followed by the number to this English edition.
8 Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations With Respect to Aristotle: Indication 
of the Hermeneutical Situation,” Man and World 25 (1992): 355-393.
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Heidegger and the ontological tradition
The genesis of ontology in ancient Greece can be seen as a development 
facilitated in part by the peculiarities of the Greek language. The existence of 
distinct terms for ‘beings’ (ta onto), ‘to be’ (einai) and ‘the nature of beings’ 
expressed in the abstract noun ‘being’ (<ousia) led to the question
whether there is a unified meaning of being that accrues to all beings (in 
contradistinction to “what is not”) or whether being has irreducibly many 
different meanings that fall into different categories, depending on the kind of 
entity that is under investigation.10
Could there be, in other words, a ‘unitary concept that demarcates the realm of
being as such’?11 The Greeks, John van Buren argues, variously ‘experienced
being as a stable noeton topon, an intelligible place (Republic 508c),12 an open
area of truth in the sense of unconcealment (aletheia), light (phos) or radiant
appearing (phainesthai), and emergence (physis).’ Despite the apparent variety,
however, Being was understood ‘to be the aition of beings (the cause of beings
in the pre-modem generic sense of what is responsible for something), as well
as the arche, which...has the double sense of beginning and governance
(Herrschaft), dominion, kingdom.’13 In Greek thinking the formulation of the
question of ontology around a unitary concept resulted in an understanding of
‘being (<Sein) or beingness (Seiendheit) of beings in the sense of a causal
ground for beings.’14 As a unitary concept,
Being as ground was also taken to be itself a being, the most beingly being (to 
on ontos), that is, the highest and most honored being in the hierarchical- 
teleological order of the cosmos. Thus Greeks ultimately saw in being the 
divine (to theion).15
The Greeks themselves related to being through logos ‘in the inclusive sense of 
theory, thought, and assertion’ -  they ‘stood in an ocular relation of seeing 
(idein), contemplative gazing (theorem), and in wondering (thaumazeiny to
9 See also Samuel Ijsseling, “Heidegger and the Destruction of Ontology,” Man and World 15 
(1982): 3-16 and William McNeill, “Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925- 
1935,” Heidegger Studies 8 (1992): 63-79.
10 Dorothea Frede, “The Question of Being: Heidegger’s Project,” in Charles Guignon (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 44.
11 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 44.
12 Plato, “The Republic,” trans. W.H.D. Rouse, The Great Dialogues o f  Plato (New York: 
Mentor Books, 1956), 306-7.
13 Both in van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 31.
14 van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 30.
15 van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 31.
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being. However, despite the phenomenological possibilities which Heidegger 
saw in the Greeks -  ‘letting appear (phainesthai), making manifest (deloun) 
and unconcealing (aletheuein)’ -  their seeing relation was modelled on theory 
and thought, where thinking is understood as assertoric speech.16
Their understanding of being as ground or as substance, in turn, created the 
space in which these ontological enquiries were to take place. At the same 
time, however, it restricted the possible answers that the Greeks were capable 
of providing. The fundamental metaphysical positions which established 
themselves in Greek thinking appeared as ‘competing answers: for example, 
being (Parmemides), logos (Heraclitus), idea (Plato), category, being-in-work 
(Aristotle)’; this competition, however, took place within a ‘deeper unanimity 
[which remained] concealed in the very unquestioned question about being as 
ground.’17 Against the background of this underlying unanimity about Being as 
substance, these metaphysical positions did not attempt to articulate the 
question differently or direct it towards a different path.
While Plato had offered a distinction between being and not-being as ‘what has 
the power to act or be acted on,’ it was Aristotle’s doctrine on the manifold 
meanings of Being, however, that prevailed in the history of Western 
metaphysics.18 Frede argues that ‘Aristotle distinguished as many meanings of 
“being” as there are categories of entities.’ He divided Being into ‘a primary 
category of substance, designating natural “things” that exist in their own 
right,’ while regarding other beings as ‘attributes o f substances either inhering 
in them or standing in some other relation to them (quality, quantity, relation, 
place, time, action, affection, possession, position).’19 Thus, with Aristotle, 
Being received manifold meanings with physical entities being accorded the 
dominant meaning of substance and the rest becoming reduced to qualitative 
attributes of it. Yet, what is important to note is that ‘Aristotle regarded the 
categories as distinctions contained in the nature of things; they are read off
16 van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 33.
17 van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 31.
18 Plato posed the question of Being in his dialogue The Sophist, calling it a gigantomachia 
peri tis ousias (a battle of giants about being).
19 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 44.
nature and are not schemas read into or imposed on nature by us.’20 Aristotle’s 
categories, then, must be understood as merely describing the natural structure 
of reality. ‘Such a structure is based on the primacy o f substances, naturally 
existing independent entities that form the building blocks of Aristotle’s 
universe. Substances are the only entities that can exist in their own right, 
while all other entities are attributes that need substances as the substrate for 
their existence.’21 As Charles Guignon points out, this is the belief that ‘what is 
ultimately real is what underlies properties—what “stands under” {sub-stantia) 
and remains continuously present throughout all change.’22 The implication of 
this ontology of substance is that “‘to be” then means either to be a substance 
or to be (one of the nine other kinds of) attributes of a substance’; by 
implication, it meant that there was ‘no unified sense of “being” that could be 
predicated in all categories’ because, as Frede explains, ‘the being of a 
substance and any of the attributes are irreducibly different.’23
Heidegger considered that a false clarity about Being had come about in 
traditional ontology since, ‘[o]n the basis of the Greeks* initial contributions 
towards an Interpretation of Being, a dogma has been developed which not 
only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but 
sanctions its complete neglect’ (BT, 21). It is the widely held acceptance of the 
manifold meanings divided into categories of Being that Heidegger invoked 
when he wrote that ‘this question has today been forgotten’ (BT, 21) implying 
that the question of the meaning of being, of a ‘unitary concept that demarcates 
the realm of being as such,’ had ceased to be a question™ that what ‘the 
ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and 
hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to 
ask about it he is charged with an error of method’ (BT, 21). In elucidating the 
urgency of going beyond the reliance on categories, and restating the question 
as ‘continually disturbing,’ Heidegger argued that ontology would remain 
blind to the question which supposedly animated it ‘if it has not first
20 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 45, emphasis added.
21 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 45.
22 Guignon, “Introduction,” 4.
23 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 45.
24 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 44.
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adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as 
its fundamental task’ (BT, 31).
Heidegger’s goal with respect to the ontological tradition, therefore, was to 
problematise ‘the idea that reality must be thought of in terms of the idea of 
substance at all.’ Heidegger considered the reliance on substance or ground as 
the enduring principle of reality as a ‘metaphysics of presence’ because 
substance is what ‘remains continuously present throughout all change.’ It is 
this reliance on substance that has facilitated dichotomous ways of 
philosophising such as, for example, ‘either there is mind or everything is just 
matter; either our ideas do represent objects or nothing exists outside the 
mind...’. These, Heidegger claimed, ‘are derivative, regional ways of being for 
things,’ which are ‘remote from concrete lived existence.’25 This problem of 
theorising about reality preoccupied Heidegger throughout his student years, to 
which the discussion turns next.
The early works
Heidegger’s doctoral thesis and qualifying dissertation, or Habilitationsschrift, 
examined the problem of reality and pointed him towards Husserlian 
phenomenology. Specifically, both of the early works led Heidegger to 
challenge the acceptance of Aristotle’s theory of categories within the 
ontological tradition and attempt to overcome the difficulties with the 
‘substance ontology’ that permeated it. The thesis, entitled “The Doctrine of 
Judgement in Psychologism” (1913), was a critique of psychologism, a strand 
associated with Franz Brentano and the early Edmund Husserl.26 Heidegger’s 
critique of this doctrine showed that ‘that the key to meaning cannot lie in the 
empirical observation of the actual psychological processes that constitute our 
thoughts’; indeed, Heidegger argued, the act of judging ‘[i]f we want to know 
what our thoughts are about. . .we must analyze the content o f thought itself, as 
distinct from the psychic events that are at work.’27 With regards to the
25 All quotes in Guignon, “Introduction,” 4.
26 For Husserl’s turn away from psychologism see Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to 
Existentialism: The Existentialists and their Nineteenth-Century Backgrounds (Lanham: 
Littlefield Adams Books, 1972), 147-150.
27 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 46.
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question of being, the young Heidegger thus became interested in ‘how 
meaning as a whole is embedded in the actual life of the person who entertains 
a thought...’28 It is such insights that moved him towards a sustained 
engagement with Husserlian phenomenology.
The Habilitationsschrifty published as Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre
des Duns Scotus (The Theory of Categories and Meaning of Duns Scotus), can
be seen as a refinement of the question of being. Heidegger expressed an
interest in Duns Scotus because the latter considered the Aristotelian system of
categories, as briefly described above, to be ‘only one of several such systems,
a subclass that fits one special part or specific realm of being but does not
exhaust reality as such.’29 Duns Scotus’s concerns largely arose from the need
to expand the ontological categories for theological reasons: for Scotus, ‘the
most fundamental concepts apply to God...only in analogous sense.’30 Scotus
did not merely seek to expand or diversify the categories of the Aristotelian
tradition. Neither did he only ‘assign different realms of reality to the different
subject matter of different disciplines’; rather, the scholastic philosopher ‘saw
the need for a new conception of reality as such’:
[i]f different disciplines import different (senses of the) categories, then the 
categories of reality cannot simply be read off nature, as they were for 
Aristotle, but they are obviously also read into nature by us, or rather into 
reality as a whole.
Thus, for Heidegger, ‘[t]he “question of being” becomes then the question of 
the givenness of the object to the subject.’ Heidegger showed that in Scotus the 
conditions and means by which the subject takes hold of or interprets its 
objects, which Scotus had called the ‘conditions of subjectivity,’ attain 
paramount importance: ‘all objects depend on the meaning that is bestowed on 
them by the subject, and... they are always part of a wider network of 
referential totality.’ It would be philosophy’s purpose to understand ‘in what 
sense there is a structure o f meaning that stands in relation to or conditions 
what one might call the structure o f reality.’
28 Both in Frede, “The Question of Being,” 47, second emphasis added.
29 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 47.
30 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 47.
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Scotus considered language as the tool with which to access the structure of 
meanings, given that ‘all meanings find their expression in linguistic signs.’ 
Scotus explored how language, and particularly its grammatical structure, 
imposes a discernible form on our thinking.31 According to Heidegger’s 
examination of Scotus, ‘the categories of “all that is” become the categories of 
our understanding o f being', the categories become the “elements and means of 
the interpretation of the meaning of what is experienced”.’32 The idea that 
categories of ‘what is* are categories of the interpreter’s understanding of 
being, crucially, urged Heidegger to question the consequences of reflection 
and theorising on reality and so to challenge Aristotelian metaphysical realism. 
Heidegger concluded, then, that reality was framed by the subject’s 
understanding, and this led to his concern with accessing a pre-theoretical 
attitude arose in Heidegger’s thinking.33 Thus, Heidegger set out to access a 
sense of beings outside theorising and reflection by studying ‘the way [entities] 
/ show up in the flux of our everyday, prereflective activities.’34
Heidegger’s engagement with Duns Scotus also led him to argue that the 
objectifying outlook originated not so much in the natural sciences (as 
Husserlian phenomenology and neo-Kantianism, the two prominent 
philosophical ‘movements’ of the early twentieth century, had claimed) but 
‘from the theoretical attitude itself.’35 Scotus’s insights provided the impetus 
for the search for a method for ontology to avoid the imposition of categories 
onto everyday experience by modes of theoretical thinking, which served to 
‘un-live’ human experience and objectify existence.36 Importantly, however, it
31 All quotes in Frede, “The Question of Being,” 48.
32 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 49, citing from Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 1: 
Friihe Schriften, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (ed.) (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 
1978) 400.
33 See Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 25-32; Roderick M. Stewart, “Signification and Radical Subjectivity 
in Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift,” Man and World 12 (1979): 360-386; and John D. 
Caputo, “Phenomenology, Mysticism and the “Grammatica Speculativa”: Heidegger’s 
Habilitationsschrift,” Journal o f  the British Society fo r Phenomenology 5 (1974): 101-117. See 
also, the separate conclusion to the Habilitationsschrift written for publication Martin 
Heidegger, “The Problem of the Categories,” Man and World 12 (1979): 278-86, an appendix 
to Stewart, “Signification and Radical Subjectivity in Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift.”
34 Guignon, “Introduction,” 5.
35 Guignon, “Introduction,” 5.
36 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 21-56 and Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in- 
the-Wqrld: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I  (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1991), 1.
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is not necessarily the case that Heidegger was against theory; rather, Heidegger
aimed to interrogate anew what it is to be a human being and for this purpose
he needed a new approach towards pre-reflective activity, ‘a phenomenology
of “mindless” everyday coping skills as the basis of all intelligibility.’37 In this
vein, Heidegger subsequently ‘made it his task to show that there is a
meaningful concept of the being of all beings, a conception that underlies all
our understanding of reality.’38 This task found expression in a
holistic conception of human existence as “Dasein,” that is, as being-in-a- 
world, or of “care” as the meaning of our existence, which comprises and 
unifies in its understanding all the different conceptions of what there is, let 
alone of temporality as the transcedental horizon of the overall meaning of 
being as such.39
This is perhaps an opportune juncture at which to focus more specifically on 
Heidegger’s search for a method for ontology, which he found through a 
critical engagement with phenomenology.
2. Radical phenomenology as the method of ontology
Although providing a generally valid definition of phenomenology is a
difficult task, there are certain things that are accepted as the means and tasks
of inquiry.40 According to John Sallis, for example, phenomenology
is, in the first instance, the methodological demand, that one attend constantly 
and faithfully to the things themselves. It is the demand that philosophical 
thought proceed by attending to things as they themselves show themselves 
rather than in terms of presupposed opinions, theories, or concepts41
The ‘things themselves’ refer to objects of perception because phenomenology 
involves ‘attending to the perceptual object as it shows itself,’ accepting that
37 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 3. P. Keller and D. Weberman, “Heidegger and the Source(s) 
of Intelligibility (Dasein, Care, Temporality),” Continental Philosophy Review 31, no. 4 
(1998): 369-386 contest Dreyfus’s understanding the mindless ongoing coping is the ground of 
intelligibility and rightly suggest ‘care.’
38 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 43.
39 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 50-51.
40 Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Phenomenology,” in Roberto Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary 
o f  Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 578-579.
41 John Sallis, “The Origins of Heidegger’s Thought,” in John Sallis (ed.), Radical 
Phenomenology: Essays in Honor o f  Martin Heidegger (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 
1978), 46.
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‘perception o f such objects is always one-sided.’42 Performed again under 
different conditions, the phenomenological method may yield different results. 
At the same time, however, phenomenology saw itself as able to provide ‘the 
scientific ideal of knowledge with a rigorous foundation’; Husserl, in 
particular, was ‘deeply suspicious of attempts to apply the model of the natural 
or positive sciences to the understanding of human consciousness.’43 
Phenomenology aimed, in this regard, to eliminate the presuppositions 
amassed by the natural sciences about the world and objects of study, so that 
the phenomenologist could access experience as pure phenomena. In this way, 
Husserl distinguished between man’s involvement with things and the world, 
which he called the natural attitude, and the phenomenological attitude, which 
denotes ‘the reflective point of view from which we carry out philosophical 
analysis of the intentions exercised in the natural attitude and the objective 
correlates of these intentions.’44 The natural attitude ‘only credits that which is 
physically given,’ and in so doing, it ‘either denies the life of consciousness 
altogether or else “natulalises” it as a “fact” of physical reality.’ If encountered 
as objects through the natural attitude, therefore, ‘the phenomena of 
consciousness are thereby deprived of their essential status as living intentional 
experience.’45 In order to avoid this misunderstanding, Husserl proposed the 
suspension of the intentions and convictions that operate in the natural attitude 
by something he called ‘the phenomenological epoche.’
The epoche is not a doubt or negation of these intentions, as it was for 
Descartes, but rather a distancing which is required in order to allow the 
phenomenologist to contemplate their structure. The method by which one 
achieves the epoche or suspension, and by which one moves from the natural 
attitude to the phenomenological attitude, is called the phenomenological 
reduction, and it is, perhaps, the most salient feature of Husserlian and 
subsequent phenomenologies. The reduction is to be understood as ‘a “leading 
back” from natural beliefs to the reflective consideration of intentions and their
42 Sallis, “The Origins of Heidegger’s Thought,” 47, emphasis added.
43 Richard Kearney, Modem Movements in European Philosophy (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1994), 16.
44 Robert Solokowski, “Edmund Husserl,” in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary o f  
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 349.
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objects.’46 In the words of Mary Wamock, the reduction ‘consists in putting on 
one side (in brackets) all that is known, normally assumed, about the objects of 
perception or thought in order to describe and, later, analyse them as pure 
phenomena.’47 Bracketing-out and description are crucial for un-objectified 
access to experience, which theories of the natural sciences could not obtain. 
What, though, remains behind once the reduction has been carried out and the 
epoche or suspension has occurred? John Caputo suggests that ‘by the 
reduction the phenomenological investigator is, according to Husserl, carried 
back from the hitherto naively accepted world of objects, values and other 
men, to the trascendental subjectivity which “constitutes” them.’48 Bracketing 
the world thus shows ‘how the ordinary objective world is dependent upon the 
perceiving and thinking subject,’ such that what has been thus-far taken for 
granted as existing independent of any act of perception is ‘shown to be given 
both existence and intelligibility or sense by my transcendental Ego,’ which is 
the self left over after common assumptions previously held have been reduced 
or suspended.49 As Wamock claims, the goal of the phenomenological epoche 
‘may be said to be transcendental subjectivity’ or ‘consciousness.’50
It must be remembered that there are, in fact, two separate points that must be 
retained from this summary statement about phenomenology as a ‘method.’ 
The first is the return to pure phenomena and, the second, is that the reduction 
‘enables us to return to the generating axis of our intentional experiences 
before they are overlaid by objectifying constructs,’ the generating axis being 
transcendental subjectivity. Husserl was striving towards restating the relation 
between knowing and the world: ‘the world is an experience which we live 
before it becomes an object which we know in some impersonal or detached 
fashion.’51 This statement contests at a fundamental level the subject-object 
dichotomy, reminiscent of Heidegger’s comments about either/ors, and
45 Both in Kearney, Modem Movements in European Philosophy, 16.
46 Solokowski, “Edmund Husserl,” 349.
47 Mary Wamock, Existentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 28, emphasis 
added.
48 John D. Caputo, “The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology: Reflections 
on Heidegger’s Relationship to Husserl,” in John Sallis (ed.), Radical Phenomenology: Essays 
in Honor o f  Martin Heidegger (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978), 86.
49 Wamock, Existentialism, 35.
50 Wamock, Existentialism, 35. See also Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialism, 166.
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replaces the notion of ‘substance’ as the enduring quality of things or entities 
with the category of relation: ‘[m]an and world are first and foremost in 
relation; it is only subsequently, at the reflective level of logic, that we divide 
them into separate entities.’52 Phenomenology, then, seeks a pre-theoretical 
attitude through which to gain access to life or lived experience by bracketing 
out the imposition of theoretical frameworks and schemata which prevent 
things from showing themselves in themselves.
Returning to Heidegger’s search for a method for the question of Being, it 
should be clarified that Heidegger did not follow ‘unerringly’ in the 
methodological path of Husserl. For Heidegger, phenomenology was the 
method which conceived of itself as the attempt to investigate originary lived 
experience, and was, as such, Heidegger’s chosen method for his project of 
fundamental ontology. He believed, however, that up to this stage 
phenomenologists had
defined the human being as a coherence of experience, a centre of acts unified 
in an ego: they never raised the question of the sense [meaning] of Being of 
this, our own Dasein [existence]. Instead, they fell back on traditional 
definitions dividing man into reason and sense, soul and body, inner and 
outer, without a sense of what holds these realities together as a whole.51
Hence, Heidegger’s need to restate the question of Being (i.e. what produces 
being as an effect or what determined beings as beings) as a question led him 
to a radicalisation of phenomenology, away from its Husserlian assumptions.54 
It is telling that Heidegger was aware that there were numerous limitations to 
phenomenology. He wrote in his discussion on method in Being and Time, 
‘what is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 
“movement” [“Richtung”]. Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can 
understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility’ (BT, 62).
51 Both in Keamey, Modem Movements in European Philosophy, 19.
52 Keamey, Modem Movements in European Philosophy, 13.
53 Theodore Kisiel, “Why the First Draft of Being and Time Was Never Published,” Journal o f  
the British Society fo r  Phenomenology 20, no. 1 (1989), 13, emphasis and brackets added.
54 Simon Critchley claims that Heidegger revealed through his changes the true potential of 
Husserlian phenomenology. See Simon Critchley, “Heidegger for Beginners,” in James E. 
Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall (eds.), Appropriating Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 101-118.
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Radical phenomenology
After World War I, Heidegger collaborated with Husserl to implement radical 
phenomenology, ‘which he now regarded as [philosophy’s] highest and 
deepest possibility.’55 Such a radicalisation centred on ‘explicating life as it 
presents itself to us in concrete, individual, historical existence.’56 Heidegger’s 
attempts departed from Husserlian phenomenology, despite their close working 
relationship throughout the early post-war years. It was, in fact, Heidegger’s 
response to Husserl’s critics that led to his departure towards accessing lived 
experience.
The post-war years witnessed the interactions and debates between neo- 
Kantianism, proponents of which included figures such as Paul Natorp, 
Heinrich Rickert (Heidegger’s doctoral supervisor), and Wilhelm Windelband, 
and phenomenology, as advocated by Husserl.57 Neo-Kantianism was the 
reigning philosophical movement at the time and Heidegger made it his task to 
‘expose the primacy of the theoretical attitude* in its methodology and in the 
philosophy of values in general.58 The critical exchanges between neo- 
Kantianism and phenomenology revolved around Husserl’s call ‘for a radical 
break with any philosophy which is even remotely oriented toward a 
worldview.’59 In 1919 Heidegger criticised neo-Kantianism, arguing that it 
understood itself as ‘the critical science of values which, “based as it is on the 
basic acts of consciousness and their norms, has in its system ah ultimate and 
necessary tendency toward a worldview,”’60 despite the fact that neo- 
Kantianism regarded wordviews to be the personal affair of the individual and 
not the focus of philosophy as such. Heidegger supported the Husserlian
55 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 116.
56 Tom Nenon, “Martin Heidegger,” in Richard H. Popkin (ed.), The Pimlico History o f  
Western Philosophy (London: Pimlico, 1999), 682.
57 Caputo, “The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology,” 84-105 and Jacques 
Taminiaux, “Heidegger and Husserl’s Logical Investigations,” in John Sallis (ed.), Radical 
Phenomenology: Essays in Honor o f Martin Heidegger (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 
1978), 58-83.
58 George Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early 
Heidegger,” Journal o fthe British Society fo r  Phenomenology 21, no. 2(1990): 121-135, 125.
59 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 38-39.
60 Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe Vol. 56/57, edited by 
Bemd Heimbuchel (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1987) 12, cited in Kisiel, The 
Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 39.
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perspective arguing that worldview and philosophy are incompatible. This 
notion of philosophy as radically separated from worldview led Heidegger to 
suggest that philosophy ought to remain ‘outside any connection with the 
ultimate human questions/61 which was meant to recover philosophy’s 
vocation which did not ‘consist in building and developing a worldview.’62 
George Kovacs explains that for Heidegger ‘the true essence of philosophy is 
something quite unique beyond any connection with ideology, worldview, and 
teachings about the ultimate destiny and meaning of human living.’63 
Heidegger considered that the kind of thinking that can be called philosophical 
should be ‘more rigorous, more primordial than scientific knowing; it is more 
radical, more essential than the exploration of nature and life by the theorizing 
attitude of the sciences.’64 He intended to establish that ‘philosophy is not a 
theoretical, speculative science at all; it is a way of disclosing (living) 
experience.’65
The harsh opposition between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology was, in 
fact, rooted in the very proximity of the two ‘movements.’ Both were in search 
of ‘establishing philosophy as the “primal” or “original” science 
(Urwissenschaft)...to determine origins and ultimates, the first and last things, 
the underived from which all else is derived, which can only be “shown” or 
“pointed out” but not “proven”.’66 In the early 1920s Heidegger sought the way 
that would make phenomenology into a ‘primordial science.’67 Heidegger took 
phenomenology into a new direction by focusing on the need to look at the 
origin, the Ur-sprung or “‘primal leap” into the factic,’68 as opposed to life 
itself that had been the concern of the totality of human and natural sciences, 
which investigated factic life by dividing it into separate disciplines.
61 Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, 11 cited in Kisiel, The Genesis o f  
Heidegger’s Being and Time, 39.
62 Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 124.
63 Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 124.
64 Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 124- 
125
65 Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 125.
66 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 39.
67 Primordial in this very sense of originary. See Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science 
(Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” and Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, 117-123.
68 Kisiel, The Genesis o f Heidegger’s Being and Time, 117.
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Phenomenology, therefore, aimed to locate and access ‘the origin of the factic 
life.’69 This is not, however, entirely unproblematic; as Kisiel argues, it is 
rather ‘the most basic problem of phenomenology is itself, understood as a 
science of origin.’70 If that is indeed the self-proclaimed mission of 
phenomenology then what would be the method and the matter of such a 
science of origins? ‘The problem of a pretheoretical science thus ultimately 
becomes a problem of language: how to approach and articulate the dynamic, 
and thus elusive, facticity of life?’71 This was the programmatic call of Husserl 
himself that phenomenology be able to grasp and also ‘articulate the 
pretheoretical realm of life in a pretheoretical way, and so to achieve the 
unique status of a pretheoretical science.’72 It is while searching for his own 
way towards accessing life philosophically that Heidegger engaged with the 
two simple, yet fundamental, objections rendered against phenomenology by 
Paul Natorp, the neo-Kantian philosopher associated with the Marburg School; 
specifically, it is his reaction to these criticisms that led him away from 
Husserl’s phenomenology.
Natorp’s critique argued that ‘the “stream” of living experience is brought to a 
halt by reflection: “there is no immediate grasp (hold) of living experience”.’73 
This argument challenged both Husserlian phenomenology and Heidegger’s 
own attempts to use phenomenology as the method for accessing lived 
experience for his question of Being. There were two specific objections raised 
by Natorp, the first of which suggests the inability of phenomenology to have 
‘intuitive access to its chosen subject-matter.’74 This objection amounts to 
asking the question: ‘[h]ow is the nonobjectifiable subject matter of 
phenomenology to be even approached without already theoretically inflicting 
an objectification upon it? How are we to go along with life reflectively 
without de-living it?’75 The second objection, furthermore, doubted that
69 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger's Being and Time, 117, emphasis added.
70 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger's Being and Time, 117.
71 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 47.
72 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 47.
73 Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 129, 
citing Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophy, 101.
74 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48.
75 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48.
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phenomenology was able to express its purported access to its subject matter. 
As Kisiel explains,
[p]henomenology claims to merely describe what it sees. But description is 
circumscription into general concepts, a “subsumption” under abstractions.
The concrete immediacy to be described is thereby mediated into abstract 
contexts. There is no such thing as immediate description, since all 
expression, any attempt to put something into words, generalizes and so 
objectifies.76
Natorp had argued that reflective analysis always already unwittingly 
transformed, or even deformed, the living experiences upon which it reflected. 
This ‘devastation’ brought on to experience could be undone, he claimed, by 
the method of reconstruction, according to which ‘analysis and interpretation 
can “regain” (reconstruct) the “wholeness of the subjective” (the immediately 
given prior to the analysis) from the primordial life of consciousness 
“theoretically”.’ Heidegger, however, challenged this proposed method of 
reconstruction, arguing that it could not successfully disclose the sphere of 
lived experience because, despite Natorp’s arguments to the contrary, ‘[e]ven 
reconstruction is objectification; it consists in construction, in theorizing.’77 For 
Heidegger, Natorp’s method brought about the ‘absolutization of the logical’ 
and the ‘most radical absolutization of the theoretical.’78 With respect to 
Natorp’s objections as such, Heidegger responded by turning away from the 
transcendental or pure phenomenology of Husserl towards Verstehen, or 
understanding, a school of thought largely influenced by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).79
Heidegger’s reply to the first objection about accessing life without 
objectifying it ‘pointed to a non-intuitive form of access... a certain familiarity 
which life already has of itself and which phenomenology needs only to repeat. 
This spontaneous experience of experience, this streaming return of
76 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48. See also, Martin Heidegger, Zur 
Bestimmung der Philosophy, 101-111.
77 Both in Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissensehaft) in the Early 
Heidegger,” 129.
78 Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophy, in Gesamtausgabe Vol. 56/57, edited by 
Bemd Heimbuchel (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1987), 107 and 108, cited Kovacs, 
“Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissensehaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 129.
79 For Schleiermacher and Dilthey see, Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger's Being and Time, 
89-93 and 100-105 respectively.
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experiencing life upon already experienced life, is the immanent historicity of 
life.’80 Heidegger suggested that instead of relying on ‘objectifying concepts 
which seize life and so still its stream,’ one ought to turn to the kind of access 
that life has to itself, which ‘provides the possibility of finding less intrusive 
pre-cepts ot pre-concepts which at once reach back into life’s motivation and 
forward into its tendency.’81 This understanding that life already has of itself 
‘at once repeats and foreruns life’s course accordingly stretches itself unitively 
and indifferently along the whole of the life stream without disrupting it.’82 
Heidegger’s response advocated against extracting experience and subsuming 
it to the universal, which he had likened to the situation of ‘form subsuming 
matter.’83 Instead, Heidegger called for a ‘nonobjective option of a more 
indicative and intentional universal stemming directly from the very temporal 
intentional movement offinding oneself experiencing experience.’84
What is crucial to note is that in responding to the first objection, Heidegger 
also provided the answer to the second critique, which had contested the ability 
to express immediate experience. ‘The problems of intuition and expression 
are therefore transposed into the possibility of a 1) nonreflective understanding 
and 2) the nonobjectifying conceptualization that it [non-reflective 
understanding] itself provides, that allusive universal called the formal 
indication'*5 Formal indication formulates the understanding of life that life 
has of itself into concepts which merely designate certain terms to denote in a 
formal manner the phenomena under scrutiny, leaving their determination to 
the phenomenological bracketing-out and description. As Kisiel explains 
‘[w]ords like “life,” “lived experience,” “I myself’ drawn from daily life pose 
a danger of objectification in our descriptions; they cannot be taken univocally, 
but rather must be understood in their formal character as indicative of certain 
phenomena of the concrete domain.’86 Formal indication, thus, was 
Heidegger’s attempt to avoid the reduction of phenomena to their
80 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48, emphasis added.
81 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48. See also, Martin Heidegger, Zur 
Bestimmung der Philosophy, 99-102.
82 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48.
83 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48.
84 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48-49.
85 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger's Being and Time, 49, emphasis and brackets added.
86 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 121.
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representative concepts and the subsequent neglect of these phenomena of 
lived experience in which such an ossification resulted.
Heidegger’s reactions and responses to these neo-Kantian objections opened 
up the way to the pre-theoretical solution to the problem of intuition and 
expression. Whereas Husserlian phenomenology lost the ‘the immediacy of 
intuition’ in the ‘mediacy of expression,’ a disruption which led Husserl to 
seek a theoretical solution to the methodological problem of access and 
expression, just as Natorp did,87 Heidegger attempted to ‘find less intrusive, 
more natural ways to get a grip of its subject matter, which remain in accord 
with the “immanent historicity of life in itself’.’88 This non-disruptive entry 
into the historicity of life is an implicit understanding called ‘hermeneutic 
intuition,* which was brought to serve phenomenology methodologically. The 
hermeneutic intuition could understand ‘the articulations of life itself, which 
accrue to the self-experience that occurs in the “dialectical” return of 
experiencing life to already experienced life.*89
The departure from Husserl ultimately rested on the need to conduct 
philosophical questioning which ‘is not added on and attached to the 
questioned object, factical life, externally; rather it is to be understood as the 
explicit grasping of a basic movement of factical life,’ by that life itself.90 In 
other words, the structure of understanding is such that ‘[a]ll of our 
experiences, beginning with our most direct perceptions, are from the start 
already expressed, indeed interpreted.’91 This turn away from Husserlian 
phenomenology amounted, as Kisiel argues, to a ‘hermeneutic breakthrough,’ 
the point at which the method and the subject matter are revealed as united, 
where ‘a formally indicating hermeneutics and a dynamically understood 
facticity belong essentially together in a close-knit unity.’92 Heidegger’s 
answer to Natorp’s objections of accessibility and expression is akin to a desire
87 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 49.
88 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 55, also citing Martin Heidegger, Zur 
Bestimmung der Philosophy, 117. He is citing from student transcripts of the lecture and the 
comment on the immanent historicity of life did not make it into the GA Vol. 56/57.
89 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger's Being and Time, 55-56.
90 Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations With Respect to Aristotle,” 359.
91 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 49; see also (BT, §31 and §32).
92 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 23.
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‘to let the facts speak for themselves; and at the same time to claim that there 
are nor such things as uninterpreted facts.’93 But his answer was also much 
more than that: it is the grasping of the presupposed ‘subject’ in non­
subjectivist terms. Wamock has argued that Heidegger’s reformulation of 
phenomenology amounted to a rejection of the attempt by transcendental 
phenomenology ‘to isolate the “transcendental Ego”, the undifferentiated, pure 
“I,” who perceives and constructs the world, but is not involved in it.’94 
Heidegger radicalised phenomenology ‘by adhering even more radically than 
Husserl to the phenomenological demand to attend to the things themselves’95 
by asking ‘what remains unthought in the appeal to the things themselves.’96 
What had remained unthought in Husserl’s phenomenology was thinking of 
Being-thus, of how it is that being appears as something.97 Thinking the 
unthought led to the search ‘for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is 
and with regard to its Being as it is’ (BT, 24, emphasis added).
3. Challenging subjectivity: the priority o f facticity
As has been already argued in the introduction of the thesis, International 
Relations relies on an ontology centred around the notion of the modem 
subject. Philosophically, there have been many manifestations of modem 
subjectivity.98 However, in most of these manifestations the modem subject, 
Stephen K. White has noted, is the ‘assertive, disengaged self who generates 
distance from its background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external 
nature, other subjects) in the name of accelerating mastery of them.’99 This , 
moreover, is precisely the subject which refers to itself as ‘I.’ As was shown
93 Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1970), 35.
94 Wamock, Existentialism, 49.
95 Sallis, “The Origins of Heidegger’s Thought,” 49.
96 Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), 71, 
cited in Sallis, “The Origins of Heidegger’s Thought,” 48.
97 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesotta Press, 1993), 97-99 and (BT, §7,49-67).
98 See the discussion in William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to 
Thought (The Hague, NL: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 321-330.
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above, Greek thought maintained that Being was substance, that which lay 
under or grounded, entities. Even in the attempt to use the subject, knowledge, 
life, history, or society as ‘as the universal horizon of inquiry’ Heidegger 
suggested that ‘in these modem concepts the ancient sense of being is actually 
implicitly retained. ’100
In Heidegger’s view, the modem conception of the subject was infiltrated by 
the notion of substance (BT, 123-131). According to Heidegger, Descartes 
‘takes the Being of “Dasein” (to whose basic constitution Being-in-the-world 
belongs) in the very same way as he takes the Being of the res extensa -  
namely, as substance’ (BT, 131).101 For Heidegger, the main problem with the 
modem subject understood as substance, or bearing an essence, is that it is 
‘phenomenally inadequate.’ As John McCumber suggests, ‘ousia 
[substance]...is inadequate as a descriptive framework for the fabric of our 
lives’; rather than accepting the modem subject as given, Heidegger proposed 
instead to undertake an examination of this entity, abandoning the ‘I* of post- 
Cartesian philosophy, which had obscured the structures of existence of this 
entity whose Being is in each case mine, structures which cannot be grasped in 
terms of substance:102 ‘[I]f we posit an “I” or subject as that which is 
proximally given we shall completely miss the phenomenal content [Bestand] 
of Dasein’ because ‘every idea of a “subject”... still posits posits the subjectum 
(hypokeimenon) along with it’ (BT, 72) .,03
Heidegger’s early years at Freiburg were spent, as was suggested above, 
seeking a way to challenge modem subjectivity in its manifestation as 
Husserlian transcendental consciousness, which resounded with Cartesianism. 
This challenge also manifests itself into an evolution in the terms specifying 
the matter of Heidegger’s project. In the War Emergency Semester of 1919 the
99 Stephen K. White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection,” Political Theory 25, no. 4 
(1997), 503.
100 Ernst Tugendhat, Self-consciousness and Self-determination, trans. Paul Stem (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1986), 146.
101 See also John McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger’s Challenge to Western 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 219.
102 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 206.
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topic is still ‘amorphously’ described as ‘life in and for itself.’ This later
changes to ‘factic life experience’ with Heidegger adopting the term ‘facticity’
from neo-Kantianism to describe what Kisiel has called his ‘own “distressing”
topic,’ that of philosophically accessing life. By the Summer Semester of 1920
the matter of his thinking becomes ‘concrete actual Dasein,’ reminiscent of the
vocabulary of Being and Time.m The term ‘Dasein’ is used in order to avoid
the preconceptions that accompany ‘subject’ and to tentatively describe an
entity which we ourselves are. As Jean-Luc Nancy notes,
Dasein—that ordinary German noun for existence, which Heidegger gives as 
a “title” to humanity and beneath which, for him, humanity and only 
humanity ex-ists—is the being-the-there of being itself...the there of being, 
its taking place, insofar as it is a ravishment and a distancing (a coming and 
going of sense), takes place neither anywhere other not toward anywhere 
other than the here of this world here.105
The term ‘Dasein,* this ‘intentionally vague, non-descriptive, almost vacuous 
designation,’ both avoids presuppositions about what kind of entity this is 
(conscious, having mind and body) and also unites the search for method with 
the matter to be analysed.106 A look at Heidegger’s 1923 course ‘Ontology’ 
illustrates that his notion that ‘life’ has the ability to access its own experience, 
had by then been connected to the entity which has this ability: Dasein, in each 
case our own.107 In the eleven years between the Habilitationsschrift and Being 
and Time, Heidegger pursued an interaction between matter and method to 
arrive at a convergence, ‘a point where they are one and the same: a 
hermeneutics o f  facticity.’108 The genitive ‘o f  is a double genitive. At once it 
means that understanding, Verstehen, belongs to facticity; and at the same time 
it means that understanding takes facticity as its object.109 The hermeneutics of 
facticity ‘is simply the operation of philosophy itself that catches hold of life in
103 Even Husserl’s phenomenology appeared confined to subjectivity. See J. Quentin Lauer, 
The Triumph o f  Subjectivity: An Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1958).
104 All quotes in Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 117.
105 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, trans. Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 56.
106 Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall o f  the Self 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 154.
107 Heidegger, Ontology, 13.
108 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 21.
109 van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 94.
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its activity....[it] is factical life caught in the act of interpreting itself.’110 As
Heidegger himself notes,
“Facticity” is the designation we will use for the character of the being of 
“our” “own” Dasein. More precisely, this expression means: in each case 
“this” Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time.. .insofar as it 
is, in the character of its being, “there” in the manner ofbe-ing\lu
For Heidegger, then, ‘Dasein,’ serves as a formal indicator for this entity 
whose primary characteristics have yet to be properly delineated by means of 
existential analysis, a type of inquiry explained below. Importantly, in avoiding 
the term ‘subject’ and choosing ‘Dasein’ over the ‘I’ of Cartesian philosophy, 
Heidegger leaves open the question of the ‘who’ of this entity, while at the 
same time claiming that in each case ‘I’ am this entity. However, Heidegger is 
not simply proposing any type of inquiry for examining Dasein. He states quite 
clearly that such an inquiry must take the form of what he calls existential 
analysis. ‘[FJundamental ontology, from which almost all ontologies can take 
their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein’ (in German, 
Daseinanalytik) (BT, 34).
What, then, is the existential analytic through which Heidegger interrogates 
Dasein? It is the type of inquiry that enables access to ‘lived experience’ and 
an investigation of the entities within the world by means other than theoretical 
construction. Existential analysis concerns itself with the structures of 
existence of Dasein in order to find out how Dasein is without assuming in 
advance, and on the assumptions of traditional ontology, what it is. The how 
and what are related since, as Heidegger has shown in his rejoinder to Natorp, 
there is an ‘intimate relationship between method and subject matter in 
ontology’ which enables to letting-be-seen of Dasein’s constitution as Being- 
in-the-world.112
110 James Risser, “Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Question of Community,” in Charles E. 
Scott and John Sallis (eds.), Interrogating the Tradition: Hermeneutics and the History o f  
Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 22.
1,1 Heidegger, Ontology, 5.
112 Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being 
and Time,” in John Sallis (ed.), Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor o f  Martin 
Heidegger (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978), 107.
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Matter and method: phenomenology as the method for ontology
Heidegger’s own engagement with phenomenology was configured to his 
specific intention to redirect philosophical thought to the Question of Being, 
which now may be restated. Heidegger has brought phenomenology to bear on 
the facticity of entities, rejecting the phenomenological reduction of isolating 
the pure I from the perceptual objects. Phenomenology and ontology become 
explicitly intertwined because in interpretative phenomenology the ‘perceiving 
subject’ turns to inquire about itself as the perceptual object. The analysis that 
being which each of us is and which Heidegger referred to as ‘Dasein’ showed 
Dasein to be the investigator, as well as das Befragte, or that which is 
interrogated (BT, 24). Hence, Heidegger’s phenomenological concern becomes 
the manner in which Dasein shows ‘itself to itself.’ From Greek ontology 
Heidegger’s thought received its fundamental issue, and from Husserlian 
phenomenological beginnings Heideggerian thought reformulated its own 
radicalised access to existence.113
Radicalised phenomenology had to become ontology in order to become the 
method for ‘that which makes possible this showing [of Dasein to itself]’; yet, 
what remains unthought is ‘the ground of the possibility of such showings as 
those to which phenomenology demands we attend,’ where the ‘grounds must 
themselves be such as can be brought to show themselves.’114 John D. Caputo 
also agrees that ‘Dasein’s understanding of Being is the sole condition under 
which both ontology and phenomenology are possible.’115 Not only is 
phenomenology possible solely as ontology, but in the words of Heidegger 
himself, ‘only as phenomenology, is ontology possible’ (BT, 60). Furthermore, 
Caputo argues that ‘[i]t is only under the condition that Dasein understands 
Being that beings can be experienced as beings (phenomenology) and that they 
can be understood to be (ontology).’116
113 Sallis, “The Origins of Heidegger’s Thought,” 49.
114 Sallis, “The Origins of Heidegger’s Thought,” 49.
115 Caputo, “The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology,” 103.
116 Caputo, “The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology,” 103, emphasis 
added.
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This interconnected matter-method of a ‘more hermeneutically oriented 
phenomenology’117 was intended by Heidegger as the ‘way to return to origins 
through an analysis of preconceptions’118 about ontology which permeated the 
tradition after Aristotle, as discussed in section one. What has become, since 
Heidegger’s initial attempts to dismantle the guiding question of ontology, the 
celebrated method of deconstruction (Destruktion or destruction meaning 
deconstruction, critique) was, in this way, rendered inseparable from 
phenomenology. ‘Destruction is first regarded as a counter to the pervasive 
tendency of objectification...and then in its more comprehensive role as an 
antidote to any and every tendency to lapse or “fall” from originality into the 
“surface existence” of everydayness. ” 19 In thinking about the meaning of 
Being, the thinker has to have a ground from which to undertake the thought. 
At the same time, the thought has to be aware of the philosophical tradition in 
which it occurs and which makes its articulation possible. The notion of 
destruction or ‘destructive retrieve’ as Kockelmans has formulates it, provides 
both of those requirements. It destroys ‘in the tradition what is philosophically 
unjustifiable and maintain[s] those primordial experiences from which genuine 
philosophical insights ultimately flow.’120 The task of fundamental ontology, is 
thus, made possible by destruction: ‘the destructive retrieve and the 
phenomenological method cannot be taken to be independent and unrelated 
procedures; rather both procedures belong intimately together and the one 
(hermeneutic phenomenology) cannot possibly achieve its goal without the 
other (destructive retrieve).’121 Thus the destructive retrieve does not overcome 
a tradition, but rather, searches for and retains its positive possibilities, which 
are subsequently used to transform the tradition’s problematique and preserve 
it as a possible question.
Having transformed phenomenology as the method for ontology, in Being and 
Time, it no longer ‘characterise^] the what of the objects of philosophical
117 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 49.
118 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 117.
119 Kisiel, The Genesis o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time, 117.
120 Kockelmans, “Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being and Time,” 
118.
121 Kockelmans, “Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being and Time,” 
108.
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research as subject matter,’ and comes to designate ‘the how of that research’
(BT, 50). Phenomenology is made up of two components, those of
phenomenon and logos. The first term, phenomenon, is derivative of the verb
‘phainesthaV which means ‘to show itself.’ Phenomenon is ‘that which shows
itself, the manifest’ yet the word’s relation to the verb ‘phaino’ which means
‘to bring to the light of day, to put in the light’ exemplifies that a phenomenon
‘signifies that which shows itself in itself the manifest’ (BT, 51). However, ‘an
entity can show itself from itself in many ways, depending in each case on the
kind of access we have to it’ (BT, 51). It is possible, therefore, that entities
‘show themselves in many different ways: they may appear as something they
are not (semblance), or as an indication of the presence of something else that
does not show itself directly (symptoms), or as the manifestation of something
that is essentially incapable of ever manifesting itself directly.”22 For
Heidegger, then, a phenomenon is
something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it 
is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the 
most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to 
what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its 
meaning and its ground (BT, 59).
The second term, ‘logos,’ in turn, is deprived of its usual rendering as Reason 
and, in Being and Time, refers instead to ‘discourse.’ As such, it denotes 
‘making manifest what one is “talking about” in one’s discourse’ (BT, 56). 
Logos, then, ‘lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely, what the discourse 
is about’ (BT, 56). It brings about this letting-be-seen ‘“apo”... that is, its lets 
us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about’ (BT, 56). 
Logos ought to be understood as referring precisely to ‘this fundamental 
uncovering or unconcealing of entities in their Being.’123 It is because logos ‘is 
a letting-something-be-seen’ that ‘it can therefore be true or false’ as 
aletheuein (unconceal) and pseuthesthai (cover up) respectively.
Phenomenology, moreover, also ‘informs us of the how with which the what is 
to be treated in this science,’ recalling that Heidegger’s etymological 
reflections on phenomenology are rooted in ontology’s connection to
122 Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996), 24-25.
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phenomenology, i.e., to the implicit, non-intuitive understanding which 
existence has of itself (BT, 59). It is with delineating this priority of Dasein 
that this chapter concludes.
The Paradoxical priority of Dasein?
Heidegger at that time agrees with modem philosophy, from Descartes to 
Husserl, that philosophical investigation has for its ground the being that we 
ourselves are. What he disagrees with is not the priority of our own being, but 
the ontological definition of our being.124
In his account of the analysis of Dasein, Heidegger set out to challenge the
predominance of subjectivity that has provided the basis for human inquiry in
the modem era. Yet, it may appear as a paradox that the very being to which
Being and Time accords priority is an entity which appears to be suspiciously
akin to the subject. Is not the proposed existential analysis of Dasein another
exercise in the same tradition? At this juncture, it must be emphasised that
Dasein is not equivalent to the modem subject, for at least three reasons. First,
Heidegger ‘contests the view that the being of every entity is merely its
capacity for being apprehended as an immanent or transcendent object by a
present consciousness.’125 Second, ‘the subject of intentionality, far from
constituting “a region of being that is enclosed in itself’ and absolute as it does
for Husserl, is in fact an entity the being of which is openness,
transcendence.’126 Third, Heidegger, as noted briefly above, proposes that ‘a
phenomenological approach to the being of the intentional ought to begin by
paying attention to the intentional behaviour of man in his concrete and daily
life, to the ways in which man actually comports himself to the things of the
world’ and cannot be ‘be revealed by turning away from the facticity of human
experience.*127 Since experience of the world is paramount for phenomenology
‘a phenomenological interpretation of subjectivity must radically disassociate
itself from what is often referred to as a worldless Cartesian subject, a res
123 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 24.
124 Jacques Taminiaux, “Heidegger on Values,” in James Risser (ed.), Heidegger Toward the 
Turn: Essays on the Work o f the 1930s (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 
235.
125 Rudolf Bemet, “Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being,” Journal o f  the British 
Society fo r  Phenomenology 21, no. 2 (1990), 146.
126 Bemet, “Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being,” 146.
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cogitans. . .it must avoid a notion of subjectivity in which it becomes a problem 
to account for how a subject can ever hook up with the world.’128
Therefore, Heidegger was concerned to avoid positing a theoretical account of
existence, which isolates it from its world; on the contrary, he wished to show
that Dasein’s dealings in the world are always already infused with meaning,
and take place within already existing intelligibility; such availability of
meaning, in turn, leads to wonderment: to the question of Being itself. In the
words of Robert B. Pippin,
to deal with objects, other persons, social practices, and so forth, all the 
“beings” or “entities”, is to be engaged in an always disclosed world, familiar 
and saturated with significance. Any sort of dealing, whether practical or 
cognitive, goes on “in the light of’ such already present intelligibility, and 
ought to force on us the question of the possibility of such significance itself, 
or the meaning of Being in general.129
The possibility of things making sense to Dasein, and more importantly, the 
possibility that Dasein makes sense to itself rests on certain conditions: ‘what 
are the conditions for the possibility that Dasein could make sense to itself, 
could, in other words, be “at issue” for itself?’130 An initial answer to this 
question is that the ‘meaning of Being must already be available to us [Dasein] 
in some way,’ otherwise Dasein could not ask the question in the first instance 
(BT, 25, brackets added). Yet this initial understanding of Being is ‘so 
infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain 
hidden as sources of the way in which it is prevalently understood.’(BT, 25) 
Dasein, then, is the entity which has some understanding of Being, although 
this understanding is saturated with pre-existing theories which occlude proper 
understanding. Thus, in order to gain a better understanding as to ‘Being’, the 
existential structures of this entity, to which some understanding of Being 
belongs, must be investigated. Dasein, moreover, is the entity that poses the 
question of the meaning of Being, and, in order to
127 Bemet, “Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being,” 146.
128 Einar Overenget, Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity (Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998), 1.
129 Robert B. Pippin, “On Being Anti-Cartesian: Hegel, Heidegger, Subjectivity, and 
Sociality,” in Robert B. Pippin, Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 379.
130 Pippin, “On Being Anti-Cartesian: Hegel, Heidegger, Subjectivity, and Sociality,” 379.
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to work out the question o f Being adequately, we m ust make an entity -  the 
inquirer -  transparent in his own Being. The very asking o f  the question is an 
entity’s mode of Being", and as such it gets its essential character from what is 
inquired about -  namely, Being (BT, 26-27).
In other words, the choice of Dasein is not accidental; at the very least, by 
posing the question of Being, Dasein launches the inquiry, so to speak. Dasein 
is the being under analysis, as opposed to the modem subject, and this choice 
is the reasons for the suggested priority of this entity. In his consideration of 
the question of Being, Heidegger discerns three closely related ways in which 
Dasein has priority. First, ‘Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate 
character of existence’ and thus exhibits ontic priority.131 Second, Dasein has 
an ontological priority because its ‘existence is thus determinative for it’; yet, 
‘Dasein also possesses—as constitutive for its understanding of existence—an 
understanding of Being of all entities of a character other than its own’ (BT, 
34). This understanding indicates Dasein’s third priority, which constitutes ‘the 
ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of all ontologies.’(BT, 34, 
emphasis added). These priorities are revealed to be related, therefore, to 
Dasein’s factical being as existence, a fact which is determines the kind of 
Being that it is -  and the Being that it is constitutes the possibility of 
understanding itself and entities other than itself.
4. Conclusion
The chapter has provided the context within which an ‘optics of coexistence,’ 
which will be the focus of the following chapter, can be understood. 
Heidegger’s philosophical project sought to challenge the predominance of the 
subject in modem philosophy, in his search for the appropriate method for the 
question of Being. Discussing the search for method also highlighted that 
Heidegger’s thought was not animated by the specific issue of coexistence, but 
was concerned with reinstating the question of the meaning of Being as a valid 
philosophical undertaking. The method Heidegger used for philosophically 
accessing existence aimed to go beyond the reflective or theoretical attitude. Its
131 Ontic refers to features which have to do with actual life, with beings as opposed to Being.
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radicalisation by Heidegger wedded phenomenology to ontology, in order to 
make possible the showing of Dasein to itself. Such a ‘hermeneutics of 
facticity’ indicates that facticity has an understanding of itself and that 
understanding has to take facticity as its object. It is out of this confluence that 
existence lets itself be seen as coexistential and heteronomous. The coming 
chapter, therefore, will discuss the elements that comprise the ‘optics of 
coexistence’ arising out of the existential analysis of Dasein and reflect 
specifically on the question of otherness in coexistence.
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Chapter 4
An Optics of Coexistence: Dasein’s Radical 
Embeddedness in its World
The previous chapter outlined Heidegger’s critical engagement with 
phenomenology and traditional ontology in search of a method that would 
access lived experience while, at the same time, avoiding the prevalent 
assumptions related to the modem subject. The present chapter, in turn, 
examines the substantive existential analysis of Being-in-the-world found in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, out of which, it is argued below, emerges an 
account of the primary sociality of existence (Da-sein)} Whereas a ‘subject’ is 
traditionally understood as an ‘assertive, disengaged self who generates 
distance from its background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external 
nature, other subjects) in the name of accelerating mastery of them,’2 the 
interrogation of Dasein’s existential structures offers an account of existence 
beyond autonomy.
Specifically, Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world diverges substantially 
from previous Cartesian and post-Cartesian articulations of subjectivity. 
Whereas they tend to understand the subject as an isolated and self-sufficient 
being, Heidegger’s existential analytic refuses to proceed on the basis of such 
presuppositions.3 Being and Time begins from the premise that it is misleading 
to presuppose the answer to the question ‘who is Dasein?’ and to use the 
subject as the guide to inquiry. This cautionary avoidance of the assumptions 
of modem subjectivity enables Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses to
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), thereafter cited in text as BT with the page number of this English 
translation.
2 Stephen K. White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection,” Political Theory 25, no. 4 
(1997), 503, brackets added.
3 On the Cartesian formulation of ‘subjectity’ into subjectivity, see Martin Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell Krell, Vol. IV: Nihilism (New York: Harper and Row, 1991), 
85-122; on the subject as I-saying being see Christoph Menke, “Modernity and Subjectivity: 
From an Aesthetic Point of View,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 21, no. 2 (1999): 
217-232.
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subsequently suggest that the theoretical positing of Dasein as subject is 
phenomenally inadequate at the ontological level.4
What is particularly important for this project, however, is that the account of 
primary sociality amounts to an ‘optics of coexistence,’ a host of elements that 
attest, not to subjectivity in its autonomous and non-relational sense, but rather, 
to a ‘coexistential heteronomy.’ These elements are best referred to as an 
optics because they enable a different seeing of the phenomena of existence. 
This chapter, therefore, seeks to illuminate and gather these elements into a 
heterology, a discourse about to heteron, the other. There are four distinct, but 
related, elements, which contest the premises of modem subjectivity. First, 
Dasein initially and primarily finds itself immersed in its world. Understanding 
Dasein as existing primarily in the mode of ‘engaged immersion’ helps to shift 
emphasis away from reflection and ‘knowing’ as the definitive modes of 
human relationality. Challenging the reflective relationship of comprehension 
and of objectification that the modem subject is assumed to have towards 
entities and the world, allows the disclosive character of existence to be 
brought to the fore.
Second, Dasein’s comportments while immersed in activity disclose a different 
conception of the world as such. Thinking of existence as engaged immersion 
brings to the fore a notion of the world as a web of involvements with other 
entities, as a background of meanings against which existence makes sense of 
itself pre-reflectively. The world is revealed as a referential web of meanings 
and relations, but it is a web which is not authored by Dasein alone. Rather, 
Dasein’s way of life, the norms and rules, which help it go about its business in 
the world are structured by otherness and are only shared by Dasein. This 
dependence that Dasein has on other-created meanings and understandings 
signifies that Dasein has an ontological relationship to the world. Third, Dasein
4 Ontological inquiry, as used by Heidegger, is distinguished from ontic inquiry, in a 
distinction known as the ‘ontological difference.’ Ontic inquiry has to do with beings and 
entities, as the type of research undertaken by the natural and human sciences, while 
ontological inquiry has to do with Being, see Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f  
Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 318- 
330. In an ontic sense, it can be argued that Dasein regards itself as subject and its human 
sciences are predicated on such an understanding.
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is Being-in-the-world with others. For Dasein, existence is already coexistence, 
Being-there is always Being-with. Selfhood is coexistential in its constitution, 
where such an understanding of ‘coexistence’ is not tantamount to the uniting, 
composition, or co-presence,5 of completed and autonomous subjects. Fourth, 
Dasein is fundamentally attuned to the world in which it exists and its 
understanding of itself and other entities is affected by this attunement. Its 
attunement shows it to be an entity thrown into its world; at the same time, its 
understanding of itself as ‘possibility’ indicates that it also projects itself 
towards the future. Taken together, the aspects of Dasein’s fundamental 
attumenment indicate that its world matters to it; in other words, Dasein is an 
entity better understood as care.
When viewed in connection, therefore, these four elements of the optics of 
coexistence elucidate Dasein’s coexistential heteronomy, which can be found 
in Heidegger’s phenomenology of average everydayness and which the 
following four sections seek to explicate in greater detail.
1. Dasein’s engaged immersion in its world
Writing at a time when the prominence of neo-Kantianism, on the one hand, 
and Edmund Husserl’s concern with the transcendental subject, on the other, 
signalled the dominance of the modem subject, Heidegger attempted to 
‘advance an anti-individualist and anti-mentalist account of the general 
possibility of any sort of meaning, of anything being intelligible at all.’6 The 
centrality of the reflective subject in Western philosophy since Descartes, and 
the attendant emergence of the theoretical attitude, had resulted in the creation 
of rigid dichotomies between subject and object. It led to the perception that 
‘as individual humans we are individual subjects and egos, and what we
5 Co-presence has two senses, the first referring to being-present as substance (ousia) and the 
second to being-present in time, that is ‘now-ness’ (parousia). For an exposition, see Jacques 
Derrida, “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time" trans. Alan Bass, in 
Jacques Derrida, Margins o f  Philosophy (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), 29-68.
6 Robert B. Pippin, “On Being Anti-Cartesian: Hegel, Heidegger, Subjectivity, and Sociality,” 
in Robert B. Pippin, Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 376.
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represent and mean are only subjective pictures which we carry around in us.’ 
Holding onto this understanding of the subject meant that ‘we never reach the 
things themselves.’7 The account of the world in idealist terms could not be 
surpassed by a mere shift to the consideration of collective ‘things,’ ‘by talking 
about “we” instead of “I” and by taking into account the community rather 
than the individual.’8
Heidegger’s thinking about the question of the general intelligibility of our 
world, the question of ‘Being’ as he called it, sought to divert attention from 
the detached subject of post-Cartesian philosophy. In fact, as the previous 
chapter has argued, he wished to call into question the primacy of relating to 
beings as mere objects of reflection and representation, whose very existence 
could be doubted by a ‘subject.’9 The Western philosophical tradition, he 
claimed, had been concerned either with ‘explaining deliberate action 
(Aristotle) or with assigning moral responsibility (Kant).’10 Refusing to restrict 
human comportment to these two modes, Heidegger focused attention on the 
more primary, but neglected, perspective of everydayness, in order to elucidate 
a pre-reflective and non-deliberative type of comportment in the world, which 
forms the first element of the optics of coexistence. Hubert Dreyfus usefully 
refers to this mode of everyday relating to beings as ‘ongoing coping,’ in order 
to emphasise its non-deliberative aspect, while Slavoj Zizek suggests the term 
‘engaged immersion’ to highlight the character of being within the world of 
activity.11 Both terms, however, highlight that Dasein initially and primarily 
finds itself immersed in the world and relates to others and the world in the 
mode of average everydayness. Everydayness is ‘a positive phenomenal 
characteristic’ of Dasein that enables the examination of Dasein’s pre- 
reflective relations by offering a perspective quite distinct from the privileged 
position of disinterested gazing at objects of comprehension (BT, 69).
7 Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery, 1967), 11-12.
8 Heidegger, What is a Thing?, 11-12.
9 See the account of the rise of the subject in Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 
1750: The Rise and Fall o f  the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
10Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, 
Division I  (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), 58.
11 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre o f  Political Ontology (London: 
Verso, 1999), chapter 1.
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The discussion of engaged immersion as the first element of the optics of 
coexistence, calls into question not only the supremacy of disinterested 
knowledge towards objects and the world, but also the reduction of Being-in- 
the-world to ‘a single exemplar—knowing the world’ (BT, 86). Whereas the 
‘relation of subject to object is initially conceived as a knowing relation’ this is 
due to the prior determination of both terms as ‘knower and known.’12 The 
suggestion that Dasein exists in its world as ‘ongoing coping’ contests this 
prior determination as phenomenologically distortive. Moreover, the focus on 
immersion rids intentionality of its mentalistic connotations and allows Dasein 
to show itself as ‘directed-toward’ the world and other entities.13 The 
examination of such a type of comportment towards entities reveals ‘that all 
relations of mental states to their objects presuppose a more basic form of 
being-with-things which does not involve mental activity.’14 Prior to reflection, 
‘[o]ur dealings with the world typically absorb or fascinate us; our tasks, and 
so the various entities we employ in carrying them out, preoccupy us.’15 
Theoretical reflection, then, is not primary for Dasein’s dealings with entities 
in the world; rather, ‘Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world 
with which it is concerned’ (BT, 88). Even when Dasein refrains from non- 
deliberative, non-reflective activity such as ‘producing, manipulating, and the 
like,’ it is still not reflective as such. Rather, ‘it puts itself into what is now the 
sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside (amidst) 
[das Nur-noch-verweilen bei] ...’ (BT, 88, brackets added). The mode of going 
along in the midst of other entities is the very condition of possibility of 
deliberate reflection about entities, but is not the primary and initial way in 
which Dasein comports itself in its world.
Suggesting that Dasein’s everyday mode of being is engaged immersion does 
not intend to denigrate reflection or knowing, however. Heidegger’s focus on 
ongoing coping does not simply wish ‘to make practical activity primary’;
12 David Carr, The Paradox o f Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 19. ‘It is in this sense,’ Carr suggests, ‘that ontology or 
metaphysics is always prior to epistemology.’
13 Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology, 58.
14 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 52.
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rather, it suggests ‘that neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing 
can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient mind and an 
independent world.’16 Engaged immersion and ongoing coping in the world 
was ‘meant to show that the traditional epistemic situation of a mind distinct 
from objects, whether observing or acting upon them, is a deficient mode of 
being-in-the-world.’17 The theoretical attitude tends to obscure the 
phenomenon of ‘world’ by considering it as ‘nature’ and as the container of 
other entities. For Heidegger, ‘knowing,’ in the sense of disinterested 
knowledge, can only be regarded as a ‘founded mode’ of Being-in-the-world, 
‘a mode which can subsist only when connected with something else’ which is, 
in this case, the mode of engaged immersion (BT, 86, note 1).
The first element of the optics of coexistence, furthermore, enables one ‘[t]o 
get the phenomenon of the world properly into view,’ by Tocat[ing] a type of 
human interaction with entities that casts light on its own environment.’18 The 
focus on Dasein’s engaged immersion in everyday, directed activity also sheds 
light on the specific context of the work-world, as well as refuting the 
Cartesian claim that reflection is the primary mode of comportment in towards 
entities. As the following discussion suggests, when a non-deliberative mode 
of Being-in-the-world is shown as both initial and primary for Dasein, the 
world and other entities cease to be objects for a reflective subject and come 
into relief as themselves constitutive of Dasein. Ongoing coping in the world 
of work usually takes the form of usage of available things and clearly 
illustrates that Dasein does not encounter entities as objects of ‘theorem’ (see, 
gaze or observe) but, rather, as ‘equipment’ or ‘gear’ available in its world of 
activity.19 But more importantly, in going about its concerns in everyday life, 
Dasein discloses the Being of other entities, and of the world itself, while at the
15 Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996), 43.
16 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 49.
17 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 54.
18 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 47.
19 In order to understand the practical activity through which Heidegger wants to access 
‘world’ we must remember that ‘[tjhere are two basic ways o f being. Being-human, which 
Heidegger calls Dasein and nonhuman being. The latter divides into two categories: 
Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit.’ These are normally translated respectively as ‘readiness-to- 
hand’ and ‘presence-at-hand’ but the meaning of these terms can be best rendered by 
‘availableness’ and ‘occurrentness.’ Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, xi.
119
same time, revealing the role of otherness in the ‘layer of everyday 
experience.’20
Engaged immersion and Dasein’s disciosive character
In what way can Dasein be said to disclose the Being of other entities? 
Engaged immersion, in the form of manipulating a simple tool, like a hammer 
for example, makes manifest the kind of Being which equipment has. The act 
of ‘[hjammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s 
character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way that 
could not possibly be more suitable’ (BT, 98). It is the handling of equipment 
in the most appropriate way that reveals its Being: ‘the less we stare at the 
hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more 
primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it 
encountered as that which it is—as equipment’ (BT, 98). It is by using the 
hammer for what it is intended, for hammering, that ‘uncovers the specific 
‘manipulability’ of the hammer’ and manifests its Being as readiness-to-hand 
(availableness) (BT, 98). As John Haugeland suggests, ‘[a]vailability is the 
way of equipmental being.’21 Dasein’s directed activity to get something done 
in its work-world, then, affirms that gear is not merely occurrent in the world 
(present-at-hand) but is available (ready-to-hand) for Dasein to use in its 
everyday activities.
Furthermore, equipment does not occur singularly in this world of work. 
Rather, it functions as part of an equipmental totality; it belongs within this 
equipmental whole, which endows it with meaning. A hammer is only a 
hammer in relation to nails, wooden boards, etc. ‘Equipment -  in accordance 
with its equipmentality -  always is in terms of its belonging to other 
equipment’ and this equipmental totality invokes the concrete circumstances or
20 Jean-Luc Nancy, Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris: Galilee, 1996), 27, cited in Simon Critchley, 
Ethics - Politics - Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary French 
Thought (London: Verso, 1999), 240.
21 John Haugeland, “Dasein's Disclosedness,” The Southern Journal o f  Philosophy 28, Spindel 
Supplement (1989), 57.
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context of using the equipment-Thing (BT, 97).22 In addition to disclosing the 
concrete context of use, however, Dasein’s engaged immersion with available 
equipment in the world of work highlights its proper function, which, in tum, 
‘presupposes something for which it is usable, an end-product.’23 In other 
words, the Being of an available thing becomes accessible when one considers 
its role. Thus, the role of the hammer might be to drive nails into wooden 
boards: disclosing the function of equipment enables the relationship of a 
specific piece of equipment to the equipmental totality to be understood as a 
role-relationship. The highlighting of the referential ‘assignment’ of a piece of 
gear indicates that, with each available entity, ‘there always belongs an 
equipmental whole, in which it can be this equipment that it is.’24 The ‘specific 
functionality,’ the assignment, of a piece of equipment within a whole set of 
references ‘makes the thing what it is.’25
It should be noted, moreover, that Dasein’s initial involvement is not with the 
things (equipment or gear) themselves. ‘On the contrary, that with which we 
concern ourselves primarily is the work -  that which is to be produced’ (BT, 
99). The work, for which the equipment is assigned a specific function also 
presupposes that raw material is available. Furthermore, the final product or 
service is intended for people to make use of. Their requirements and interests, 
then, have an impact on the work being done. Thus, the work is assigned a 
‘towards-which’ reference that refers to the ‘end-points we use in making 
sense of a flow of directed activity.’26 The final end of the chain of ‘towards- 
which’ assignments is Dasein itself, because ‘Dasein exists in the manner of 
being-in-the-world and as such it is for the sake o f its own self It is not the 
case that this being just simply is; instead, so far that it is, it is occupied with 
its own capacity to be.’27 This assignment of work and gear ‘for-the-sake-of 
Dasein is not conspicuous in everyday work, however (BT, 116). Yet it is this
22 Haugeland, “Dasein's Disclosedness,” 56.
23 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 48.
24 Haugeland, “Dasein's Disclosedness,” 56.
25 Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology, 164.
26 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 94.
27 Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology, 170.
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latent ‘self-interpretation’ of directed activity that ‘informs and orders all [of 
Dasein’s] activities.’28
Dasein’s worldly Being is ‘always already outside of itself, dwelling amidst 
objects in all their variety;’ entities show up for Dasein ‘in the full specificity 
of their nature’ and this ability to disclose entities as they are ‘in their what- 
being and that-being’ makes Dasein the ‘clearing.’29 It is because Dasein has 
the ability to disclose other entities by the fact of its being-in the world, that 
Dasein’s Being is constituted by its disclosedness. Dasein’s involvement with 
equipment in the work-world discloses that existence operates according to a 
totality of references and assignments. The work itself ‘bears with it that 
referential totality within which the equipment is encountered’ (BT, 99). The 
referential assignments that map how, and for what reason, activity occurs 
make the wprk-world meaningful and comprehensible for Dasein. As such, the 
work-world is a micro example of the surrounding world (Umwelt) which 
Dasein’s disclosive character brings to the fore. This understanding of the 
world, as a totality of involvements, references, and meanings must be 
examined in greater detail, in order to show its essentially co-existential and 
heteronomous character. Prior to this discussion, however, the role of reflective 
deliberation deserves some more analysis in order to dispel its assumed 
primacy and to suggest its proper place in human existence.
The role of reflection
As was briefly noted above, the equipmental totality is not noticeable while 
Dasein is immersed in its everyday comportments. This is because, in the 
example of the work world, the user of equipment is focussing on the 
particular task at hand and on the end-result, such that the equipment itself, and 
the totality of which it is a part, are subsumed in the task and become 
transparent and ‘invisible.’ The user is not explicitly aware of any specific 
traits that a particular piece of equipment may have while manipulating it, or
28 Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World, 95.
29 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 75. See also (BT, 171).
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how it specifically functions within the equipmental whole. The 
inconspicuousness of equipment continues throughout the normal, 
unproblematic functioning of everyday directed activity. Deliberate reflection 
towards available entities is only called for when a breakdown in the 
referential totality occurs. When non-deliberative ongoing coping is no longer 
possible, the user turns to deliberation in order to restore the referential totality 
to its normal state. Knowing is required as a mode of relating to entities when 
there is ‘a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concemfully’ (BT, 
88). The specific situation of breakdown in Dasein’s ordinary immersion in the 
world of work, therefore, calls for new modes of encountering entities and of 
being-encountered, that are not, as it was shown above, part of Dasein’s initial 
involvement with entities in the world.30 Such disturbances in the flow of 
comportment, reveal Dasein as a being capable of reflection and deliberation.
Using disturbance as the instance when reflection is required, however, 
establishes that disinterested reflection (itheorem) is not the primary or initial 
mode of relating to the world and other entities. Rather, the world and 
available equipment are related to primarily through ‘the circumspection of the 
dealings in which we use it’; it is Dasein’s constant and extensive involvement 
in practical activity which lends itself as a novel starting point for existential 
analysis (BT, 102). As the situation of breakdown illustrates, Dasein is both 
capable and inclined to engage in theoretical reflection when it is called for by 
a deficiency in everyday comportment. To focus from the start on the reflective 
subject, however, is to obscure how reflection comes about and to occlude 
Dasein’s proximal relationship to its world as one of immersed involvement.
30 According to Heidegger there are ‘three modes of disturbance—conspicuousness, obstinacy, 
and obtrusiveness.’30 Conspicuousness reveals that equipment is no longer available and in 
being so ‘it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its 
readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too’ (BT, 103). 
However, usual and ordinary breakdowns perhaps do not necessarily lead the user to deliberate 
reflection. Based on habit and experience, the user might switch to another mode of repairing 
the equipment or asking for help. In a situation where things are missing, rather than broken, 
the non-availability of equipment renders it obtrusive. In other words, its momentary 
unavailibility, its ureadiness-to-hand, in other words, clarifies its very usual availability. So 
much so Heidegger argues, that it seems to lose its readiness-to-hand in the very urgency with 
which it is needed, and therefore, reveals itself as present-at-hand. In the case of equipment 
being neither unusable nor missing, something may ‘stand in the way of our concern’ when it 
does not, for example, belong in this context, or has not been taken care of. ‘Anything which is
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The knowing subject which ‘encounters present-at-hand objects on to which he 
then projects his aims, and exploits them accordingly,’ Zizek clarifies in this 
regard, ‘falsifies the proper state of things: the fact that engaged immersion in 
the world is primordial, and that all other modes of the presence of objects are 
derived from it.’31
The phenomenological observation, therefore, that Dasein’s engaged 
immersion is the primary mode of relating to entities within the world forms 
the first element of the optics of coexistence. Understanding human existence 
to be immersed in its world in an engaged manner, counters the proposition 
that the subject is first and foremost involved in a relation of reflection and 
objectification with things and the world. Furthermore, everyday 
comportments, in the form of ongoing coping, help to disclose the Being of 
entities, as either available or present, and the world as a referential totality of 
meaning and relations. Dasein’s disclosive character suggests that, as an entity, 
Dasein has an ontological relationship to the world. In fact, it can be argued 
that ‘solipsism is an ontological impossibility for Dasein since Dasein occurs 
only in disclosive relations.’32 This understanding of the world as a referential 
totality in which Dasein makes sense of itself, as well as the ontological 
relationship that this indicates, is examined in the following section as the 
second element of the optics of coexistence.
2. The world as a shared web of meanings and relations
Two equally important insights emerge from the above discussion of engaged 
immersion to form the second element of an optics of coexistence. First, that 
engaged immersion is indicative of a more basic state of immersion, one that 
Heidegger calls ‘Being-in-the-world.’ This state of radical embeddedness 
reveals, as is analysed below, that Dasein has an ontological relationship to the
unready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that 
which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else’ (BT, 103).
31 £izek, The Ticklish Subject, 15.
32 Charles E. Scott, The Question o f  Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), 108.
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world and, as such, it is not merely contained in the world spatially as a dis- 
embedded ‘subject.’ Second, the conception of the world that arises from the 
discussion of engaged immersion as the initial and primary mode of Dasein’s 
comportment is not ‘nature,’ or even a container of other entities; rather, the 
world appears as a totality of references and assignments, a set of relations and 
sense according to which Dasein orients itself. Both aspects, Being-in-the- 
world and the world as a referential totality, related as they are, serve to 
establish a context of inner-worldly belonging that gives Dasein a worldly 
character and becomes, together with the primacy of engaged immersion, the 
bedrock of the optics of coexistence.
The disclosive character of Dasein’s engaged immersion in the work-world has 
crucially illuminated that Dasein can be understood as Being-in-the-world, and 
that this denotes a range of inner-worldly involvements, such as, primarily 
‘dealing with the world; tarrying alongside it in the manner of performing, 
effecting and completing, but also contemplating, interrogating, and 
determining by way of contemplation and comparison’; taken as a whole, it 
can be argued that ‘Being-in-the-world is characterized as concern.’33 Yet, 
Dasein’s everyday praxis does not only indicate that Dasein is Being-in-the- 
world. It also simultaneously discloses the ‘world’ as a totality of meanings, in 
which Dasein makes sense of itself (as existence).
Thus, the insight that Dasein is a being that ‘has a world’ leads to an 
understanding of ‘world’ as the referential background that enables Dasein to 
make sense of its environment.34 Referred to in this manner, ‘world’ designates 
something other than a spatial container of all other entities, an object, or, 
even, nature. For Dasein, whose Being is Being-in-the-world, this ‘world’ can
33 Both in Martin Heidegger, The Concept o f  Time, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992), 7E.
34 Although the understanding of ‘world’ as a referential totality is most clearly brought into 
perspective by the accidental interruption of Dasein’s engaged immersion, the disclosure of the 
referential totality can occur in the absence of a disturbance by entities ‘whose function it is to 
show their practical context.’ Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 100. Such entities are ‘signs’ 
which help Dasein achieve orientation in its own environment by ‘explicitly raisfing] an 
equipmental whole into our circumspection’ (BT, 110). Signs, then are ‘indicative of the 
ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of worldhood’ (BT, 
114).
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only be understood as ‘an “environment” within which man dwells with the
things he uses in a circumspective manner. The worldliness of this world is
defined...as a meaningful totality of references.’35 The references by which
Dasein locates itself in the world, and according to which existence becomes
both possible and meaningful, are all connected in such a way that the totality
is also a ‘web of assignment relations.’36 One assignment is related to another,
and to the referential whole, in a chain or, rather, a web, such that the
referential totality is also a ‘relational totality,’ which Heidegger calls
‘significance’ (BT, 120). It is this connectedness of signifying assignments that
makes the whole meaningful. Because it is meaningful, the world is ‘a web of
socially or culturally constituted assignments within which entities can appear
*
as the particular types of object that they are.’37 Furthermore, it is Dasein’s 
familiarity with the totality of assignment relations which ‘is the ontical 
condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a 
world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which 
can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves’ (BT, 120).
Making assignments, completing the chain, enlarging or altering the web of 
references is part of Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world. Therefore, the 
totality of involvements helps to substantiate that within it Turks an 
ontological relationship to the world’ (BT, 118). Dasein’s general absorption in 
its everyday dealings reveals ‘the world as familiar in such a way that there is 
no separation between Dasein’s disclosing comportment and the world 
disclosed.’38 Dasein’s familiarity with the referential totality and its readiness 
to do what is appropriate, to cope in other words in each concrete context, is 
constantly active. This relationship to the world is so familiar that Heidegger 
‘simply calls it being-in-the-world,’39 ‘On the face of it,’ John Haugeland
35 Wemer Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 88-89.
36 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 51.
37 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 51.
38 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 106. However, it should be noted that ‘the way in which Being 
and Time arrives at the phenomenon of world—via analysis of praxis—is not the sole possible 
way or a privileged way.’ Joseph P. Fell, “The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of 
Praxis in the Early Heidegger,” The Southern Journal o f  Philosophy 28, Spindel Supplement 
(1989), 24.
39 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 104.
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notes, ‘this structure looks like a relation: being-amidst as a relation between 
self (agent, who) and world’; yet, Being-in-the-world is more properly 
understood ‘as a single entity with two interdependent structural aspects: self 
and world.’40 In other words, Dasein is worldly from the start and as part of 
the kind of being that it is. ‘In clarifying Being-in-the-world’ Heidegger notes, 
‘we have shown that a bare subject without a world never “is” proximally, nor 
is it ever given’ (BT, 152). ‘Dasein in so far as it is, has always submitted itself 
already to a “world” which it encounters, and this submission belongs 
essentially to its Being’ (BT, 120-121). It is, Heidegger argues, the most basic 
instantiation of the understanding of Being, which belongs to Dasein’s Being 
(BT, 118).
What is the nature of this ‘world’ in which Dasein is always already absorbed? 
As was noted above, within the referential totality assignments are relational. 
This primarily includes references assigned and altered by other Daseins, as 
shall be discussed in greater detail in the following section. The multitude of 
Dasein’s activities ‘presuppose the disclosure of one shared world.’41 Without 
this shared ‘web,’ this ‘common institutional framework,’ behaviour would not 
be intelligible; the web works tacitly and holistically and against this 
background, Dasein’s roles, norms, and praxis ‘make sense in relation to one 
another and as a whole.’42
Furthermore, the web of other-created, shared references ‘must therefore 
always be laid out...in advance of any particular encounter with an object.’43 
As it can be recalled from the discussion of engaged immersion above, 
Dasein’s initial and primary comportment towards things and other Daseins is 
in the mode of average everydayness. In this mode of averageness, Dasein 
operates according to already existing meanings, rules, and norms within the 
equipmental whole. In fact, it is important to note that without the mode of 
averageness there could be no equipmental totality, because its functioning 
requires a certain average or undifferentiated way of acting and behaving into
40 Haugeland, “Dasein's Disclosedness,” 61.
41 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 142.
42 Haugeland, “Dasein's Disclosedness,” 58.
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which Dasein has always already socialised. This understanding of the world 
as an other-created totality of meaning brings to the fore the heteronomous 
aspect of the phenomenon of the world.
Averageness, however, does not suggest that ways of behaving and acting are 
identical among Daseins. On the contrary, Dasein goes about its concerns by 
uniquely appropriating these shared meanings, norms and practices that add up 
to the referential totality. This appropriating relationship that Dasein has with 
respect to the shared web of meanings and relations is what Heidegger calls 
mineness. Mineness enables Heidegger to say about Dasein that, in each case, I  
am this entity. Dasein is Being-in-the-world, a basic state of being that 
indicates an ontological familiarity and submission to the world. The world is 
understood as a shared, already given, web of references. In this constellation, 
Dasein is ‘shared social activity’44 uniquely appropriated, in each case, through 
mineness. This unique appropriation that Dasein is does not result, however, in 
the return of the autonomous self of Cartesian thought.45 Confusion can arise 
by the two apparently divergent claims, namely, that Dasein is not equivalent 
with an ‘individual’ (the answer to the question ‘who’ is Dasein, is 
phenomenologically not ‘I,’ it will be argued below) but, at the same time, it is 
‘essentially distinctive of people; and in each case, we are it.’46 It can be 
avoided, however, if Dasein is conceived of as ‘a “living” way of life,’ that is, 
a way of life currently being lived out.47 This allows mineness (in each case I 
am myself this entity) to be reconciled with averageness (‘Dasein is shared 
practices’) in order to arrive at Dasein being a uniquely appropriated way of 
life.
The relationship between averageness and mineness is quite distinct from the 
subjectivist ‘conception of Dasein as an occurent (present-at-hand) subject,’
43 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 51.
44 Haugeland, “Dasein's Disclosedness,” 61.
45 See Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, trans. F. E. Sutcliffe 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 150-169.
46 Haugeland, “Dasein's Disclosedness,” 61.
47 Haugeland, “Dasein's Disclosedness,” 61-62. Also see John Haugeland, “Heidegger on 
Being a Person,” Nous 16, no. 1 (1982): 15-26.
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which ‘isolates Dasein’48 and which requires a conception of coexistence as the 
composition and co-presence of self-sufficient entities. Since Dasein’s 
absorption in the world has ‘the quality of “mineness”’ then, Dasein’s 
immersion and participation in averageness can ‘have its unique 
appropriations’49 without the two being opposed to each other. Only then can 
averageness appear as ‘the ontological source of the familiarity and readiness 
that makes the ontical discovery of entities, of others, and even of myself 
possible’50 and that lends meaning to Dasein’s comportment towards things 
and others.
The second element of the optics of coexistence, then, provides an 
understanding of the world as a relational totality of meaning and involvement, 
to which Dasein has an ontological relationship. This element rescinds 
completely the relationship of disinterested distance which the modem subject 
is purported to have to the world, taken as its object of reflection. On the 
contrary, not only is Dasein Being-in-the-world, but also the world is accessed 
by Dasein as a web of relations and references already formed by otherness 
and, as such, it is only ever shared (and, occasionally, appropriated in a distinct 
way) by Dasein. The way assignments of meaning are connected show that 
Dasein’s world is fundamentally relational; it is shared with other Daseins, and 
therefore, coexistential; but it is also already created by others in an average 
way and, as such, it is heteronomous. This relationship that Dasein has with 
others is the third element of the optics of coexistence and is the focus of the 
next section.
3, Being-there is Being-with
The third element of the optics of coexistence sets out the precise relationship 
that Dasein has with others, as well as the ontological significance of this 
relationship, following the discussion of the worldly context in which Dasein’s 
comportments with other entities unfold. Robert Pippin has argued that the
48 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 146.
49 Pippin, “On Being Anti-Cartesian,” 383.
50 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 144.
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account of engaged immersion, as given above, is ‘immediately suggestive of 
some theory o f sociality, rather than subjectivity in the Cartesian sense.’51 This 
third element refutes most directly the phenomenological adequacy of the 
modem non-relational subject, of the T  as the answer to the question ‘who is 
Dasein,’ and suggests, instead, that Dasein is essentially Being-with. The 
analysis of engaged immersion has already suggested that conceptualising 
Dasein as a knowing subject would not be ‘phenomenally adequate,’ while the 
conception of the world as a totality of meaning has indicated that Dasein is 
not an isolated subject but, rather, has an ontological relationship with the 
world. The exposition of Dasein as fundamentally constituted by its capacity to 
be with others within the world, in turn, dispels the understanding of 
coexistence as mere co-presence, which the ground of subjectivism imposes 
upon ontology.
Withness as a prior capacity of Dasein
Following the discussion of engaged immersion in the world, it can be recalled 
that ‘Dasein finds itself proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids -  in 
those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally 
concerned’ (BT, 155). Others, therefore, ‘are encountered from out of the 
world, in which concemfully circumspective Dasein essentially dwells’ (BT, 
155). While the other has been traditionally viewed as either an object of 
comprehension or a co-present subject, existential analysis shows that in the 
mode of average everydayness Dasein encounters Others ‘environmentally’ in 
its surrounding work-world in the course of its everyday dealings. For 
example, the available equipment that a particular Dasein uses are not 
designated specifically for it; rather, it is available for all others who are 
disclosed by their usage of equipment. More specifically, the equipmental 
totality highlights the importance of the other because equipment bear not only 
‘in-order-to’ (e.g. perform a task) assignments, but also ‘towards-which’ ones
51 Pippin, “On Being Anti-Cartesian,” 377, emphasis added. Despite the potential which exists 
in the Mitsein analytic it was itself underdeveloped by Heidegger as is claimed by Frederick A. 
Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground o f  Ethics: A Study o f  Mitsein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) and Michael Theunissen, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology o f
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(e.g. for this end) and ‘whereof (e.g. the origin of the ready-to-hand). These 
‘whereof and ‘towards-which’ references ‘of equipmental totalities relate the 
work-world to other people.’52 When Dasein is at work producing something or 
performing a task, this is always oriented with reference to the others for 
whom the task is performed or thing is produced, to its future users or 
consumers, in other words. When Dasein is using material, its suppliers or 
producers are encountered as to whether they do their supplying or producing 
well. Even on the mode of ‘tarrying amidst,’ various entities show themselves 
as belonging to others, being serviced, maintained, or sold by them. In the 
surrounding world of praxis, then, ‘along with the equipment to be found when 
one is at work [in Arbeit], those Others for whom the “work” [ Werk] is 
destined are “encountered too’” (BT, 153). It is, then, in this world of activity 
where Others are disclosed by Dasein’s everyday praxis.
Mulhall notes that there are three distinct ways in which other Daseins ‘show 
up’ in the world. First, they are one additional type of entity which is 
encountered by Dasein in the course of its disclosing engagement in the world. 
Second, the work Dasein produces and the tasks it performs are generally 
intended for others, either as consumers or as further producers in the process 
of completing the work. Third, the available things which Dasein uses or 
encounters are not ready-to-hand for that Dasein alone. An available thing is 
available for every Dasein capable of using it; in this way readiness-to-hand is 
‘ inherently intersubj ective. ’53
The emphasis placed on Dasein’s engaged immersion means that the ‘Dasein- 
with of others is often encountered in terms of what is ready-to-hand within- 
the-world’; they are encountered in their own work environment, and not as 
entities which Dasein studies reflectively: ‘[w]e meet them “at work,” that is,
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, trans. Christopher Macann (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1984).
52 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 67.
53 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 66. The use of language in the work world also 
constitutes ‘not just a human world, but a common world.’ James Risser, “Philosophical 
Hermeneutics and the Question of Community,” in Charles E. Scott and John Sallis (eds.), 
Interrogating the Tradition: Hermeneutics and the History o f  Philosophy (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2000),19.
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primarily in their Being-in-the-world’ notes Heidegger (BT, 156). Although it
is within this environmental context of equipment and in the mode of ongoing
coping that their Being is disclosed, this is neither readiness-to-hand nor
presence-at-hand. Heidegger employs the term “Dasein-with”
to designate that Being for which the Others who are [die seienden Anderen] 
are freed [disclosed] within-the-world. This Dasein-with o f the Others is 
disclosed within-the-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who are Daseins 
with us [die Mitdaseienden], only because Dasein in itself is essentially 
Being-with (BT, 156, second brackets added).
The others are encountered ‘in’ the work-world in the basic mode pf Being-in- 
the-world, that is, ‘they are like the very Dasein which frees [discloses] them, 
in that they are there too, and there with i f  (BT, 154, brackets added). 
Although the relationship to the other is mediated through the work-world, this 
does not mean that it is not originary, that there is in other words, a distinction 
between the with-world and the work-world, as if these were separate and 
distinct. As Michael Theunissen has argued, ‘the environmental kind of 
encounter of Dasein-with does not suspend the circumstance that the 
surrounding world is itself already a with-world and that thereby all equipment 
carries “with-like” traits from the outset.’54
What is more important to note is that others are not encountered in the world
‘as a “plurality” of subjects that, thanks to their incarnation, arise as “person-
things-present-at-hand” among other things.’55 The logic of composition is
directly refuted by Heidegger both in its conception of others as subjects and of
their coexistence as a plurality of distinct units being together as a composition
of self-sufficient subjects. The reformulation of the ‘with’ beyond composition
‘unworks’ the non-relational character assumed of the modem subject. ‘The
world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others.
Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein] ’ (BT,
155). ‘With,’ then, shapes the very Being of Dasein as a worldly entity.
Being-there-too [Auch-da-sein] with them does not have the ontological 
character o f a Being-present-at-hand-along-‘with’ them within a world. This 
‘with’ is something o f the character of Dasein; the ‘too’ means a sameness o f 
Being as circumspectively concemful Being-in-the-world. ‘W ith’ and ‘too’
54 Theunissen, The Other, 182.
55 Theunissen, The Other, 176.
132
are to be understood existentially, not categorically. By reason o f this with- 
like [mithaften] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one I share with 
Others (BT, 154-155).
The claim that ‘Dasein is essentially Being-with’ is not merely a description
that ‘I am not present-at-hand alone, and that Others of my kind occur’ nor that
‘I am currently with others’ (BT, 156). Rather, Being-with is an attribute of
Dasein’s Being; as Heidegger explains, ‘Being-with is an existential
characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or
perceived’ (BT, 156). Even when no Others are present Dasein is Being-with.
Being-alone is possible only for an entity who has Being-with as its Being and
as such being-alone can be understood as ‘a deficient mode of Being-with’
(BT, 157). To say that Dasein is Being-with, then, has little to do with the
actual presence of multiple others, because ‘with’ is not about composition or
spatial proximity. Rather, the ‘with’ is an existential attribute of Dasein.
Georgopoulos articulates this quite effectively when he argues that the term
‘with’ cannot be seen
as designating a relationship that can be noted once there are more than two 
terms. Rather we have to think o f Mit-sein, o f  Being-with, or more exactly of 
the very Being o f  with, o f withness. There can be two terms that can 
encounter one another only if  first there is withness. That is, only if  first there 
is a primordial structure of commonness, o f a with relationship, can a specific 
type o f relationship be instituted.56
‘Withness,’ Heidegger suggests, is the existential commonness that makes all 
actual interactions with and experiences of others possible. This ‘sharing’ of 
the world is a ‘prior capacity,’ which Dasein possesses; it is the capacity to-be- 
with (mit-sein) that makes any consideration of others possible. Coexistence 
and its multifaceted dimensions rest on this existential structure of Being-with. 
As Michael Gelven notes ‘[t]o say that Being-with (or to-be-with) is an a 
priori existential of Dasein means that one cannot be a self unless it is within 
one’s possibilities to relate in a unique way to other Daseins. Hence, to be 
Dasein at all means to-be-with.’57
56 N. Georgopoulos, The Structures o f  Existence: A Reading o f  Heidegger's Being and Time 
(University Park: The Dialogue Press of Man and World, 1994), 91.
7 Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1970), 67-68.
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What is this way in which Dasein relates to others, given that its Being is 
Being-with? ‘If the world is revealed in concerned dealings, what Heidegger 
called besorgen, so Mitdasein (Dasein-with) is originally revealed in what he 
calls Fursorge’ where this ‘refers to those dealings by virtue of which the 
Other appears as another Dasein.’58 Dasein comports itself towards other 
Daseins with solicitude (Fursorge, commonly meaning ‘welfare’). Referring to 
the range of comportment to other Daseins, solicitude cannot be understood to 
be synonymous with ‘respect.’ As an ontological claim, comportment in terms 
of solicitude can take many forms, from being inattentive, indifferent or hostile 
towards others to being attentive and caring. While it may be attractive to view 
solicitude in an a priori positive way, it may be worth remembering that ‘[i]n 
average everydayness, however, solicitude, is...an absorption in worldly 
matters of common concern’59 and that such a concern often finds expression 
in keeping one’s distance and interacting with others with distrust and reserve 
(BT, 219). However, despite the forms in which solicitude is manifested in 
average everydayness, ‘[i]n clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that 
a bare subject without a world never ‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever given. And 
so in the end an isolated ‘I’ without Others is just as far from being proximally 
given’ (BT, 152).
The phenomenology of average everydayness enables an account of the 
priority of relationality and, hence, coexistence in its ontological sense. The 
analysis of Dasein as Being-with goes beyond notions of intersubjectivity, with 
their basis on empathetic relations with Others, because, ‘[o]nly those who cut 
the I off from the Other must latch onto “empathy” as that act that is supposed 
to instate the initially absent bond between I and the Other.’60 Being-there is 
Being-with, Heidegger claims, to the extent that others ‘are rather those from 
whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself -  those among 
whom one is too’ (BT, 154). Walter A. Davis concurs when he writes of the 
fundamental relationship with the other: ‘[w]hen the other comes before us it is 
not to meet an already formed subject which may or may not choose to enter
58 Georgopoulos, The Structures o f Existence, 93.
59 Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile "We”: Ethical Implications o f  Heidegger's Being and Time 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 14.
60 Theunissen, The Other, 175. See also (BT, 160).
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into relationships from which it can always subsequently detach itself. 
Relationships have “always already” begun.’ Dasein’s constitution is 
structured by the other: ‘Being with and like the others, we are one with the 
comforts of the commonplace, the already thought, which is not outside us but 
within, already at work producing an “identity” which is prior to all 
subjectivity.’61
The manifestation of Being-with as the ‘they’
It is not only important to examine ‘withness’ as an attribute of human 
existence, however. It is equally significant to ask how this existential structure 
of Being-with manifests itself. According to Heidegger, in average 
everydayness Being-with manifests itself in the phenomenon of ‘Das Man,’ 
which has been rather misleadingly translated as the ‘they,’ although one 
cannot not assume that Dasein is distinct from the ‘they’ on the basis of this 
translation. The ‘they,’ or the ‘one’ as it also sometimes referred to, is part of 
Dasein’s constitution. Dasein belongs to others ‘who proximally and for the 
most part “are there” in everyday Being-with-one-another’ (BT, 164). ‘The 
“they,”.. ..which we all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being 
of everydayness,’ notes Heidegger; as the ‘they,’ others are not distinct in 
average everydayness; rather, ‘any Other can represent them’ (BT, 164).
The answer to the question ‘who is Dasein?’ finally has its response: the who 
of Dasein is not the ‘I’ but the ‘they.’ This answer asserts the priority and 
primacy of the others for Dasein in its constitution as Being-in-the-world. As 
Davis explains, ‘[t]he “they” is primary. We don’t fall into it from a prior self­
presence, but are in it and delivered over to it long before any question of 
independence arises.’62 What does this response to the question of ‘who’ in the 
form of the ‘they’ signify however? The ‘they,’ it can be argued, rescinds any
61 Both in Walter A. Davis, Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity in/and Hegel, Heidegger, 
Marx, and Freud (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 115-116.
62 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 118.
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priority of the self and affirms the primacy of sociality and relationality found
in the first three elements of the optics of coexistence:
[w]e live in the midst of others with their beliefs and values, fears and 
conflicts already so deeply embedded in us that the initial experience of 
reflection is the shock o f discovering how utterly the voice o f the other comes 
pouring forth whenever I, the sovereign individual, speak, feel, think, or act.63
There are two related arguments contained within Heidegger’s examination of 
Dasein’s indistinguishability from others in the form of the ‘they.’ First, the 
suggestion that the ‘they,’ rather than the ‘I,’ may be the ‘who’ of everyday 
Dasein, attests to Dasein’s immersion in the world with others. Averageness, it 
was noted in section two, has a norm-creating function. When the ‘they’ is 
understood to establish and maintain ‘averageness’ and to contain the whole of 
shared practices, it can be seen to constitute ‘one shared world rather than a 
plurality of individual worlds’; to point, moreover, to the norm-creating role of 
‘withness,’ which might be called ‘constitutive conformity.’64 As Herman 
Philipse notes, the ‘they’ ‘is a fundamental structure of everyday life that is 
constitutive of the cultural public world’ and it is moreover, ‘the mode of 
Being in which we live “proximally and most of the time”.’65 The notion of 
‘constitutive conformity’ illuminates that Dasein ‘requires for its Being-in-the- 
world an expected and normal way of referring to and dealing with others. In 
this sense the “I-myself ’ exists, in significant part, in its conformity to the 
“one” or “anybody” or “they,” and it shares...a commonality of significance,’ 
suggests Howard Tuttle.66 The problematisation of the subject’s purported 
autonomy through the designation of the ‘they’ as Dasein’s everyday self, 
therefore, appears to be ‘the last nail in the coffin of the Cartesian tradition.’67
Second, Heidegger’s discussion of the ‘they’ also contains what appear to be 
‘negative connotations,’ in order to establish that ‘our habitual and social self,
63 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 115.
64 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 154. He claims that this constitutive conformity is not fully 
developed by Heidegger who obscures the constitutive role of the with-world by not 
distinguishing between it, on the one hand, and the impropriety of conformism for Dasein’s 
Being, on the other.
65 Herman Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” Inquiry 42 (1999), 451.
66 Howard N. Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth: the Existential Critique o f  Mass Society in the 
Thought o f  Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega y  Gasset (New York: Peter Lang, 
1996), 67.
67 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 144.
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which is structured by public rules, norms, and roles...is not our real or 
authentic self.’68 It is important to note at this point that the reference to 
Dasein’s ‘habitual self gestures towards the ease with which Dasein 
understands and comports itself as subject. What must be problematised, 
therefore, is the publicly conveyed self-understanding of Dasein as ‘subject’ 
that flourishes within the discourses of the ‘they.’ When Heidegger claims that 
average everydayness is an ‘inauthentic’ mode of being, he is referring to the 
ways in which Dasein understands itself as a sovereign, self-sufficient subject. 
He, thus, views the shared world as the place of self-dispersal, where one 
compares himself to others and where ‘there is constant care as to the way one 
differs from them’ (BT, 163). Whether Dasein feels that it is lagging behind, 
whether it wants to maintain a certain superiority, Dasein’s ‘Being-with-one- 
another has the character of distantiality [Abstandingkeit] ’ (BT 164). Yet 
distantiality is only possible because ‘Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one- 
another, stands in subjection to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken 
away by the Others’ (BT, 164). This happens precisely because Dasein belongs 
to the Others, to the ‘the one’ and ‘enhances their power’ so that Dasein is ‘the 
one’ initially and primarily (BT, 164). Yet, in designating them as ‘the Others’, 
we hide this fact of belonging to them. We belong to ‘the One’ to such an 
extent that:
Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind 
o f Being o f ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the others, as 
distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness 
and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded (BT, 
164).
In the safe fold of ‘the one’ Dasein takes its pleasures as one would, and
considers certain things sad, as one would, and so comport itself in the world
with entities and other Daseins as the ‘they’ would. Heidegger argues, that
the “they” maintains itself factically in the averageness o f that which belongs 
to it, o f that which it regards as valid and that which it does not, and o f that to 
which it grants success and to that which it denies it...Publicness proximally 
controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted (BT, 165).
Although constitutive of the shared world, the general acceptance of 
averageness has a serious repercussion in that it tends towards a ‘levelling
68 Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” 451.
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down’ of Dasein’s possibilities of Being. In the constant process of 
‘adjustment’ it ‘seek[s] in its everyday sense to approximate the public, 
positive sense of the “anybody,”’ and this renders it too hesitant ‘to roam too 
far from public use and expectation.’69 Publicness affects interpretations of the 
world and makes it appear familiar to all. In this way ‘[ejveryone is the other, 
and no one is himself. The “they,” which supplies the answer to the question of 
the ‘who’ of Dasein, is the nobody to whom every Dasein has already 
surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another’ (BT, 166). This surrender can 
be thought of as dispersal into the ‘they-self such that ‘Dasein is the “they”’ 
(BT, 167). Similarly, the particularity of the other is diffused: the other is the 
anonymous nobody, an unnamed no-one. Such a dispersed Dasein must be 
distinguished from the proper self, although this dispersed self is ‘who’ Dasein 
is primarily in its inauthentic everydayness.70
The negative connotations that Heidegger bestows on the discussion of the 
‘they’ might prompt the question: why does he shed light on the heteronomous 
constitution of Dasein, only to immediately call for something translators have 
called ‘authenticity’? Dreyfus claims that Heidegger confuses the two aspects 
of the ‘they,’ namely, ‘constitutive conformity’ (the norm-creating and 
socialising function of the ‘they’) and unwanted social conformism. 
Heidegger’s analysis, this chapter suggests instead, endeavoured to prevent the 
reification of the ‘they’ as the antidote to the ‘I.’ Heidegger’s description of the 
‘they’ aims to problematise of this everyday mode of being, not towards a 
recovery of the ‘I’ but, on the contrary, to illuminate that it is within the ‘they’ 
that notions of sovereign subjectivity have arisen. Dasein’s self can neither be 
the they-self nor the subject, but must be proper for Dasein’s Being. Being-in- 
the-world is constituted as radically embedded within the referential totality 
and as Being-with. Dasein’s Being-with is ontologically manifested in the 
‘they,’ from whom Dasein does not distinguish itself. Being-lost in the ‘they’
69 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 67-68.
70 However, self-dispersal does not mean that Dasein does not have its world: ‘[t]he lack of 
reflexivity, the complete self-identification as well as the total identification with the 
environment, in other words, narcissism and conformity, do not prevent any Joh from 
conjuring up a world “according to Joh”,’ writes Agnes Heller. See her “Death of the 
Subject?” in George Levine (ed.), Constructions o f  the Self (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1992), 280.
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results in Dasein regarding itself as an autonomous and self-sufficient subject, 
unaware of its possibilities as a heteronomous entity. The negative 
connotations one might sense in the discussion of the ‘they’ arise, therefore, 
from the desire to unsettle Dasein’s acceptance of public discourses about its 
selfhood which are improper for Dasein and its ability to be itself.
This third element of the optics of coexistence, then, illustrates that Dasein’s 
Tactical’ coexistence is heteronomous: ‘the ways in which the other inhabits 
our being as the subtext that is constantly at work in a vast array of activities 
that make up the busy business of the day.’71 The ‘they’ is constitutive of both 
the significance of the world and of Dasein as submitted to the world. It also 
emphasises, however, that such heteronomy, such ‘withness’ is not part of 
Dasein’s everyday self-understanding. Becoming-proper, as we shall see in 
chapter five, is a movement towards genuine understanding and awareness of 
Dasein’s ability to be itself. Below, however, is an examination of the final 
element of the optics of coexistence, which is the most illuminating of 
Dasein’s radical embeddedness in the world and its Being as ‘care.’
4. Dasein is Care: Thrownness, Projectiveness, Fallenness
Dasein, it was outlined in the previous sections, is immersed in an engaged 
manner into its everyday world of praxis. It has an ontological relationship to 
the web of meanings that is its world, in which it is essentially Being-with 
others, such that it cannot, ontologically, be distinguished from others. The 
first three elements of the optics of coexistence have challenged the 
understanding of human existence as ‘subject’ in three ways: as a primarily 
reflective subject that encounters other entities as merely co-present; as a 
subject that is autonomous and dis-embedded from its world; and, finally, as an 
isolated and self-sufficient being. A certain ‘coexistential heteronomy’ has 
emerged thus far; Dasein’s attunement and understanding, this section shows, 
provide a more detailed account of Dasein’s radical embeddedness in the world
71 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 116.
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of otherness and form the last element of the optics of coexistence. Their 
consideration illustrates that Dasein is already attuned to the world, and that 
this fundamental attunement structures its understanding. These inter-related 
aspects of embeddedness, of Being-in, show Dasein to be thrown entity, yet 
one which projects itself outwards into the world.
Heidegger’s term Befmdlichkeit, which Michel Haar rightly translates as 
‘attunement,’72 refers, Mulhall suggests, to ‘the capacity to be affected by the 
world, to find that the entities and situations it [Dasein] faces matter.’ Dasein’s 
attunement is most easily disclosed by the phenomenon of moods, which are 
sometimes falsely understood as mental states, but are more appropriately 
considered to be ‘affective inflections of Dasein’s temperament that are 
typically experienced as “given,” as states into which one has been thrown.’73 
These dispositions are indications that what goes on around Dasein affects it. 
Dasein’s moods disclose that it is fundamentally attuned to the ‘world’ (both as 
surrounding world, Umwelt, and as with-world, Mitwelt). Such attunement 
reveals that it is an entity thrown in the world of activity and of others and that 
it is in such a state of thrownness without being explicitly aware of it. 
Rejecting the notion that moods are solely related to mental states, Heidegger 
argues that, since moods affect Being-in-the-world, they ‘must be as revelatory 
of the world and of Being-in as they are of Dasein.’74 The affect of fear, for 
example, illustrates that ‘that in the face of which we fear, the fearsome, is in 
every case something which we encounter within-the-world and which may 
have readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being’ 
(BT, 179). At the same time, fear fears about Dasein, it discloses Dasein as 
afraid, as the kind of entity for which its own Being is an issue (BT, 180). 
Moods, therefore, signify ‘a disclosive submission to the world, out of which 
we can encounter something that matters to us’ (BT, 177).
Moods, Heidegger claims, disclose Dasein to itself ‘prior to all cognition and 
volition, and beyond their range of disclosure’ (BT, 175). Specifically, they
72 Michel Haar, “Attunement and Thinking,” in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.), 
Heidegger: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 159-172.
73 Both quotes in Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 76.
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show it to be that entity which is ‘Being-delivered-over to the “there”’: that 
Dasein is, means that it is ‘thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it 
is its “there”’ (BT, 174). The ease with which bad moods, in particular, are 
recognised by Dasein is related to its being a thrown entity. Moods ‘disclose 
Dasein in its thrownness, and -  proximally and for the most part -  in the 
manner of an evasive tuming-away’ (BT, 175). Yet, the disclosure of such 
fundamental attunement to the world and to others can also be seen as the 
‘existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the 
“world” and lets the “world” “matter” to it in a way that somehow Dasein 
evades its very self (BT, 178). In the ‘they’ Dasein’s Tostness’ in 
everydayness is sustained by this publicness of moods. ‘Publicness, as the kind 
of Being which belongs to the ‘they,’ not only has in general its own ways of 
having a mood, but needs moods and “makes” them for itself (BT, 178). 
Moods are public and their ‘socialness.. .also implies that an individual’s social 
world fixes the range of moods into which she can be thrown.’75 Moods, 
therefore, disclose Dasein as a thrown being and, simultaneously, affect how 
Dasein comports itself to its world, whether in relation to objects or to the 
possibilities about its life.
Being-in the world in a radically embedded manner also affects Dasein’s 
understanding. As Heidegger suggests, ‘understanding something’ usually 
refers ‘to being able to manage something, being a match for it, being 
competent to do something’ (BT, 183). When understanding is constitutive of 
how Dasein is ‘in’ the world, how it is ‘the there’ (Da\ this competence ‘is not 
a “what,” but Being as existing’: Dasein is not merely competent for this or 
that task, but rather ‘it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in every case 
what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility’ (BT, 183). But what 
is the meaning of ‘possibility’ here? It does not mean merely something that 
has yet to take place. Understood as an existential attribute, possibility is the 
most proximate and appropriate characterisation of Dasein and its ability to be
74 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 77.
75 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 79.
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(iSeinskonnen) (BT, 183). In other words, ‘Dasein’s true existential medium is 
not actuality but possibility.’76
Where attunement ‘ reveal [s] Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, 
understanding reveals it as carrying forward that momentum; it corresponds to 
the active side of Dasein’s confrontation with its own existentiell 
possibilities.’77 Tuttle suggests that this means that ‘human existence is open to 
the future in such a way that it casts a tendential structure ahead of itself as part 
of its Being. This structure is Dasein’s apprehension of its own possibilities.’78 
This forward pressing structure of Dasein’s self-understanding shows that ‘[a]s 
thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call “projecting”’ 
(BT, 185). The invocation of thrownness suggests that, as already thrown, 
Dasein has ‘already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting’ (BT, 
185). ‘Dasein must project itself onto one or other existentiell possibility,’79 
and how it decides upon these definite possibilities, as well as their success 
depends on its authenticity. As Being-in-the-world Dasein is faced with 
concrete possibilities, that are defined and ‘limited’ by the factical situation in 
which it finds itself as thrown. ‘Just as thrownness is projective (disclosing the 
world as a space of possibilities that matter to us in specific ways), so 
projection is thrown (to be exercised in a field of possibilities whose structure 
it did not itself project).’80 Thrownness and projection, then, form one 
ontological structure which signifies Dasein’s radical embeddeness as both 
taking place within the bounds of the world and also taking up concrete 
possibilities within it. Hence, Dasein’s Being must be understood ‘as ahead-of- 
itself-in-already-being-in-the-world’ (BT, 236).
Attunement and understanding are co-originary (Heidegger calls this 
‘equiprimordial’): attunement accompanies and affects understanding, while 
vice versa, attunement is meaningless without the understanding of how 
Dasein finds itself in the world. A ‘pure beholding’ of the world could never,
76 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 83.
77 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 81.
78 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 58.
79 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 82.
80 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 84.
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without mood, encounter something present-at-hand, as ‘threatening’, for 
example (BT, 177) because Dasein’s ‘anxious attunement to...[its own 
existence] is the ultimate basis of any act of interpretation.’81 Tuttle concurs 
with Davis in this regard, noting that ‘understanding and inquiry are “circular” 
in the sense that the interpreter always brings to the interpretant or world-at- 
hand the pre-existing frames of meaning and reference which constitute the 
significance of such a world-at-hand’; the circularity of interpretation, 
therefore, can only mean that ‘[t]he world does not exist neutrally, or as a clear 
and distinct object. Instead the world must always remain an object of possible 
interpretation, and all interpretation is circular in its presuppositions of what 
something has been and what it has been projected for.’82 This does not create a 
sort of a ‘vicious circle’; on the contrary, ‘[c]ircularity implies that Dasein 
comes to objects in the world by casting upon them the past possibilities that 
were present in the previous constructions of Dasein’ and that ‘the manner in 
which we have been in time and the manner in which we conceive the future 
are always preconditions for the way that we come to understand something in 
the present.’83
Dasein’s ‘attunement’ and ‘understanding,’ therefore, are constitutive of how it 
is ‘the there.’ Their examination reveals, for the purposes of explicating the 
fourth element of the optics of coexistence, a radical emdeddedness in the 
world, which can be best understood as ‘thrown projection.’ In its average 
everydayness, when Dasein is manifested as the ‘they,’ its radical 
embeddedness is guided by idle talk, ambiguity, and curiosity. These ways in 
which Dasein exists in public discourse comprise the Being of the ‘they’ as 
fallenness. Together with thrownness and projectiveness, ‘falling’ makes up 
the Being of Dasein as ‘care.’
81 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 5.
82 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 59.
83 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 60.
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Falling prey to the ‘world’
Idle talk refers to the type of everyday understanding and interpreting, which 
lies in everyday ‘ready’ significance present in casual, customary expressions 
that make claims about this thing or that, but primarily focus on the claim and 
not on the thing itself As such, idle talk ‘does not communicate in such a way 
as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but communicates 
rather by following the route of gossiping and passing the word along’ (BT, 
212). Expressions of idle talk ‘are a way of preventing an honest search for 
what is real, while at the same time asserting some definiteness,’84 because 
‘[w]hat is said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an 
authoritative character’ (BT, 212). Average understanding, however, does not 
wish to draw a distinction between what might be gossip and what might be an 
appropriate way of disclosing this or that thing. On the contrary, saying 
something in idle talk ‘gets passed along in further retelling,’ and ‘amount[s] to 
a perverting of the act of closing o ff (BT, 213). When Dasein ‘closes off,’ it 
distorts its proper relationship to ‘its primary and primordially genuine 
relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Being-with, and towards its 
very Being-in’ (BT, 214).
Curiosity, moreover, ‘expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting 
the world be encountered by us in perception’ (BT, 214). This tendency shows 
Dasein to be floating away ‘from what is ready-to-hand and towards the exotic, 
the alien and the distant,’ by searching for new and unknown ‘objects not in 
order to grasp them in their reality but to stimulate itself with their newness, so 
that novelty is sought with increasing velocity.’85 Dasein acquires a spectatorial 
attitude towards the world but this is concerned less with marvelling at things 
but with ‘abandoning itself to the world’ (BT, 216). Comporting itself 
curiously to the world, Dasein ‘remains in a state of concealed indifference; it 
seems observational yet is neutral in its relation to the world. In its search for 
distraction and novelty, it is blind to the actuality in front of it.’86 The effects of
84 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 72.
85 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 106.
86 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 72.
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both idle talk and curiosity make it ‘impossible to decide what is disclosed in a 
genuine understanding and what is not’ (BT, 217).
In addition to idle talk and curiosity, ambiguity affects not only Dasein’s 
understanding of the world but also its relations to ‘Being-with-one another as 
such, and even to Dasein’s Being towards itself (BT, 217). ‘Dasein here sees 
the world as theory and abstraction, while remaining neutral and passive,’ 
explains Tuttle regarding ambiguity.87 This, however, is ‘manufactured 
indifference or theoreticality,’ which nonetheless ‘has already established itself 
in the understanding as a potentiality-for-Being, and in the way Dasein projects 
itself and presents itself with possibilities’ (BT, 217). It is important to note 
that in the ambiguity of how things are interpreted in publicness, Dasein 
relates to the Other on the basis of ‘what “they” have heard about him, what 
“they” say in their talk about him, and “they” know about him’ (BT, 219). 
There is no effort to comport oneself to the other in ways that might be 
genuine. Rather, there occurs an ‘intent watching of one another, a secret and 
reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of “for-one-another,” an “against-one- 
another” is in play’ (BT, 219).
Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity are the ways in which the ‘they,’ Dasein’s 
ontological manifestation in everydayness, is ‘the there.’ They make up the 
Being of everydayness, which Heidegger calls fallenness, best understood as 
‘falling prey’ (BT, 219). ‘Falling prey to the “world” means being absorbed in 
being-with-another as it is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.’88 This 
absorption, although initial and primary, accounts for Dasein being-lost, being 
something other than its proper self, a self which is its proper ability-to-be 
(potentiality-for-Being). Dasein has ‘fallen prey to the “world,”’ away from its 
Being, its genuine self-understanding, as was also noted in the everyday 
manifestation of Being-with, the third element of the optics of coexistence. As 
Mulhall notes, the prominent characteristic of everydayness is that Dasein has
87 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 72-73.
88 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation o f Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 164.
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no conception of itself as lost.89 Dasein believes in the fiction of separeteness 
and views its relationality as voluntary.
This characterisation of ‘fallenness’ does not mean to imply, however, that in
falling Dasein becomes mere facticity; quite the contrary ‘in falling, Dasein
itself as factical Being-in-the-world, is something from which it has already
fallen away’ (BT, 220). If Dasein is an entity thrown into a world, dominated
by ways of being-in which are given to it, rather than adapted to it as that
particular Dasein that it is, then the aforementioned dispersal of its self into the
‘they,’ is what occurs ‘proximally and for the most part’ for Dasein. Similarly,
fallenness ought not to be portrayed negatively, as though it indicated a less
than optimal situation, because this is not the status of the discussion of falling:
a set o f limits, can only be thought of as limitations i f  there exists a possible 
mode o f existence to which those limits do not apply. Since that is not the 
case, the inherent worldliness o f human existence must be thought o f as an 
aspect o f the human condition. It is a condition o f human life, not a constraint 
upon it.90
Dasein is an entity thrown into the world, whose norms and practices are not of 
its own making and ‘which it did not itself fully choose or determine.’91 It acts, 
thinks, and feels as anyone would; it is, in other words, other-directed and self­
dispersed. One of the consequences of self-dispersal is that it has no awareness 
of its fallenness. It begins to become aware of itself as a thrown and fallen 
entity through anxiety, which is a particular kind of affect. Unlike fear, with 
which it is often misleadingly confused, anxiety does not arise from the 
perception of an external object. Rather, it ‘plunges Dasein into, an anxiety 
about itself in the face of itself and reveals Dasein’s ‘existence as essentially 
thrown projection’ into the world ‘but its everyday mode of existence as 
fallen.’92 What Dasein is anxious about is no one but itself: ‘[i]n anxiety, 
Dasein is anxious about itself: not about some concrete existentiell possibility, 
but about the fact that its Being is Being-possible, that its existence necessarily
89 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 133.
90 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 61-62.
91 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 110.
92 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 110-111.
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involves projecting itself upon one or other possibility.’93 Georgepoulos also 
indicates that through anxiety, ‘attention for the first time...is focused on 
Dasein as Dasein’ (Being-the-there), thrown, projected and fallen. As such, 
Dasein’s Being has a threefold structure, which Heidegger called ‘care’ 
(Sorge).9*
In sum, the final element of the optics of coexistence is the disclosure of 
Dasein as ‘care.’ The three elements of the care-structure are thrownness, as 
seen in Dasein’s attunement, which reveals that the world matters to it; 
projectiveness, as seen through its capacity for understanding itself as futural 
and possible; and finally, fallenness, seen in its being-guided by idle talk, 
curiosity, and ambiguity, which shows it to have fallen prey to the everyday 
world.95 The phenomenological description of the three aspects of ‘care’ grasp 
Dasein’s comportment more effectively ‘than do the categories of “rational 
animal”,’96 contests J. Glenn Gray. These three aspects are not so much a 
‘unity’ but a configuration of Dasein’s Being. They ‘belong together,’ John 
McCumber suggests, and cannot ‘be reduced to the others either, and there is 
no yet more basic unity to bring them together.’97 Care, used here to illuminate 
the radically embedded way in which Dasein is heteronomous in the world, is 
above all ‘the unifying origin of the various limits that characterize Dasein’s 
distinctive mode of existence.’98 As the fourth element of coexistence ‘care’ 
serves to reinforce the other three elements, of engaged immersion, of having 
an ontological relationship to the world and of Being-with, by providing the 
unifying context of embeddeness in the form of thrownness, projectiviness and 
fallenness.
93 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 110.
94 Georgopoulos, The Structures o f  Existence, 148.
95 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 111.
96 J. Glenn Gray, “Martin Heidegger: On Anticipating My Own Death,” The Personalist 46 
(1965), 439.
97 John McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 208.
98 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 112.
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5. Coexistential heteronomy, or otherwise than composition
Recalling the analyses in the first and second chapters of the thesis, post- 
Cartesian subjectivity allows the conceptualisation of entities as indivisible 
units.99 This assumed indivisibility has historically enabled modem political 
theory to reduce coexistence to the condition of staying-together, requiring an 
event of union, described astutely by Jurgen Habermas as a ‘physics of 
sociation.’100 The inquiry of coexistence within International Relations, too, 
can be said to be predicated on these subjectivist ontological premises. 
Coexistence, then, is a state, which involves the assembling of a composition 
of units with characteristics not amenable to composition; the non-relational 
and self-sufficient nature of these units renders coexistence a tentative and 
uncertain, though sought-after, condition.
Thus far, the investigation of the optics of coexistence has shown Dasein to be 
heteronomously constituted. The coexistential heteronomy to which the four 
elements attest renders unstable the location of this entity within the 
‘metaphysics of subjectivity.’ The optics of coexistence found within the 
existential analysis of Dasein serve to ‘unwork’ the reflective, non-relational 
and self-sufficient features of modem subjectivity. Specifically, they perform 
this task of unworking in four distinct but connected ways: first, Dasein 
initially and primarily finds itself immersed in its dealings with the world. 
Understanding the primary mode of Dasein to be ‘engaged immersion,’ 
challenges the assumption that reflection and ‘knowing’ are the definitive 
modes of human relationality towards entities and the world.
Second, Dasein’s disclosive character reveals a different conception of the 
world as such. The mode of engaged immersion allows the web of relations 
with available things and other beings to become conspicuous as a background 
of meanings against which existence makes sense of itself pre-reflectively. The
99 See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, 
Michael Holland and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 3.
100 Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1988), 72.
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world is revealed as a referential totality of meanings and relations which is not 
solely authored by Dasein. Rather, the practices, norms, and rules which help 
Dasein cope with its involvements in the world are structured by otherness and 
already given to it in advance of its involvement. Dasein shares into this 
totality but it is not its author. Generally, any access that Dasein has to ‘itself 
is ontologically mediated through otherness.
Third, Dasein is Being-in-the-world with others in this totality of meanings. 
For Dasein, existence is already coexistence, Being-there is always Being- 
with. Selfhood is coexistential but this is far from identical to the uniting, 
composition, or co-presence, assumed of the completed and autonomous 
subjects of modernity. Rather, Dasein can be said to be essentially Being-with 
-  withness is an attribute of the kind of entity that it is. Withness, furthermore, 
manifests itself in such a way that, for the most part, Dasein cannot be 
distinguished from others.
Finally, Dasein is fundamentally attuned to the world in which it exists and its 
understanding of itself and the surrounding world is affected by this 
attunement. Its attunement illuminates a radical embeddedness which is best 
described as being-thrown into the world, but at the same time its 
understanding of itself as ‘possibility’ indicates that it also projects itself 
towards the future. Dasein’s embeddedness has the structure of thrown 
projection. The world, and others, matter for Dasein: Dasein’s attunement is 
evident in its disposition for moods, from the structure of its understanding, 
and its use of language or discourse. In everydayness, the world matters to 
such an overwhelming extent that Dasein can be said to have fallen prey to the 
world. Fallenness, thrownness, and projectiveness together suggest that, rather 
than self-presence and self-sufficiency, Dasein’s Being is better understood as 
care. In average everydayness Dasein can be said to be inauthentic, but this is 
the primary and initial mode in which it is found, and expresses the primacy of 
otherness in Dasein’s life. Dasein is inauthentic when it is not aware of its 
heteronomous constitution and its immersion into the ‘they’; it behaves as 
subject, as autonomous and sovereign, as the subject of control.
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Through these elements, coexistence can be revealed as the proximal fact of 
Dasein’s existence. A number of theoretical implications arise from this 
observation: the optics of coexistence offer an account of primary sociality, 
which begins to unwork the subjectivist ground through which ethical, and 
political issues of being-with-others are traditionally thought. The disclosure of 
Dasein as coexistential and heteronomously embedded in the world, renders 
unstable the terms of subjectivist discourse. It also problematises those critical 
discourses which try to articulate ‘respect for difference or otherness’ or a 
sensitivity to the exclusion of the other.101 The articulation of such respect, or 
sensitivity, in the language of the subject results in the effacement of 
heteronomy just as profoundly as the defence of modem subjectivity.102 This is 
not heteronomy, but alterity-sensitive homology, a logos which tries to escape 
its own limits but finds itself trapped in its masterful discursive creation. 
Coexistence beyond the logic of composition is that condition which disrupts 
the domination of the non-relational subject and reveals, instead, the 
constitutive role of the other (heteron).
In the course of its everyday comportments, Dasein’s heteronomy is 
manifested in its being other-directed, although Dasein itself is unaware of this 
and, rather, considers itself as both self-sufficient and autonomous. This flight 
from its heteronomy is understood as inauthentic for the kind of entity that it is. 
Therefore, although the optics of coexistence illustrate the ways in which 
human existence is coexistentially heteronomous, they do not illustrate how it 
becomes aware of this heteronomy. The ontological submission to the world 
that the four elements of the optics of coexistence bring to the fore is 
manifested in Dasein losing sight of its own ability to be and projecting itself 
onto possibilities which are not proper for it. When Dasein ‘falls’ into the 
world, it comports itself in public terms. Relating to itself in average terms
101 In International Relations literature, see Vivienne Jabri, “Restyling the Subject of 
Responsibility in International Relations,” Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 27, no. 
3 (1998): 591-611, David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice 
in Bosnia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), but also, Andrew Linklater, 
The Transformation o f  Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f  the Post-Westphalian Era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
102 See, for example, in the essays in Joan Copjec (ed.),Supposing the Subject (London: Verso, 
1994).
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means that it has a self-understanding, which is not proper for a coexistentially 
heteronomous, fundamentally worldly entity. It is lost in the public discourses 
o f ‘sovereign subjectivity’ and regards itself as self-sufficient.
Becoming its proper self, then, could be thought as a process of recognising 
itself as ‘already’ being-radically-in-relation. Becoming-proper, then, would 
require that Dasein begin to grasp its heteronomy as the primacy of relation. 
Seeking to critique the discourses of autonomy to which it conforms while 
living its life according to average understandings and in unawareness of its 
possibilities, Dasein would open itself up to its self as a heteronomous entity 
characterised by anxiety and care for its Being. The process of becoming- 
proper, which is the focus of the following chapter, is reinterpreted therein, not 
as the discovery of some true ‘inner self but, rather, as the process of 
relinquishing notions of self-sufficiency and of being resolute towards its 
coexistential heteronomy. Becoming-proper involves an awareness of its own 
ability to be as a primarily heteronomous entity, whose very Being-there is 
Being-with and whose world matters to it.
Furthermore, the optics do not immediately suggest how this awareness might 
help reformulate ontic inquiry such as ethical and political coexistence. This is 
the task, respectively, of the next three chapters.
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Chapter 5
Becoming-proper
The previous chapter surveyed Heidegger’s analysis of the existential 
structures of Dasein in Being and Time,1 and suggested that its existential 
analytic contains a number of elements, which reveal that coexistence is the 
initial and primary fact of Dasein’s existence. One might call these four 
elements, which challenge the prominent features of the modem subject, ‘the 
optics of coexistence.’ Dasein’s existential structures exemplify a coexistential 
heteronomy first, in the mode of ‘engaged immersion,’ in which it copes with 
its dealings in the world. Second, it exhibits this heteronomy in its ontological 
relationship to the totality of references, which is its ‘world’ and by which it 
makes sense of itself and its activities. Dasein, in other words, is immersed in a 
web of meanings, assignments and signs, of which it has not been the author; 
in its everyday world of praxis Dasein copes with its everyday going-about-its- 
business ‘plugged into’ this relational totality, which forms the background of 
its life. Third, Dasein’s heteronomy is evident in its prior capacity for 
‘withness.’ Dasein is Being-with to the extent that in its everydayness it cannot 
be distinguished from others. This Being-with, moreover, can hardly be 
understood as the ‘with’ which unites distinct and self-sufficient entities. And 
finally, Dasein’s heteronomy can be seen in the way in which it is an entity 
thrown into the world, and which understands its existence as possibility. 
Dasein’s modes of being-in the world, namely its attunement and 
understanding, reveal that Dasein’s ‘factical life is disturbed by everyday 
concerns,’ that its world, in other words, matters to it.2 It is attuned to the world 
and its self-understanding is already affected by this attunement. When Dasein 
is indistinguishable from others, its ‘there’ is manifested in language in terms
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), thereafter cited in text as BT with the page number of this English 
translation.
2 John D. Caputo, “Heidegger’s Kampf,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14-15, no. 2-1 
(1991), 67.
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)of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity, such that the Being of this everyday self 
is ‘falling.’
Heidegger regarded the fallenness of Dasein as the proximal way in which it is 
found in the world. As an everyday public self indistinguishable from the 
‘they,’ however, Dasein is not able to have a proper understanding of itself. 
Without a genuine understanding of its Being as coexistentially heteronomous, 
Dasein cannot project itself onto possibilities which make most of its ability to 
be, something that Heidegger called its Seinskdnnen. The ontological 
submission to the world that the four elements of the optics of coexistence 
have brought to the fore also indicate that Dasein has no awareness of its own 
ability to be and projects itself onto possibilities which publicly decided for it 
by the ‘they-self.’3 Its self-understanding is determined by the public 
discourses of ‘sovereign subjectivity,’ which lead it to regard itself as self- 
sufficient. When Dasein ‘falls prey’ to the world, it comports itself in average 
terms that are not proper for its Being as a co-existential heteronomous, and 
fundamentally worldly entity.
Therefore, the optics of coexistence illustrate the ways in which human 
existence is coexistentially heteronomous, but do not delineate the process by 
which Dasein becomes aware of its heteronomy or how it takes it up in the 
unfolding of its existence. The present chapter, thus, provides an exposition of 
what has been, somewhat misleadingly, called ‘authenticity,’ which refers to 
the process of ‘becoming-proper,’ as Dasein’s traversing towards a proper 
intelligibility of itself might be more appropriately called. As a process, 
becoming-proper involves a recovery of its dispersed being as a ‘self.’ 
Importantly, it is argued here that ‘authenticity’ is only a modification of the 
inauthentic way in which Dasein relates to its coexistential heteronomy in its 
everydayness. This reinterpretation of ‘authenticity’ turns away from its 
understanding as the discovery of some true ‘inner self,’ and advances a 
conception of it as the process of relinquishing notions of self-sufficiency and
3 As was noted in chapter four, there is a distinction between ‘others’ and the ‘they.’ In the 
‘they’ the others have already ‘lost’ their distinctiveness, just as Dasein has. Others have
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of becoming resolute towards its coexistential heteronomy. This process of 
modification, it will be argued below, enables Dasein to improve its self­
intelligibility by gaining an awareness of its own ability to be as a primarily 
heteronomous entity, whose very Being-there is Being-with and whose world 
matters to it.
Inauthenticity, the last chapter noted, meant that Dasein has no conception of 
itself as lost,4 it is oblivious, in other words, both to its heteronomy and its 
Tostness’ in the they-self. In denying its other-mediated existence, it comports 
itself in the world as a sovereign subject, believing in the fiction of 
separeteness and viewing its relationality as voluntary. How can Dasein reach 
a genuine understanding of itself, and of its possibilities, not as subject, but 
rather on the basis of its Being as ‘care’? How can it reach an understanding 
of itself as ‘already* being-radically-in-relation and recognise the primacy of 
relation for its Being? Anxiety, it was noted in chapter four, brings Dasein 
back from its falling and ‘makes manifest to it that authenticity and 
inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being’ (BT, 235). In this way, anxiety can 
be said to ‘individualise’ Dasein by signalling that its Being is an issue for it. 
Anxiety in itself, however, does not provide the means through which Dasein 
can break through its dispersal and view its existence as a whole self, as care. 
Ontologically, this recovery occurs through Dasein’s understanding of itself as 
being-towards-finitude, an exposition of which is given in section one below. 
Section two addresses some of the concerns regarding the effect of 
‘authenticity’ on Dasein’s radical embeddedness, bringing about, as a result, a 
rethinking of becoming-proper itself. Finally, the chapter concludes with an 
examination of the ‘dialogic’ relation between authenticity and inauthenticity.
‘blended’ in this public domain of discourse, in which no one comports herself as a uniquely 
distinct being.
4 Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996), 133.
7. Becoming-whole: Being-towards-death
Lost in the ‘they,’ Dasein does not regard itself as whole; it is self-dispersed 
and ‘insofar as it exists, it is oriented towards the next moment of its 
existence.’5 In order to be able to recover an understanding of its potentiality 
for Being as a radically thrown entity, Dasein must grasp itself in all its 
elements of its care-structure. How, though, can Dasein see itself as a whole 
self however when, at the end of its life, Dasein is no longer able to look at 
itself as a whole, just as its life has reached its end and can be fully grasped?
According to Heidegger, death brings Dasein to its end and makes it complete, 
but this completion cannot be grasped, since Dasein does not experience its 
death. Although it can witness the other’s death, this is not tantamount to 
grasping someone else’s life as a whole. The other’s death is an event that 
Dasein may find sad or frightening but, as an occurrence, it does not afford the 
outlook of totality which might redress Dasein’s understanding of itself beyond 
self-dispersion. As Jacques Derrida notes, ‘nothing is more substitutable and 
yet nothing is less so than the syntagm “my death.’” That is because 
‘[e]veryone’s death, the death of all those who can say “death,” is 
irreplaceable.’6 The inability of Dasein to examine itself as a whole, just when 
it is ‘completed,’ points to the concealment of death as an issue for Dasein. In 
everydayness Dasein’s being-towards-death is never given proper 
consideration despite it being constantly referred to in ‘idle talk.’ As Heidegger 
explains, ‘death is “known” as a mishap which is constantly occurring’ (BT, 
296). The everyday reference to death and its designation as a well-known 
occurrence renders it inconspicuous. Covered up by its everyday interpretation 
as something that will eventually occur to everyone, an examination of death 
as something worth pondering is always postponed: in the present ‘it has 
nothing to do with us’ (BT, 297). ‘They say, “Death is certain”; and in saying 
so, they implant in Dasein the illusion that it is itself certain of its death’ (BT,
5 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 114.
6 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 
22.
155
301). In this way, ‘[t]he ‘they’ provides a constant tranquilization about death’ 
(BT, 298).
By revoking the everyday understanding of death as a biological act, 
Heidegger showed that finitude is not merely the physical end or limit of 
Dasein. It ‘impends at every moment of Dasein’s life’ and this has nothing to 
do with the progression of age.7 Death is a possibility which cannot be 
surpassed, no matter how young or old Dasein might be presently. When 
Dasein is forced to consider what its own death means for it, it realises that 
death is nothing but the possibility of its impossibility (BT, 294). Since the 
other’s death cannot afford Dasein this perspective, nor can it unburden Dasein 
of its own death, it can be said that death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. 
Once Dasein anticipates its own death, its finitude ceases to hold it in morbid 
fascination, or condemn it to melancholy. Anticipation of its death, readiness 
for finitude, makes Dasein ready for anxiety; it is in this anticipatory sense that 
Dasein can be said to be ‘Being-towards-death.’ Finitude is, therefore, also 
Dasein’s ownmost possibility and, as such, it is unsurpassable no matter how 
the ‘they’ try to mitigate against the proper anticipation of death through 
comforting idle talk. Moreover, facing the possibility of one’s death leads 
Dasein to realise that, despite its fundamental relationality and its 
embeddedness in its world, death is ‘a non-relational possibility.’8 Dasein 
cannot, in other words, share it with others as one would a burden. To this 
extent, Heidegger argues that ‘death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. 
The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, 
individualizes Dasein down to itself (BT, 308). Thus, taking the three defining 
characteristics of finitude: it is ‘that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which 
is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped’ (BT, 294).
There are several significant implications of such an understanding of Being- 
towards-death for Dasein’s existence. When death is grasped as Dasein’s 
ownmost possibility, Stephen Mulhall argues, it is accompanied by the 
realisation that its Being is an issue for it. Dasein’s existence matters to it, not
7 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 117.
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in its disparate moments, but as a whole; it is as a whole that Dasein must 
question how it wants to live its life and it is for the whole of its life that it 
must take responsibility. Taking responsibility for one’s life as a whole, 
furthermore, involves an acceptance that, for the greater part of its existence, 
Dasein has relinquished such responsibility to others and has allowed itself to 
be drawn into customary practices and ways of living that it had not critically 
appraised. When Dasein conceives of its death as a non-relational possibility, 
moreover, it realises that the publicly held opinions by which it had ordered its 
life, the discourses of idle talk in which it drowned its anxiety, and the curious 
and ambiguous involvement with available things, ‘are ultimately inessential to 
the task of being authentically itself.’ Finally, the impossibility of surpassing 
or avoiding death shows Dasein that its existence is ‘ultimately to be given up 
or annihilated, and is utterly contingent, and in no way necessary; from which 
it follows that every existentiell possibility which makes up that utterly 
contingent life is itself contingent.’9 Mortality enhances the fact that Dasein 
has to chose one life to live and, at the same time, forego other possibilities; 
hence, it elucidates that only Dasein can be responsible for the projection it 
chooses. The radical contingency of Dasein’s existence reveals it to be finite 
and not grounded in certainty. Becoming-proper can begin to be understood, 
then, as ‘a projection upon an existentiell possibility in the light of itself as 
mortal.’10
It would be ontologically possible, then, to grasp Dasein’s existence as a whole 
by invoking a confrontation with one’s own finitude. How, though, could such 
a confrontation come about in the course of everyday life, however? Since the 
roots of the existential analytic are found in the lived experiences of Dasein 
(BT, 34), what sort of experience can actually lead Dasein to recover its 
dispersed self and to view itself in its totality? Heidegger suggests that the 
phenomenon of ‘the call of conscience’ performs precisely this task of rousing 
Dasein out of its Tostness’ in the ‘they,’ and bringing about a consideration of 
itself as a contingent, yet whole entity. The phenomenon of the voice of
8 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 119.
9 All quotes in Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 119.
10 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 120.
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conscience, speaking to human beings from within, had been previously 
discussed in spiritual, mystical, religious, and moral terms. Heidegger, 
however, wished to see whether the voice of conscience could be seen as a call 
to Dasein’s ownmost ability-to-be, without becoming reduced to an aspect of 
spirituality or morality. In order for the call of conscience to be effective in this 
sense, it must not be similar to the kind of discourse in which Dasein 
participates in the folds of the ‘they.’ It must not voice the things Dasein wants 
to hear, as with idle talk, nor should it fuel Dasein’s curiosity about everyday 
events. Heidegger maintains that the call of conscience cannot, furthermore, 
contain a specific directive towards particular possibilities or encouragement 
for Dasein to follow this or that way of life. Rather the call of conscience ‘has 
the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality- 
for-Being-its-Self (BT, 314). “‘[Njothing” gets called to this Self,’ Heidegger 
writes, pointing to the call’s lack of positive content; the call appeals to 
Dasein’s self which is lost in the ‘they-self (BT, 318).
It is important to ask, moreover, whose voice might call Dasein to itself.
Heidegger suggests that the call comes from within Dasein and yet from
beyond it; the voice of conscience itself does the calling. It would appear that
the call of conscience is ontologically possible for Dasein only because the
Being of Dasein is care. Yet, this apparent indeterminacy of the identity of the
caller ‘does not justify seeking the caller in some entity with a character other
than that of Dasein’ (BT, 321). The caller could not be a being which does not
have Dasein’s coexistential heteronomy because, as Mulhall argues, the
passive aspect of the voice of conscience suggests that it relates to Dasein’s 
thrownness -  that the voice of conscience is somehow expressive of the fact 
that Dasein is always already delivered over to the task of existing, placed in a 
particular situation it did not choose to occupy, but from which it must 
nevertheless choose how to go on with his life.11
The primary reason for the prevalent understanding of the call of conscience in 
religious or moral terms lies with the nature of the call, which often appears to 
accuse Dasein, to address it as guilty, and to call it to accept responsibility. 
Dasein’s everyday comportment in the world, however, does not make it guilty
11 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 127.
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according to a body of law or a certain moral code. The discussion of guilt and 
conscience, therefore, should not be taken in a moral but, rather, in an 
ontological sense. In fact, Heidegger notes, ‘“Being-guilty”.. .is a kind of Being 
which belongs to Dasein* (BT, 328). Dasein can be seen as Being-guilty 
because it is responsible for a lack, not as something present-at-hand which 
ought to be there but is not, but nevertheless as something which has the ‘not’ 
as its basis. ‘This “not” belongs to the existential meaning of thrownness’ (BT, 
330). Conscience, for Heidegger, ‘calls Dasein forth to the possibility of taking 
over, in existing, even that thrown entity which it is; it calls Dasein back to its 
thrownness so as to understand this thrownness as the null basis which it has to 
take up into existence’ (BT, 333).
It is important to note that the discussion of finitude and guilt in some way can 
be seen as a return to the discussion of ‘who’ is Dasein. The process of 
recovering its dispersed self discovers something even more destabilising for 
modem subjectivity: it reveals ‘authentic’ Dasein as a entity whose basis is the 
‘not,’ whose existence is utterly contingent. Therefore, the attempt to 
understand its being-there as a whole for which Dasein is responsible requires 
that Dasein take ‘on one’s finitude, if...finitude is characterized by 
groundlessness (Grund-losigkeit) or by the concealment of the ground (Grund- 
verborgenheit).*12 Becoming-proper, therefore, is not about the adoption of 
particular lifestyles or attitudes, which can be confirmed by the lack of specific 
content in the call of conscience. On the contrary, ‘the response it seeks is 
responsiveness, the desire to have a conscience,’ which can be understood as 
the desire to be a self; in this vein, ‘the particular form of self-disclosedness 
that the voice of conscience elicits in Dasein is a reticent self-projection upon 
one’s ownmost Being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety.’13 This self- 
projection encouraged by Dasein’s responsiveness to the call of conscience is 
what Heidegger calls ‘resoluteness’ (in the sense of having ‘resolve’). Taking 
over death as Dasein’s ownmost possibility, can only mean, Francois Raffoul 
argues, ‘taking over and making oneself responsible for or making oneself the
12 Francois Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco 
(Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1998), 234.
13 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 129.
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basis of this “not” or absence of basis.’14 Jean-Luc Nancy makes the 
connection between nothingness as the ground of Dasein and the 
deconstruction of ‘certainty’ as the ground of modem subjectivity quite 
explicit when he notes that ‘[a]ll of Heidegger’s research into “being-for (or 
toward)-death” was nothing other than an attempt to state this: /  is not—am 
not—a subject.’15
For historical reasons -  whether they are as specific as the frequent reading of 
Heidegger through the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, or whether they are as general 
as the attempt to grasp a text which unsettles modem subjectivity through 
subjectivist terms, translations and understandings, or even whether are fuelled 
by the difficulties of Heidegger’s neologisms -  authentic Dasein and its 
resolute response to the call of conscience has been interpreted as a return to an 
individualist, decisionist and isolated subject, which rejects the ‘inauthentic’ 
world for authentic solitude. If the optics of coexistence is to be useful in 
rethinking coexistence in international relations beyond the composition of 
individualist subjects, however, this conception of becoming-proper must be 
refuted, a task to which the next section turns.
2. Becoming-proper and individualisation
Authenticity is often condemned as harbouring the radical individualisation of
Dasein, which leaves it isolated from its world and others, negating the
phenomenal descriptions both of Dasein’s worldly immersion and its Being-
with. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews, for example, write:
Although, in its authentic existence -  through the experience of angst, death, 
and conscience -  Dasein becomes individualized and resolute, that is, it 
becomes a Self, this conception of authentic selfhood cannot be confused with 
metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity. Or can it?16
14 Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, 234.
15 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael 
Holland and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 14.
16 Simon Critchley and Peter Dews, “Introduction,” in Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (eds.), 
Deconstructive Subjectivities (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996), 5.
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Their question exemplifies the, at best ambivalent, and at worst subjectivist, 
reception of becoming-proper. Some of the more prevalent critiques of 
authenticity are thus concerned with the possibility that authentic Dasein 
becomes a decisionist subject in its comportments and also, individualised and 
isolated from the world following the transcendence of its inauthenticity. 
Although Dasein becomes ‘individualised’ through its understanding of itself 
as Being-towards-death, it will be suggested below, this is a not the kind of 
individualisation that revokes, the radical embeddedness of Dasein, or its 
capacity for ‘withness.’ The process of becoming-proper only seeks to unsettle 
the ontological manifestation of Being-with in the form of the ‘they,’ and to 
suggest that Dasein’s coexistential heteronomy can be taken up ‘properly.’ 
This somewhat confusing claim can be placed into perspective by recalling 
that, while indistinguishable from the ‘they,’ Dasein does not understand itself 
as heteronomous. Rather it has an understanding of itself given to it through 
the public discourses of the self as subject, as self-sufficient and largely non­
relational.
Resoluteness: Countering the charge of decisionism
Prominent amongst the suspicions about authenticity is the charge of 
decisionism which, has been most eloquently put forward by Karl Lowith. 
Decisionism amounts to a serious challenge for the optics of coexistence 
because it suggests that the authentic self is akin to masterful, wilful subject of 
decision. He draws parallels between what he calls the ‘ontological 
decisionism’ of Heidegger and the political decisionism of his contemporary 
Carl Schmitt.17 Lowith discerns affinities between the ‘readiness for death and 
for killing’ that distinguishes Schmitt’s concept of the political and 
Heidegger’s ontological analysis of Being-towards-death and resoluteness. 
Lowith argues that the concern with finitude, ‘rather than any kind of ordering 
of the social life as is proper to the primordial meaning of the polis, becomes
17 See Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f  the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The 
University of Chigaco Press, 1996). Such a charge might be considered justified by 
Heidegger’s 1933 political involvement with National Socialism and also based on a letter 
exchanged between Schmitt and Heidegger and translated into English as Martin Heidegger, 
“Heidegger and Schmitt: The Bottom Line,’’ Telos , no. 72 (1987): 132.
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the “highest court of appeal”’ for Schmitt.18 In this vein, he also draws a 
parallel between the ‘threat to existence,’ as it serves a justifying role for 
Schmitt’s distinction between friend and enemy, and Heidegger’s analysis of 
finitude. Dasein’s resolute ‘“capacity-for-being-a-whole,”19 corresponds in 
political decisionism to the sacrifice o f one’s life for the total state in the 
exigency of war,’ Lowith suggests, because ‘the principle is the same: the 
radical return to something ultimate, namely the naked that-ness of facticity.’20
What is of concern presently, however, is whether the charge of ‘decisionism’
reverses the ‘unworking’ of modem subjectivity that the optics of coexistence
have extensively outlined in the previous chapter. When the notion of
resoluteness is understood as to have the essence of a decision, it would require
a sovereign and masterful subject. The linkage of decisionism and resoluteness
superficially appears to be an easy one to make. It must, however, it self be seen
not only as a political reading, but as an interpretation which remains firmly
embedded within subjectivist philosophy. In this vein, Richard Polt rightly
points out that ‘any discussion of Heidegger as a “decisionist” should note that
he does not view decisions as springing from the will of the subject as
understood in modem philosophy.’21 Joanna Hodge concurs by noting that
[t]he critique that the enquiries in Being and Time are decisionist, voluntarist 
and fatalist presupposes a humanist, subjectivist reading.. .They all fail to take 
into account Heidegger’s questioning of the Cartesian break, through which 
Heidegger displaces the modem assumption that the starting point of enquiry 
is the thinking of an individual human being, a res cogitans.22
In addition to the subjectivist presuppositions about the subject of resoluteness, 
readings of resoluteness as ‘mastery of self fail to recognise that 
‘[rjesoluteness has little to do with a determined seizing of our freedom to act; 
it is closer to a steadfastness in the face of the vicissitudes of circumstance.’23 
For Miguel de Beistegui, too, resoluteness ‘is the way in which Dasein comes
18 Karl Lowith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 146.
19 Lowith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 160.
20 Lowith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 160-161.
21 Richard Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrage zur Philosophies Political 
Theory 25, no. 5 (1997), 675, n. 6.
22 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995), 172.
23 Paul Standish, Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Limits o f  Language 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 218.
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back to itself, back to its original site, from the dispersion in everydayness into 
which it is for the most part Dasein thrown.’24 Finally, the equation of 
resoluteness with a decisionist disposition is also unsustainable because, for 
Heidegger, resoluteness cannot be understood as ‘an unqualified call to action.’ 
Since there is no encouragement to any one particular option, political, social, 
or otherwise, ‘Dasein’s resoluteness remains empty’25 of content and cannot be 
seen to represent any one social or moral perspective. Rather, resolutess can 
only embody ‘a reticence which makes us ready for anxiety. Our acceptance of 
anxiety does not lead to a frenzied state but is the basis of our composure and 
calm openness (Gelassenheit).’26
Speaking the middle voice
Even if scholarly pronouncements in favour of alternative readings of authentic 
Dasein help counter the charge of decisionism, there is still another way to 
illustrate that the charge of decisionism cannot be sustained with respect to the 
process of becoming resolute. For, the examination of a linguistic form known 
as the middle voice promotes an understanding of Dasein’s becoming-proper 
beyond the self-appropriation of a hyper-individualist and decisionist 
subjectivity. The middle voice is the form that is linguistically situated 
between the active and passive voices, but is no longer prevalent in modem 
Western languages. As Charles Scott suggests, ‘[i]n the active voice the verb is 
for another. In the passive voice the verb acts on the subject. The middle voice 
is used when the subject is in some way specifically implicated in the result o f 
the action but is neither active subject nor the passive object of the action.*27
Heidegger employs the middle voice when writing on authenticity and the call 
of conscience and this usage dissuades charges of decisionism. Although it is 
difficult to relate the precise loss of meaning in the translation/rendering of the
24 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1997), 15.
25 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 15.
26 Standish, Beyond the Self, 218. See also Heidegger’s later reformulation o f ‘letting-be’ or 
‘releasement’ in Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking: A Translation o f  Gelassenheit, 
trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
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middle voice into active voice (which frequently happens in English renderings 
of it), it is worth bearing in mind that the middle voice ‘suggests something 
that goes beyond subject-object formations...it is the voice of something 
taking place through its own enactment.’28 Furthermore, the middle voice 
inteijects a certain ambiguity and destabilisation of presence while, 
simultaneously, offering a more immediate access to presence. It is important 
to note, therefore, that usage of the middle voice signifies an attempt to ‘think 
outside of the domain of subjectivity’29 because it aims at ‘undermining the 
syntactical distinction between the subject and the predicate’ in order to bring 
to the fore a certain ‘hermeneutics of nearness’ that becomes apparent in 
‘phrases like “world worlds,” “language languages,” or, most explicitly, 
“nearness nears”.’30 Nearness attempts to be ‘mindful of the otherness of other 
beings’ while avoiding the opposition of self (same) and other.31 Instead of 
invoking an opposition between subject and object, the middle voice shows 
that ‘the way in which the world transpires.. .is by each being or thing opening 
itself, in its self-concealment, to the other,’ resulting in a ‘powerful 
reconfiguration of otherness.’32 A pertinent example of this usage if the verb 
‘to end,’ which
means both to limit and to terminate. It suggests arrival at a telos (the end of 
this project is at hand) or incompleteness (the project came to an untimely 
end) or the continuing presence of a telos (the end of the project guided its 
process) or delimitation (the project’s possibility ends here).33
If ‘to end’ is removed from the active voice and is thought, instead, in its 
middle voice form, ‘both the conclusiveness of termination and the 
nonconclusiveness of delimitation become apparent, both the overtone of death 
and the overtone of self-realization, the presence of both limited identity and 
possibility at the limit’ are brought out without the prior subject-act-object 
form imposed by the active voice.34 The call of conscience is characteristic of
27 Charles E. Scott, The Question o f Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), 19, emphasis added.
28 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 24.
29 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 19.
30 Krzysztof Ziarek, Inflected Language: Toward a Hermeneutics o f  Nearness (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), 54.
31 Ziarek, Inflected Language, 55.
32 Ziarek, Inflected Language, 56.
33 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 21.
34 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 21.
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the middle voice, enabling the unique appropriation of everydayness in terms 
of mineness to be understood as an enactment which enacts itself in each case 
without the assumption of the willing and sovereign modem subject.
From 'inwardness’ to transcendence towards the world
The second concern that arises from the supposed reassertion of sovereign 
subjectivity in the process of becoming-proper, purports that Dasein’s 
transcendence of its inauthenticity leads to a form of isolating ‘inwardness.’ 
Understood in this way, authenticity is regarded as an isolation or removal of 
Dasein from its world, as a return to some inner self, which is more proper for 
it than its worldly immersion. Is it appropriate, however, to equate authenticity 
to Polonius’s call ‘to thine own self be true’?35 Does the call of conscience 
draw Dasein away from its lostness in the ‘they’ in order to return it to a fixed 
self that is there to be discovered? The answer to the urging to be true to one’s 
self (‘I am who I am’ was Yahweh’s answer) is ‘an answer of self-sufficiecy.’36 
Thinking of authenticity in this manner, it would seem, transforms becoming- 
proper into pure introspection, and misleadingly confuses Dasein’s search for 
propriety with inwardness.
On the contrary, becoming-proper requires the realisation that one’s self is 
Being-in-the-world, disclosed and constituted by its innerworldly relations. 
Any inwardness or introspection brought about by the call of conscience has 
the intention of precisely highlighting the constitutive importance of the world. 
Becoming-proper turns Dasein towards the world, therefore, and cannot be 
interpreted as an isolating individuation. The resoluteness of propriety is, 
indeed, a return from self-dispersal, yet ‘such a coming back, such gathering is 
not an inward movement whereby Dasein would cut itself off from the world 
so as to enjoy the peace and depth of some precious inner life,’ Beistegui 
argues; ‘[rjather it is a movement of disclosure, of clearing, where Dasein 
authentically ek-sists its own essence, and this means confronts its own
35 Standish, Beyond the Self, 210.
36 Paul Barry Clarke, Autonomy Unbound (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 112.
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facticity. In coming back to itself, Dasein comes back to its own ecstatic yet 
finite essence.’37
According to Dasein’s constitution it is, contrary to the charge of inwardness, 
inauthentic to flee in the face of its worldly character. The call of conscience, 
therefore, aims to awaken Dasein to the realisation that ‘in its fall it seeks 
tranquilization and distraction through the concealments of worldliness.’38 
Worldiness is inescapable, however, because Dasein’s Being is thrown 
projection. No transcendence can ever rescind thrownness, since Dasein cannot 
exist without a world: ‘[wjorld belongs to a relational structure distinctive of 
Dasein as such, a structure that we called being-in-the-world.’39 Authenticity 
seeks to bring out the propriety of Dasein’s worldly anxious existence, so that 
becoming-proper is a finite transcendence, ‘a surpassing in the direction of 
world,’ where the world is understood neither as belonging to Dasein as 
something ‘subjective’ nor as something ‘objective’ related to natural entities 
or their totality.40 Dasein’s transcendence and its thrownness in the world are 
linked: ‘[t]o transcendence belongs world as that toward which surpassing 
occurs.’41 Transcendence belongs to the very fact of Dasein’s being-the-there.42 
‘Inwardness,’ then, does not negate the heteronomously co-existential 
character of Dasein. On the contrary, the struggle for authenticity cannot be 
reduced to radical individualisation because ‘the only inwardness that the 
existential subject has is that which plunges it into the world; an inwardness 
thrown and initially lost and ever only as good as its labor’; if this 
understanding of transcendence as an anxious movement of Dasein towards the
37 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 15.
38 Howard N. Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth: the Existential Critique o f  Mass Society in the 
Thought o f  Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega y  Gasset (New York: Peter Lang, 
1996), 73.
39 Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground (1929),” trans. William McNeill, in William 
McNeill (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
121 .
40 Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground (1929),” 121. Agnes Heller attests to such a view 
from a different perspective: to be one’s self, is to have a map to the self with which to orient; 
‘the center of the map of the self (be it reason, passion or something else) is not the center of 
the self: for the center of the self (around which the self is centered) is outside the self. It is 
“in” the world.’ Agnes Heller, “Death of the Subject?” in George Levine (ed.), Constructions 
o f the Self (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 282.
41 Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground (1929),” 111.
42 Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground (1929),” 109.
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world is obscured, then, ‘the reification of the subject is a foregone 
conclusion.’43
The proposition that Dasein transcends its everydayness in the direction of the 
world suggests that becoming-proper is predicated on a distinction between, on 
the one hand, a ‘naive everyday, understood as unproblematic and not in need 
of clarification, an everyday in which the uncanny experienced as anxiety takes 
place’ and ‘an everyday rendered strange by being subjected to analysis’ on the 
other.44 Dasein attempts to transcends its inauthentic self by moving from a 
flighty (curious, ambiguous, gossipy) immersion in its publicly comprehended 
everyday towards a resolute engagement with a world which can be subject to 
critique. Its everyday world becomes luminous and its ontological relationship 
to it is taken up in a steadfast readiness for anxiety. However, if becoming- 
proper is interpreted as an achievement which is complete, which can be fully 
actualised, this distorts the understanding of everydayness as that which ‘both 
is and is not a simple structure; that the everyday both is and is not aporetic 
and paradoxical.’45 The everyday world is that which is most familiar for 
Dasein and yet that which simultaneously harbours uncanniness. Dasein 
discovers in the midst of familiarity something that shatters its self-perception 
as a distinct and autonomous subject. It discovers that what distinguishes it 
from ‘the they’ is not innate autonomy but, in each case, an internalisation of 
the shared practices and norms of its world, formulated in way unique for its 
factical situation.46
If Dasein does not become a ‘subject’ once it strives to become-proper, then 
what is the result of its transcendence towards the world? According to 
Michael Gelven becoming-proper discloses Dasein as thrown projection, 
projecting itself on its possibilities. In his view, ‘authentic existence is
43 Walter A. Davis, Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity in/and Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, 
and Freud (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 142.
44 Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, 182. Such a distinction, however, is unstable and can never 
become concrete, it is heuristically used to create a space for thinking.
45 Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, 182.
46 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 141-142.
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awareness of possibilities.’47 However, it was argued earlier in this chapter that
Dasein’s ownmost possibility is its finitude: how, then, can propriety and death
be thought together? Scott argues that, ‘[w]hen dasein’s eigenste Moglichkeit
(most proper possibility) is named death, the meaning of most proper or
ownmost or most essential is thus interrupted.’48 Becoming-proper cannot be
determined as a specific way of being according to an essence of Dasein,
because ‘[authenticity for Heidegger is not a matter of selfs actualizing
itself.’49 Rather, it only be thought as a proper readiness for the ‘improper’
being that Dasein is. Seizing Dasein’s ownmost possibility, means then that
Dasein ‘exposes itself as Being-guilty, to its Being-toward-Death, to its
thrownness, in short, it exposes itself to its own finitude and to its “own”
inappropriable.’50 When Dasein is ‘lost’ in the ‘they’ it is unaware of its
constitution as Being-in-the-world and understands itself as self-completing
and unencumbered, voluntarily participating in relations with others. In
becoming-proper, an interruption of the myth of the ‘I’ reveals Dasein to itself
as Being-in-the-world. Thus, becoming-proper tears Dasein away from its
passive immersion in the ‘they’ only to return Dasein back to a recognition of
its fundamental worldly emdeddedness. In the process of becoming-proper, it
‘is tom from its inherited interpretation of itself as self-founding’51 and self-
sufficient, and brings about a recognition of otherness as constitutive for it.
Dasein, as an intrinsically social, worldly being, is a being marked by
difference in its being from the totality of its relations and values. In its
relations and values dasein is the opening [erschliesseri\oi its ownmost 
incapacity to own its being by affirming who in fact it is. It comes into its own 
by disowning its selfhood in the way it is a self52
The impossibility of isolation: Dasein’s bounded ‘historising’
There is, furthermore, a third reason why authentic Dasein cannot be seen to 
signify a return to an isolated ‘disengaged self who generates distance from its
47 Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1970), 69.
48 Charles E. Scott, “Nonbelonging/Authenticity,” in John Sallis (ed.), Reading Heidegger: 
Commemorations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 70.
49 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 97.
50 Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, 251.
51 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 99.
52 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 100.
168
background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other 
subjects).’53 The previous discussion maintained that Dasein’s process of 
becoming-proper does not isolate it from its world as a masterful subject while, 
on the contrary, it achieves the proper comportment to Dasein’s ‘foreground’. 
Authentic Dasein, moreover, cannot signify a return to a Cartesian kind of 
subjectivity because Dasein’s coexistential heteronomy is also manifested in its 
relationship with its ‘historical background.’ Dasein is historical in the sense 
that it exists ‘between’ birth and death. Its existence unfolds between the two, 
and this unfolding Heidegger calls ‘historising.’ Since Dasein is Being-with, its 
historising, is co-historising, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 
seven. Its possibilities are not self-made but, rather, have been inherited from 
its tradition. In this manner, ‘[t]he resoluteness which comes back to itself and 
hands itself down, then becomes a repetition of a possibility of existence that 
has come down to us’ (BT, 347).
When Dasein is resolutely considering its possibilities, it does so with respect 
to those possibilities handed down to it by its tradition. Awareness of 
possibilities, thus, signifies an engagement and adaptation of ‘past 
possibilities.’54 ‘Repeating’ past possibilities, however, does not mean that 
Dasein uncritically accepts the outlook of its tradition. This kind of repetition 
is, on the contrary, related to the unique appropriation of the world into which 
Dasein is thrown. Thus, Dasein brings its resoluteness to bear on those ‘past 
possibilities,7 which are found to be worth repeating after critically evaluation 
within Dasein’s factical situation. Repetition, therefore, refers to the critical 
appropriation of the shared past. In becoming-proper, one’s understanding of 
the separation from others as a sign of selfhood gets disrupted by being- 
towards-death. Dasein’s recognition of its contingency and finitude, as well as 
its openness to its factical possibilities, tear Dasein ‘from the meanings and 
values by which it makes its way in its society.’ 55 This includes both one’s 
familiar surrounding world (Umwelt) and those past possibilities that have
53 Stephen K. White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection,” Political Theory 25, no. 4 
(1997), 503.
54 ‘What we have been, what we call our past, exists nowhere else than as an idea in our 
minds,’ writes Philip Allott. Philip Allott, "Globalization from Above: Actualizing the Ideal 
through Law," Review o f  International Studies 26, Special Issue (December 2000), 61.
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been handed down by one’s ‘historical community and identity,’56 which are 
not proper for it.
Therefore, Dasein’s historising supplements the discussion on resoluteness, the 
middle voice and finite transcendence. Taken together these related arguments 
counter the charges of decisionism and isolating individuation. They gesture, 
moreover, towards an understanding of propriety as a modification, and not a 
negation, of the coexistential heteronomy that the optics of coexistence 
outlined in the previous chapter. The relationship between authentic and 
inauthentic modes of being concludes the exploration of becoming-proper, in 
preparation for the unworking of ethical and political subjectivity in the 
following chapters.
3. Authenticity and inauthenticity -  a dialogic relationship?
Both authenticity and inauthenticity are modes of Dasein’s existence which are 
‘grounded upon that state of Being which we have called “Being-in-the- 
world” (BT, 78). It is important to illustrate that the two modes of being are 
not separate but rather constitute one another dialogically. Dasein comports 
itself towards its Being even in the mode of average everydayness, ‘even if it is 
only in the mode of fleeing in the face o f it and forgetfulness thereof (BT, 69). 
Since Dasein flees from a confrontation with the fact that its Being is an issue 
for it, Heidegger designates everydayness as inauthentic. However, there can 
be no transcendence of everydayness as such. The proper comportment to 
one’s Being and to entities within the world occurs when Dasein appropriates 
its average practices, norms, and values in a unique way and has an awareness 
of its ability-to-be. Thus, it is not everydayness which is transcended, but the 
inauthentic relation to one’s Being in which Dasein finds itself initially and 
primarily (zunachst und zumeist). This is the meaning of the statement
55 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 99.
56 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 100.
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‘[i]nauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factical Dasein. Authenticity 
is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity.’57
Moreover, transcendence does not mean ‘to overcome’ or ‘to go beyond’ in the 
context of the optics of coexistence, as was noted above. Rather, it is more 
appropriately reformulated for an entity whose basic constitution is Being-in- 
the-world, as a going towards the world, towards facticity, a movement 
through which the shared world is uniquely appropriated in each case. 
‘Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition 
which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible’ (BT, 78). Dasein’s 
appropriation of its factic coexistence launches a process of becoming-proper 
as a being who is a radically contingent, foundation-less, death-bound 
possibility. Authenticity demands recognition of one’s entity as ‘Being the 
basis of a nullity,’ not in a morbid attempt to urge Dasein towards a taking- 
leave of the factical world, but to urge an appropriation of its worldly existence 
in a unique way. The recognition of finitude and its appropriation as one’s 
ownmost possibility do not rid Dasein’s impropriety. On the contrary, ‘by 
resolutely projecting my Being-guilty, I appropriate the inappropriable as 
inappropriable. I  must be the improper (inauthenticity) properly 
(authentically).’58 When authenticity is understood in connection with Dasein’s 
relation to its self as contingent and groundless, ‘Dasein comes to dwell in 
familiarity with its mortal temporality.’59 This is the primordial sense of 
mineness, namely, ‘giving oneself to what is other and being this givenness 
(which is at once a reception, a hearing, a corresponding, a hearkening, a 
belonging) authentically.’60 Although Dasein is ‘in each case mine’ (BT, 67), 
‘mineness,’ is not a property but a reiteration. The singularity of Dasein is 
taken anew in each case. As Nancy insists,
there is no being apart from singularity: each time just this once, and there
would be nothing general or common except the “each time just this once”.
This is how we must understand Heidegger’s Jemeinigkeit, Dasein’s “each
time as my own,” which does not define the subjectivity of a substantial
57 Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology, 171.
58 Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, 235.
59 Scott, “Nonbelonging/Authenticity,” 67.
60 Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, 235.
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presence of the ego to itself.. .but which on the contrary defines “mineness” 
on the basis of the “each time.”61
This kind of ‘mineness’ restates singularity and uniqueness in a temporal 
sense:
Each time there is the singularity of a “time,’’...there is “mineness,” which 
does not imply the substantial permanence, identity, or autonomy of the 
“ego,” but rather implies the withdrawal of all substance, in which is 
hollowed out the infinity of the relation according to which “mininess” 
identically means the nonidentity of “youmess” and “his/her/its-ness”.’62
Relation is primary, since mineness cannot be understood as Dasein’s property, 
substance or even its possession of itself. Rather, ‘existence always exists in 
the plural... that being one can be understood on the basis o f plurality within 
being, the singularity o f being is plural.’63
The ambivalent content, tone and language in which inauthenticity is 
approached has often led Heidegger scholars either to denigrate such an 
‘inauthentic mode’ or who rush towards a defence of inauthenticity.64 Yet both 
‘camps’ of the inauthenticity/authenticity debate rest on a distinction that was 
not intended to establish and maintain a rigid dichotomy between inauthentic 
and authentic modes of being. Rather, Heidegger invoked this distinction to 
call for a rendering-s/range of the average manifestation of Dasein. A 
dichotomy is not ontologically possible, moreover, because the mode of 
‘averageness’ cannot be transcended, as it constitutes the shared world of 
significance. If by transcendence is meant the overcoming of averageness, then 
this is a phenomenal impossibility, because the structures of shared existence 
are constituted by it. Lawrence Vogel notes in this regard that, ‘[t]here is no 
pure authenticity but at best an authentic appropriation of the inauthentic.’65 
But this is not merely an indication of the limitations of the process towards
61 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience o f  Freedom, trans. Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 67.
62 Nancy, The Experience o f Freedom, 67.
63 Simon Critchley, Ethics - Politics - Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and 
Contemporary French Thought (London: Verso, 1999) 244.
64 See Jean-Luc Nancy, Eire Singulier Pluriel (Paris: Galilee, 1996), excerpts cited in Simon 
Critchley, Ethics - Politics - Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary 
French Thought (London: Verso, 1999).
65 Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile "We”: Ethical Implications o f  Heidegger's Being and Time 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 12.
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propriety. Rather, it is meant to highlight that, ‘authenticity is nothing but 
inauthenticity seized as such'66
Furthermore, transcendence in a conventional meaning of going beyond is not 
only impossible but also unnecessary because of the dialogic relation between 
these two modes. As Joan Stambaugh argues, ‘[w]e are both at once, usually 
without realizing it.’67 In this vein, setting up a dichotomy between 
inauthenticity and authenticity can be said to obscure the fact that there is 
never a complete severance of the dialogic relation between the two modes of 
being. ‘Inauthenticity characterizes a kind of Being into which Dasein can 
divert itself and has for the most part always diverted itself; but Dasein does 
not necessarily and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of Being’ (BT, 
303). In this way, Heidegger’s paradoxical statement ‘inauthenticity is based 
on the possibility of authenticity* can be better understood as a dialogical 
interaction between the two modes (BT, 303). Within inauthenticity can be 
found the very possibility of its modification, authenticity; but, at the same 
time, inauthenticity is only possible for a being who has the capacity to be 
authentic (proper) within its everyday possibilities. Their interconnection 
reveals that ‘if authenticity is always manifested by inauthenticity, authenticity 
is itself in some sense inauthentic,’ belonging, that is, in some way to the 
everyday and its possibilities.68
Thinking of authenticity as a ‘modification of inauthenticity’ also transforms 
Dasein’s relation to otherness. Dasein’s submission to the world and the ‘they’ 
is modified so that it becomes Dasein’s understanding of the primacy of 
relation for its Being-in-the-world (BT, §27). Dasein is both singular (unique) 
and fundamentally related, its ‘singularity of the self which knows itself as 
opening to alterity.’69 Authenticity modifies Dasein’s self-understanding so that 
it comes to consider its heteronomy as being-radically-in relation. Becoming- 
proper, therefore, involves a transformation of Being-with from fallenness in
66 Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, 251.
67 Joan Stambaugh, ‘An Inquiry into Authenticity and Inauthenticity in Being and Time’ in 
John Sallis (ed.), Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor o f  Martin Heidegger (Atlantic 
Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978), 158.
68 Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, 250.
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the ‘they,’ to the critical appropriation of one’s shared way of life and an 
understanding of oneself as determined by the critical repetition of possibilities 
which are historically inherited. Propriety is an awareness of the heteronomy 
of the concrete situation, as well as a response to it that is unique. It is the 
recognition, in other words, that ‘[existence exists in the plural, in the 
singularly plural.’70
Thus, discussions of authenticity/inauthenticity must ‘be understood at the 
philosophical-hermeneutic level of whether an implicit self-interpretation 
appropriately articulates and discloses the being proper to Dasein or not.’71 
This enhanced intelligibility involves, ultimately, relinquishing perceptions of 
selfhood as ‘merely self-consciousness, self-possession, or self-control’ and no 
longer comporting oneself towards beings as a self-sufficient subject; higher 
intelligibility enables Dasein to ‘appreciate the meaningfulness of all beings’ 
and to be ‘the maintenance of creative openness to the significance of what is, 
to the difference it makes that there are beings rather than nothing.’72 
Becoming-proper involves, therefore, a disclosive enhancement to relations 
with others and available things. The dialogic relationship between 
inauthenticity and authenticity serves to highlight, also, Dasein’s relation to 
itself. It aids the questioning of the assumptions of the modem subject and 
signifies the unstable process of ‘the deconstruction of Dasein, Dasein’s 
making itself tremble’ by which ‘Dasein is its own deconstruction.’73
To recapitulate, then, the ‘optics of coexistence,’ discussed at great length in 
chapter four and modified in chapter five, has sought to ‘unwork’ the 
characteristics attributed to modem subjectivity. Acting both as a means of
69 Christopher Fynsk, ‘Foreword: Experiences ofFinitude,’ xiii.
70 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Being-With,” trans. Iain Macdonald, Centre fo r  Theoretical Studies 
Working Papers, no. 11 (1996), 14.
71 William McNeill, The Glance o f  the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends o f  Theory 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 103, n. 15.
72 Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrage zur Philosophie,” 661. For an 
interpretation of authenticity in terms of an improved intelligibility see Hubert L. Dreyfus, 
“Could Anything Be More Intelligible Than Everyday Intelligibility? Reinterpreting Division I 
of Being and Time in Light of Division II,” in James E. Faulconer and Mark A. Wrathall (eds.), 
Appropriating Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 155-174.
73 Michael Roth, The Poetics o f  Resistance: Heidegger’s Line, (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1996), 181.
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accessing the facticity of existence and as an analysis of the structures of 
Dasein (being-there), the ‘optics of coexistence’ reveals that, far from being an 
innately autonomous and sovereign subject, Dasein is coexistentially 
heteronomous. This means that its existence is coexistence: in the proximal 
and average way in which it finds itself in the world, Dasein is radically 
embedded Being-with, although it flees in the face of this worldiness. Its 
efforts to become proper for its Being, moreover, take up this radical 
embeddedness and allow it to define Dasein’s ability-to-be. By bringing to the 
fore the ways in which heteronomy permeates and constitutes Dasein, the 
various elements of the ‘optics of coexistence’ have rendered untenable the 
conception of coexistence as the co-presence of already constituted, and self- 
sufficient subjects. What is needed at this stage, therefore, is an elaboration of 
coexistence in which the heteronomous constitution of the self can be 
adequately reflected.
The dialogic relationship between Dasein’s proper and improper 
manifestations ‘unworks’ subjectivity as the ground of international political 
inquiry. This unworking is neither a closure, nor the replacement of ‘subject’ 
by another ontological certainty; rather, it is the unravelling of ossified 
assumptions, which creates the possibility for thinking of coexistence beyond 
composition. How might a new understanding of coexistence be articulated if 
it can no longer be conceived as mere co-presence? To think of coexistence on 
the basis of this facticity of coexistential heteronomy is to seek its articulation 
in ethical and political terms.74 To think of coexistence after the insights of the 
heteronomous facticity of selfhood involve the interrogation of ethical and 
political terms towards which coexistence might turn after the logic of 
composition. Reflecting on the insights of the optics of coexistence in terms of 
ethics and politics is required, furthermore, because many of the issues of
74 Though such an exercise might appear as a grounding one, i.e. one that provides ultimate 
foundations, it is important to note that it can only occur on the basis of a groundless entity, a 
Being-towards-Death. In this regard, the transcendental “condition of possibility” of our 
experience...is revealed as also the historical finite “condition” of Dasein,’ who is a thrown 
project and as such cannot constitute an ultimate ground as did God, Spirit and human 
subjectivity, Gianni Vattimo, “Toward an Ontology o f Decline,” trans. Barbara Spackman, in 
Giovanna Borradori (ed.), Recoding Metaphysics: The New Italian Philosophy (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), 69.
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coexistence in world politics are addressed as ethical and political issues. In the 
remaining chapters of the thesis it will be suggested that heteronomous Being- 
with-others must be articulated, not in an additive way, but in terms of ethical 
and political selfhood.
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Chapter 6
Recovering the ‘Ethical’ Self as an Opening to 
Otherness
Thinking takes place, as the universal validity o f what is thought falls more
and more into question.
Charles E. Scott1
The ‘optics of coexistence,’ discussed at great length in chapter four and 
modified in chapter five, has sought to ‘unwork’ the characteristics attributed 
to modem subjectivity. Acting both as a means of accessing the facticity of 
existence and as an analysis of the structures of Dasein (being-there), the 
‘optics of coexistence’ reveals that, far from being an innately autonomous and 
sovereign subject, Dasein is coexistentially heteronomous. This means that its 
existence is coexistence: in the proximal and average way in which it finds 
itself in the world, Dasein is radically embedded Being-with, although it flees 
in the face of its worldliness. Its efforts to become proper for its Being, 
moreover, take up this radical embeddedness and allow it to define Dasein’s 
ability-to-be. By bringing to the fore the ways in which heteronomy permeates 
and constitutes Dasein, the various elements of the ‘optics of coexistence’ have 
rendered untenable the conception of coexistence as the co-presence of already 
constituted, and self-sufficient subjects. The previous chapter, therefore, ended 
with the question of how a new understanding of coexistence might be 
articulated, in which the heteronomous constitution of the self can be 
adequately reflected. It suggested that heteronomous Being-with-others must 
be articulated, not in an additive way, but in terms of ethical and political 
selfhood. Reflecting on the insights of the optics of coexistence in terms of 
ethics and politics is required, furthermore, because many of the issues of 
coexistence in world politics are addressed as ethical and political issues.
1 Charles E. Scott, The Question o f  Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), 134.
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Allowing the optics of coexistence to bear on ethical selfhood has two effects. 
First, it expands and subverts what is normally designated as ethics. For, it 
requires a movement beyond the supposition that ethics is solely ethical 
construction, i.e. the elaboration of rules which are intended to moderate 
relations between subjects who are only voluntarily associated. This kind of 
reduction, characteristic of modernity, takes ethics as ‘obligatory principles of 
conduct, rules that tell you what you must do to be blameless.’2 
Conventionally, then, the term ethics refers to ‘the body of values by which a 
culture understands and interprets itself with regard to what is good and 
bad...a group of principles for both conduct and value judgement.’3 These 
specific definitions of ethics, moreover, resonate throughout ethical theorising 
in some Continental and most Anglo-American moral philosophy but, more 
importantly, also represent the articulation of the great majority of normative 
theorising within the discipline of International Relations.4 In fact, the 
literature on normative theories within International Relations is dominated by 
the traditional conception of ethics as ethical construction. The majority of 
ethical international approaches, which call for an inclusion of normative 
questions amongst the concerns of the discipline, are, to date, formulated 
largely in the manner of universalisable theorising or the application of 
existing ethical theories to specific issues, such as refugees, societal exclusion, 
inter-cultural critique, universal human rights and their political success in 
non-westem parts of the world, etc. Even for those international ethical 
discourses that strive for a ‘thoroughgoing anti-foundationalist ethics,’ such as 
that of Molly Cochran, ‘[b]y definition, an ethic is understood to be
2 Albert Borgmann, “Heidegger and Ethics Beyond the Call of Duty,” in James E. Faulconer 
and Mark A. Wrathall (eds.), Appropriating Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 68.
3 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 4. This citation might be taken to resonate with the cultural 
relativist position. It is moderated, however, by the clarification made by Kai Nielsen as early 
as 1966 that, anthropologically, similar types of obligations or prohibitions are evident in all 
cultures signifying a cross-cultural overlap. However, the content of the rules ‘varies 
considerably from culture to culture.’ See Kai Nielsen, “Ethical Relativism and the Facts of 
Cultural Relativity,” Social Research 33 (1966): 531-551.
4 See James P. Sterba (ed.), Ethics: the Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Mervyn 
Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) but also the related literature on human rights which is predicated on 
this understanding o f ethics such as R.J. Vincent and Fred Halliday.
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universalizable’5 in the sense that it is ‘interested in seeking convergence on 
ethical principles.’6
Second, the optics of coexistence leads to a ‘recovery of the ethical self,’ 
understood as a stance of heteronomous selfhood ‘which knows itself as 
opening to alterity.’7 The present re-conceptualisation of coexistence in terms 
of ethical selfhood participates in a number of critical discourses that have 
emerged within ethical international theorising and which are concerned with 
the shortcomings of traditional conceptions of ethics. In particular, their 
animating spirit arises from attestations of otherness and suffering that 
traditional ethics is said to unwittingly occlude. These discourses are troubled 
by the possibility that the reduction of ethics to ethical construction and rule- 
making might not be sufficiently open to otherness.8 It is in this way that the 
reconceptualising of coexistence in terms of ethical selfhood simultaneously 
contributes to a rethinking of ethics itself.9
What occurs, then, is a ‘de-construction,’ or a ‘destructive retrieve,’ of ethics 
in the sense of a double movement of ‘destruction* and ‘retrieve,’ which calls 
into question the assumptions that hinder its full potential, while bringing 
about a recovery of the ‘ethical’ self as a possibility within ethics that is worth 
reclaiming and enhancing, and which has positive implications for ethical 
theorising in IR. Importantly, then, this chapter does more than to just reflect 
on an understanding of coexistence beyond composition. Rather, it contributes 
to the critical re-evaluation of the very possibility of ethics in the traditional 
sense and considers whether a more fruitful direction for ethical theorising
5 Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: a Pragmatic Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 206.
6 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 249.
7 Christopher Fynsk, ‘Foreword: Experiences of Finitude’ in Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative 
Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland and Simona Sawhney, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), xiii.
8 See specifically Chris Brown, ‘“Turtles all the way down’: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical 
Theory and International Relations,” Millennium 23, no. 2 (1994): 227-230, David Campbell 
and Michael Dillon, ‘The Political and the Ethical,” in David Campbell and Michael Dillon 
(eds.), The Political Subject o f Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), and 
Vivienne Jabri, “Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations,” 
Millennium 27, no. 3 (1998): 591-611.
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might not be found, instead, in an exploration of ethical selfhood informed by 
the optics of coexistence.
Specifically, the present chapter examines the linguistic trajectory of the word 
ethos and weds it to the extensive Heideggerian discussion of Dasein’s 
socialisation in the ‘they/ This combined perspective questions ethics by 
enabling the understanding of the discursive creation of moral norms as crucial 
to, and inseparable from, processes of socialisation and normalisation. It is 
through this connection between normalcy, normalisation and ethos within 
conventional conceptions of ethics as moral rules that the occlusion of 
suffering and of alterity occurs. The veiling of otherness and suffering points to 
the urgent need to turn away from a restricted notion of ethics as ethical 
construction and to seek other means of access to the ethical, which adequately 
reflect the heteronomy disclosed by the ‘optics of coexistence.’ Hence, ethics 
itself becomes radically re-determined, beyond rules, until it reaches an 
‘unrestricted conception of ethics concerned not just with human beings, but 
with human beings in relation to difference and to otherness.’10
1. Questioning ethics
questioning was the piety o f thought...piety shouldfrom the start have been 
understood as the docility o f listening, thus making the question...into a 
modality o f reception, a trusting attention to what gives itself to be understood 
rather than -  or prior to -  the enterprising, inquisitional activity o f a request
or inquest. 
Jacque Derrida11
The lack of explicit theorisation of ethics by Heidegger had discouraged many 
Heidegger scholars and moral philosophers from exploring the possibilities of
9 This suspension of traditional meaning of ethics, or the desire to utilise the term and yet 
postpone its definition, is indicated in the text by the use of quotation marks (while in all other 
instances a traditional definition can be assumed).
10 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995), 2.
11 Jacques Derrida, “A Number of Yes (Nombre de Oui),” trans. Brian Holmes, in Martin 
McQuillan (ed.), Deconstruction: A Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 
102.
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Heideggerian thinking for normative concerns.12 It can be argued, however, 
that the discussion of everydayness found in Being and Time and, specifically, 
the analysis of everyday social practices, rules, roles, and norms, under the 
heading of the ‘they’ (das Man) amounts to a forceful critique of modem 
conceptions of morality and ethical construction, and indicates that Heidegger 
did indeed have a lot to say about ethics. Charles E. Scott, for example, states 
that the question of ethics is ‘functioning with exceptional force’ within 
Heidegger’s thinking.13 Joanna Hodge similarly regards that ‘the question of 
ethics is the definitive, if unstated problem of his thinking.’14 The ‘optics of 
coexistence,’ it is here suggested, offers a forceful critique of ethics as ethical 
construction and enables a recovery of the ethical self which aids the re­
conceptualisation of ‘ethics’ itself.
The constitutive function that conformity and mimesis have for Dasein’s 
worldly existence is evident in everyday ontological manifestation of the ‘who’ 
of Dasein as the ‘they.’ As can be recalled from chapter four, Heidegger 
acknowledges conformity as positively constitutive for Dasein15 but also offers 
a critique of ‘conformism’ which suggests that shared social practises must be 
evaluated and uniquely appropriated. The critique challenges public morality 
insofar as it is an important mode through which Dasein is socialised into the 
mentality of the ‘they.’ Slavoj Zizek calls this ‘the inauthentic ontic morality of
12 Such neglect is, of course, partly attributable to Heidegger’s own comments about his work 
not being related to ethics, see Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism (1946),” trans. Frank 
A. Capuzzi, in William McNeill (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 239-276. It is also traceable to the widely-held perception that there is 
a profound absence of normative concerns in phenomenology. This view is contested in Reiner 
Schiirmann, “Riveted to a Monstrous Site: On Heidegger’s Beitrage zur Philosophies trans. 
Kathleen Blarney, in Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (eds.), The Heidegger Case: On 
Philosophy and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 313-330.
13 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 2.
14 Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, 1. This new type of work, has succeeded earlier ethical 
thought that had, in part, assumed that Heidegger’s contribution to ethics lay primarily in 
questioning the fact-value dichotomy, a distinction which had largely contributed to the 
academic ‘neglect of human conduct,’ Fred R. Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 109. Surpassed is also the assumed equivalence between 
ontological concepts, such as ‘authenticity,’ ‘resoluteness,’ or ‘solicitude’ and ethics. See, for 
example, Charles M. Sherover, “Founding an Existential Ethic,” Human Studies 4 (1981): 223- 
236 and Marjorie Grene, “Authenticity: An Existential Virtue,” Ethics 62, no. 4 (1952): 266- 
274.
15 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 167, thereafter cited in the text as BT with the page number of this 
English translation.
181
“this is how it is done, how one does it”."6 Scott similarly recognises that what 
is meant by ethics as rules of conduct can only arise in the context of the 
‘they.’ If by ethics we understand the emergence of a code or of a set of norms 
expressive of locally acceptable and expected behaviour, then ‘the possibility 
of ethical thought and action is found in traditional “normalcy” and its 
history.*17 The reference to normalcy indicates that the construction of norms 
usually arises within habitual behaviour, which tends to have a normalisation 
effect. People are socialised by adjusting their dealings in the world towards 
what becomes average practice through infinite and minute adjustments. It is 
through such normalisation that ‘norms’ develop, in the sense that historical 
and local habitual practice tends to coalesce into customary ways of doing 
things.18 Norms, then, are representative of current average practice which is 
attained through processes of normalisation of behaviour and the power of 
habituation.19 As such, they are undeniably public.
Some of these ‘ways’ also ascend to the level of moral rules, by which we 
normally refer to locally desirable ways to regulate action towards others and 
the collectivity in general. Moral rules have been accorded value within a 
historically determined and locally specific public group and some of them 
might have been gradually and/or officially codified.20 That such a body of 
rules exists, however, need not involve the explicit individual choice of those 
specific rules as such, neither does it signify each individual’s conscious 
agreement to obey them. On the contrary, the everyday value judgements and 
moral acts of members of society involves recourse to such rules without 
reflexive choice (BT, 164-165).
16 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre o f  Political Ontology (London: 
Verso, 1999), 48.
17 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 106.
18 Additionally, in a Foucauldian argument, the process of habituation can be supplemented 
with the exercise of power beyond its traditional understanding as coercion, since ‘[i]n modem 
societies, power operates in a much more complex manner: through normalisation rather than 
prohibition,’ Andrew Schaap, “Power and Responsibility: Should we Spare the King’s Head?,” 
Politics: Surveys and Debates fo r  Students o f  Politics 20, no. 3 (2000), 129.
19 See John Haugeland, “Heidegger on Being a Person,” Nous 16, no. 1 (1982): 15-26.
20 This statement brings together conceptions of ‘mores’ and ‘morals.’ For a discussion of 
codification of rules in international politics, see Michael Dillon, “Criminalising Social and 
Political Violence Internationally,” Millennium 27, no. 3 (1998): 543-567.
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A linguistic excursion might help to illustrate the relationship between the 
customary and the moral, as well as the transition from one to the other. 
Charles Chamberlain’s research in this area shows how in the 5th century BC, 
the word ‘ethos can usually be understood and translated as “character”’ but 
that this was not true in the case of earlier writers; on the contrary, the term had 
the prior signification of ‘animal haunts’ or ‘dwellings’ and was usually used 
in its plural form, ethea.21 Gradually the term became commonly used 
regarding humans and came to mean ‘the arena in which people or animals 
move; further, this essence, whether in an animal or a human being, resists the 
imposition of outside influences.’22 Similarly for Scott, ethos has to do with 
customary dwelling and the behaviour or manners which one exhibits in such a 
homestead. In ethos one finds a particularist drive which encompasses its own 
‘ordering, identity-giving, and nurturing force.’23 Ethea, then, were places of 
belonging, but the term connoted a certain disposition to recalcitrance and 
resistance to ‘civilising’ influence.24 Furthermore, it can be established that the 
term, where it referred to humans, initially did so to barbarians (such as 
Persians), indicating that these ‘are subject to a principle of order, a logos all 
their own, off the scale of “normal” -  that is, Greek -  expectations.’25
In the 4th century BC, the term’s meaning as a place of belonging was 
reconfigured and ethos became located in the soul, and was occasionally used 
in conjunction with tropos (way or manner). It is from this configuration that 
the connection to ‘character’ develops as that which evidences one’s manners. 
The ‘spatial’ sense of the term persists, however, and ‘now refers to the 
peculiar characteristics which citizens of a polis acquire as part of their civic 
heritage...ta ethe in particular are often mentioned in connection with trepho 
and paideuo, that is, with the socialization of children.’26 Customary habits 
become gradually codified into rules and laws, that is, nomos. Nomos, which 
means ‘both law and melody,’ can be seen as the movement to codify into
21 Charles Chamberlain, “From ‘Haunts’ to ‘Character’: The Meaning of Ethos and its Relation 
to Ethics,” Helios 11, no. 2 (1984), 97.
22 Chamberlain, “From ‘Haunts’ to ‘Character’,” 99.
23 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 145.
24 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 144.
25 Chamberlain, “From ‘Haunts’ to ‘Character’,” 100.
26 Chamberlain, “From ‘Haunts’ to ‘Character’,” 101.
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standardised rules and, perhaps promulgate, that which belongs to a particular 
habitual order.27 Nomos, then, raises particular manners to the level of 
principles, by which also the recalcitrant ethea are ‘civilised.’ The movement
towards codification and ordering, in this regard, necessarily involves struggle
between free and differentiated habituation on the one hand, and the desire to 
impose an external but principled order, on the other. Ethos, then, derived from 
the Indo-European Swedh, meaning ‘one’s own’ character and also the ‘way 
we are of our own’ as a distinct group: ethos nurtures, socialises, and provides 
the identificatory processes by which one is one’s own self.28
The connection between customary ways of life and ethics is, moreover, 
constant and ever-evolving through infinitesimal changes, a process which is 
historically bounded and undeniably local. One cannot but perceive ‘of laws 
and principles for thought and action as regional, as a group of claims 
characteristic of one cultural and historical segment.’29 The derivation of the 
term ethics from ethos, from customary ways of life, does not refer only to 
mores of small secluded communities, tribes of anthropological interest or 
imagined ‘closed’ cultural groups. It could similarly refer to ‘Western culture,’ 
‘Western civilisation,’ or ‘European ethos’ as a historically enlarged group 
with its specific ways of being. In this light, the norms, rules and ethical 
practices, such as human rights, normally associated with ‘the West’ are shown 
to be situated in processes of habituation and socialisation of this public group 
or culture, despite their universalist aspirations. When the insights of the 
historico-linguistic development of the term ethics are allowed to inform 
ethical inquiry, the universality of such norms is called into question.
The particular location and basis of ethical codification and construction in 
customary ways of behaving brings to the fore the relation between ethics and 
habituation, and recalls Heidegger’s discussion of average everydayness as the 
initial and primary way in which Dasein finds itself as Being-in-the-world. The 
historical development of the term ethos as a habitual dwelling place underlies
27 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 143.
28 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 144.
29 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 145.
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the analysis of how Dasein is embedded in the with-world. It informs the 
phenomenological investigation of Being-there amidst others in the form of the 
‘they,’ in a specific cultural tradition that is constitutive for Dasein, because it 
is constitutive of sense and all norms by which Dasein lives. Dasein, 
manifested in the ‘they,’ ‘is shared practices’ and, as such, finds itself in a 
world already infused with sense.30 Hence, Dasein is thrown into a world 
through its dealings with available entities (the ready-to-hand) and its 
solicitude towards other Daseins.
The intelligibility which Dasein has within the ‘they’ is, however, average and, 
through it, Dasein relates to other entities, be they available in its work world 
or other Daseins, as merely occurrent (present-at-hand).31 The average 
solicitude towards other Daseins as present-at-hand is particularly problematic 
for a discussion of ethics because this ‘misperception’ does not disclose 
entities in their Being but rather as assumed presence. Inasmuch as something 
or someone is accorded moral significance, it requires the assignment of 
‘value’ as the expression of positivity.32 As regards itself, moreover, Dasein 
entertains conceptions of autonomous selfhood and action free from constrain 
bestowed upon it by an assumed innate autonomy. This average kind of 
comportment and intelligibility leads to a ‘levelling-down’ of Dasein’s 
possibilities for Being, but also involves a lack of recognition of this levelling- 
down and a flight from Dasein’s own anxious ability-to-be. Insofar as morality 
enables this flight away from one’s becoming-proper by socialising Dasein 
within its group, and keeping it within this average and constricting level of 
interaction, it is a product of the ‘they.’ The narrow significance of 
Heidegger’s critique of morality, then, is that ‘ethics’ commonly understood 
enclose Dasein in commonplace and average comportment. The moral subject
30 See Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, Division I  (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), 157 and John Haugeland, “Dasein’s 
Disclosedness,” The Southern Journal o f  Philosophy 28, Spindel Supplement (1989): 51-73 for 
an account of the ‘they’ as shared historical practices.
31 For a discussion of average intelligibility see Richard Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in 
Heidegger’s Beitrdge zur Philosophies Political Theory 25, no. 5 (1997): 655-679.
32 The assignment of value is but a sign of nihilism, see Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. 
David Farrell Krell, Vol. IV (New York: Harper and Row, 1991), 44 and also Martin 
Heidegger, “The Age o f the World Picture,” trans. William Lovitt, in Martin Heidegger, The
185
is, despite its purported autonomy, the subject of averageness, publicness and 
conformism, unquestioningly remaining within ‘traditional* and customary 
bounds of behaviour. Morality, therefore, is part of the ‘average’ intelligibility 
through which the world and beings within the world are disclosed, and what is 
more, forms part of the process by which Dasein is constituted within its 
group. Yet, if ethics arises within the folds of the ‘they,’ and sustains the 
average intelligibility and inauthentic comportment towards the world, then 
becoming-proper, as discussed in chapter five, itself involves a critical 
examination of ethics.
This questioning of ethics has a number of implications for universalist ethical 
construction in International Relations, even at this early stage in the overall 
discussion. The questioning of ethics as contained within a prevalent 
communal ethos contextualises scholarly ethical work within its particularist 
location, which in the case of International Relations scholarship is mostly 
Western.33 This ‘locating’ contests its universal claims and reveals its situated 
roots.34 Seen in this light, the aspirations of universalist ethics are disclosed as 
particularist drives of socialisation which seek to spread beyond their 
particularity. This questioning also attempts to create a distance from the 
specific issues which might preoccupy international ethics at a time and 
Tead[s] towards the construction of a larger picture of the whole’ in the effort 
to theorise or construct an ethic calling into question its aspiration.35 Moreover, 
no matter how valuable such universalism is considered to be for the inter­
Questiort Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 115- 
154.
33 Of course, as Ken Booth writes, ‘[t]o say that human rights comes from somewhere -  and 
the West is not the only geographical expression claiming to be a parent -  should never be 
allowed to be the end of the story: it is only a discussion of how we should live, as humans, on 
a global scale.’ Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” in Timothy Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler 
(eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 53.
34 Even Andrew Linklater’s universalist approach acknowledges this: ‘A new universality may 
yet bring an end to the West’s use of universalist moral concepts to celebrate the achievements 
of Western modernity and to enlarge its control o f other peoples.’ Andrew Linklater, The 
Transformation o f Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f  the Post-Westphalian Era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 24.
35 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory,” Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981), 129. Mark Neufeld directs Cox’s approach to 
international ethics in Mark Neufeld, “Thinking Ethically -  Thinking Critically: International 
Ethics as Critique,” in Maria Lensu and Jan-Stefan Fritz (eds.), Value Pluralism, Normative 
Theory and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 41-58.
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national and global concerns that International Relations wishes to address, this 
‘locating’ suggests that universalised customary norms might not be the ideal 
response to these concerns and that ethical theorising in IR might greatly 
benefit from heeding the call for a relinquishment of ethics understood as 
ethical construction.
Turning away from ethics
If ethics arises within the folds of the ‘they,’ the call to becoming-proper or 
‘authenticity’ amounts to a ‘turning away from ethics as we know it.’36 To find 
out what is questionable in one’s own ethics, based on the group ethos as these 
are, Dasein must confront its customary practices and their assigned values, no 
matter how nurturing and comforting the former may be, or how much value 
has been previously accorded to them. In this way, becoming-proper, 
understood as the process of increasing awareness of Dasein’s thrownness in 
the world and its mortal possibility (Being-towards-death), entails a 
fundamental reconsideration of the commitment to socially constructed ethical 
norms. Such a critical re-evaluation of ethics, however, is hard to pursue 
because it disrupts the everyday safety that Dasein seeks in the ‘they.’ 
Specifically, four difficulties can be discerned that might hinder a re­
examination of customary normativity.
First, the turn away from ethics is checked by the power of habituation. Since 
it challenges that which has been most revered by a particular culture or 
society, ‘[w]e cannot believe that our recognition of wrong, our commitment to 
right, our worship of God, our love of just laws, and our respect for human 
beings have as part of their fabric the inevitability of what we most abhor.’37 
Leaving ‘what we most abhor’ for later consideration, let it be noted that what 
is required in such a turning away from ethics is not to proclaim that this or 
that rule is faulty, or that another maybe better suited to the moral judgement at 
hand. Rather, the notion of ‘value’ must itself be brought under scrutiny since
36 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 106. For one account of the customary and the ethical see 
Gemot Bohme, “Ethical Life or ‘The Customary’,” trans. John Farrell, Thesis Eleven, no. 60 
(2000): 1-10.
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it contributes, through its assignment, to the concealment of average 
comportment. The habitual practice of moral norms misleads Dasein into 
believing that it is morally dutiful, a belief that is reinforced by the approval 
that Dasein receives within the ‘they.’ Therefore, Dasein remains closed off to 
the question of ‘ethics,’ to the question of how it might be ‘ethical’ beyond 
ethical rules.
A second difficulty with critically questioning ethics is that such a process 
disputes the normativity of phenomena which are widely accepted as 
signifying ethical activity. A re-evaluation of ethics would render suspect, for 
example, the notion of ‘moral conscience,’ which refers to the inner voice that 
alerts one to do the right thing or brings on feelings of guilt when one has acted 
wrongfully. For Heidegger, however, moral conscience is a tally, a keeping of 
scores, through which Dasein is alerted to his moral debt, guilt and, sometimes, 
innocence. The moral individual is ‘a moral accountant who treats life as a 
business, forever worrying about whether he has covered the moral costs.’38 
Seen in this way, moral conscience is a subjectivist remnant, another way of 
making-secure a particular kind of subjectivity. Even, the transgression 
prevailing morality in order to follow ones ‘own conscience’ still falls under 
the subjectivist will to security. Dasein seeks to ensure that its life is dictated 
by no one but himself, instantiating the autonomy assumed by modem 
subjectivity. Both kinds of behaviour are connected, in that they both reflect 
the schema of the moral conscience that involves ‘a turning away from having 
to choose one’s own possibilities and a turning toward possibilities that “have 
already been decided-upon”.’39 It is, then, both a manifestation of the ‘falling’ 
into the ‘they’ but also a tool of sovereign subjectivity in its desire to take 
moral action autonomously.40
37 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 142.
38 Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile “We”: Ethical Implications o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 9.
39 Vogel, The Fragile “We”, 20.
40 An interweaving of autonomy and morality, of sovereignty and willed-subservience to 
morality has characterised the modem subject. See Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. 
Higgins, A Short History o f Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 211. See 
also Jane Flax, Disputed Subjects: Essays on Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Philosophy 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 95. Etienne Balibar also comments that the ethical self is 
presupposed as autonomous. The ‘autonomous subject,’ therefore, is a redundant statement,
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The third difficulty is related to the assumption of sovereign subjectivity 
mentioned above. The rupture involved in the calling of ethics into question, 
brings Dasein face to face with its impropriety or inauthenticity: turning away 
from ethics ‘is nothing less than a twisting free of a body of selfhood that is 
given in its investment in not knowing its being or its propriety vis-a-vis its 
being.’41 The interruption of ethics arrests Dasein’s self-conception as subject 
and throws it back into anxiety by reminding it that it is the entity whose Being 
is an issue for it. Dasein, having no definite and determinate substance or 
nature, is called to itself by ‘being called to a being whose meaning is mortal 
temporality and thus has no intrinsic, determinate meaning at all.’42 
Questioning ethics, then, is inseparable from reflecting on the subjectivity that 
Dasein posits for itself and the relation that ethics has in sustaining it. The 
indeterminacy and contingency of Dasein’s Being reveals ethics to be the 
ossification and occasionally-willed construction of a web of rules for a being 
it wills itself to be in its flight from its ownmost possibility.43 The critique 
leads, therefore, Dasein to question itself and, in so doing, to challenge its 
ethical constructions in a cyclical and reinforcing manner.
Finally, and most importantly, turning away from ‘ethics’ brings with it the 
realisation that, for all our rules and, what is worse, because of them, we have 
permitted and covered up that against which we purport to construct all moral 
rules: suffering.44 Enclosed within the ‘they’ Dasein comports itself
“Subjection and Subjectivation,” in Joan Copjec (ed.), Supposing the Subject (London: Verso, 
1994), 14, n. 12. Michel Foucault also registers a particular incitement to ethical discourse 
reconfigured to fit the modernist and subjectivist understanding of the ethical subject in Michel 
Foucault, The Order o f  Things: Archaeology o f  the Human Sciences (London: Tavistock
Publications, 1974), 345.
41 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 106.
42 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 107.
43 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 144, 155, 157-162 and Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of 
Ground (1929),” trans. William McNeill, in Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks, 97-135 for a 
discussion of the ‘generation of ground’.
44 On suffering see Philip Allott, “Globalization from Above: Actualising the Ideal through 
Law,” Review o f  International Studies 26, Special Issue (December 2000): 76-77. The focus on 
suffering necessarily refers to a Western conception of ethics and morality because the 
unworking of modem subjectivity for the purpose of exploring the ontological basis of 
coexistence is itself targeted towards the Western conception of the subject. To call the modem 
subject ‘Western’ might be redundant. See Etienne Balibar, “Subjection and Subjectivation,” 
14, n. 12 and his “Citizen Subject,” in Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy 
(eds.), Who Comes After the Subject? (New York: Routledge, 1991), 33-57.
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ambiguously towards the world and, prompted by curiosity, it moves from one 
topic of interest to another without relating to entities in a way that would let 
them be in their Being. Moreover, average solicitude reduces communicating 
to ‘idle talk’ and treats other Daseins as merely present along Dasein in the 
world, occluding in this way the paramount role of others and otherness for 
Dasein’s constitution. Morally secure within communal norms and sets of rules 
set out according to the being it believes it is, Dasein drowns out its anxiety in 
the volume of idle talk and the speed of its curiosity. Avoiding anxiety makes 
Dasein’s own suffering invisible: the truly other to Dasein, then, is that which 
is most familiar, that is, itself. Dasein’s existence is rendered commonplace by 
the subjectivist assumptions held by the ‘they.’ The invisibility of anxiety 
reduces suffering to the occurrent, the recognisable, ‘real violence,’ as it were. 
Other Dasein are also reduced to occurrence or presence, and rendered 
voiceless in the endless transmission of things of interest. Additionally, the 
non-communal other, and his suffering, remains voiceless.
Questioning ethics, then, reveals a tension between the affirmative nurturing 
and socialisation provided by one’s own ethos on the one hand, and that which 
the ethos makes inaudible, namely, the suffering and the very voice of the 
other. Ethics, located within normal and habitual behaviour, is deaf to the 
suffering and voice both of alterity and of Dasein’s Being. In this way, ‘[t]he 
interruption of ethics provides an opening to hear what is inaudible in our 
ethos.’45 Is there a way to hear from within the ethos, a way to render the ethos 
open to the voice of the other? Can suffering be made audible without an 
isolation from one’s own group and customs? How, moreover, can Dasein’s 
own anxious self be acknowledged? Finally, how can the ethical self be 
recovered without a severance of Dasein from its identity-giving ethos?
45 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 178.
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2. Hearing and silence
Calling ethics into question, it was suggested above, might create an opening 
for Dasein to hear the other’s voice and confront its own suffering. How might 
conventional morality be questioned, however? ‘[D]o we create the opening by 
wilfully moving beyond our situation and even beyond ourselves? Or do we, 
from the beginning and unknowingly, stand in the opening which is granted?’46 
The discussion of the call of conscience, outlined in the previous chapter, and 
particularly, a recent modification to it suggested by Stephen Mulhall, might 
offer a way to make the other’s and Dasein’s own suffering audible and enable 
Dasein to be called to its mortal possibility. Mulhall proposes that the call of 
conscience, which is the way in which Dasein confronts its radical 
contingency, ought to be voiced by a third party, quite plausibly, a friend.47 For 
Heidegger, the call comes within Dasein and yet from beyond it, signifying in 
this way that the voice of conscience ‘does the calling.’ This apparent 
indeterminacy ‘does not justify seeking the caller in some entity with a 
character other than that of Dasein,’ since the call of conscience is only 
ontologically possible because the Being of Dasein is ‘care’ (BT, 321).
Mulhall proposes that the call has to come from an authentic friend, one who 
by his example shows Dasein that its everyday way of being is not proper to it. 
The authentic friend has already differentiated herself from the they-self and 
Dasein witnesses this. The authentic friend does not mirror Dasein in its 
actions and, thus, withholds the affirmation which the ‘they’ usually grants 
Dasein for its perpetuated absorption in average comportment. Furthermore, 
the friend does not accept any inauthentic relation with Dasein. Thus, the 
‘undifferentiated mass of the they’ is disrupted: ‘[f]or Dasein could mirror 
another who exists as separate and self-determining, and who relates to others
46 Henry G. Golz, Plato and Heidegger: In Search o f  Selfhood (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
University Press, 1981), 301. Is authenticity, in other words, predicated on a notion of ‘grace’?
47 ‘If that capacity [to become-proper] is genuinely repressed, how can it possibly speak out? If 
it can, its repression must have already been lifted; but it is just that lifting, that transition from 
inauthenticity to authenticity, which the call of conscience is supposedly invoked to explain.’ 
For Mulhall, the external source of the call is a requirement of coherence of the account 
provided by Heidegger. See Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 130, brackets added.
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as genuinely other, only by relating to her as other and to itself as other to that 
other.’48 The mode of existence that the friend exhibits helps Dasein 
appropriate its own life properly. Rather than vocalising the call, the friend 
disrupts Dasein’s lostness in the ‘they’ by example. Her very mode of 
existence awakens ‘otherness in Dasein itself; Dasein’s relation to that other 
instantiates a mode of its possible self-relation (a relation to itself as other, not 
as self-identical).’49 The mimetic processes by which Dasein is socialised in the 
‘they’ lend some support to Mulhall’s contention: the proposal concurs with 
the phenomenal attribute of the call of conscience is ‘silent’ and recalls, 
moreover, that the notion of ‘catching-up’ with other Daseins is part of Being- 
with (BT, 164). This type of ‘mimetic competition’ involves Dasein in 
catching-up with the friend. Once an opening is made by this type of 
inauthentic catching-up, then Dasein’s own capacity to hear might be 
enhanced.50 Furthermore, this kind of mimetic competition unwittingly shows 
Dasein that its everyday existence is not proper to it and inaugurates the 
struggle of becoming-proper within Dasein. Catching-up is embedded within 
the ‘they’ and, thus, illustrates that the turning away from ethics suggested 
above can indeed be made an integral part of the identity and nurturing 
processes that Dasein’s ethos entails.
This still does not address the question of how Dasein can hear the call, even if 
voiced by a friend? The problem might not be the source of the call as such 
but, rather, the inability of Dasein to recognise itself as inauthentic while 
immersed in the ‘they’: Tacking any conception of being other than it is, 
Dasein conflates its existential potential (Seinskonneri) and its existentiell 
actuality, and represses its uncanniness.’51 If, as Mulhall concedes, the lostness 
in the ‘they’ arises primarily from Dasein’s inability to recognise itself as lost,
48 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 133.
49 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 133. The notion of mimesis involved in Mulhal’s 
modification, is attuned to the ‘problematic of attestation’ required by Heidegger in which ‘a 
proper existential possibility of Dasein is shown in an existentiell manner’ (BT, 34).
0 Does this ‘catching-up’ comply with the need for the call to be perceived by Dasein ‘not in 
some external and superficial way’ but as the means of revealing that becoming-proper is a 
necessity grounded in Dasein’s existence? See Francois Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, 
trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1998), 226.
51 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 133. Uncanniness translates Unheimlichkeit which 
might be better understood as homelessness see (BT, 233, n. 3).
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then the chances of hearing the call, irrespective o f its source, are limited. 
Thus, the voicing of the call by a friend is not in itself sufficient to rouse 
Dasein from its absorption, nor does it offer any guarantee that the call will 
penetrate through Dasein’s immersion in the ‘they.’ The friend would have to, 
as it were, ‘create the conditions for her own audibility.’52 The ability to hear, 
then, has to be understood as a stepping away from ‘idle talk’ into silence, to 
which we turn next.
The ‘conditions of audibility’
I  could not speak, 
and my eyes failed, I  was neither 
Living nor dead, and I  knew nothing, 
Looking into the heart o f light, the silence.
T.S. Eliot53
In what way, then, can the ‘conditions of audibility’ be improved and how 
could the transformative process begin by which one’s own ethos might open 
up to otherness and suffering? Is all that is required, ‘a simple ontological [or 
otological?] operation, a small puncture through Dasein’s ears so that it could 
for a moment at least escape the deafening sounds of “they” drowning out the 
question of (its) Being’?54 Yet, Dasein’s absorption and fascination with others 
and publicness is rooted in its ontological structure as Being-with others.
Heidegger traces such a possibility to the existential structure of discourse. 
‘Hearing is constitutive for discourse,’ he notes, because the ability to listen 
discloses authentically that Dasein is Being-with others (BT, 206). Having 
more than a disclosive function, moreover, ‘[listening to...is Dasein’s 
existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others’ (BT, 206, emphasis 
added). ‘Da-sein hears because it understands. As being-in-the-world that 
understands, with the others, it “listens to” itself and to Mitda-sein, and in this
52 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 133.
53 ‘The Waste Land,’ in T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land and Other Poems (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1998), 34.
54 Rudi Visker, Truth and Singularity: Taking Foucault into Phenomenology (Dordrecht, NL: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 31, brackets added.
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listening it belongs to these.’53 Hearing is an aspect of Dasein’s attuned 
understanding that highlights its thrownness: Dasein is bom into discursive 
relations, so to speak, but it is specifically ‘listening to’ which enhances the 
coexistential character of existence. As Heidegger notes, ‘Being-with develops 
in listening to another’ (BT, 206). Dasein’s heteronomous constitution is made 
concrete through hearing; Dasein lives according to its heteronomy when it 
listens to the other. When ‘Dasein is, or rather exists, hearingly’ it is brought 
into communion with itself as Being-with.56
Yet, what could make Dasein hear out of its lostness? The possibility for 
hearing is related to keeping silent, because silence ‘is another essential 
possibility for discourse’ (BT, 208). Indeed, Bestegui argues, silence ‘seems to 
occupy a.. .privileged position’ in Heidegger’s thought, and is regarded as a 
pivotal link in the relationship between discourse and otherness.57 ‘In talking 
with one another, the person who keeps silent can “make one understand” (that 
is he can develop an understanding) and he can do so more authentically than 
the person who is never short of words’ (BT, 208). In this regard, ‘[kjeeping 
silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing’ because ‘[t]o be 
able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say -  that is, it must have at 
its disposal an authentic and rich disclosure of itself (BT, 208). In this way, 
silence cannot be associated with an inability to speak, or be considered ‘a 
negation nor a privation’; on the contrary, silence should be thought of as ‘a 
positive possibility, indeed speech in its most proper sense.’58 As with hearing, 
with which silence is aligned, ‘silence is essentially Mitteilung, communicating 
and sharing’ because ‘[i]n silence, Dasein has an ear for the Other, it is “all 
ears,” as it were.’59
As a constitutive part of discourse (logos), hearing belongs to everyday 
comportment in the world; yet, through hearing ‘Dasein is open, disclosed to
55 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation o f  Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996), 153.
Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1997), 
149.
57 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 148.
58 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 148.
59 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 148-149.
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itself, to the world and to others in the most authentic way.’60 Hearing, then, 
‘constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being -  as in hearing the voice o f the friend whom 
every Dasein carries with-it’ (BT 206, emphasis added). This is an extremely 
important passage, as it is the only one in Being and Time that makes this 
explicit reference to the other-as-ffiend, carried within, carried as otherness ‘in 
the mode of a voice, a purely phonic presence.’61 Such a ‘phonic presence’ is 
not uncanny or ghost-like but ought to be understood as constitutive for Dasein 
as a speaking being. As Jacques Derrida remarks, ‘[t]his voice is an essentially 
understandable voice, the possibility of speech or discourse.’62
The sort of presence invoked in Heidegger’s quote is not representational in 
the pure sense of the word. ‘Through its voice that I hear, I hear the friend 
itself, beyond its voice but in that voice’; it is almost an echo of Dasein’s 
withness, where ‘I hear and carry the friend with me in hearing its voice... 
Dasein carries it, one might say, in the figure of its voice, its metonymic 
(figure) part of the whole.’63 It is a reminder that otherness is not external, as 
that from which Dasein distinguishes itself. Dasein has no choice with regards 
to its relation to otherness because, as Being-with, Dasein carries its otherness 
within it. Relations can be only thought of as voluntary on the basis of an 
ontological account of subjectivity which denies and obliterates Dasein’s 
heteronomy and refutes the other’s constitutive role in Dasein’s world. The 
other-as-ffiend whose voice Dasein carries within it, is the specificity of this 
otherness, while at the same time it is Dasein being made aware of the 
internalisation of otherness. ‘What defines “the voice of the friend,” then, is 
not a quality, the friendly characteristic, but a belonging.’64 In this regard, the 
belonging also says more about the constitution of Dasein, its internal relation 
to otherness that is part and parcel of its thrownness, than about the friend, who 
is there as a voice to be heard without choice within Dasein:
60 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 149.
61 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 149.
62 Jacques Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV),” in John Sallis (ed.), 
Reading Heidegger: Commemorations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 175.
63 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 164.
64 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 174.
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Through its voice, Dasein carries the friend with it, whether it wishes to or 
not, whether it knows it or not, and whatever its resolution. In any case, what 
m atters here is not what the friend’s voice says, not its said, not even the 
saying o f  its said. Hardly its voice. Rather what m atters is the hearing {das 
H oren) o f  its voice.65
The ear to which the hearing refers, however, does not point to the organ ‘ear’ 
but alludes instead to ‘the ear of and for one’s self,’ attuned not to some inner 
life but the disclosedness of Dasein as projected outward and ahead of itself, 
‘its very ek-sistence.’66 It is what renders the familiarity of one’s own ‘self 
strange. It is significant for becoming-proper that the voice, which Dasein 
carries within it, is the voice of the other-as-ffiend: ‘this hearing could not 
open Dasein “to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being,” if hearing were not first 
the hearing of this voice, the exemplary metonymy of the friend that each 
Dasein bears close to itself (bei sich tragt).’67 Beistegui too insists that 
propriety and silence are related, because ‘silencing reveals existence to itself, 
a call that can only be heard in the withdrawal of language.’68
Listening to the other, however, need not only have positive connotations. As
Heidegger explains, it ‘can be done in several possible ways: following, going
along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and
turning away’ (BT, 206-207). Similarly, there can be assumed no a priori
positivity about the voice of the other, as Derrida confirms, ‘[t]he voice is not
friendly, first because it is the voice of a friend, of someone, of another Dasein
responding to the question “who?”’69 And yet, this is embedded in a different
kind of positivity, which pertains to all modes of hearing. The incessant
relation between discourse, hearing, and otherness encompasses opposition,
resistance and the possibility of turning away: as Derrida suggests ‘there is no
essential opposition betweenphilein and Kampf.’70
The negative modes could still determine the hearing o f  the voice o f  the 
friend. To be opposed to the friend, to turn aw ay from  it, to defy it, to not hear
65 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 164.
66 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 149.
67 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 164.
68 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 150.
69 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 174.
70 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 176.
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it, that is still to hear and keep it, to carry with self, sich bei tragen, the voice 
of the friend.7'
The crucial question, however, is whether the friend is used in those passages
as any other interchangeable example [‘why not sister, brother, father,’ asks
Derrida] or whether the concept of the friend is in itself crucial to audibility
and propriety. Could it possible that
exemplarity functions here in another sense, not in the sense of an example 
among other possible examples but of the exemplarity that gives to be read 
and carries in itself all the figures of Mitdasein as Aufeinander-hdren1? All the 
figures of Mitsein would be figures of the friend, even if they were 
secondarily unfriendly or indifferent.72
In the space created by silence and hearing there is a possibility of 
reformulating the ethos so that it is open to otherness, to the internal and 
permanent recollection of the voice of the friend, which Dasein carries with it. 
‘[B]y developing what one would call an ontology of friendship or an 
ontophilology, Heidegger seems to provide the space for a rethinking of 
ethics.’73 Silence ‘makes dangerous the values by which we give ourselves 
common lives and establish the rules within which we are constituted,’ and
71 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 176.
72 Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 176.
73 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 151. It can be argued that the connection between 
silence, hearing the other in Dasein, and ‘ethics’ is not sustained in the later thought of 
Heidegger, where the emphasis on Dasein is relinquished and substituted with an emphasis on 
epochality (history of Being). This neo-Hegelian insight asserts that ‘each historical epoch is 
based upon a fundamental metaphysical stance the determines how things shows up for human 
beings in that epoch,’ writes Herman Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” Inquiry 42 (1999), 440. 
See also Robert Bemasconi, Heidegger in Question: The Art o f  Existing (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1993), chapter 9. The withdrawal and oblivion of Being, which the later 
Heidegger thought described the present epoch ‘is deaf to the appeal of suffering,’ because, 
‘nowhere in the call of Being is the cry of the victim to be heard, nowhere the plea for mercy, 
the summons for help,’ writes John D. Caputo, “Heidegger’s Scandal: Thinking and the 
Essence of the Victim,” in Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (eds.), The Heidegger Case: 
On Philosophy and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 277. Heidegger’s 
abandonment of worldly Dasein and its projective thrown ‘resoluteness’ found in his early 
work is partly responsible for Heidegger’s own silence about the holocaust. Within the later 
approach of the history of being, ‘there is no call of conscience, no response that says “guilty,” 
and so there are no victims. There is/it gives (es gibt) only the epochal shifts which have fallen 
into an escalating history of oblivion from eidos to Technik.’ Caputo, “Heidegger’s Scandal,” 
278. So, for the early Heidegger, silence is a positive possibility, the only way Dasein can be 
be-with others in a proper way, while, years later silence is an escape for Heidegger from the 
Holocaust and the ‘greatest blunder,’ as he called his rectorship of the University of Freiburg 
during 1933. Beistegui writes in this regard, ‘[o]ne might wish, then, to hear the silent voice of 
Heidegger sympathetically, as if echoing the almost imperceptible moan of his victims. One 
would like to understand this silence as memory and mourning, as if language, wounded and 
bruised, had found refuge only in the inner ear of thinking. Yet the meaning of Heidegger’s 
silence lies elsewhere: not in memory, not in mourning, but in a lack and failure of thinking
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instigates the questioning of morality.74 In the wider silence of Being/time 
Dasein’s ‘reticence [ Verschwiegenheit] makes something manifest, and does 
away with “idle talk’” (BT, 208). Thus, ‘[h]earing in this silence [of 
Being/time] is finding oneself in the question of ethics.’75
3. Recovering the ethical self
The above exploration suggested that the voice of the friend, exemplary of 
otherness, is carried within Dasein. However, Dasein’s flight from the most 
fundamental otherness, its own, renders it deaf to the cry of the other. The 
conditions of audibility might be enhanced when ‘idle talk’ (Gerede) is 
interrupted, perhaps by the example of a friend and, in the space of this 
suspension, there is silence, in which the voice calls Dasein into question and 
is heard. Heard in silence, the voice is a genuine communication and enables a 
‘wrenching motion,* by which Dasein recoils from its inauthentic practices and 
‘puts itself in question by the values it holds.’76
Heidegger’s critique of morality as a product of the ‘they’ reveals that
becoming-proper involves a ‘twisting free,’ not only from traditional ways of
life but also from conceptions of selfhood which are not proper to it. What
becomes interrupted in the radical recoiling movement is not the worldly
relations Dasein has with others, but rather, the understanding of its existence
in terms of subjectivity and self-sufficiency. The recoiling movement enables
an understanding of propriety as the placing of oneself in question, of
questioning the adequacy of thinking of oneself as a subject:
Heidegger thinks in the interruption of the meaning of our lives by the mortal 
possibility of living and finds in owning the being’s interruption of our lives 
we may disown the theoretical and existential sufficiency of our selves for 
defining our being or ability to be.77
itself,’ Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 152-153 and David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: 
Heidegger and Life-Philosophy {Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 138-142.
74 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 111.
75 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 110, emphasis added.
76 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 217, n. 4.
77 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 100.
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Therefore, becoming-proper is tantamount to becoming-other or strange to 
oneself.78 This estrangement leads to a self-relationship where otherness is not 
only ‘accounted for’ (in the philosophical sense of other minds) but it is what 
Dasein becomes and how it relates to itself. Once this process is set into 
motion, Dasein’s heteronomy is made apparent to it, enhancing in this way the 
possibility of listening to ‘the voice o f the friend whom every Dasein carries 
with-it’ (BT, 206).
Thus, the turn away from ethics is entailed in Dasein’s own ‘destructive 
retrieve,’ where its selfhood is placed into question. Moreover, through 
sustained critical engagement with the shared past of its tradition, Dasein is 
able to discern its own Tactical’ and ‘repeatable possibilities,’79 which are 
worthy of reconfiguration, but also to distance itself from possibilities that 
obscure its ability-to-be (Seinskdnnen). Seen in this light, the movement away 
from ethics brings Dasein to face itself as being-guilty-as-the-basis-of-a- 
nullity, and effects an act of disclosure of the difference between Dasein and 
its tradition: ‘the call itself discloses not the power of an ethos but the 
difference of human being, in its being, from traditional ways of life.’80
To find oneself in the ‘question of ethics,’ to use Scott’s phrase, is to attempt a 
recovery of the ‘ethical’ self, which is open to itself as strange and to the voice 
of the other as always within it. There is no choice to hear otherness once 
Dasein embarks on this process of self-estrangement.81 The process of attaining 
this ‘ethical’ kind of selfhood is not universal but unique to each struggle, its
78 For a Freudian account see Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, trans. Roudiez, Leon S. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 191-192 and in International Relations, see 
Vivienne Jabri, “Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations,” 607-609.
79 Factical refers to the possibilities within Dasein’s concrete situation. The phrase ‘repeatable 
possibilities’ is suggested by Peg Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal 14, no. 2 - 15, no. 1 (1991): 25-45.
80 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 106.
81 ‘Choice is at the heart of ethics, but our choices are never entirely free.’ Ken Booth, Tim 
Dunne, and Michael Cox, “How Might We Live? Global Ethics in a New Century,” Review o f 
International Studies 26, Special Issue (December 2000), 1. The difference with the 
presupposition that choice always informs ethical decisions is that the recovery of the ethical 
self is not about this or that choice because these issues would be determined within the 
specific factical context. The recovery of the ethical self involves a ‘turn away from ethics’ in 
which customary moral practices are deconstructed: recovering ethnicity is about opening up 
and remaining within the ‘question of ethics’ aware that any factical momentary choice is 
contingent.
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achievement is never assured nor static; we cannot phenomenally speak of 
‘completion’ because what is defining of authenticity is the effort to achieve 
it.82 The struggle, the ceaseless movement towards propriety can be thought, 
Walter Davis argues, as ‘the “ethical” relationship one is living toward 
oneself.’83 Such a recovery is inextricable from the struggle with one’s self 
towards a modification of one’s impropriety. Thus ‘the ethical’ is not 
determinate or universal; on the contrary, it is particularist because it refers to 
‘the primary relationship which underlies all the positions and attitudes one 
adopts toward the world.’84 How one relates to others on the basis of this self­
relationship is not given in advance nor can it be collectively dictated since this 
would mean a fall into the ‘they.’ In the absence of the relationship one 
resolutely assumes towards one’s own existence, it is impossible to have any 
appropriate relationship towards others.
Of course, it can be argued that this self-relationship is not ethical in any 
common sense of the word but ontological. In the ‘Letter on Humanism,’ 
Heidegger refers to ethics as the dwelling in the nearness of Being.85 The term 
ethos is modified with propriety in mind86 so that it now ‘means abode, 
dwelling place. The word names the open region in which the human being 
dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to the essence of the 
human being, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear.’87 
There might be an intimate relationship, therefore, between ‘propriety’ and 
something like ‘ethicity,’ which is, according to Derrida, that which makes 
ethics ‘ethical.’88 The movement to authenticity is ‘ethical’ then in the sense
82 See Walter A. Davis, Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity in/and Hegel, Heidegger, 
Marx, and Freud (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 142.
83 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 113.
84 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 113.
85 See Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism (1946),” 269 and Scott, The Question o f Ethics, 143- 
147.
86 It can be noted that the later Heidegger no longer speaks of authenticity as a process to be 
achieved by Dasein but speaks of regions of Being. See Michael E. Zimmerman, Eclipse o f  the 
Self: The Development o f  Heidegger’s Concept o f  Authenticity (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1986) and Charles B. Guignon, “Heidegger’s “Authenticity” Revisited,” Review o f  
Metaphysics 38 (1984): 321-339.
87 Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism (1946),” 269.
88 Thus, ‘ethicity’ refers to ‘the essence of ethics,’ see Robert Bemasconi, “Justice without 
Ethics?,” PLI: Warwick Journal o f  Philosophy 6 (1997): 58-69 and Jacques Derrida,
“Passions: An Oblique Offering,” trans. David Wood, in Jacques Derrida, On the Name
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 3-31.
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that it indicates a struggle expressive of a self-relationship which brings Dasein 
to reside closer to its Being. In this way, Dasein’s genuine appropriation of its 
heteronomous existence, the relationship it sustains with itself, might be 
compared to Michel Foucault’s Heidegger-inspired ethics as ‘a practice; ethos 
is a manner of being.’89 The ethical self, then, would embody its propriety 
towards its finite being as a techne tou biou, or a technology of the self.90 Only 
on the ground of such a self-relationship can an ‘ethical’ attitude arise towards 
other beings. It is only on the ground of itself as finite transcendence and 
unique appropriation of historical possibilities that the authentic Dasein can 
ask the ethical question ‘who am I; what shall I do?’ and find an answer in its 
concrete situation. This is also the view of Scott, that ‘Dasein’s temporal and 
mortal movement, its Vorlauf.\ would then be the basis for the way we design 
our lives.’91
4. Rethinking the need for rules ofproper conduct
The recovery of the ‘ethical’ self, it was mentioned above, refers to the 
‘ethicity of propriety,’ where propriety is the self-relationship which enables 
Dasein to be take up its heteronomy properly, and to hear the voice of 
otherness that it carries within it. Does this necessitate the relinquishment of 
ethical construction as inauthentic, as a remnant of a subjectivist ontology? 
Could not the ‘ethicity of propriety* form the basis for minimalist ethical 
construction? This possibility of utilising the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self as a 
ground for ethical construction is examined below.92
89 See Michel Foucault, “Ethics and Politics: An Interview,” trans. Catherine Porter, in Paul 
Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 377.
90 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: Overview of Work in Progress,” in Rabinow 
(ed.), The Foucault Reader, 343.
91 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 98.
92 ‘Ground means: possibility, basis, account’ writes Heidegger adding that ground is 
inseparable from transcendence: See Heidegger, “On the Essence o f Ground (1929)”, 131.
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On the impossibility of a renewed ethical foundationalism
There is a tension between the affirmative nurturing associated with the 
socialisation processes of a communal ethos and impropriety of the average 
intelligibility, which these processes result in, so that the voice of the outsider 
and of Dasein’s own anxiety in the face of its own Being, become inaudible. 
One cannot ‘do away’ with ethos, since the averageness it generates is 
constitutive for Dasein’s totality of meaning; socialisation is intimately 
connected to ‘belonging,* as Jean-Luc Nancy notes, and ‘there is nothing 
sentimental, domestic, or “community-oriented” about wanting to say we. It is 
existence reclaiming its due or its condition: co-existence.’93 Acknowledging 
that ethics is embedded in ethos, Scott wonders whether it would be possible to 
maintain ‘a limited field of nurturance...a structure that shows itself 
differently, that shows itself to be outside time and outside ethnic suspicions 
and conservative provinciality’ and, at the same time, delineate on the basis of 
it ‘a field of laws and principles, that brings with it, into time, indications, 
more than hints, but patterns that point to a transtemporal circumscription of 
the writhing, belligerent interplay of ethea,’94 Such a field of nurturing would 
effectively maintain the identity-giving and norm-creating characteristics of 
the local while, at the same time, attempt to provide a minimalist set of 
principles that would restrain its resistance to otherness and render it open to 
the influence of alterity.
What is at stake in Scott’s suggestion, then, is the possibility of universalising 
the recovery of the ethical self out of a specific ethos. Below, four related 
arguments are examined as to the impossibility of renewing a universalism 
‘grounded’ on the recovery of the ethical self. A first argument would be to 
recall the conditions under which universalism is possible, and specifically, its 
connection to foundationalism. For Hermann Philipse, Scott’s suggestion for 
minimal ‘indications’ for ethical conduct can be taken as merely another ‘stage 
in the historical development of ethical foundationalism.’95 If this is indeed so,
93 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Being-With,” trans. Iain Macdonald, Centre fo r Theoretical Studies 
Working Papers, no. 11 (1996), 1.
94 Scott, The Question o f  Ethics, 145.
95 Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” 456.
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what is the ultimate ground on which these principles would be based, and 
does not such a search for foundation, in and of itself, ‘lead to an infinite 
regress unless there are first principles of ethics that are so secure that further 
justification is not needed’?96 If one contests ‘the idea that there is supreme 
moral truth from which rules of conduct could be deduced,’ then a renewed 
foundationalism becomes untenable.97 Andrew Linklater has recently 
suggested from a self-styled universalist position, that ‘the possibility of 
occupying an Archimedean standpoint which permits objective knowledge of 
permanent moral truths which bind the whole of humanity is a claim’ that not 
only has been repeatedly contested but that contemporary theorists ‘are correct 
to deny.’98
Second, could Dasein’s ‘ethical’ openness to otherness, seen in its ‘self- 
relationship,’ serve as this foundation for the universal construction of rules? 
Could one rely, in other words, on the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self as ‘some 
kind of ontological commitment’ to act as a basis for construction?99 The 
answer is most likely negative, since it would require that Dasein be ascribed a 
substantive essence. In chapter five, the impossibility of Dasein having an 
essence was discussed extensively in the discussion of Being-toward-death and 
Dasein as Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity. The essence of Dasein’s propriety is 
not permanence, but an abyssal structure which can never act as ground: ‘in 
such a structure, which is a non-fundamental one, at once superficial and 
bottomless, still and always “flat,” the proper-ty (propre) is sunk.’100 Dasein’s 
groundlessness arrests the foundationalist drive from instantiating itself in an 
ultimate ground: this could only be Dasein’s self-relationship, the content of 
which is that Dasein has no ground, and in becoming proper, it comes to terms 
with this groundlessness and into communion with itself as strange. What 
Dasein has, rather, is a disposition towards itself (it is ready for anxiety) and
96 Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” 456. This question is asked in IR in Brown, ‘“Turtles all 
the way down’.”
97 Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” 468.
98 Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political Community, 48.
99 Cochran asks the same question with respect to international ethics in Cochran, Normative 
Theory in International Relations, 204.
100 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles/Eperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, trans. Barbara 
Harlow, English-French Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 117.
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solicitude towards others. As such, it cannot form the foundation that this kind 
of ethical construction requires. ‘Nothing would be more violent or naive,’ 
writes Derrida, ‘than to call for more ffontality, more thesis or more 
thematization, to suppose that one can find a standard here.’l01 Authentic 
Dasein is not an answer in the form of a ground, but a struggle towards 
propriety, which is but an awareness that its Being is an question for it, that it 
is itself questionable.
Third, universalising the insights gained in the recovery of the ethical self,
moreover, is rendered particularly untenable when one considers that
ontology can provide ethics...only with formal indications of the general 
characteristics of human existence. In turn, the practical disciplines can be of 
help to human action only indirectly by providing a rough outline of the 
practical sphere in question that has to be interpretively concretized in the 
historical situation of one’s own existence.102
The role of fundamental ontology is not to dictate explicitly how one ought to
act by constructing ethical rules, rather it ‘frees the individual for his self-
reflection.’103 When, just after the Second World War, Jean Beaufret asked
Heidegger why he had hesitated in constructing an ethics, Heidegger’s reply
could only be that ‘the question was essentially unanswerable.’104 The
responsibility of philosophy was to induce thinking, but not to impose
restrictions or conditions of an ontic nature, as if these were generalisable to
each and every factical situation. As Hans-Georg Gadamer notes
[h]ow can it be the task of a philosopher to construe an ethical system that 
proposes or prescribes a social order or recommends a new way of molding 
morals or general public convictions about concrete matters?105
Ethical judegements can only be taken on the basis of the factical situation and 
its specificity. Moreover, as was noted above with the examination of ethos,
101 Derrida, “Passions,” 11, emphasis added. O f course, the refusal of foundationalism involves 
its own universal claim about the ‘universal questionability of philosophical grounds,’ Horace 
L. Fairlamb, Critical Conditions: Postmodemity and the Question o f  Foundations (Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7.
102 John van Buren, “The Young Heidegger, Aristotle, Ethics,” in Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. 
Scott, and P. Holley Robert (eds.), Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental 
Thought (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 178.
103 Martin Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jasper’s Psychology ofWorlviews (1919/21),” trans. 
John van Buren, in Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 1-38, cited and translated in van Buren, “The Young Heidegger, Aristotle, Ethics,” 178.
104 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Political Incompetence of Philosophy,” in Tom Rockmore and 
Joseph Margolis (eds.), The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1992), 366.
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ethical norms ‘involve processes of human learning and socialization that are 
already under way, forming an ethos, long before people confront the radical 
questions associated with philosophy. “Ethics” presupposes a lived system of 
values.’106 Whatever assistance on how to live one’s life ethics might desire to 
provide, it can never replace reflection about and in the factical situation by 
which already existing rules of conduct are interpreted. To answer the question 
of ethics with, even a minimalist, codified morality is to ignore that 
codification can only be understood as embedded and socialised into a group 
ethos which resists the ‘imposition of outside influences’ or at best interprets 
them on the ground of its ethos. To claim that rule-making could lie outside 
one’s own ethos, outside of a historical and factical situation, would be to 
assert that morality requires a kind of reasoning based on logic which everyone 
is capable of.107 It is to suggest that reasoning is not embedded within local 
practices but is universal, but this might indicate an ethnocentric outlook 
disguised as universalism.108
Fourthly, it is worth noting that both foundationalism and universalism are
called into question by the general philosophical crisis in which ethical
theorising finds itself. As Philippe Lacaoue-Labarthe notes, ‘[t]o speak of
doing wrong presupposes that there exists an ethics, or at least that an ethics is
possible. Now it is probably the case today that neither of these conditions is
fulfilled.”09 In this regard, ethical contruction
also suffers from the general exhaustion of philosophical possibilities and 
manifestly cannot claim to stand outside that exhaustion except at the cost of a 
certain blindness towards it and its origin: how and from where could one 
philosophically get back beyond Heidegger’s delimitation of ethics and 
humanism?110
105 Gadamer, “The Political Incompetence of Philosophy,” 366.
106 Gadamer, “The Political Incompetence of Philosophy,” 366.
107 Nielsen, “Ethical Relativism and the Facts of Cultural Relativity,” 544.
108 Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism and Exoticism in French 
Thought, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 32.
109 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction o f  the Political, trans.
Chris Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 31. See also Brown, ‘“Turtles all the way down’,”
215-218.
110 Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics, 31. His argument is targeted against 
Emmanuel Levinas’s insistence that ethics escapes ‘the end of philosophy’ and ought to be 
‘first philosophy.’
205
The ascription of a substantive content to the ethical self and the attempt to 
universalise it is a return to philosophical humanism whose possibility is 
limited by the exhaustion of philosophy’s own possibilities. What has been 
called the ‘end of philosophy’111 refers not only to ‘end’ as having reached 
exhaustion or culmination, or even to its goal, but also to the understanding of 
philosophy as a finite undertaking.112 It is not possible to encompass universal 
ethical construction in a philosophy of the limit, such as Heidegger’s 
phenomenology of Dasein, which recognises not only the facts of cultural 
relativity but that an ahistorical and foundational approach towards proper 
conduct cannot but fail to do what it is intended to achieve: make the other’s 
voice audible and act in ways which do not occlude the heteronomous facticity 
of existence.
The impossibility of a renewed universalfsm, however, brings into relief that 
what currently exists is but ‘an urgent plea for a universal morality.’113 Yet, it 
is questionable whether a set of universal principles could, indeed, bring about 
a transformation of local ethe and provide a design for inter-ethical interaction. 
There is no assurance that what has been inaudible in one’s ethos will not be 
equally or more starkly so if voiced in ways not able to be captured or 
accommodated by codified norms. The preceding discussion considered that 
the ‘ethical’ self cannot provide the new foundation nor can its comportment 
within the factical situation be universalised. Such a refusal directs the present 
inquiry towards the possibility of disposition or sensibility towards the other, 
coming full circle to revisit coexistence as an ‘ethics’ radically re-determined. 
This, moreover, has wide ranging implications not only for the ontological 
basis of coexistence in IR but also for ethical discourses of IR in their efforts to 
confront and respond to the limitations of universalist and foundationalist
111 Martin Heidegger, The End o f Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1972), especially the essay entitled “Overcoming Metaphysics,” 84-110.
112 See David Campbell and Michael Dillon, The End of Philosophy and the End of 
International Relations,” in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), The Political Subject o f  
Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 5.
113 Nielsen, “Ethical Relativism and the Facts of Cultural Relativity,” 545. This notion of a 
plea is slowly also being heeded in International ethical theorising. See Ken Booth, for 
example, who articulates, it seems, a similar plea for universality: ‘not because we are human, 
but to make us human.’ Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” 52, and also Molly Cochran, who writes in 
a similar vein ‘There may be a hope for a principle to have a range of applicability, a degree of
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thought, called into question in the current crisis of Enlightenment thinking. As 
Linklater has noted in this regard, the conversation that IR ethical theories 
sustain with their critics open up the very possibility of ‘a radically improved 
universalism.’M4 The turn to disposition examined below, forms an affirmative 
path within the Enlightenment ethos, in which most IR ethical theorising is 
located, in that it is a measured response to the unworking of the modem 
subject by the phenomenological attentiveness to the facticity of existence; it is 
a response which heeds, more than ever, the desire to hear the voice of the 
other that does not pursue an ethical project which unwittingly obscures its 
very object of concern.
5. The ‘ethical* self*s disposition: liberating solicitude
What is proper to Dasein, then, has little to do with the moral norms and rules 
of the community in which Dasein is thrown or, more importantly, rules 
grounded on a universalised understanding of propriety. There is no standard 
of what an ‘authentic’ human being ought to be, but rather a conception of 
propriety that is linked to the struggle to render audible the voice of otherness, 
which Dasein already carries with it. Nonetheless, a mediation amongst 
‘belligerent ethea,’ which ethical construction wishes to restrain, is still 
desirable in a world of value plurality and inter-communal conflict.115 As was 
noted above, the notion of the ‘ethical’ self proposed above can be understood 
as an opening to alterity which constitutes the very ‘ethicity’ of any ethics. 
Dasein’s awareness comes from seeing that its ground is nothingness, that it is 
the basis-of-a-nullity, having no ground but thrownness and no other 
transcendence but a plunge towards the world. Becoming-proper is a constant 
recovery of its world as relational totality, within which relationships with 
others become re-evaluated in their own facticity and thrownness. The 
recovery of silence and hearing, resulting from the questioning of ethics, brings
universality beyond the context of the situation from which it arises...’ Cochran, Normative 
Theory in International Relations, 206.
114 Linklater, The Transformation o f Political Community, 48.
115 See the essays in Maria Lensu and Jan-Stefan Fritz (eds.), Value Pluralism, Normative 
Theory and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
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Dasein to face itself as ‘singularity of the self that knows itself as opening to 
alterity,’116 a knowledge which arises from an awareness of itself as other. As 
Jean-Luc Nancy insists that ‘[singularity...installs relation as the withdrawal 
of identity, and communication as the withdrawal of communion.’117 The 
ontological disposition associated with the ‘ethical’ self suggests ‘that human 
being can be thought in terms of the clearing or space that it makes for Being, 
for world, for the realms and regimes of “truth” or manifestness, for the 
plurality of cultures.’118 This disposition is none other than what Heidegger had 
called ‘liberating solicitude.’
Liberating solicitude is, according to Heidegger, one of the two radical 
manifestations of solicitude, discussed in chapter four. On the one hand lies the 
situation when Dasein’s solicitude ‘take[s] away “care” from the Other and 
puts itself in his position in concern: it can leap in for him’ (BT, 158). But this 
kind of solicitude does not facilitate the process by which the other uniquely 
appropriates its shared world and confronts it own mortal facticity. Liberating 
solicitude, on the other hand, ‘pertains essentially to authentic care -  that is to 
the existence of the other.. .it helps the other to become transparent to himself 
in his care and to become free for it’ (BT, 159). Only the solicitude which 
‘leaps forth and liberates’ allows the other to embark on her own struggle and 
become-proper. Through this proper kind of comportment ‘I call the other to 
face his own anxious self-responsibility.’119 It is important to note, however, 
that liberating solicitude does not only assist the other to face her own Being as 
care but, furthermore, it is the precondition for the other to become transparent 
to me as ‘for who he is’ as a whole.120 John Caputo has argued that in this 
conception of interaction with alterity can be found ‘an ethics of otherness’
116 Christopher Fynsk, ‘Foreword: Experiences of Finitude,’ xiii.
117 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience o f Freedom, trans. Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 68. This singularity is different from individuality which ‘equated 
identity with sameness,’ Noel O’Sullivan, “Postmodernism and the Politics of Identity,” in 
Kathryn Dean (ed.), Politics and the End o f Identity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 234. Being 
singular only occurs in its concrete relation to others.
118 John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1993), 127.
119 Vogel, The Fragile "We”, 75.
120 Vogel, The Fragile "We”, 82.
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based on humility and compassion.121 It is through such a liberating and 
disclosive solicitude, that Dasein may recognise others in their own 
groundlessness. Liberating solicitude, far from being a paternalistic attitude 
towards the other, is the comportment by which Dasein shares the other’s 
basis-of-a-nullity and comports to the other Being-with.
As the ‘ethical’ self s disposition, liberating solicitude is able to penetrate a 
particular factical situation, even if this crosses the boundaries of another 
community. Similarly, it allows for the other to do the same because it involves 
the ‘recognition of the claim of others who, from beyond “our” horizon, call 
into question the parochialism of our tradition insofar as it does not speak for 
them and who demand that we include their perspectives in the effort to 
understand ourselves.’122 Such a disposition
does not involve a subordination of self and others to a common standard that 
would provide a decision-procedure telling anyone what he ought to do in a 
particular situation; rather, it involves an attunement to the particularity of 
others, to others as truly other, stemming from an awareness of the singularity 
of one’s own existence.123
This is not an impersonal and anonymous perspective but an ‘interpersonal
orientation motivated by one’s desire not to incorporate others into “the
universal” but, rather, to “let others be” in their freedom for their own
possibilities and to allow one’s self-understanding to be informed by theirs.’124
The ‘ethical’ self implies the withdrawal of identity based solely on the
nurturing ethos in which Dasein is primarily and initially socialised and thus
can sustain ‘a form of coexistence in which one remains attentive to others as
centers of transcendence and possibility who are never subsumed by the public
projects in which they happen to be absorbed.’125
121 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic 
Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 258-259.
122 Vogel, The Fragile " We ”, 70. Vogel’s account places this disposition in a deconstructed
notion of the moral conscience which transforms the ontological insight into a moral
mechanism. This, however, should be treated with caution. I retained only the useful 
examination of solicitude as a disposition, which can be employed without Vogel’s account of 
the moral conscience.
123 Vogel, The Fragile “We”, 70.
124 Vogel, The Fragile " We ", 71. See also David Campbell and Michael Dillon, “The Political
and the Ethical,’ in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), The Political Subject o f  
Violence, 167-168.
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Beyond its reduction to the composition of otherwise unrelated subjects, 
coexistence can be sustained and renewed by the disposition of liberating 
solicitude, which does not subsume the other into its sameness but calls him 
out to her own Being. The ‘ethical’ self liberates the other, not by awarding 
him personhood and accompanying rights, but by calling him to face his own 
heteronomy and groundlessness as Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity. The liberation 
comes precisely from the unworking of modem subjectivity and the 
‘releasement’ from a kind of selfhood which is predicated on the denial of 
heteronomy. This is an active letting-be, a releasement to one’s own Being, in 
which genuine coexistence might be found.126
6. Conclusion
Following the exposition of the optics of coexistence, this chapter brought it to 
bear on ethical selfhood, engaging in a ‘destructive retrieve’: ethics, 
understood as ethical constmction was called into question and its meaning 
was both subverted and expanded. The linguistic trajectory of the word ethos, 
from which ethics is derived, showed it to arise through processes of 
habituation within distinct, customary ways of life and to be embedded within 
habitual and average behaviour. Analysed through Heidegger’s discussion of 
the ‘they,’ ethics is revealed as implicated in the processes of socialisation and 
conformity which are nurturing and even constitutive for Dasein as an entity 
whose Being is Being-with. However, these average processes are inauthentic. 
The intelligibility which arises from these processes of socialisation is not 
appropriate to Dasein as Being-in-the-world: they comfort it into considering 
itself as subject, and relating to things in the world as objects and to the other 
as merely occurrent. More importantly, however, they help Dasein flee its own 
anxiety in the face of its Being, which is an indication that its Being is an issue 
for it. As an integral part of the socialisation of Dasein into the ‘they,’ ethics is 
implicated in the lostness of Dasein and fails to hear the otherness which
125 Vogel, The Fragile " We ", 71.
126 Polt, “Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger’s Beitrage zur Philosophies 657.
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permeates Dasein’s heteronomy. Therefore, the call to self-propriety entails 
within it a turning away from ethics as we know it.
As a ‘retrieve,’ however, the optics of coexistence also led to a ‘recovery of the 
ethical self,’ understood as a stance of heteronomous selfhood ‘which knows 
itself as opening to alterity.’127 This ‘ethical’ self cannot be utilised as the 
foundation for instantiating the will to universalising morality. It cannot serve 
as a ‘deconstructed’ but reasserted ground for ethical construction; rather, it is 
a kind of selfhood, which is the at the very heart of the ‘ethicity’ of ethics.
There are a number of wide ranging implications for ethical theorising brought 
to the fore by the questioning of ethics and the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self. 
Shown to be contained within an ethos, to be a community’s own, ethics is 
disclosed as the codification and promulgation of particular practices and 
norms. It becomes clear, in this sense, that any claim to the universal must 
travel through the particular. Universal aspirations for specific codes remains, 
then, little more than a plea. For the normative literature of International 
Relations, whose initial and primary attempts at ethical theorising are 
dominated by universal theories aimed at global issues, this contextualisation 
places such attempts within their particularist, almost exclusively Western, 
locations. Although, universalism (seen most prevalently in the articulation of 
human rights) is regarded as suitable for a discipline with global concerns, it is 
argued that universalisation of the customary may indeed prove to be a 
crippling and harmful response to those global issues. Calling ethics into 
question -  making it, in other words, questionable is more likely to benefit IR 
ethical theorising. For, far from limiting their resonance with global concerns, 
the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self is but a different, more attuned, response to 
the plea of audibility from the other.
The recovered ‘ethical’ self can neither provide a renewed foundation to fill 
the space left by the unworking of modem subjectivity, nor can its 
comportment within any concrete situation be universalised. Yet this double
127 Fynsk, ‘Foreword: Experiences of Finitude,’ xiii.
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prohibition directed the present inquiry towards the articulation of disposition 
or sensibility towards the other whose possibility might as yet exceed the 
‘ethicity* of ethics. For the ethical discourses of IR, this could become a path 
in their efforts to work within the limits (not limitations) of Enlightenment 
thought, at its margins. The turn to disposition is, then, a response befitting an 
awareness of the limit, which abides by the ‘destruction* of the modem subject 
by the phenomenological attentiveness to the facticity of existence; it is a 
response which heeds, more than ever, the desire to hear the voice of the other 
and witness its suffering, and pursue no ethical project which unwittingly 
obscures its very ‘object’ of concern. The recovery of the ‘ethical* self as a 
disposition has, thus, also come full circle to think coexistence as an existential 
sensibility of a heteronomous being who is aware of its disclosive role for itself 
and the other. In this regard, liberating solicitude is more than an empathy for 
the other; it is a caring-for (in the sense of Fiirsorge) which calls the other to 
his own anxious Being-in-the-world and lets her assume her fundamental 
mortal possibility.
For coexistence in IR, furthermore, this has destabilising repercussions because 
the unworking of the modem subject is taken a step further with the 
elaboration of the ‘ethical’ self, not as a replacement of the modem subject, but 
precisely not as its replacement: a decentring occurs with the ontological 
consideration of a groundless self whose Being-with, manifested in its 
solicitude to others, places heteronomy at the centre of coexistence. The 
solicitude of the ‘ethical’ self constitutes the very ethicity of what is ‘ethical’ 
such that coexistence becomes the manifestation of the ‘ethical.’ Furthermore, 
the recovery of an ‘ethical’ selfhood participates in and is equi-primordial with 
a de-centring the self-sufficient subject of politics, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, and opens up the space for considering the notion of a politics o f non- 
self-sufficiency.
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Chapter 7
Worldly Realms: Political Selfhood and 
Communal Constitution Beyond Composition
nothing guarantees that the very concept o f politics should retain
any validity in this context whatsoever.
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe1
The exposition of ‘ethical’ selfhood explored in the previous chapter argued 
that the ‘ethical’ self becomes open to, and ‘embodies,* its innate otherness by 
cultivating silence and hearing. This ‘openness to alterity’ is crucial for the 
task of this final chapter of the thesis, which examines the impact of the 
recovery of ‘ethical’ selfhood on political coexistence and communal 
constitution as such. The ‘ethical’ selfs acknowledged coexistential 
heteronomy informs, it was suggested, a disposition of liberating solicitude 
towards others and this can be said to facilitate coexistence with others, where 
their own alterity is at the forefront: liberating solicitude assists other Dasein to 
embark on their own process of propriety.
Returning to the claim that subjectivist ontological presuppositions restricted 
coexistence to a ‘logic of composition,’ it can now be suggested that the 
recovery of the ‘ethical’ self renders untenable political theoretic accounts 
about coexistence available to us within the discursive horizon of modem 
subjectivity. It effects a shift away from the determination of certain categories 
of modernist political discourse, which parallels the ‘turn away from ethics’ 
undertaken in the previous chapter. This concluding chapter suggests, 
therefore, that the consideration of the optics of coexistence and the recovery 
of an ‘ethical’ selfhood brings about a hermeneutic shift away from modem 
political subjectivity that, at the same time, calls for a rethinking of the ways in 
which coexistence might be theorised beyond co-presence. Since the ‘logic of 
composition’ becomes untenable through the unworking of modem
1 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Typography (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 267.
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subjectivity, coexistence is rethought through three trajectories, which are 
representative of the levels of the argument. The first path, refers to Thomas 
Hobbes’s account in order to demonstrate how Hobbesianpolitical subjectivity 
is unworked (abbauen) by the rethinking the phenomena of fear, violent death, 
and self-interest that are constitutive of the contractarian imaginary, an 
imaginary which is an exceedingly pertinent example of the logic of 
composition. The second trajectory considers how the constitution of 
‘community’ or collectivity might be rethought, if it is no longer to be reduced 
to the composition of non-relational units. Finally, the third trajectory indicates 
how this conception of communal constitution and belonging contributes to the 
discipline of International Relations as it finds itself in an era of ‘global 
transformations. ’2
1. Unworking Political Subjectivity: toward non-self-sufficiency
Can one think through a politics o f nonselfsufficiency? That is, as one will 
want to say, a politics o f dependence or interdependence, o f
heteronomy or heterology?
Jean-Luc Nancy3
Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan has shaped the political imagination for a 
substantial period in political inquiry and, more specifically, international 
relations. Since Hobbesian political theory had served as an example of the 
‘logic of composition’ in chapter two, his account of the subject is again 
utilised here as an extreme exemplar of the modem configuration of 
subjectivity.4 Juxtaposing selected insights of the ‘optics of coexistence’ with 
the Hobbesian construction both illuminates the ways in which 
phenomenological investigation can ‘unwork’ political subjectivity and also 
reconstructs an account of political non-self-sufficiency that is informed by the 
recovery of ‘ethical’ selfhood and, therefore, that is attuned to the 
heteronomous constitution of existence. The analysis is limited to the
2 See David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
3 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense o f the World, trans. Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), 111.
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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phenomena of fear/anxiety, death/finitude and interest for the sake of brevity, 
but even in such a limited way, it illustrates the hermeneutic shift away from 
the categories and terms of modernist political discourse, and allows for the 
possibility of rethinking coexistence concomitant to a non-self-sufficient 
political selfhood.
The ethos of survival and the will to security
The claim that Hobbes founded an intellectual tradition of modem liberalism 
known as ‘possessive individualism,’5 or that he is ‘one of the ancestors of 
technological rationalism’6 is by now well argued in social and political 
philosophy. The theoretical articulation of early modem subjectivity in terms 
of danger, fear and survival was illustrated in detail in chapter two but it is 
worth recalling some of these earlier discussions to demonstrate the unsettling 
effects that the recovery of the. ‘ethical’ self has on it. The Hobbesian 
configuration of subjectivity links anxiety and death (in the form of the 
‘anxious anticipation of death*) to an external source, the other-as-enemy. 
Enmity becomes omnipresent and ‘structural,’ in the context of the state of 
nature. The other-as-enemy is not truly other, it is not in other words 
considered as alterity because he is gathered into the fold of the same by 
Hobbes’s account of human nature, where otherness mirrors sameness. Both 
reflect the quarrelsome disposition of man, his search for glory, and material 
security. Otherness is as knowable to the modem subject as itself: the 
Hobbesian theoretic constmction achieves the equivalence of the Other with 
the Same.
The ontological premises of the Hobbesian account are hinged upon the 
occurrentness (substance or, in Heidegger’s idiom, presence-at-hand) of 
entities, which enables Hobbes ‘to structure his accounts of the human mind
5 C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory o f  Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 
cited in Fred R. Dallmayr, “Hobbes and Existentialism: Some Affinities,” in Fred R. Dallmayr, 
Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Phenomenology o f  Politics (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 120.
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and of society.’7 While the account of the primacy of conflict in the state of 
nature might be understood to signify some sort of initial relationality with 
world and other, upon reflection it becomes apparent that the political-theoretic 
intention of this primacy is precisely the opposite. It suggests the impossibility 
of ‘civil’ relationality prior to regulatory government, reducing, in this way, 
coexistence to the sum of merely present, non-relational entities. In the pre- 
social state of nature of Leviathan, the other serves to generate a suspicious 
and pessimistic heterology, where the fearful anticipation of death renders 
survival as the primary responsibility of the self, which chapter two called ‘the 
ethos of survival.’ Death is to be avoided at all costs: in order to prevent 
violent death, understood as the self s demise, the subject rationally (that is, in 
recognition of its interest) agrees to a Covenant by which he gives up all his 
rights (except the right of self-preservation) for the safety provided by the 
Leviathan. There is a reiterative process of self-control and self-mastery at 
work here and its theoretic result is an account of socio-political interaction 
where ‘civil society... [is considered] the result less of natural inclination than 
of design and planning.’8 Therefore, the configuration of the Hobbesian subject 
around security and self-control usefully results in a theory of controlled 
interaction.9
The agreement of the self-instantiating, self-present and self-sufficient subject 
to collectively relinquish its rights through a social contract indicates a desire 
to secure itself against want and need. The subject ‘wants to be untroubled, 
safe, and settled,’ expressing a will to making-secure. The other is encountered 
as co-present by a self imbued with natural right and reason, yet who is, 
paradoxically, furnished with an unsociable nature. Onto otherness is 
transferred part of this problematic and an othering process assigns the other 
(and every other) as enemy, as dangerous and fearsome, until man’s natural 
reason breaks through and brings about the creation of a civil commonwealth.
7 John McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 135. William Connolly argues that 
the modem outlook of Hobbesian political theory can only be grasped via an examination of 
his ontological commitments, William E. Connoly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1988), 18.
8 Dallmayr, “Hobbes and Existentialism,” 123, brackets added.
9 Connoly, Political Theory and Modernity, 21-33.
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The displacement of fear with disclosive anxiety
If this brief reminder of Hobbes’s reflections on the subject is juxtaposed with 
Heidegger’s account of Being-toward-death, there occurs a disruption of the 
constellation of anxiety, death and self-interest. Viewed from the perspective 
of the coexistential ‘ethical’ self, who becomes proper through an increasing 
awareness that otherness is not only constitutive for its everyday self, but it is 
always already carried within it, the subject’s desire to secure itself against 
want indicates that the modem subject ‘wants to cover over its very being as 
needy, as Darbung.’10 In this vein, John Caputo suggests that ‘it is because 
factical life is disturbed by everyday concerns,’ because its Being is an issue 
for it, ‘that it seeks to “secure” itself against want’; the Hobbesian subject’s 
will to making-secure arises from the need to ‘look whole not privatio. . .as if it 
were without care, sine cura, secure -  even though that very desire for security 
is itself a (deficient) mode of care [Sorge].iU Hobbesian subjectivity, it has 
already been suggested, has a right to the world: man’s natural right results in 
the creation of a perspective on the world as possessed and authored by the 
subject. This perspective denies an understanding of Dasein’s Being as care 
and its ground as nothingness (in the sense of Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity). 
The subject conceals the anxiety induced by its thrownness and lack of ground 
by conceiving of the world as a state of nature, whose structural conditions and 
the presence of widespread enmity lead to the extemalisation of anxiety about 
its own Being. This making-secure serves to illustrate the suppression of 
anxiety in the Hobbesian subject’s ‘warre of all against all.’
When Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety is brought to bear on the Hobbesian 
schema, it becomes evident that it is confused, or better still conflated, with the 
phenomenon of fear. Anxiety, Heidegger insists, cannot be confused with the 
phenomenon of fear as, arguably, occurs in Leviathan. Heidegger agrees that 
‘obviously these are kindred phenomena’ and their confusion or conflation is 
further complicated ‘by the fact that for the most part they have not been
10 John D. Caputo, “Heidegger’s Kampf” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14, no. 2-15, 
no. 1 (1991), 67.
11 Caputo, “Heidegger’s Kampf” 67.
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distinguished from one another: that which is fear, gets designated as 
“anxiety,” while that which has the character of the anxiety, gets called 
“fear”.’12 While fear is an affect which corresponds to something in the world 
which is fearsome, and becomes more so as it approaches Dasein, what 
Heidegger designates as ‘anxiety’ has no concrete worldly referent. 
‘Anxiousness as a state-of-mind [attunement] is a way of Being-in-the-world; 
that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that 
which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Thus 
the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in- 
the-world’ (BT, 235). Anxiety is generated from the general constitution of 
Dasein as care and as being-thrown, which causes Dasein to flee from itself 
constituted as such. ‘In falling, Dasein turns away from itself. That in the face 
of which it thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character 
of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the one that shrinks 
back: it is Dasein itself (BT, 230). It cannot, then, be fear that guides Dasein’s 
falling, for fear is that affect which ‘comes from entities within-the-world.’ 
(BT, 230)
The conflation of anxiety and fear in Hobbes, results in the causal attribution 
of anxiety, which is related to Dasein’s constitution as ‘care’ (Sorge), to 
otherness. In seeking an external referent, fear is displaced towards the other. 
The encounter of the other-as-enemy and the assignment of fear to the other 
can be understood, then, within the framework of Dasein’s inability to accept 
itself as the basis of a nullity, as Being-toward-Death. Othering is disclosed as 
an inauthentic response to Dasein’s own Being in an attempt to externalise the 
anxiety that emerges from Dasein’s finitude and groundlessness and direct it to 
otherness. The heterophobia found in Hobbes’s reworking of early modem 
subjectivity is shown to be displaced from anxiety about Dasein’s thrownness 
and care for its Being to the other. The assumption that fear/anxiety is the 
result of the omnipresent other-as-enemy, moreover, leads to a political theory 
where such fear/anxiety can be avoided through the right sort of regulation and
12 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), 230, thereafter cited in text as BT with the page number of this English 
translation.
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governance. ‘In the last instance,’ writes John Dunn, ‘humans’ political 
authority is a rational response to the overwhelming motivational power of 
human fearlfulness. It rests practically upon the systematization of the passion 
of fear.’13
Heidegger’s distinction between fear and anxiety, reveals that in Leviathan 
anxiety is transformed, from an affect disclosive of Dasein’s Being as ‘care,’ to 
fear of another. In the Hobbesian construction, the conflated fear/anxiety is 
always related to danger, and is thought to be induced by the other within the 
state of nature. Fear is displaced to an external other because there is no 
understanding of Dasein as ‘care.’ Anxiety is not traced to Dasein fleeing from 
itself, because in its inauthenticity, Dasein avoids a confrontation with itself as 
thrown and finite. Rather, fear/anxiety can only be seen by the Hobbesian 
subject as linked to its encounter with the other. The assumption of a 
completed self, which encounters the ‘world* and the other, distorts the 
disclosure of thrownness and care that anxiety can effect. In flight from its 
Being, the Hobbesian subject attributes its anxiety to fear of others. Leo 
Strauss argues that the institution of the commonwealth is possible because the 
subject realises that, not the other, but death is man’s common enemy; if this 
proposition is accepted, then it becomes apparent that what the subject ‘fears’ 
in the state of nature is its own mortality.14 It ‘fears,’ in other words, its own 
finite constitution within the world.
Contrary to such a fearful heterology, for Heidegger, being with others in the 
world is the initial and primary way Dasein finds itself. Anxiety serves a 
positive function because it brings to the fore the thrownness and falling of 
Dasein, and acts as a reminder that Dasein’s Being is an issue for it. For 
Heidegger, the other is neither the source of fear, nor an impetus to regulatory 
government as it is for Hobbes. On the contrary, the other is to be welcomed: 
rather than fearing the other as an enemy and distancing one’s self from him, 
personally or institutionally, Dasein seeks the safety of the other in the flight of 
its anxious Being: ‘what this tuming-away does is precisely to turn thither
13 John Dunn, The History o f  Political Theory and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 52.
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towards entities within-the-world by absorbing itself in them. The tuming- 
away of falling is grounded in anxiety, which in turn is what makes fear 
possible’ (BT, 230). The other delivers us from the unsettling experience of 
anxiety, and this ‘makes the other an inordinately sought source of comfort and 
support.’15 At the same time, however, the ‘they’ is the foremost manifestation 
of thrownness in the face of which Dasein flees, because, as Davis notes, ‘[t]he 
“they” is the most immediate issue of anxiety because anxiety and 
inauthenticity are virtually indistinguishable at the “origin” of experience.’16
Therefore, the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self who disaggregates the reiterative 
processes of establishing certainty for a contingent self from fear for the other, 
can be seen as a political act of resistance enunciated in two movements. First, 
it denies political theory the justification of the othering process through fear 
and the preservation of life. Second, it disrupts the will to security by 
unravelling the constellation of anxiety and death which is part and parcel of 
the Hobbesian configuration of modem subjectivity.
The hermeneutics of finitude
As noted above, the consideration of finitude in terms of possibility and 
groundlessness also helps to rethink the role of death in Hobbesian 
philosophical anthropology. For Hobbes, it can be recalled from chapter two, 
death is equated with the body’s demise and is thought of as the end of life. 
Violent death is to be avoided at all costs, even if this entails the 
relinquishment of the subject’s natural will and right. Finitude, in this regard, is 
considered as the deprivation of life, as being-finished. Fear of violent death is, 
for Hobbes, the condition for the creation of the Commonwealth because it 
brings about the acquiesce of man to regulatory government. Heidegger, 
however, insists on a distinction between finitude, on the one hand, and the
14 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy o f Hobbes: its Basis and its Genesis, trans. Elsa M. 
Sinclair, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 22.
15 Walter A. Davis, Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity in/and Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, 
and Freud (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 119.
16 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 119.
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death of Dasein as its biological end, on the other.17 For Heidegger, and as 
noted in chapter five, death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. This 
interpretation denies that the phenomenon of finitude can only be understood 
as physical demise. ‘Finitude is not the being-finished-off of an existent 
deprived within itself of the property of completion, butting up against and 
stumbling over its own limit.’18 The distinction drawn between the biological 
end and the ontological understanding of finitude enables the utterance, 
perhaps contrary to a more commonplace understanding of death, ‘[f]initude is 
not privation.’19 In denying death as privative, the existential analytic reveals 
the phenomenal content of finitude as a possibility which is one’s ownmost, 
non-relational and unsurpassable. In this way, it relates finitude not to the ‘end’ 
but to a radical contingency, a lack of certainty, which is Dasein’s ground. 
Thus, regulatory government cannot mitigate against finitude understood in 
this way. It is merely a spectral postponement, a concealment of the lack of 
ground through action.
The phenomenological investigation of finitude brings about an understanding
of finitude as possibility, which disrupts fear of violent death and, moreover,
also dispels thinking in terms of essence. Jean-Luc Nancy suggests in this
regard that ‘“death” = the nullity of essence,’20 the invalidation of which lets
existence be seen in all its contingency. By arresting the unfolding of essence
this conception of finitude allows existence to come forth undetermined. ‘In
other words, toward death would mean toward life, if “life” did not refer too
simply to the contrary of death.’21 Since death is Dasein’s possibility it allows
Dasein to be understood as the Being which is determined by its relationship
with its end, and which always and from the start carries its death, as its
unsurpassable possibility, with it. In this vein, ‘finitude’
should therefore be attributed to what carries its end as its own, that is what is 
affected by its end (limit, cessation, beyond-essence) as its end (goal, 
finishing, completion) -  and is affected by it not as a limit imposed from
17 See Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 26.
18 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, 29.
19 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, 29.
20 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, 32.
21 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, 32-33.
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elsewhere...but as a trance, transcendence, or passing away so originary that
22the origin has already come apart there.
Unlike the Hobbesian problematic which theorises the regulation of relations 
aimed at the avoidance of violent death, it can be argued that Heidegger shows 
precisely that, *privation annuls itself, essentially’ while, ‘...finitude affirms 
itself.’23 The thought of finitude as possibility highlights, moreover, the 
contribution that a philosophy of the limit might make to a reconsideration of 
international political theory: it disrupts an understanding of death and its 
avoidance as the justification for contractarian theories, but also reverts the 
reduction of the political to the decision in the face of an ‘existential threat.’24 
Where the Hobbesian subject, as an inauthentic Dasein, suppresses its anxiety 
(by displacing it onto the other in terms of fear) in order to maintain its self­
certainty in the face of its radical contingency and embeddedness in the world, 
the ‘ethical’ self appropriates its anxiety and becomes ready for it, and for 
death as its ownmost possibility.
While for political theory ‘[Hobbes’s] teaching...remains to be overcome in 
fact* because ‘[o]ur way of regarding things political is still predominantly 
Hobbesian,’25 the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self provides a challenge to the 
determination of worldly phenomena in a Hobbesian manner. In addition to the 
unworking of political subjectivity, such a recovery primarily questions the 
pertinence, and encourages the relinquishment, of the inside/outside 
dichotomy, which is but a manifestation of the distinction between self and 
other. The recovery of the ‘ethical’ self shows the same to itself as other, and 
the inside does not need to guard itself against the outside: otherness is not 
only internal but pervasive. In this way, the predication of strands of 
international theory on a logic of composition sustained by a pessimistic
22 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, 31-32.
23 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, 30.
24 See, for example, Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f  the Political, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). It also provides a context where the ‘right 
to self-preservation’ might itself be rethought On this issue see Peg Birmingham, “Ever 
Respectfully Mine: Heidegger on Agency and Responsibility,” in Arleen B. Dallery, Charles 
E. Scott, and P. Holley Roberts (eds.), Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and 
Continental Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
25 Stuart Umphrey, “Why Politike Philosophia?,” in J. N. Mohanty (ed.), Phenomenology and 
the Human Sciences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 193.
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ontology and heterology can be challenged. This cannot be regarded as an 
outdated task because, as Mary Dietz, argues, Hobbesian political theory ‘is at 
least partly constitutive of the ways in which we continue to understand and 
describe our own political practices,’26 particularly as regards the framing of 
the non-relational subject of politics, the other-as-enemy, and the theoretic 
right of self-preservation. In the following section ‘interest’ is examined as a 
central term of political subjectivity related to both fear and death in the 
Hobbesian configuration of the self-sufficient subject of politics.
From self-interest to care
How do subjects of modem politics interact with each other, how are their 
relationships manifested? In a contractarian conception of politics, such as the 
Hobbesian one, instituting and regulating ‘relation’ comes from the notion of 
‘interest.’ For a subjectivist understanding of politics, the notion of interest 
‘imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into 
the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of 
politics possible.’27 In addition to its being a lens through which the 
phenomena of politics become intelligible, the concept of interest and 
understandings of ‘political association’ are intertwined because the modem 
subject, which is ontologically non-relational, requires a connection through 
which sociability is expressed. In a non-relational conception of the ‘world’ of 
politics, the phenomenon of political relationality must be explicated with the 
aid of that which both institutes and regulates relation. As a requirement for the 
existence of relation, the notion of interest reconciles the subject to its 
sociability by bringing together the disparate phenomena of ‘sociation.’ The 
notion of ‘interest’ serves, therefore, not only to regulate relation or interaction 
but to also effect the relation of subject to subject, and subject to ‘political 
association.’ By relating and (interacting according to its own knowable 
interest, the subject receives both its regulative political connection to
26 Mary G. Dietz, “Introduction,” in Mary G. Dietz (ed.), Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 4.
27 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 5.
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otherness and also relationality as such. The distinct characteristic of the 
notion of ‘interest’ is, therefore, that it provides both a reason for and a 
blueprint to regulate association in politics, in the ‘absence’ of prior 
constitutive relationality, the concealment of which is brought about by the 
modernist understanding of subjectivity.
In this vein, Jurgen Habermas’s discussion of this distinctly modem 
conception of politics elucidated by modem social and political thought 
highlights that, with the advent of the modem subject, politics relinquishes its 
role in instructive socialisation, through which one learned how to cultivate not 
only the ways of customary participation in the communal space, but also how 
to properly conduct and improve oneself, in the sense of techne tou biou or 
technologies of the self.28 Politics, suggests Habermas, inevitably becomes the 
mere ‘regulation of social intercourse’ based on diverse interests.29 As a 
consequence, the self-interested decision to agree to a covenant can be seen as 
necessary in order to articulate the framework which constitutes and, at the 
same time, institutionalises relationships between subjects, as well as between 
government and subjects.
A shift from ‘interest’ to ‘care’ (meaning concern and radical embeddedness in 
the world) brings to the fore Dasein’s relationality, which is not reducible to, or 
dependent on, a calculus of interest. On the basis of its being as care, Dasein 
can admit its anxiety for its potentiality-for-Being (its Being-free for its 
possibilities) and for its thrownness as Being-in-the-world; Dasein can fully 
inhabit itself as ‘thrown projection’ (BT, 243). The notion of ‘care’ transforms 
the rational reflection of the modem subject and its subsequent calculations of 
interest: ‘[t]he “sum” [the I am] is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense 
that “I am in a world’” (BT, 254, brackets added). The ability to relate the ‘am’ 
as thrown in a world serves to condition the “I,” such that it understands itself, 
not in terms of interest but rather in terms of possibilities, of ‘various ways of
28 See Habermas, Theory and Practice, 43ff. Regarding the technologies of the self, see Michel 
Foucault, The History o f  Sexuality: The Care o f  the Self Vol. Ill (London: Penguin, 1988), 81- 
95, and Michel Foucault, “The Political Technology o f Individuals,” in Luther H. Martin, 
Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (eds.), Technologies o f  the Self (London: Tavistock, 
1988), 145-162.
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comporting myself -  namely, cogitationes -  as ways of Being alongside 
entities within the world’ (BT, 254). ‘[N]either does “care” stand primarily and 
exclusively for an isolated attitude of the “I” towards itself...“Care” cannot 
stand for some special attitude towards the Self (BT, 237).
Dasein’s ‘reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which 
one is ready for anxiety,’ known as resoluteness, cannot be understood as the 
ascertaining of one’s interest and acting according to it, as also argued in 
chapter five (BT, 343). Rather, resoluteness is a mode of Dasein’s 
disclosedness, ‘the disclosive projection of what is factically possible at the 
time’ (BT, 345). Resoluteness, then, can be thought of as the discovery of the 
factical situation, as distinct from the general situation known by the ‘they,’ a 
discovery which ‘brings the Being of the “there” into the existence of its 
Situation’ (BT, 347). Interest can be said to have a similar function for the 
Hobbesian subject, but unlike interest, resoluteness is not isolating or 
oppositional. It
does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes 
a free-floating “I”. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic 
disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-worlcH 
Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concemful Being-alongside 
what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others (BT, 
344).
Toward non-self-sufficiency
The politics of self-sufficiency is intimately linked to the logic of composition, 
since both rely on the modem subject’s posteriority of relation. One can go as 
far as to say that the politics of self-sufficiency is the discursive promulgation 
of the logic of composition, in other words, its political manifestation.30 
Therefore, the attempt to unwork a politics of self-sufficiency has at its core 
the achievement of Dasein’s recognition of its relationality to its world and 
others. It takes place through the concerted disruption of the characteristics of
29 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 43.
30 This does not hold in the case of David Campbell, whose work intends to transcend ‘self- 
sufficiency’ but retains, however, contractual elements which lend it coherence.
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modem subjectivity that permeate political discourse, prominent amongst 
whom are the notions of ‘fear,’ ‘death,’ and ‘interest.’
The ‘unworking’ of political subjectivity creates an opening or path toward 
non-self-sufficiency, which can now be defined as the desire or end which not 
only ‘accommodates’ heteronomy, but makes its disclosure possible. It allows 
heteronomy to be revealed as that configuration whose possibility is the 
shattering -  foundering and failure -  of the modem subject of self-sufficiency. 
The notion of shattering has both a symbolic and an interpretative function, in 
that it links Dasein’s propriety to the dissolution of the subject’s mastery. 
Proper understanding of Dasein ‘bends to the task at hand and risks “genuine 
failure”.’31 Dasein’s radical embeddedness in its world and its constitutive 
relationality, projecting its thrownness on possibilities proper for its 
heteronomous constitution, brings about ‘genuine failure’: it relates Dasein’s 
‘improper’ propriety to the shattering of the sovereign self and shows that 
where subjectivity was effortlessly posited, phenomenological examination 
finds heteronomy. Becoming-ready for anxiety shatters the becoming-secure of 
the subject. As David Farrell Krell explains, becoming-proper can be likened 
to foundering or to disintegrating. But upon such ‘failure’ of the will to 
security Dasein can take itself up as anxious and ready for its possibilities. 
‘Failure or foundering. Scheitern. Failure as a trembling or agitation to the 
point of disintegration. Erchutterung. In a word, shattering.’32 Failure to be a 
subject is the outcome of Dasein’s search for propriety, ‘[w]hose very 
genuineness, the genuineness of its understanding, guaranteed precisely insofar 
as it genuinely shatters.’33
How does this incessant unworking of political subjectivity, which aims to 
bring about its very shattering, affect thinking about coexistence as such? In 
the first instance, there occurs the dissolution of the legalist conception of
31 David Farrell Krell, “Shattering: Toward a Politics of Daimonic Life,” Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal 14, no. 2 - 15, no. 1 (1991), 156.
32 Krell, “Shattering: Toward a Politics of Daimonic Life,” 155. Krell notes that ‘Scheitern -  
foundering, failing, shattering -  appears regularly in Being and Time when it is a question of 
the methodological conduct of Heidegger’s own existential hermeneutic of Dasein,’ that is it 
brings to the reader’s attention the precarious nature of claims about Dasein.
33 Krell, “Shattering: Toward a Politics of Daimonic Life,” 157.
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communal constitution, of belonging and relationship, as well as the
mechanistic conception of social regulation, which Jurgen Habermas has
rightly termed a ‘physics of sociation.’34 Moreover, the reduction of
coexistence to an additive calculus of subjects, as occurs through the ‘logic of
composition’ is arrested. Coexistence beyond composition requires that the self
ceases to be determined in unitary terms. To reverse the commonly held notion
that interest-based decisions and agreements institute political relationality,
explaining in this way the emergence of civil society and government, radical
embeddedness in the world (Being-in-the-world) must be seen as primary, or at
least as co-appearing with formal ‘political association.’ When sociability itself
and the heteronomous self are shown to jointly appear, there can be thought a
‘comparition’ of the phenomena of coexistence:
Comparition must therefore mean...that “appearing”, that is, coming into the 
world and being in the world, existence as such, is strictly inseparable, 
indissociable from the cum, from the with, wherein it finds not only its place 
and its taking-place, but also -  and it is the same thing -  its fundamental 
ontological structure.35
With comparition, otherness also is allowed to show itself standing at the 
outset of selfhood, no longer requiring mechanistic concepts, such as interest, 
in order to be related to. In this sense, comparition might be thought as ‘the 
appearing to and with an other.’36 The disavowal of a politics of self- 
sufficiency, therefore, also aims to account for the simultaneous appearance of 
both relation and singularity. Reflecting on a politics of non-self-sufficiency 
Nancy notes that ‘[s]uch a politics consists, first of all, in testifying that there is 
singularity only where a singularity ties itself up with other singularities.’37 
This co-disclosed inherent plurality, or multiplicity, of singularity hopes to 
arrest a return to a subject-driven politics where, ‘politics considered as a real 
practice has always been taken to subserve (i.e. to originate and culminate in) a
34 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 72.
35 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Being-With,” trans. Iain Macdonald, Centre fo r  Theoretical Studies 
Working Papers no. 11 (1996), 18-19. See also, Jean-Luc Nancy, “La ComparutionTThe 
Compearance,” trans. Tracy B. Strong, Political Theory 20, no. 3 (1992): 371-398.
36 David Ingram, “The Retreat of the Political in the Modem Age: Jean-Luc Nancy on 
Totalitarianism and Community,” Research in Phenomenology 18, no. 1 (1988), 108.
37 Nancy, The Sense o f  the World, 112. See also on the multiplicity of being singular, Jane 
Flax, Disputed Subjects: Essays on Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 92-110.
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self-identical, self-sufficient, self-determining entity.’38 Non-self-sufficiency, 
then, is ‘an end that can serve double duty as ethical imperative commanding 
respect for others and existential condition securing the open endedness (of a- 
teleology) of political life.’39
In sum, the above discussion has illustrated the unworking of fundamental 
terms of the Hobbesian configuration of political subjectivity through a 
juxtaposition of Heidegger’s discussions of related or identical phenomena. It 
has been shown that anxiety, which is often confused with fear, has a 
disclosive function for Dasein’s own existence as thrown, whereas the fear of 
the other initiates an othering process which misdirects anxiety in the face of 
Dasein’s Being to the other. Finitude, moreover, is shown to be the self s 
ownmost possibility, an indication not only of mortality but of groundlessness 
and radical contingency. Comportment on the basis of care, finally, reveals the 
particularities of the factical situation into which Dasein is thrown but avoids 
the reduction of sociability and relationality to calculations of interest. Being- 
resolute, furthermore, on the basis of one’s Being as care, leads to a mode of 
comportment towards beings in the world which avoids the isolating and 
regulative effects of interest. The broader contribution of the recovery of the 
‘ethical’ self and the consideration of the optics of coexistence lies in 
illustrating the possibility of a hermeneutic shift away from the political 
manifestation of the modem subject as self-sufficient and towards the recovery 
of a politically non-self-sufficient self who takes up its radical relationality. 
The theoretic construct of the self-sufficient subject, and its relations of 
mastery over world and others, remains one of the main obstacles hindering the 
disclosure of the ‘irreducibly plural worlds’ in which the ‘ethical’ self finds 
itself.
Hermeneutic phenomenology, as understood by Heidegger, brings to the fore 
the subjectivist features of politics and makes their usage problematic. At the 
same time, it reveals possibilities, which had been hitherto obscured. This is
38 Jeffrey S. Librett, “Interruptions of Necessity; Being Between Meaning and Power in Jean- 
Luc Nancy,” in Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks, and Colin Thomas (eds.), On Jean-Luc 
Nancy: The Sense o f Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997), 123.
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the self-stated task of the deconstructive enterprise of political philosophy, 
which has called into question its own reliance on traditional categories of 
politics. What remains to be examined, however, is how this shift from the 
subjectivist discursive domain affect the ways in which coexistence is 
theorised?40 The ‘unworking’ of the modem subject and the recovery of the 
‘ethical’ self render the understanding of coexistence as co-presence untenable, 
and the challenge to the modem subject opens up the question how coexistence 
might be rethought. This question is posed explicitly during the second 
trajectory: on the basis of the reconsideration of these concepts, how a 
‘community’ or collectivity might be rethought if it is no longer to be reduced 
to the composition of non-relational units?
2. Coexistence and communal constitution through critique
The act of bringing about a hermeneutic shift in the terms of discourse is a 
political act that seeks to effect a change in the ways the world and entities 
within the world are to be understood: ‘every hermeneutical program,’ argues 
Stanley Rosen, ‘is at the same time itself a political manifesto or the corollary 
of a political manifesto.*41 Seen in this vein, the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self is 
political in the sense that it has weighty repercussions on the unproblematic 
usage of the modem subject in international political theory. Politically, then, 
‘[w]hat becomes of being-with when the with no longer appears as 
composition, but rather as dis-position?’; in what way is the primacy of 
relation to be theorised politically without the additive logic of composition of 
self-present and self-sufficient subjects?42 Furthermore, how can political
39 Ingram, “The Retreat of the Political in the Modem Age,” 107.
40 Stanley Rosen, “Political Philosophy and Ontology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 18, no. 4 (1958), 537. Of course, the persistence with delineating a politics entails a 
danger that these insights are appropriated by dominant subjectivist conceptions o f politics, 
such that their heteronomous aspects are dissolved. Slavoj Zizek argues, therefore, that rushed 
rearticulations on the basis of deconstructed notions ought to be resisted since they are likely to 
be determined by liberal ideology; ‘thesis eleven’ ought to be resisted. See Slavoj Zizek, Did 
Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use o f  a Notion (London: 
Verso, 2001).
41 It must be added that Rosen means this in a disparaging way. See Stanley Rosen, 
Hermeneutics as Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 141.
42 Nancy, “Being-With,” 5.
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praxis arise within fundamental ontology in a way that would bring to the fore 
Dasein’s thrownness and relationality? The recovery of the ‘ethical’ self is 
political, however, in another, more direct sense: it gestures towards a different 
understanding of coexistence and communal constitution, one which becomes 
available to political discourse following the unworking of the modem subject. 
Addressing itself to the ‘with,’ or the ‘together,’ beyond the ensemble, it 
suggests that collectivity can be understood to be constituted through the 
practice of ‘critical belonging,’ which attempts to escape the logic of 
composition. This suggestion is contentious on a number of grounds, however, 
which deserve some attention before the articulation of communal constitution 
below.
Deconstructed sociality: apolitical, pre-political, ‘too’ political?
There are three prominent contentions to the suggestion that one might usefully 
utilise the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self in order to articulate a means of 
communal constitution arising from it. The first argues that the unworking of 
the modem subject of politics leaves a ‘gap,’ a ‘ceasura,’ in political thinking 
which is not addressed in the hermeneutics of facticity one finds in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time. In the midst of a cottage industry about 
Heidegger’s Nazism, fuelled by historians and philosophers alike, it is 
sometimes easy to forget that the early reception of Being and Time held the 
view that it was largely an apolitical work. More recently, this reiterated 
concern arises not only from the lack of explicit discussions about politics in 
that work but it is grounded in the absence of a positive account of sociality to 
replace Heidegger’s ‘critique’ of the ‘they.’43 The everyday comportment of 
Dasein with others in public takes, as was discussed in chapter four, the form 
of the ‘they.’ While adhering to conceptions of itself as autonomous and 
sovereign subject, the nature of publicness occludes Dasein’s lostness in the 
‘they,’ its behaviour of conformity (even in breaking the norms generated by 
the ‘they’ Dasein asserts their hold over it), and the levelling-down of its
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possibilities through their convergence with the possibilities of the ‘anyone,’
resulting, in this way, into a generalised consideration of its ability-to-be
(Seinskdnnen). However, the critique of the ‘they’ has led a number of
commentators to suggest that ‘[i]n Being and Time, there is thus an especially
negative phenomenology of being-with, which at no point introduces a positive
phenomenology of political sociability.’44 As Dominique Janicaud argues,
[t]he fundamentally ontological turn given by Heidegger to the 
phenomenological project...reduces the rational city-dweller [of Aristotle] 
and the political space to the “they” and only leaves open an apolitics, an 
indeterminate and (in Hegel’s term) “abstract” authentic sociability, to Dasein 
concerned with its possibilities.45
The purpose of the articulation of the ‘they’ as the ontological manifestation of 
Being-with was to render strange the familiar accounts of man as subject, that 
is, as autonomous and rational, giving instead a phenomenological description 
of the everyday being of Dasein as indistinguishable from others. Heidegger’s 
account of the ‘they/ therefore, is an extensive criticism of humanism’s 
conception ‘of man as animal rationale, and hence on the basis of a 
preconceived notion of “nature” or “animality” or “objects”.’46 At the same 
time, Heidegger’s implicit critique sought to avoid reifiying the ‘they’ as a 
preferred ‘alternative’ to the subject.47 Nevertheless, according to Janicaud, the 
dismantling of the rational, reflective subject undertaken in Being and Time 
results in a lack of attention to political socialisation. Habermas largely 
concurs when he notes that ‘[attributing a merely derivative status to Mitsein 
(Being-with others) he [Heidegger] also misses the dimension of socialization 
and intersubjectivity.’48 While other accounts of modernity might corroborate
43 The term critique is placed in quotation marks because, although this is a widely held 
interpretation, for Heidegger the ‘they’ forms part of an ontological discussion of an existential 
structure, see (BT, 167).
44 Dominique Janicaud, The Shadow o f  That Thought: Heidegger and the Question o f  Politics, 
trans. Michael Gendre (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 39.
45 Janicaud, The Shadow o f  That Thought, 39-40. Robert Pippin avoids a directly political 
specification of this same issue, which he refers to as the problem of inter-subjectivity in 
Robert B. Pippin, “On Being Anti-Cartesian: Hegel, Heidegger, Subjectivity, and Sociality,” in 
Robert B. Pippin, Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 375-394.
46 Gail Soffer, “Heidegger, Humanism, and the Destruction of History,” Review o f  Metaphysics 
49 (1996), 548.
47 See chapter four, section 3, for a fuller discussion.
48 Jurgen Habermas, “Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controvery from a German 
Perspective,” trans. John McCumber, Critical Inquiry 15 (1989), 439, brackets added. The 
initial critique regarding intersubjectivity can be found in Michael Theunissen, The Other:
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this phenomenological description, in Heidegger, Janicaud claims, there is no 
‘rehabilitative’ discussion of political sociability to provide alternatives for 
political socialisation.
Michael Theunissen concurs with this critique when he writes that 
‘individualisation is supposed to make being-with-one-another possible, a 
being-with-one-another that, by comparison with the absorption in the They, is 
presented as authentic’; yet, this purported authenticity, Theunissen further 
argues, only means ‘[t]hat Dasein which is individualised down to itself has 
equally to be with Others is derived, purely formally, by Heidegger, from the 
circumstance that authentic being-self remains being-in-the-world and that this 
latter is still being-with.’49
The second contention disagrees with the first and proposes, instead, that the 
purported apolitical content has to come under closer scrutiny. Heidegger’s 
focus on practical comportment under the heading of ‘engaged immersion’ and 
his suggestion that rational and reflective relationships with the world and 
other entities subject are secondary might not be a sign of the apolitical 
character of his work. Miguel de Bestegui argues, instead, that the nature of the 
existential analytic might be better captured by the term ‘pre-political’ rather 
than ‘apolitical’:
If Being and Time is indeed apparently devoid of political views and opinions, 
if it displaces the terrain of the philosophical investigation in the direction of 
an analysis of being, or of the way in which things come to be present for 
Dasein on the basis of the way in which they are granted with meaning, it also 
acknowledges the essentially collective and historical dimension of human 
existence, prior to questions of organization of this being-in-common.50
Although ‘pre-political’ in a direct sense, James Ward suggests that, 
‘Heidegger is a political thinker if by “political” one means, in the manner of 
classical antiquity, the order of human things.’51 As a result, ‘the seeming 
apoliticality of the project of fundamental ontology cannot be settled so
Studies in the Social Ontology o f Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, trans. Christopher 
Macann (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984), chapter 4.
49 Theunissen, The Other, 189.
50 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1997), 11, 
emphasis added.
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easily.’52 The notion that the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self lies at some ‘pre- 
political’ level leads, however, to the question of whether it is at all amenable 
to an analysis of politics. It will suggested below that, indeed, it offers an 
understanding of how community might come to be constituted from a practice 
of critique with regards to the ethical self s tradition. First, however, the third 
and most serious contention deserves some discussion, namely, is the 
possibility for articulating an account of coexistence and communal 
constitution not impaired by the overly political, even nationalist, 
determination of the project of fundamental ontology by Heidegger himself?
At the most obvious level, Heidegger inserts the possibility of a political or
‘nationalist’ determination of Dasein’s co-historising when authentic Being-
with is determined in the now infamous paragraph 74 of Being and Time as
communal.53 Heidegger writes that,
if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with 
Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny 
[Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a 
people (BT, 436).
Why should Being-with be specifically determined in terms of a ‘people’ and 
what might this mean? A number of diverse opinions exist. Philippe Lacoue- 
Labarthe, for example, calls this determination ‘an ontic preference’ of 
Heidegger’s, arising presumably from his own political persuasions.54 Jurgen 
Habermas regards it to be a consequence of the way understanding and sense 
are connected to disclosure, which is, of course, collective. He considers that 
‘the historical destiny of a culture or society is determined by a collectively 
binding preunderstanding of the things and events that can appear in the world 
at all.’55 Beistegui, on the other hand, argues that the concept of historicality
51 James F. Ward, Heidegger’s Political Thinking (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1995), xviii, emphasis added.
52 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 11.
53 Simon Critchley calls this determination the ‘political fate of fundamental ontology and the 
Dasej/i-analytic.’ For Critchley, thinking about politics in the space opened by Being and Time 
would have to avoid the ‘autarchic telos and tragic-heroic pathos of the thematics of 
authenticity, where in Paragraph 74, Mitsein is determined in terms of “the people” and its 
“destiny”.’ Simon Critchley, Ethics - Politics - Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and 
Contemporary French Thought (London: Verso, 1999), 240.
54 Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 286.
55 Jurgen Habermas, “The Undermining of Western Rationalism Through the Critique of 
Metaphysics: Martin Heidegger,” trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, in Jurgen Habermas, The 
Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 132.
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(Geschichtlichkeit, Geschehen) is ontologically vague, which allows it to be 
‘from the start politically oriented.’56 And finally, Newell suggests that the 
apparent political orientation of Being-with in the language of the ‘people’ 
comes from Heidegger’s political philosophic ‘concern of how to achieve a 
cohesive community in a world increasingly dominated by the values of liberal 
individualism.’57 The identification with community is, however, what ‘gives a 
political orientation to Heidegger’s discussion.’58
Lacoue-Labarthe lends credence to Newell’s claim by suggesting that the 
concept of mimesis to be the ‘formidable unanswered, or unformulated, 
question that continually haunts Heideggerian thought.’59 Heidegger refuses, 
according to Lacoue-Labarthe, to examine the problem of identification, which 
is the ‘German political problem par excellence.’60 With regards to the 
manifestation of this problem in the 1930s in the form of National Socialism, 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue that there is a complicity or responsibility 
of German thought in the continued mythic response to this problem of 
identification:
[tjhere incontestably has been and there is still is perhaps a German problem; 
Nazi ideology was a specifically political response to this problem; and there 
is no doubt whatsoever that the German tradition, and in particular the 
tradition of German thought, is not at all foreign to this ideology.61
But, indeed, Lacoue-Labarthe subsequently wonders ‘[w]hy would the 
problem of identification not be, in general, the essential problem of the 
political?’62
Habermas dates the turn to Nazism, however, to 1929 noting that ‘from around 1929 on, 
Heidegger’s thought exhibits a conflation of philosophical theory and ideological motifs,’ 
Habermas, “Work and Weltanschauung,” 439. This amounts, for Habermas, to ‘the invasion of 
the philosophy of Being and Time by ideology,’ 441.
56 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 19.
57 R. N. Newell, “Heidegger on Freedom and Community: Some Political Implications of His 
Early Thought,” American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984), 783.
58 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 20.
59 Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 297.
60 Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 299.
61 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Nazi Myth,” trans. Brian Holmes, 
Critical Inquiry 16, no. 2 (1990), 295. Also, ‘it is because the German problem is 
fundamentally a problem of identity that the German figure of totalitarianism is racism... It is 
because myth can be defined as an identificatory mechanism that racist ideology became 
bound up in the construction of a myth,’ 296. See also, the discussion of Nazism’s revival and 
production of mythic identification, pp. 296-312.
62 Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 300.
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How is Dasein’s historical happening (its co-historising, in terms of its past 
possibilities) to be understood? An interpretation of it is essential in order to 
take a stance with respect to the claim that there is an unacknowledged process 
of mimesis, which casts the thought of being-with as community-bounded and, 
seen in light of the terror of the 1930s and 1940s, nationalistic. Chapter five 
has argued that Dasein’s facing its death individualises Dasein but does not 
turn it away from its thrownness in the world, it does not, in other words, 
revoke its constitution as Being-in-the-world. Beistegui notes that in 
anticipatory resoluteness ‘Dasein understands itself as this being which is both 
projected against its own end and thrown into a world.’63 Heidegger claims that 
the ‘resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current 
factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms o f the 
heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over* (BT, 435). David 
Couzens Hoy suggests that such a ‘taking over’ of inherited possibilities 
effects ‘a recognition of the compelling situation of the actual historical world’ 
and can lead ‘to an urgent commitment to what is most unique and individual 
about one’s way of being-there.’64 In other words, the ‘determination’ of 
historical being-there is always embedded in a historically situated public 
group -  Dasein is radically embedded in its world and this world is manifested 
publically and historically. The reference to community may not be, arguably, 
a theoretical commitment to an understanding of Gemeinschaft but might be, 
rather, a reminder of the historical manifestation of the worldliness of being- 
there.
While it is true that ‘[tjhrough anticipatory resoluteness, the “there” or the 
situation of Dasein is made transparent to Dasein,’ the actual choices or 
options which might follow from such an understanding are intentionally not 
discussed by Heidegger.65 Neither is speculation about them entertained, 
because a consideration of actual factical possibilities is not possible in the 
abstract: they can only be thought through by each particular Dasein finding
63 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 15.
64 David Couzens Hoy, “History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time," in 
Michael Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modem Philosophy: Critical Essays (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1978), 340.
65 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 15.
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itself in a factical situation. ‘If an ethics or a politics could indeed unfold from 
this fundamental existential constitution, Heidegger refuses to consider it. 
Dasein’s resoluteness remains empty.’66
And yet, the emptiness of resoluteness is but a step away from ‘the abyss of 
steely and volkish rhetoric.’67 A step which Heidegger takes, it seems, when he 
asserts that
[o]ur fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one 
another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. 
Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become 
free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its “generation” goes to make up the 
full authentic historizing of Dasein (BT, 436).
This can be, and has been, read as the emergence of nationalism in Heidegger, 
where the struggle of the community in its self-determination leads to a 
process of identification and mimesis. Such a reading would agree with 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s assessment of the unstated identificatory process at play in 
Being and Time and justify his concern that ‘[a]n unacknowledged mimetology 
seems to overdetermine the thought of Heidegger politically.’68
Alternatively, one could argue with Hoy that ‘[d]estiny {Geschick) and fate 
(Schicksat) are technical terms for Heidegger’ where ‘fate represents the way 
Dasein becomes definite and actual through its relation to events in the world’ 
and destiny ‘involves the essential connection of the individual to the 
community or a people,’69 But is it so easy to consider this determination of the 
‘with’ in terms of people a technical matter, a repercussion, so to speak of the 
primacy of relationality which dictates that ‘since Dasein is essentially in the 
world with others...and since Dasein is essentially fateful or historical it 
follows that Dasein’s fate is a co-fate and its history a co-history’?70 Is the 
content of this determination, in other words, inevitable? And is this ‘we,’ 
which is almost presupposed from the Being-with of Dasein, constituted
66 Because of the emptiness of anticipatory resoluteness Beistegui refuses to identify it ‘with 
the heroism and decisionism with which it has been often charged.’ Both quotes from 
Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 15.
67 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 16.
68 Lacoue-Labarthe, “Transcendence Ends in Politics,” 300.
69 Hoy, “History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time? 340-341.
70 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 17.
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authentically in the same manner as Dasein, that is, by confronting death as an 
ownmost, unsurpassable and unrelational possibility?
The question of this ‘we’ deserves some additional attention especially as to 
whether it mirrors Dasein’s becoming-proper through death. Briefly, the 
concern lies primarily with the possible contradiction that such a conclusion 
would have with the account of Dasein’s death. How can this be reconciled 
with ‘a passage from a particular and individual Dasein to one that is general, 
no less particular by virtue of its generality -  namely, one of German 
Dasein'T1 The reason for this concern emerges from the invocation of Carl 
Schmitt’s determination of the political in his monograph The Concept o f the 
Political where the ‘we’ is formed when its continued existence is threatened 
and upon which it is able to name another collectivity as the enemy.72 Indeed, 
Karl Lowith suggests that there is a correspondence between Heidegger’s 
being-toward-death and ‘Schmitt’s “sacrifice of life” in the politically 
paramount case of war.’73 Furthermore, does the co-historizing of Dasein, the 
passage from ‘one’s ownmost Dasein’ to a community, and later to a ‘German 
Dasein,’ not signify in a disturbing manner that the lm if (with) modifies ‘Sein’ 
(being), that the ‘with,’ in other words, is but a modification of that which is 
towards-death?
Despite the recent avalanche of writings on ‘Heidegger’s politics,’ not all of it 
is condemnatory. Amongst the numerous and diverse interpretations of 
Dasein’s co-historicality, David Wood suggests that ‘[t]he distinctive function 
played by destiny.. .is to provide a way of transcending the mere arithmetic 
addition of individual fates,’74 to transcend, in other words, the determination 
of coexistence through what this thesis has called the ‘logic of composition.’ It 
is important to note that Heidegger avoided any references to society
71 Karl Lowith, My Life in Germany Before and After 1933: A Report, trans. Elizabeth King 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 38.
72 Schmitt, The Concept o f  the Political, 33.
73 Lowith, My Life in Germany Before and After 1933, 32 and Karl Lowith, Martin Heidegger 
and European Nihilism, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 
160-161.
74 David Wood, “Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time,” in 
John Sallis (ed.), Reading Heidegger: Commemorations (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1993), 151.
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{Gesellschaft) because he believed that ‘society today is only the absolutization 
of modem subjectivity.’75 Indeed, Beistegui argues that the usage of 
community (Gemeinschaft) by Heidegger is made ‘as much in favour of a 
specific understanding of the nature of our being-in-common as it is made 
against the view -  associated with liberalism, capitalism and intellectualism -  
which articulates the meaning of communal life in terms of Gesellschaft and 
S taa tf6
Beistegui suggests that Heidegger’s statement that ‘[o]nly in communicating 
and in struggling does the power of destiny become free’ (BT, 436) could be 
understood as an explicit stance against a subjectivist conception of 
Gesellschaft.11 The term ‘community,’ therefore, is invoked to contest and 
problematise this ‘absolutization of subjectivity* through communication 
(Mitteilung) and struggle. Mit-teilung communicates that which is shared, 
which is itself ‘communicated through the sharing (Teilungf78; it is in this way 
that historically unfolds.79 Furthermore, Heidegger discusses struggle and 
sharing / communication, which form the internal contestation of community 
by its own members, in order to counteract the account of ‘idle talk’ with 
which the ‘they’ is said to drown all its communication.80 In the next section 
the question and charge of mimesis, or identification, is examined more closely 
and its configuration by the ‘ethical’ self is shown to introduce a productive 
conception of coexistence and communal constitution beyond composition.
75 Martin Heidegger cited in Karsten Harries, “Heidegger as a Political Thinker,” in Michael 
Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1978), 304.
76 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 22, first emphasis added.
77 The sentence reads in German: 7« der Mitteilung und im Kampf wird die Macht des 
Geschickes erst frei.’ Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1993), 384.
78 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 23.
79 See also, the discussion of the interweaving of struggle, agon and communication in Jacques 
Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV),” in John Sallis (ed.), Reading 
Heidegger: Commemorations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 163-218.
80 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 168, n. 32.
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‘Critical mimesis’: tradition, repetition, destructive retrieve
The argument, advanced primarily by Lowith, that the co-historising of Being- 
with can be equated with the collective confrontation of an enemy considers 
Being-with as a subject and has attracted avid disagreement. Peg Birmingham, 
for example, argues that on the contrary in ‘ [ajnticipating death, Dasein 
determines itself authentically in a co-determination of being-with wherein the 
indifferent and efficient mode of solicitude becomes emancipatory.’81 As was 
discussed above, the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self implies that, understanding 
itself as Being-towards-death, that is, ‘individualised’ from the they-self, 
‘makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality- 
for-being of others’ (BT, 309). In this way, solicitude is ‘radically transformed’ 
into a liberating kind of comportment: ‘no longer viewed as part of the 
indifferent emptiness of the crowd, the homogeneous anonymity of the anyone, 
the other is freed to be who he or she is in his or her potentiality-for-Being.’82 
In Dasein’s becoming-proper, ‘being-with others now has a sense of a 
heterogeneous space, a differentiated temporality in which each is grasped in 
his or her own specificity.’83 The discussion of co-historicality, then, ought not 
to be thrust aside as the premonition of a conservative agenda; rather, it can be 
crucial towards the theoretical construction of an account of ‘critical mimesis.’
To develop a notion of critical mimesis, one must outline the response of 
Dasein to ‘that in which Dasein is always immersed and implicated: its 
historical possibilities.’84 Heidegger attempts to distinguish between history 
and his own claim that Dasein is historical. History is commonly understood as 
‘something past,’ as ‘that belonging to an earlier time,’ as ‘context of events,’ 
and as ‘the tranformations and vissicitudes of man, of human groupings and 
the “cultures” as distinguished from Nature’ (BT, 430). Dasein, however, is 
itself said to be historical; he forthrightly asks, ‘by what right do we call this 
entity “historical,” when it is not yet past?’ (BT, 431). But, he reminds us,
81 Peg Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14, no. 
2 -1 5 ,  no. 1 (1991), 27.
82 Birmingham, “TTie Time of the Political,” 27.
83 Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 27.
84 Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 29.
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since Dasein is never present-at-hand, it can never be past in the sense of ‘now 
no longer present-at-hand or ready-to-hand’ (BT, 432). Dasein’s capacity to- 
be-a-whole (to be self-constant) ‘is the movement of Dasein as it stretches 
itself through time and is called Dasein’s happening or Geschehen.’85 Hoy 
argues that ‘Dasein becomes aware of how it is its past (the past of its 
generation, i.e., its tradition) insofar as the past is an essential part of the 
constitution of Dasein’s understanding of its futural possibility.’86 In this 
understanding of itself there is no guaranteed acceptance or easy submersion in 
what is ‘past.’ Rather, ‘Dasein may relate to this constitution by trying to 
overcome the way the tradition conditions or limits its possibilities,’87 by 
engaging in practices of critique with respect to the possibilities available to it 
and conditioned by its ‘heritage. ’
Birmingham’s suggestion regarding such a critical process of identification can 
now converse with Lacoue-Labarthe’s claim that in the discussion of 
historicity there is a process of nationalist or communitarian identification at 
play. She claims that ‘Lacoue-Labarthe overlooks a crucial aspect of the 
discussion of destiny and historicity in Being and Time, namely, Heidegger’s 
discussion of Erwidert: Dasein's response to its repeatable possibilities.’88 The 
disposition of Dasein towards the tradition can be understood as repetition. 
‘Repetition is handing down (Uberlieferung) explicitly -  that is to say, going 
back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there’ (BT, 437). Yet, it is 
wrong to assume that this implies the blind reenactment of what has occurred 
in the past. Heidegger is explicit that ‘the Dasein that has-been-there is not 
disclosed in order to be actualized over again...repetition does not let itself be 
persuaded of something by what is “past,” just in order that this, as something 
which was formerly actual, may recur’ (BT, 437-438.) Rather, this sort of
handing down ‘is an attempt to retrieve a more original, a more positive and
hence constructive comportment towards one’s history.’89 Therefore, repetition 
is not repetition of the same; on the contrary, ‘the repetition of tradition opens
85 Hoy, “History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time," 338.
86 Hoy, “History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time," 336.
87 Hoy, “History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time," 336-337.
88 Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 25.
89 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 25.
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up our destiny’90 and affords a ‘ “go[ing] back” to a given situation, but in such 
a way that this situation is thus disclosed, illuminated in a new way, revealed 
as a unique historical possibility.’91 Once this occurs, Dasein comports itself 
with this possibility in the manner of erwidern. What is the manner of such a 
response? Erwiderung is rendered as ‘reciprocalve rejoinder’ by Macquarrie 
and Robinson’s translation but this fails to clearly indicate its full implications, 
and those of the root wider, which include strife and in casual discourse mean 
‘contrary to or against.’92 To emphasise this aspect of repetition, Birmingham 
argues that ‘[t]he response to repeatable historical possibilities is one which 
disavows any notion of continuity or identity with the past.’93 Beistegui 
concurs, asking in addition, ‘[I]s it not in the context of such a strifely or 
adverse attitude of Dasein in the face of its own historical situation that we 
must understand the use that Heidegger makes of the word Kampf! Does the 
“struggle” not refer to Dasein’s ability to engage with its own time in a strifely 
dialogue’?94
This kind of repetition ‘does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it 
aim at progress’ (BT, 438). In this way, it neither lends itself to ‘reactionism’ 
as a political modality which ‘is nourished by a thinking of the return (to the 
origins, God, to values, to meaning, etc.)’ and yet nor does it support a 
progressivist understanding of politics and history as ‘the arche-teleological 
unfolding of a meaningful process in a certain appropriation of the philosophy 
of the Enlightenment.’95 Heidegger’s analytic, therefore, is as suspicious of the 
liberal political understanding as of the conservative alternative. The future 
does not unfold according to a teleology: it is perhaps best imagined (as an 
extrapolation from Heidegger’s work) in the sense ‘engendering] a collective 
field of imaginable possibilities...a restricted array of plausible scenarios of
90 Wood, “Reiterating the Temporal,” 150.
91 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 25.
92 Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 31.
93 Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 31.
94 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 25. Beistegui rightly points out that the best example 
of this Erwiderung is none other than Heidegger’s method of Destruktion or ‘destructive 
retrieve’ through which he engages with traditional ontology in order to be able to restate anew 
the question of Being.
95 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 29.
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how the future can or cannot be changed.’96 The future is critically imagined or 
projected upon past possibilities, which become ‘imaginable’ in a factical 
situation through the very process of critical mimesis. In this way, ‘a collective 
field of imaginable possibilities is both a system of meanings...and an arena 
for the play of rhetorical practices.’97
The recovery of the ‘ethical’ self participates in a critical engagement with the 
customary practices of its historical being-there in order to reveal the positive 
possibilities in it and recover a constructive way of relating to it. This 
movement of a factical ‘destructive retrieve’ enables Birmingham to suggest 
that the concern regarding the nationalist identification entailed in Dasein’s co- 
historising must be reinterpreted on the basis of Erwiderung, namely, as 
‘displacement and disruption.’98 Employed in this disruptive mode, mimesis 
encourages a radical rethinking of the determination of Being-with in terms of 
a ‘people’ and also of the understanding of community as such, because 
Heidegger’s articulation of mimesis is ‘not based on a classical model of 
identification’99 of part to whole.
If Dasein’s response is understood as a critical rejoinder with respect to its 
tradition (Uberlieferung) and more generally to the social context in which it is 
thrown, there ought to be more than one possibility in which to think its co- 
historising. The suggestion that Being-with becomes historical by way of a 
critical mimetic response to the historically manifested publicness of tradition 
and ‘people,* a response whose manifold meanings include struggle, 
accommodates both the condition of indistinguishability (Dasein does not 
distinguish itself from the ‘they’) and a struggle against the prevalent average
96 Consuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make 
Their Futures,” World Politics 52 (2000), 277. Philip Allott presents a similar view of the 
future as an idea imagined or projected. In Philip Allott, “Globalization from Above: 
Actualizing the Ideal through Law,” Review o f  International Studies 26, Special Issue 
(December 2000), 61.
97 Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion,” 277.
98 Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 25.
99 Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 25. Regarding Heidegger’s involvement with the 
National Socialists she argues that at the time of the ‘turn’ Heidegger ‘begins to think that the 
Dasein’s destiny can be given a topos, ’ 44. See also the discussion of ‘ontopology’ in David 
Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 33-81.
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intelligibility (and inauthenticity) of such understandings. Moreover, it leaves 
open the space to think about tradition or heritage not only in terms of people 
and national or local community but as a ‘ group-in-becoming’, a group that 
can be inclusive in its practice of critical belonging.100 As Slavoj Zizek has 
recently noted in this regard there is a certain ‘trangression’ constitutive of the 
community which points to the ‘way we are allowed/expected to violate its 
explicit rules,’ to the extent that ‘a subject which closely follows the explicit 
rules of a community will never be accepted by its members by ‘as one of us.’ 
In this way,
we are “in,” integrated, perceived by the other members as “one o f us,” only 
when we succeed in practicing this unfathomable DISTANCE from the 
symbolic rules. It is ultimately only this distance, which exhibits our identity, 
our belonging to the culture in question.101
In sum, Dasein’s identification might be always already embedded, but if 
authentic, it ought to be critical, disruptive and, at the same time, productively 
applied to the factical situation. It is in this sense that communal constitution in 
Heidegger can be seen as an instance of critical mimesis, and coexistence can 
be understood as constituted through the practice of critique against the 
background of repeatable possibilities. The notion of critical mimesis, 
therefore, provides a response to the question of political identification, an 
identificatory response already infused with critique, rather than the mere 
unproblematic assumption of the historical heritage.
The conception of communal constitution presented above, as well as any 
‘critical explorations of alternative forms of political community have the 
unedifying effect of rediscovering the ancient tension between utopia and 
reality.’102 Does the understanding of ‘community’ as constituted through the 
practice of ‘critical mimesis,’ with respect to a historical public group in which 
Dasein is thrown, amount to a resurgence of ‘poetic’ or ‘utopian’ politics?
100 See also William E. Connolly, “Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming,” Culture, 
Medicine, and Psychiatry 20, no. 3 (1996): 251-277.
101 Both in Slavoj Zizek, “The Feminine Excess: Can Women who Hear Divine Voices Find a 
New Social Link?,” Millennium 30, no. 1 (2001), 93, capitals in the original.
102 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f  the 
Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 17.
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A note on ‘poetic’ and ‘praxeological’ politics
Samuel Ijsseling suggests that any Heidegger-informed politics is necessarily
‘poetic,’ by which he means the new founding of political space:
According to this view the state or polis is seen as a work that must be made, 
instituted, or founded. Eventually it is seen as a work of art, or the total work 
of art (Gesamtkunstwerk)...Radical politics is always a poetical politics, one 
in which the ideal society has to be built from the ground up.. .,03
The quality of greatness appears to accompany ‘a politics that no longer 
belongs to everyday chatter; as essential politics, it is great politics.’104 
However, if the above discussion on communal constitution belongs within the 
wider movement towards political non-self-sufficiency, the distinction between 
poetic and praxeological politics may not itself be sustainable. The notion of 
communal constitution as such is, in its theoretical function, interested in the 
ways in which coexistence might be rethought outside the ‘logic of 
composition.* Therefore, in the sense that the unworking of modem 
subjectivity renders problematic the discursive utilisation of certain terms of 
politics, a politics of non-self-sufficiency may not be regarded ‘praxeological,’ 
if this is to be defined narrowly as the kind of politics which is ‘limited to the 
mere reform of existing conditions.*105 Understood in this restricted way, the 
‘ethical’ self is not confined to praxeological politics because, in the words of 
Newell,
[o]rdinary political controversies about improving institutions, morality, 
culture, or the distribution of wealth are not radical enough in Heidegger’s 
view since the very familiarity of the disputes and their objects keep us 
chained to the everyday “present”.106
If it is ‘feasibility’ or ‘policy relevance’ which distinguishes praxeological 
politics, then the notion of praxis itself becomes restricted: ‘[p]olitics as praxis 
is always a politics of the feasible; it has to realize the good in this concrete
103 Samuel Ijsseling, “Heidegger and Politics,” in Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott, and P. 
Holley Roberts (eds.), Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 7. Heidegger’s own participation in 
National Socialism during 1933-34 in his attempt to influence the fate of the German 
university as rector of the University of Freiburg is seen as poetic. See also the infamous 
Rectoral address, Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” trans. 
Karsten Harries, Review o f  Metaphysics 38 (1985): 470-480.
104 Ward, Heidegger's Political Thinking, 207.
105 Newell, “Heidegger on Freedom and Community,” 779.
106 Newell, “Heidegger on Freedom and Community,” 779.
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situation, at this given place, at this given moment, and therefore it is involved 
in making compromises.’107
However, it might be more productive to resist the relegation of ‘critical
mimesis’ to the realm of the poetic by default, simply because it does not fall
with this narrow understanding of praxis. If one recalls that Dasein’s
resoluteness reveals to it its ‘concrete factical situation,’ praxis appears at the
heart of this. Praxis is the comportment that is possible within Dasein’s
facticity and its current situation. The ‘ethical’ self s mimetic disruption of its
public world is then itself praxeological in the sense that it is always
constrained by the factical situation and can never be ‘poetic,’ if by this it is
indeed meant the surpassing of the concrete towards something outside the
factical situation. Furthermore, this understanding of the term ‘praxeological’
is heuristic and adheres to a conception of praxis as ‘a process which has no
defined limit by which it ceases at some time and, by which an opposition
occurs between a past and a present.’108 Since ‘critical mimesis’ is not an act
with a defined end, but a process of continuous disruption and retrieval of
repeatable past possibilities, what it brings into being, namely, ‘community
through critique,* might be
a poiesis that brings neither to the being o f essence (the plan, one could say), 
nor to the being o f substance (stone, mortar), but only to the being o f 
existence. One must think here o f a poiesis which is in itself a praxis.109
Moreover, ‘constrain’ is also applicable not only to the concrete situation but 
to the notion of ‘subjective will’ with which poiesis might be associated. When 
community constitution is rethought as critical mimesis, the thrownness of this 
mimetic yet critical selfhood discourages a conception of ‘active subject 
shaping the world according to [its] will.’110 Such a rethinking of poiesis as 
praxis, tied to the facticity and thrownness of existence, dispels the contention
107 Ijsseling, “Heidegger and Politics,” 8.
108 Jacques Taminiaux, “Poiesis and Praxis in Fundamental Ontology,” Research in 
Phenomenology 17, no. 1 (1987), 147.
109 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience o f  Freedom, trans. Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 85.
110 Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 2000), 28.
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that politics ought to always be considered as the ‘appropriation of essences’1,1 
and comes full circle to support the movement towards non-self-sufficiency.
3. Coexistence: worldly realms of meaning
the task ofphilosophy is precisely to destroy the fantasy o f a falsely 
homogeneous and unified world while displaying the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity o f the fields o f signification which we inhabit.
Jean Greisch112
The previous section, importantly, had addressed the question ‘how might one 
think about coexistence, if not in terms of composition?* The unworking of the 
politics of self-sufficiency tied to the modem subject enabled a 
conceptualisation of coexistence and communal constitution as occurring 
through a process of ‘critical mimesis,’ where membership is taken up by the 
self in its deconstructive repetition of the ‘past possibilities’ of the tradition. 
The radically embedded self becomes a member by sustaining a critical 
relationship (Erwiderung) with the possibilities of its tradition. Through such a 
critical engagement those positive possibilities found within the tradition’s past 
are emphasised and re-articulated within the political space opened up by the 
very act of critical engagement. The ones regarded as not wholly expressive of 
the tradition’s historical potential are abandoned.
Having delineated the ‘ethical’ self s continuous practice of ‘critical mimesis,’ 
by which community is constituted, which might be called in shorthand 
‘community through critique,’ it is important to consider the issue of 
heteronomy that has served as the impetus for challenging the ‘logic of 
composition’ at the outset of this project. In this regard, communal constitution 
through critique not only responds to the charge of an unstated ‘mimetology’ 
in Heidegger’s early work, as articulated by Lacoue-Labarthe, but also offers
1,1 Wilhem S. Wurzer, “Nancy and the Political Imaginary After Nature,” in Darren Sheppard, 
Simon Sparks, and Colin Thomas (eds.), On Jean-Luc Nancy: The Sense o f  Philosophy 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 98.
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an understanding of communal constitution that is, moreover, open to 
otherness. Although any understanding of a historical public group would be 
exclusionary in some sense, the notion of a ‘critical mimesis’ as the mode of 
constitution of the group is exclusionary in ways which are not arbitrary. When 
critique becomes the mode of belonging, the public group is not arbitrarily 
excluding others because of race, religion, colour, birthplace, etc. The 
questioning of ethics, out of which the ‘ethical’ self is recovered, is paralleled 
in the political project of working out which possibilities are worth repeating 
from those ‘inherited’ by the tradition.
The act of disruption and retrieval is open to otherness because, as was shown 
in the previous chapter, this otherness is carried internally and it is as other that 
the ‘ethical’ self recovers itself. This recovery reveals how the subject is other 
to itself, in sense of being indistinguishable from, and constituted by, otherness 
in average everydayness, but also in the process of becoming-strange to itself 
through its recovery from habitual average practices and norms. Its propriety 
entails a certain becoming-strange, also to be understood as becoming not 
subject. Furthermore, others who might not be embedded in the specific 
historical public group in question are acknowledged by the ‘ethical’ self as 
having a voice, the voice that Dasein carries within, which is the ‘phonic 
presence’ of the other in the self. Regard for the other moves away from 
subjectivist self-sufficiency, is disclosed beyond additive ‘inclusion,’ by a self 
letting itself be seen as heteronomously coexistential. Hence, Nancy argues, 
‘that which is not a subject opens up and onto a community whose conception, 
in turn, exceeds the resources of a metaphysics of the subject.’ 1,3 In this sense, 
where the unworking of the subject shows it to be contingent, strange and other 
to itself, ‘[cjommunity is what takes place through others and for others.’114
1.2 Jean Greisch, “Ethics and Lifeworlds,” trans. Eileen Brennan, in Richard Kearney and Mark 
Dooley (eds.), Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1999), 54.
1.3 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael 
Holland and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 14, 
emphasis added.
1.4 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 15.
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Communal constitution, however, is open to otherness in a second, more 
concrete, way as well. Coexistence, being the proximal fact of Dasein’s 
everyday existence, becomes actively endorsed through the process of ‘critical 
mimesis.’ The openness of the ‘ethical’ self to otherness is paralleled also in 
the mode of communal constitution. Others, who wish to critically ‘repeat’ 
possibilities in a public group where they might not be members under more 
commonplace criteria, such as the figurations of family, nation, ethnicity, 
religion,115 may too engender critique and thus participate in the ‘critical 
mimesis’ of possibilities of the group in which they envision their future 
projection. Critical belonging notes only the desire to engage in a critique of 
the possibilities handed down to the group to which one wishes to belong (as in 
the case of migrants, for example).116 The. ‘praxeological’ character of this 
critique, the engagement without end in the repeatable possibilities of the 
tradition, institutes ‘membership’ as such. The mimetic process does not limit 
belonging to territorial or other identity-related criteria.117 The tradition is 
historical, in the sense of the location of the ideas, projects and practices which 
it comprises in a specific public group; membership to it, however, need not be 
restricted to those who ‘inherit’ it in an actual sense (as might be the case with 
other immutable characteristics). This is because it is based on a substantially 
different understanding of ‘tradition’ as such, where the term is conceived as 
that which is not only open to critique, but that which is, moreover, constituted 
by one’s critical engagement with the past possibilities of the tradition in 
which one might wish to locate oneself.
Furthermore, the discussion of liberating solicitude as a disposition of the 
‘ethical’ self for coexistence is presently relevant as well. Liberating solicitude 
allows the other to enter the critical mimetic process, that amounts to the 
community’s constitution, because it acknowledges,
the claim o f others who, from beyond “our” horizon, call into question the
parochialism o f our tradition insofar as it does not speak for them and who
115 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Of Being-in-Common,” trans. James Creech, in Miami Theory Collective 
(ed.), Community at Loose Ends (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 1-12.
116 Again see, 2izek, “The Feminine Excess,” 93.
1,7 See Noel O ’Sullivan, “Postmodernism and the Politics of Identity,” in Kathryn Dean (ed.), 
Politics and the End o f Identity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 234-264.
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demand that we include their perspectives in the effort to understand 
ourselves.118
Multiplicity of perspectives, referred to as ‘value pluralism’ in the IR literature, 
does not temper with this process. On the contrary, it assists the forcefulness of 
critique by rearticulating and re-imagining the repeatable possibilities of the 
tradition by bringing difference to bear on them productively. This embedded 
yet critical relationship, which is open to those who wish to disrupt and 
retrieve ‘another’ tradition’s possibilities, can be most constructive for 
theorising the negotiations of multiple perspectives, the ‘friendly struggle’ of 
coexistence in an era of global transformations.119 Most significantly, the 
awareness of an internal, already present form of otherness, is exemplary in 
that it illustrates that plurality is to be found from within the tradition and that 
any externality ought not to be othered. This enables a movement from the 
community’s conceptualisation as uniform, to its diversification, both from 
inside and from an outside that is already within.
Destructive retrieve and international discourses
The two-fold task of unworking modem subjectivity and of rethinking 
coexistence beyond composition participates, moreover, in an additional layer 
of destructive retrieve toward international critical discourses on community. It 
recognises that they are similarly animated by a concern with otherness, 
although they have fashioned their response in significantly different ways, 
within the parameters of subjectivist discourse. Specifically, it may be recalled 
that the introduction had outlined three trajectories in post-Cold War thinking 
about coexistence, the third of these being the most theoretically sophisticated 
in its attempt to extend what it calls ‘moral inclusion’ beyond the schema of 
the sovereign state, a demand which processes of globalisation are said to 
make even more pressing.
118 Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile "We”: Ethical Implications o f  Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1994), 70.
119 A ‘friendly struggle’ in the sense of ‘philopolemology’ as discussed in Derrida, 
“Heidegger’s Ear.” See also Diana Coole, “Thinking Politically with Merleau-Ponty,” Radical 
Philosophy no. 108 (July/August 2001), 25.
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Taken as a response to similar concerns this thesis, however, attempted to 
move beyond the subjectivist premises and presuppositions of international 
critical discourses. With the ‘logic of composition’ as its point of departure, 
this project offered a response to otherness that did not aim to ‘include’ it, as 
one is want to do within subjectivism, but to let the coexistential heteronomy 
of existence show itself. Thus, both the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self beyond 
the customary norms of ethics and the exposition of critical mimesis, are most 
explicitly not concerned with the extension of moral inclusion in a 
‘quantitative-representative’ sense. The account of how community might be 
constituted through a continuous process of ‘critical mimesis’ suggests that 
coexistence can be rethought as an interactive critical rejoinder to a historical 
group’s repeatable possibilities. Seen in a parallel fashion as a critical rejoinder 
to IR, this project critiques and disrupts the (persisting) subjectivist ground of 
international critical discourses and seeks to retrieve, highlight and extend their 
positive possibilities, namely, their concern with otherness, with which it has 
most affinity and sympathy.
Exemplary of this scholarship, in both senses of the word, is Andrew 
Linklater’s recent work.120 His conception of community relies on the logic of 
composition and thus can neither transcend the additive approach nor the 
occlusion of heteronomy to which it leads. In Linklater’s desire to articulate a 
universalist alternative to the Westphalian state-form and state-system and to 
examine the prospects of a universalism that is sensitive to otherness, however, 
lies a positive possibility for dialogue. His desire to question current modes of 
exclusion arising from the international sociology of the modem state system, 
and also from certain ‘robust’ universalisms expressive of ‘historically-specific 
configurations of power,’ coheres with the thesis’s interest in why and how 
compositional accounts of coexistence occlude the role of otherness.121 The 
common desire to address something like the ‘claim of otherness’ might open
120 It is intentionally that the thesis does not return, as might be expected, to the work of David 
Campbell, despite die emphasis that was placed on it in chapter two. As regards his thinking on 
responsibility, Campbell’s Levinasian rejection of the Heideggerian ‘side by side’ in favour of 
the ‘face to face’ is too stringent and hinders further discussion.
121 See his introduction for a staking of the ground against both IR’s systems o f exclusion and 
also his weariness with certain other universalisms. Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political 
Community.
250
up the space to engage in an unworking of international critical concerns, 
which presently revolve around how community might be expanded, and to 
also suggest that greater inclusivity in terms of numbers alone is not the 
decisive issue. Indeed, a critical engagement and dialogue might show that the 
pivotal issue is not greater inclusivity as such, although this too is possible 
historically and has occurred. Rather, the crucial concern is how one allows 
existence to show itself as heteronomous and coexistential, so that issues of 
addition become of no consequence. ‘Inclusivity’ is not countable, the thesis 
has suggested in the discussion of hearing and silence in the previous chapter. 
The ontological letting-be seen of otherness as always within, of the self as 
strange to itself, and the repetition of possibilities which attest to this 
disposition or desire politically, show the worldly realm of community to be 
expressive precisely ‘of the uncertainty of counting.’122
Linklater’s commitment to modem subjectivity and the limiting of his 
theoretical imagination to the ‘juridico-theoretical model,’ fail to rethink how 
community constitution might begin, not with subjects, but with ‘an ontology 
of [their] interworld,’ as Diana Coole has suggested.123 His dissatisfaction with 
the Westphalian ontology of International Relations, and the modes of 
exclusion that it entails, however, illustrate an openness to alternative 
possibilities and might well enable debates about this ‘interworld’ between 
radically embedded beings. The thesis is sympathetic, then, to the animating 
spirit of this third trajectory, as exemplified by Linklater’s project, but not the 
letter of it.124 It wishes to participate in its discussion of otherness, despite the 
fact that it shares neither its subjectivist premises nor its universal aspirations.
In sum, it is be useful to conceive of the thesis’s position with regards to 
international critical discourses as engaging in an another layer of ‘destructive 
retrieve,’ in addition to the unworking of modem subjectivity, the recovery of 
the ‘ethical’ self and the de-construction of political self-sufficiency. Such a 
retrieval would participate in the critical international ‘domain of discourse’
122 Werner Hamacher, “Heterautonomies: Multiculturalism and the Politics of Respect,” trans. 
Dana Hollander, Centre fo r Theoretical Studies Working Papers no. 15 (1997), 8.
123 Coole, “Thinking Politically with Merleau-Ponty,” 25.
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that seeks to go beyond the restricted view of coexistence as contained within 
the state form and which excludes otherness.125 But it would, at the same time, 
disrupt what is ‘unjustifiable,’ while striving to ‘maintain those primordial 
experiences from which genuine philosophical insights ultimately flow.’126 As 
Richard Bernstein notes, this is an understanding of critique which means ‘to 
choose, separate, discern. Critique lives in the unstable gap, the in-between.’127 
Thus the destructive retrieve would not overcome such critical international 
attempts to think about community but would think of its own task as 
searching and retaining its problematique and preserving it as a possible 
question. For Zizek, this upholding of the spirit, but not the letter, of a thought, 
means that ‘its essential core is redeemed through the very gesture of 
overcoming / renouncing its particular historical shape.’128
Coexistence and globalisation: the basis for future research
To conclude, it is interesting to reflect briefly on some of the ways in which 
the insights of this project might be utilised in future. Specifically, the 
consideration of coexistence following the unworking of modem subjectivity 
opens certain avenues for future research in the interface of globalisation and 
community. It is often argued that in the last years of the twentieth century 
there has been a ‘stretching of political relations across space and time’ 
accompanied by the ‘extension of political power and political activity across 
the boundaries of the nation-state.’129 The changes in social and political life 
attributed to economic and communicative processes of globalisation are 
amongst the issues requiring urgent attention in social and political enquiry, as 
it is often regarded that theorising ought to occur in a context shaped by the 
current ‘release of political and economic considerations from public
124 2izek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism, 153.
125 In the sense meant by Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
126 Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being 
and Time,” in John Sallis (ed.), Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor o f  Martin 
Heidegger (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978), 118.
127 Richard J. Bernstein, “Metaphysics, Critique, and Utopia,” Review o f  Metaphysics 42, no. 2 
(1988), 257.
128 Zizek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism, 154.
129 Held, et al., Global Transformations, 49.
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culture.’130 In particular, for scholars of political theory and international 
studies interested in issues of community, democracy and democratisation such 
changes present not only ontological challenges, but also substantial theoretic 
demands. Whereas the majority of the globalisation literature describes the 
effects of the recent intensification of global relations on the nation-state, 
either in terms of ‘internationalisation’ or transnationalisation,’ it is also 
important to contemplate how, in theoretic terms, thinking about coexistence 
might be brought in line with concerns about otherness addressed under the 
heading o f ‘globalisation.’ Specifically, the perspective outlined in the context 
of the thesis can provide possibilities for examining how community might be 
made ‘worldly’ following the intensification of forces of globalisation, both 
economic and social.131
In this vein, it can also be argued that globalisation has set political theory and 
international studies in an unsettling process of transition. Scholars such as 
David Held have proposed, in response, that thinking about community has to 
address the challenge brought about by global pressures to its traditional, 
territorially organised conception. His proposals amount to a cosmopolitan 
understanding, where ‘overlapping communities of fate’ are theorised on the 
basis of their global connections. Radical democratic theorists, such as Chantal 
Mouffe, have similarly addressed concerns about ‘community’ emerging from 
the globalisation of human relations, namely, the question of the ‘pluralism of 
values.’ Such pluralism, she suggests, is unavoidable in a rapidly globalising 
world. On their part, the radical democrats have suggested that the community 
members must be conceived as non-unitary subjects, able to simultaneously 
hold diverse and agonistic subject-positions.132 This, they claim, reconfigures 
political space into varied layers of contest amongst these subject-positions (as
130 Tim May “Series’s Editor Foreword,” in Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: 
Society, Culture, Politics (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), xi.
131 From a cosmopolitan perspective see the essays in Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and 
Martin Kohler (eds.)Jie-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) and Linklater, The Transformation o f  Political Community, 
14-45.
132 Chantal Mouffe, “For an Agonistic Model of Democracy,” in Noel O’Sullivan (ed.), 
Political Theory in Transition (London: Routledge, 2000), 113-130; Chantal Mouffe, “Radical 
Democracy or Liberal Democracy?,” in David Trend (ed.), Radical Democracy: Identity,
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opposed to the subjects themselves). For this purpose, the reintroduction of the 
‘friend/enemy distinction,’ offered by Weimar legal theorist Carl Schmitt, is 
seen to provide, in their account, the requisite element of contestation.133
As the initiation of a rejoinder to these debates, however, it is fruitful to 
illustrate how the optics of coexistence, along with the conceptualisation of 
coexistence and communal constitution through critical mimesis presented 
above, might provide a basis or starting point for future research about the 
interface of coexistence and globalisation. First, the conception of ‘world’ 
explicated within the optics of coexistence as a totality of meanings and signs 
is able to move beyond territorial and state-based conceptions of social 
relations and can be used to theorise connections, interactions and the 
production of meaning beyond the nation-state. In addtion to the conception of 
‘world,’ the very character of coexistential heteronomy is fundamentally 
‘worldly.’ The embeddedness of existence shows that ‘[w]e always stand 
inscribed in many such worlds, each of which is phenomenalized according to 
its own law.’134 The hermeneutics of facticity ‘is one of worlds -  of economies, 
regions of manifestation, constellations of presencing, games of gathering 
(ilegein), contexts,’135 where ‘world’ refers to the web of meanings and 
referential assignments, which constitute any fundamental understanding of the 
self and its public context. The networks of meanings and relations are always 
already infused with otherness, as otherness is what constitutes a world not of 
‘our making.’ Such a worldly account of existence is at the same time both 
communal and global, in the sense that the totality of references has no 
artificial or arbitrary boundaries. Contrary to accounts of modem subjectivity 
that ‘have attempted to explain the world by extrapolating its existence 
outward from the inner workings of a subject,’136 the relations in which the
Citizenship, and the State (New York: Routledge, 1996), 19-26; and the collection of essays in 
Chantal Mouffe, The Return o f the Political (London: Verso, 1993).
133 Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political, 26.
134 Reiner Schurmann, “Riveted to a Monstrous Site: On Heidegger’s Beitrdge zur 
Philosophic,” trans. Kathleen Blarney, in Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (eds.), The 
Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 
314.
135 Schurmann, “Riveted to a Monstrous Site,” 314.
136 Georges Van Den Abbeele, “Introduction,” in Miami Theory Collective (ed.), Community 
at Loose Ends (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), x.
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‘ethical’ self is embedded are ontologically prior to, and act to disclose, it in its 
heteronomy.
Once, therefore, Dasein begins to think ontologically, the world is disclosed as 
already imbued with meaning and reference. This ‘already’ signifies that it is 
towards otherness that one must look for the creation and sustenance of those 
meanings by which Dasein makes sense of itself in the world. Dasein uniquely 
understands and appropriates these meanings and ways of being in the world 
into which it is thrown prior to questions of subjectivity: ‘not subject, but 
project, and since it lacks a project’s constituted “pro,” not a project, but a 
“ject,” a throw.’137
Second, the process of critical mimesis itself offers an account of communal 
constitution which is able to respond to the deterritorialisation of community 
and the pluralization of worldly perspectives that this entails. The 
understanding of the constitution of community through the critical mimesis of 
‘ethical* subjects, who understand themselves as open to alterity, in terms of 
their constitutive existential heteronomy and of their processes of becoming- 
proper, enhances a conception of coexistence that is not tied to a territorially 
constrained understanding of belonging. Primarily, it can be argued that the 
social transformations and forces arising from the varied processes of 
globalisation would further intensify the critical engagement by which 
communal constitution occurs, both by increasing the variety of critique but 
also by bringing into interaction modes of mimesis as yet unknown to the 
specific tradition at hand. Thus, there could occur, in a theoretic sense, the 
initiation of ‘new political responsibilities’ for community,138 for example, by 
articulating coexistence and community as ‘multi-level.’139
Taken together with a notion of the ‘world’ as the other-mediated totality of 
meaningful references, the consideration of coexistence elaborated above
137 Hamacher, “Heterautonomies,” 12.
138 Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: a Pragmatic Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14 and also, Linklater, The Transformation 
o f  Political Community, 43 and 60.
139 Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age.
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encourages a conception of the global context as based on multiple webs of 
meaning and sense. As such, it provides a workable basis for a theorisation of 
global relations, the conceptualisation of which is just as much about the 
processes by which social reality is hermeneutically produced and understood, 
as it is about the challenges to statehood and territoriality that globalisation is 
said to entail. Since the process of critical mimesis can be said to be, not only 
‘communal’ understood in too narrow a sense, but also worldly, it can occur at 
in various domains in which past possibilities are encountered and ‘retrieved.’ 
In this way, critical mimesis is part and parcel of multiple levels of meanings 
and offers a way to examine and understand increasingly diverse modes of 
belonging.
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Appendix I
Glossary of Selected Terms1
Care (Sorge) Care is term that ‘pertains to Dasein itself.’ (35) Heidegger 
expands the term care to include, simulateneously, all its possible 
meanings: ‘the careworn, the careful and the caring’ (2) Contrary to 
ordinary usage, where a person might be both carefree and careworn, 
for Heidegger ‘everyone cares; no one is wholly carefree, careless or 
uncaring’ (3). Care has two senses: first, it refers to ‘to worry, be 
worried about something’ and second, ‘to take care of, see to, provide’
(35). Taken together with concern and solicitude they ‘distinguish 
[Heidegger’s] view from the view that our attitude towards the world is 
primarily cognitive and theoretical.* (35)
Concern (bersorgett), also concernful There are three meanings of this term, 
which refers to ‘Dasein’s activities in the world.’ The first is ‘to get, 
acquire, provide*; the second is ‘to attend to, see to, take care o f; and 
the third is ‘to be concerned, troubled, worried.’ As a term it is distinct 
but inseparable from care and solicitude (35) and is used as a ‘general 
term for Dasein’s multifarious dealings with things in the world.’ In 
engaged immersion, ‘concern is guided not by knowledge or explicit 
rules, but by its informal know-how’ what Heidegger calls 
‘circumspection’ (36)
Destruction, or destructive retrieve (Ab-bau) ‘must be understood strictly as 
destruere, “de-construct”, and not as devastation,’ whose intention is to 
‘subvert current and traditional accounts’ and meanings and bring 
forward the unnoticed possibilities in what is being ‘destroyed’ (183). 
In this sense it is related to the movement of ‘repetition’.
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Existentiale ‘Since Dasein exists in a way that other beings do not, we need to 
distinguish its fundamental characteristics by calling them 
Existentialien rather than categories.’ (61) (as in Aristotle’s categories 
which apply to all entities, see chapter 3). Being-with, the ‘they,’ 
Being-in-the-world, etc., are examples of existentialia or existentiales 
of Dasein.
Existential is an adjective which refers to the ontological structures of Dasein, 
i.e. the existentialia and the understanding which one has of them. (See 
62). ‘existential understanding is a worked out understanding of the 
ontological structures of existence, that is, of what it is to be Dasein.’2
Existentiell ‘applies to the range of possibilities open to Dasein, its 
understanding of them and the choice it makes (or evades) among 
them.’ (62)
Guilt Heidegger avoids the moral or theological sense of guilt. In an existential 
sense, guilt refers to ‘being the ground of a being [Sein] determined by 
a Not [Nicht, the existential counterpart of a lack of the present-at- 
hand], i.e. being the ground of a nullity [Nichtigkeit, “Notness”]’ (BT, 
283).
Historizing or historical happening refers to the way in which Dasein 
‘stretches itself along between its birth and its death.’ In this way, 
Dasein does not only have a past but ‘is its past’ which refers not only 
its own past but the past of its tradition or generation (94).
Possibility there are two uses of ‘possibility’ in Being and Time. First, 
‘something is the “condition of possibility” of something else (171).
1 All citations are from Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)
unless otherwise stated. The page numbers are indicated in brackets in the text. References to
heidegger’s Being and Time are noted as (BT) with page numbers in the text.
2 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,
Division /  (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), 20.
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Second, the term ‘possibility* is closely related to Seinskonnen, 
Dasein’s ability or potentiality to be. It is in this way that Dasein is 
being-possible (BT, 143).
Projection the verb entwerfen is related to werfen which means ‘to throw.’ 
Heidegger connects the meaning of Entwurf, projection, with ‘throwing 
forward’ and, therefore, thrownness itself. A projection in this sense ‘is 
not a particular plan or project; it is what makes any plan or project 
possible (176).
Repetition is related to the unique appropriation of the world into which 
Dasein is thrown. Thus, Dasein brings its resoluteness to bear on those 
‘past possibilities,’ which are found to be worth repeating after 
critically evaluating Dasein’s factical situation. Repetition, therefore, 
refers to the critical appropriation of the shared past.
Resoluteness or having ‘resolve’ understood as to have the essence of a 
decision. ‘Resoluteness has little to do with a determined seizing of our 
freedom to act; it is closer to a steadfastness in the face of the 
vicissitudes of circumstance.’3 Also resoluteness ‘is the way in which 
Dasein comes back to itself, back to its original site, from the 
dispersion in everydayness into which it is for the most part Dasein 
thrown.’4
Solicitude has two meanings. First, as ‘actively caring for someone who needs 
help, i.e. as ‘welfare,’ and second, that which pertains to Dasein’s being 
with others, which can assume many forms. There are two polarised 
understandings of solicitude, that of ‘dominating’ solicitude, ‘which 
relieves the other of care and in its concern puts itself in the other’s 
place and that of ‘liberating or releasing’ solicitude, which ‘attentively
3 Paul Standish, Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Limits o f  Language 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 218.
4 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1997), 15.
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leaps ahead of the other, in order to give him back care, i.e. himself
(36).
‘They’ or das Man has been misleadingly translated as the ‘they’. It refers to 
the self of publicness. ‘The “they,’’....which we all are, though not as 
the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness’ (BT, 164). As 
the ‘they,’ others are not distinct in average everydayness; rather, ‘any 
Other can represent them’ (BT, 164). The answer to the question ‘who 
is Dasein?’ in average everydayness is not the ‘I* but the ‘they.’
Thrownness refers to ‘the capacity to be affected by the world, to find that the 
entities and situations it [Dasein] faces matter.’ Dasein’s attunement 
‘reveal[s] Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world,’ into a factical 
sitation.’5
Transcendence refers to finite transcendence, as an anxious movement of 
Dasein towards the world, in other words, ‘a surpassing in the direction 
of world.56
W orld refers to the a referential totality of meaning and relations. It cannot be 
understood as ‘nature,’ or even a container of other entities; rather, the 
world appears as a totality of references and assignments, a set of 
relations and sense according to which Dasein orients itself.
5 Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996), 81.
6 Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground (1929),” trans. William McNeill, in William 
McNeill (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
121.
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